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THE   PSYCHOLOGY 
OF   LEARNING 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF 
LEARNING 

AN  EXPERIMENTAL  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE 
ECONOMY  AND  TECHNIQUE  OF  MEMORY 

BY 

E.  MEUMANN 

Professor  of  Philosophy  ia  Hamburg 


Translated  from  the  Third  Edition  of  ^'The  Economy 
and  Technique  of  Learning" 

BY 
JOHN  WALLACE  BAIRD 

Professor  of  Experimental  Psychology,  Clark  University 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  LONDON 


Copyright,  1913, 
By  D.  Appleton  and'TTompany 


PREFACE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  EDITION 

I  have  gladly  consented  to  the  publication  of  this  transla- 
tion of  my  ''Economy  and  Technique  of  Learning,"  because 
the  monograph  will  be  made  accessible  to  a  larger  number 
of  readers. 

Experimental  psychology  and  the  most  important  field 
where  it  finds  practical  appUcation, — that  is,  experimental 
pedagogy, — are  based  upon  the  product  of  the  combined 
efforts  of  students  of  psychology  and  pedagogy  in  the  United 
States  and  in  Germany;  it  may  indeed  be  said  that  these 
sciences  have  been  created  by  the  two  nations.  So  firmly  am 
I  convinced  of  this  community  of  interest  and  of  endeavor 
that  in  all  of  my  writing  I  constantly  keep  the  American 
reader  in  mind.  Much  wider  in  scope  than  the  "exchange  of 
professors"  between  these  two  countries  have  been  this  con- 
tinuous interchange  of  scientific  ideas  and  this  mutual  inspi- 
ration which  have  been  going  on  these  many  years. 

In  both  countries,  too,  there  is  a  deep-rooted  conviction 
that  the  most  important  problems  of  the  science  of  educa- 
tion can  be  solved  only  by  an  appeal  to  experimental  psychol- 
ogy, and  by  an  appUcation  of  the  methods  of  psychology  to 
the  problems  of  pedagogy. 

The  more  then  must  one  deplore  the  fact  that  until  recently 
experimental  psychology  has  devised  no  means  by  which  the 
pupil's  daily  tasks  of  learning  in  all  its  various  forms  may  be 
accomplished  more  readily.  The  efforts  which  had  hitherto 
been  made  to  facilitate  the  work  of  learning  were  Hmited 
either  to  the  old,  and  harmful,  custom  of  transforming  the 
memorial  material  into  verse  and  then  memorizing  the  verse 


vi  Preface  to  the  American  Edition 

mechanically,  or  to  the  emplo3mient  of  other  mnemonic  de- 
vices. But  mnemonics  admits  of  only  a  very  Umited  application 
both  in  the  affairs  of  daily  life  and  in  the  work  of  the  school- 
room; and  since  it  burdens  the  memory  with  a  mass  of  arti- 
ficial auxihary  ideas,  it  really  increases  instead  of  diminish- 
ing the  work  of  memory.  Moreover,  the  discovery  and 
employment  of  mnemonic  aids  demands  a  degree  of  ingenuity 
which  is  not  possessed  by  every  child. 

The  increased  demands  of  the  present  age  require  children 
to  master  a  much  greater  body  of  knowledge  than  was  deemed 
necessary  in  former  generations.  This  condition  has  given 
rise  to  the  problem  as  to  the  best  means  of  avoiding  over- 
burdening the  pupil,  which  is  an  inevitable  result  of  his 
increased  tasks.  This  difi&cult  problem  can  not  be  solved  by 
eliminating  important  subjects  from  the  curriculum;  it  can 
be  solved  only  by  devising  improvements  in  methods  of 
learning  and  in  methods  of  teaching  which  shall  be  psycho- 
logically sound. 

It  is  the  aim  of  the  present  monograph  to  meet  this  urgent 
demand  for  methods  of  learning  which  shall  be  psychologically 
most  appropriate,  and  which  shall  embraqe  all  of  the  different 
kinds  of  learning.  It  begins  with  methodical  observation  as 
the  basis  of  all  memorial  work.  It  seeks  to  develop  rules  for 
systematic  observation.  It  discusses  the  most  favorable  sub- 
jective and  objective  conditions  for  mechanical  rnemoriza- 
tion;  and  it  endeavors  to  estabhsh  at  least  a  few  of  the  car- 
dinal points  for  the  retention  of  logical  associations,— a 
process  whose  nature  is  still  imperfectly  known.  Our  present 
knowledge  of  the  economy  and  technique  of  learning  is  still 
in  need  of  being  supplemented  by  practical  instructions  as 
to  how  best  to  master  the  various  concrete  tasks  with  which 
the  pupil  is  daily  concerned. 

Such  directions  deahng  with   the  retention   of   concrete 


Preface  to  the  American  Edition  vii 

material,  with  the  learning  of  foreign  vocabularies,  of  names 
and  dates,  of  poems  and  prose  selections,  I  hope  to  publish 
in  the  near  future;  and  it  may  be  that  that  may  also  be 
made  accessible  to  American  readers. 

I  desire  here  to  express  my  sincere  thanks  to  Dr.  Baird  for 
undertaking  the  work  of  translating  this  monograph. 

E.  Meumann. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  GERMAN 

EDITION 

The  experimental  investigation  of  memory  has  made  sub- 
stantial progress  since  the  second  edition  of  this  book  was 
pubhshed.  The  pioneer  work  of  Ebbinghaus  has  been  sup- 
plemented by  several  psychologists,  who  have  hoped  by  this 
means  to  extend  our  knowledge  of  the  general  basis  of  me- 
morial function  and  to  discover  its  laws.  Psychiatrists  and 
pathologists  have  made  an  accurate  study  of  pathological 
disturbances  of  memory,  which  furnish  a  new  insight  into  the 
functioning  of  normal  memory.  Semon,  Rignano  and  others 
have  thrown  a  wholly  new  light  upon  the  bodily  correlates  of 
memorial  processes;  and  certain  of  the  more  recent  sum- 
maries which  cover  the  whole  field  of  memory,  such  as  those 
of  Offner  and  Schoeneberger,  have  also  contributed  to  the 
solution  of  our  problems. 

A  new  edition  of  this  book  must,  therefore,  consist  in  a 
complete  working  over  and  an  extensive  supplementation  of 
the  text  of  the  first  and  second  editions. 

Important  changes  have  been  made  in  the  first  three 
chapters.  The  chief  purpose  which  I  have  had  in  view  in 
introducing  the  supplementations  in  the  present  edition  was 
to  meet  the  demands  of  a  wider  circle  of  readers.  My  readers 
have  repeatedly  expressed  the  desire  that  I  should  incorpo- 
rate a  brief  summary  of  the  fundamentals  of  the  general 
psychology  of  memory.  Accordingly,  I  have  presented  in 
the  opening  chapters  an  epitome  of  the  essential  features  of 
the  present  psychok)gy  of  memory;  and  lest  the  introductory 
chapters  of  the  book  should  become  too  extended,  the  dis- 

ix 


X  Preface  to  the  Third  German  Edition 

cussion  of  the  researches  in  psychiatry,  which  was  presented 
in  detail  in  the  second  edition,  has  been  condensed.  As  a 
result  of  this  the  book  now  approximates  a  psychology  of 
memory;  but,  in  order  that  the  original  purpose  of  the  book 
should  not  be  abandoned,  the  results  of  psychological  experi- 
ments have,  so  far  as  possible,  been  considered  throughout 
from  the  point  of  view  of  their  significance  for  practical  life 
and  for  the  work  of  the  school. 

The  fact  that  the  first  and  second  editions  were  exhausted 
within  a  few  years  shows  that  educators  are  recognizing, 
more  and  more,  the  importance  of  experimental  psychology 
and  pedagogy  for  the  work  of  the  schools.  Numerous  com- 
munications, inquiries,  suggestions,  and  expressions  of  ap- 
proval of  the  discussions  of  the  first  and  second  editions  have 
come  to  me  from  teachers;  and  they  have  been  so  numerous 
that  I  could  not,  unfortunately,  always  reply  as  I  should 
wish. 

May  the  new  edition  win  new  friends  for  experimental  psy- 
chology and  pedagogy! 

E.  Meumann. 

Hamburg,  February,  191 2. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 


PAGE 

Introduction:    The  Meaning  of   the   Economy   and 

Technique  of  Learning xiii 

I.     A  Survey  of  the  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory i 

II.     The  Functions  of  Memory 34 

III.  Observational  Learning:  The  Technique  of  Observing 

and  Learning 

1.  Analysis  of  Observational  Noting 49 

IV.  Observational  Learning   (Continued) 

2.  The   Experimental   Investigation   of   Observa- 

tional Noting 78 

V.     Associative  Learning:   The  Technique  and  Economy 

of  Learning i39 

1 .  Memory  Types,  Learning  Types,  and  Ideational 

Types 169 

2.  More  Detailed  Description  of  Ideational  Types 

and  Memory  Types,  and  their  Fundamental 

Characteristics 187 

VI.    Associative  Learning  (Continued) 

3.  Economical  Learning 231 

4.  The  Conditions  and  the  Technique  of  Mechan- 

ical Learning 255 

VII.     Associative  Learning  (Continued) 

5.  The  Learning  of  Significant  Materials 290 

6.  Experimental   Investigation   of   the   Effect   of 

Learning;  Stages  of  Learning;  Retention  and 


Forgetting 3 


o 


7.  The  Education  of  Memory  in  the  Schools 335 

8.  The    Actual    Memorial    Efficiency    of    School 

Children  Compared  with  the  Results  of  Ex- 
perimental Investigations 347 

xi 


xil  Contents 

PAGE 

Appendix      I.     The   Construction    of   Series   of   Nonsense 

Syllables 365 

Appendix    II.     The  Meaning  of  Economy  of  Time  and 

Energy  ia  Learning 368 

Appendix  III.     Addenda  f !<  m  tLe  IMost  Recent  Literature  374 

Bibliography 37^ 

Index  of  Authors 3^5 

Index  of  Subjects 389 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  MEANING   OF   THE   ECONOMY  AND   TECHNIQUE 

OF  LEARNING 

The  experimental  treatment  of  the  problems  of  psychology 
and  pedagogy  has  furnished  the  modern  student  with  a 
wealth  of  information  which  remained  unknown  during  the 
non-experimental  stages  of  these  sciences.  And  this  knowl- 
edge proves  to  be  of  profound  practical  significance  in  direct- 
ing the  efforts  of  both  the  teacher  and  the  pupil.  Psycho- 
logical and  pedagogical  experimentation  has  given  us  an 
insight  into  the  complex  conditions  of  mental  activity;  and 
we  are  beginning  to  lay  a  secure  foundation  for  the  technique 
and  economy  of  mental  work.  The  mental  processes  which 
constitute  the  basis  of  the  school-work  of  pupils  are  opened 
up  to  exact  analysis;  a  great  part  of  the  mental  work  of 
children  which  was  formerly  left  to  accidental  success  and 
to  the  instincts  of  the  child  can  now  be  directed  in  a  manner 
which  is  psychologically  most  appropriate.  All  of  these  are 
problems  of  wliich  the  older  pedagogy  had  scarcely  an  ink- 
ling; and  the  pedagogy  of  the  future  will  be  enriched  by  a 
new  sub-division  of  "method"  because,  in  addition  to 
methods  of  teaching,  methods  of  learning  must  also  be  con- 
sidered. Many  of  the  investigations  which  are  now  being 
devoted  to  an  analysis  of  the  mental  life  of  the  child  have 
not  yet  extended  beyond  the  four  walls  of  the  psychological 
laboratory.  Indeed,  the  subject-matter  of  the  present  volume 
is  drawn  from  investigations  in  experimental  pedagogy  which 
are  still  far  from  being  completed  in  all  of  thdr  details;  and 

xiii 


xiv  Introduction 

this  circumstance  may  explain  why  many  of  our  inferences 
bearing  upon  the  work  of  the  school-room  are  still  hypothet- 
ical in  character.  The  reader  will  find,  however,  that  we  have 
drawn  a  distinction  throughout  between  statement  of  estab- 
lished fact  and  statement  of  mere  conjecture. 

The  questions  which  will  be  discussed  in  this  volume  are 
concerned,  in  the  first  place,  with  the  general  principles  of 
our  modern  doctrine  of  memory,  and  with  the  technique  and 
economy  of  "mental  noting," — by  which  is  meant  the  imprint- 
ing upon  memory  of  any  sort  of  material  as  a  result  of  atten- 
tive perception  and  observation  where  no  special  effort  to 
learn  is  present;  next  in  order  come  the  technique  and  econ- 
omy of  verbatim  learning;  then  the  economy  of  memory  in 
general  in  school-children;  the  fundamental  differences  of 
memory-types  among  individuals;  and,  finally,  a  number  of 
interesting  miscellaneous  results  which  have  been  obtained 
as  a  by-product  of  the  experimental  investigation  of  memory. 

In  the  traditional  pedagogy  we  read  a  great  deal  about 
methods  of  teaching;  but,  in  most  cases,  the  pedagogical 
text-books  can  tell  us  nothing  about  methods  of  learning.* 
And  yet  we  find  ourselves  confronted  by  the  very  serious 
question  as  to  whether  the  efficiency  of  school-room  manage- 
ment may  not  be  increased  by  systematically  improving  the 
pupil's  procedure  in  the  act  of  learning  in  such  a  fashion  that 
his  learning  may  be  perfected  in  its  technical  aspects  and 
accomplished  more  economically.  This  question  becomes  the 
more  pressing  in  modern  times  because  our  courses  of  study, 
in  their  attempt  to  comply  with  the  increasing  requirements 
of  practical  Hfe,  are  becoming  more  and  more  exacting  in  the 
demands  which  they  make  upon  the  memory  tasks  of  school- 
children. 

In  order  to  make  this  clear  to  the  reader,  we  must  first 
of  all  develop  the  meaning  of  the  economy  and  technique  of 


Introduction  xv 

learning.  Ignoring  for  the  present  the  fact  that  we  may 
speak  of  learning  or  imprinting  upon  memory  in  very  different 
senses,  we  find  that  in  every  kind  of  memorial  acquisition  of 
every  sort  of  material,  in  practical  Hfe  or  in  the  school-room, 
the  learner  must  always  fulfil  the  following  conditions: 

1.  In  the  act  of  learning,  he  must  endeavor  to  proceed  in 
the  most  suitable  manner  and  in  accordance  with  psycholog- 
ical conditions  of  learning,  i.e.,  he  must  fulfil  those  conditions 
of  learning  under  which  the  particular,  present  purpose  of 
his  learning  can  best  be  attained.  For  instance,  if  the  aim 
of  his  learning  be,  in  one  case,  a  literal  memorization  of  a 
poem,  in  a  second  case,  a  permanent  retention  of  a  concrete 
material,  and  in  yet  a  third  case,  the  association  of  foreign 
words  with  their  equivalents  or  synonyms  in  his  own  language, 
this  diversity  of  purpose  brings  with  it  a  diversity  in  the  con- 
ditions of  learning  under  which  his  goal  can  best  be  attained. 
We  must  attempt  to  investigate  these  conditions  and  to  make 
the  learner  familiar  with  them/ 

2.  All  the  varieties  of  memorial  acquisition  have,  however, 
certain  characteristics  in  common  because  they  are  all  me- 
morial work  in  the  broadest  sense  of  that  term;  and  all  memorial 
work,  in  turn,  is  subject  to  certain  general  conditions  and 
laws,  which  must  be  fulfilled  if  anything  is  to  be  imprinted 
permanently  upon  memory.  These  general  conditions  of  all 
learning  must  also  be  investigated;  and  the  learner  must 
become  familiar  with  them  if  he  is  to  be  able  to  fulfil  them 
in  his  act  of  learning. 

3.  Every  learner  has  his 'own  peculiar  individuality,  and 

'  It  is  really  self-evident  but  since  other  views  of  the  matter  are 
held  it  must  be  mentioned  that  upon  the  point  of  view  of  the  purpose 
which  the  learner  seeks  to  attain  depend  all  other  points  of  view  con- 
cerning the  economy  of  learning,  even  that  of  economy  of  time  and 
of  energy. 


XVI 


Introduction 


his  own  individual  endowment;  and  in  consequence  of  these 
the  general  conditions  of  learning  and  the  means  of  attaining 
a  special  goal  in  learning  are  often  modified  to  a  considerable 
degree.  From  this  it  follows  that  individual  variations  in 
memorial  work  must  be  investigated;  and  each  individual 
must  be  trained  to  employ  his  own  procedure  correctly. 

4.  Besides  these  general  conditions  of  learning,  and  these 
individual  conditions,  and  these  conditions  which  depend 
upon  the  purpose  which  the  learner  has  in  view,  we  must 
consider  certain  artifices  or  artificial  devices  which  may 
facilitate  the  act  of  learning.  Every  technique  involves 
certain  artifices  or  tricks  of  skill,  certain  artificial  aids  and 
modes  of  procedure  by  means  of  which  an  end  may  more 
readily  be  attained;  and  the  technique  of  mental  work  is  no 
exception  to  this  general  rule.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
mnemonic  devices  are  alleged  to  furnish  an  aid  to  memory. 
Hence  it  devolves  upon  a  technique  of  learning  to  inquire 
into  the  psychological  justification  and  the  practical  utility 
of  artificial  aids  to  memory;  and  rules  which  are  at  once 
psychologically  sound  and  justified  by  the  purpose  in  view 
must  be  formulated  for  the  employment  of  such  devices  as 
aids  to  memorial  work. 

5.  All  of  the  foregoing  refers  to  the  technique  of  learning. 
But  in  addition  to  this  we  aspire  to  an  economy  of  learning. 
It  is  the  purpose  of  an  economy  of  learning  to  enable  the 
learner  to  secure  a  maximum  result  at  a  minimum  cost  of 
time  and  of  energy,  and  consequently  to  enable  him  to  accom- 
plish his  task  with  a  minimum  degree  of  fatigue  and  with  a 
minimum  danger  of  over-fatigue. 

It  may  be  said,  in  summary,  that  an  economy  and  tech- 
nique of  learning  endeavors  to  investigate  not  only  the  gen- 
eral mental  conditions  of  learning  but  also  those  special 
mental  conditions  which  depend  upon  the  specific  purpose 


Introductio7i  xvii 

for  which  a  particular  act  of  learning  may  have  been  under- 
taken; it  also  endeavors  to  make  these  various  conditions 
subject  to  the  will  of  the  learner.  It  attempts  to  specify  the 
particular  conditions  which  depend  upon  the  pecuKar  mental 
constitution  of  the  individual  learner;  it  investigates  the 
possibility  of  taking  advantage  of  technical  aids  and  artifices 
in  learning,  and  of  finding  a  psychological  and  a  practical 
justification  for  employing  them;  it  aims  to  give  the  learner 
instructions  as  to  the  best  means  of  saving  time  and  energy, 
and  of  attaining  the  highest  degree  of  efficiency  in  remem- 
bering and  reproducing  what  he  has  learned/  Our  problem 
then  may  be  said  to  deal  with  the  question:  What  methods 
or  modes  of  procedure  in  learning  are  based  upon  a  sound 
psychological,  technical  and  economical  foundation? 

There  is  always  a  parallel  between  the  subjective  aspect, — 
the  economy  and  technique  of  the  work  of  the  pupil, — and 
the  objective  aspect, — the  teacher's  presentation  of  the  ma- 
terial to  be  learned, — in  so  far  as  the  pupil's  procedure  is  de- 
termined by  the  teacher's  mode  of  presentation'.  For  instance, 
if  at  one  time  the  pupil  acquires  a  given  material  in  a  visual 
fashion,  from  seeing  it,  and  at  another  time  in  an  auditory 
fashion,  from  hearing  it,  his  mode  of  acquisition  has  varied 
with  the  mode  of  presentation;  it  took  its  start  from  the 
written  or  printed  text,  in  the  former  case,  from  the  oral 
statement  of  the  teacher,  in  the  latter  case.  Hence  in  so 
far  as  these  different  external  starting-points  of  the  pupil's 
activity  in  learning  constitute  subjective  conditions  of  his 
activity,  we  may  also  speak  of  an  economy  of  presenting 
material  to  be  learned. 

It  is  evident  that  this  way  of  looking  at  the  matter  consists 
simply  in  regarding  the  subjective  conditions  of  learning  from 

'  For  a  discussion  of  the  various  meanings  of  economy  of  learning 
the  reader  is  referred  to  Appendix  II. 
3 


xviii  Introduction 

the  objective  point  of  view,  the  mode  of  presentation.  Yet 
there  are  certain  practical  reasons  which  justify  a  separate 
discussion  of  the  influence  of  presentation  upon  learning. 

It  may  also  be  noted  that  the  experiments  which  deal  with 
the  presentation  of  material  contain  the  first  beginnings  of  a 
new  branch  of  pedagogy,  which  may  be  called  the  economy 
and  technique  of  teaching.  And  it  may  be  that  the  psychol- 
ogy of  memory  will  furnish  the  means  of  taking  the  first  step 
toward  an  accurate  experimental  determination  of  rules  and 
norms  of  teaching.  In  the  discussions  which  are  to  follow, 
this  possibihty  will  frequently  be  indicated. 

These  general  statements  may  be  illustrated  in  detail  by 
an  observation  of  the  memorial  work  of  pupils.  Even  at  an 
early  age  the  pupil  is  called  upon  to  accomplish  a  great  variety 
of  mental  tasks;  and  we  require  of  him  a  work  of  memory 
to  which  he  brings  but  little,  if  any,  experience.  Now,  mental 
work  may  be  done  by  wholly  different  methods;  the  pupil's 
procedure  may  be  exceedingly  wasteful  of  time  and  energy,  or 
it  may  consist  in  the  formation  of  such  associations  as  shall 
employ  his  mental  energies  in  the  most  advantageous  manner. 
For  example,  in  memorizing  a  poem  he  may  go  through  a  slow 
and  laborious  process  of  adapting  his  attention  to  the  subject- 
matter  in  question;  or  he  may  concentrate  his  attention 
intensively  from  the  outset.  His  repetitions  of  the  poem 
may  be  mechanical  and  barren  of  result;  or  he  may  make 
every  repetition  contribute  its  quota  to  the  memorization  of 
the  material.  He  may  make  much  or  Httle  use  of  the  factor 
of  rhythm;  he  may  make  much  or  little  use  of  the  meaning 
of  the  poem;  he  may  pronounce  the  words  audibly,  semi- 
audibly  or  inaudibly;  he  may  employ  a  rapid  rate  of  pro- 
nunciation or  a  slow  and  emphatic  pronunciation;  he  may 
divide  the  poem  into  small  sections  and  memorize  each  sec- 
tion independently,  or  he  may  read  the  whole  poem  through 


Introduction 


XIX 


each  time  from  beginning  to  end  and  memorize  it  as  a  unitary 
whole;  he  may  learn  it  at  a  single  sitting,  or  he  may  devote 
several  sittings  to  the  task,  distributing  the  work  over  a 
longer  period  of  time  and  introducing  pauses  between  the 
several  sittings;  his  learning  may  be  of  a  purely  successive 
sort,  or  he  may  employ  in  part  successive  and  in  part  simul- 
taneous and  regressive  associations. 

Which  of  these  methods  of  learning  leads  most  readily  and 
most  rapidly  to  the  goal, — to  fluent  and  errorless  reproduc- 
tion?   Which  method  secures  the  most  permanent  and  the 
most  accurate  retention?     Questions  such  as  these  arise  in 
connection  with  every  sort  of  memorial  imprinting, — even 
with  the  imprinting  of  concrete  sensory  material,  whether 
presented  but  once  or  presented  repeatedly.    Here  again  the 
learner  may  proceed  in  an  unsystematic  fashion  with  an 
extravagant  expenditure  of  time  and  energy;   or  he  may  ful- 
fil all  of  the  conditions  which  are  necessary  for  a  systematic 
and  effective  imprinting  of  the  material  upon  his  conscious- 
ness.    Thus  in  every  department  of  memorial  function  we 
may  speak  of  a  technique  and  economy  of  memory;    and 
that  is  the  topic  which  we  propose  to  evolve,  in  its  essential 
features,  in  this  volume.     If  we  are  to  attain  this  end  we 
must  first  discuss  the  foundation  of  the  modern  psychology 
of  memory  in  order  that,  from  this  vantage  ground,  we  may 
be  able  to  throw  light  upon  the  various  functions  of  memory, 
and  upon  the  various  sorts  and  cases  of  memorial  activity  for 
which  we  are  to  formulate  specific,  technical  rules.    Then  we 
shall  attempt  to  give  the  reader  an  insight  into  the  experi- 
mental investigations  which  have,  in  recent  times,  established 
the  conditions  of  the  various  sorts  of  memorial  activity;  and 
finally  we  shall  discuss  the  more  important  results  of  these 
investigations,  and  indicate  their  significance  for  the  work 
of  the  teacher. 


T*HE    PSYCHOLOGY    OF    LEARNING 

CHAPTER  I 

A    SURVEY   OF   THE  MODERN  PSYCHOLOGY   OF  MEMORY 

In  every-day  speech,  memory  is  understood  to  mean  the 
capacity  to  imprint  and  to  retain  perceptions  and  ideas  and, 
as  it  were,  to  incorporate  them  into  consciousness  as  a  tempo- 
rary or  permanent  possession.  That  such  an  imprinting  or 
incorporation  has  taken  place,  however,  is  revealed  to  us  only 
by  the  fact  that  we  can  subsequently  recall  our  experiences; 
but  when  the  same  impressions  recur  to  consciousness  we 
detect  certain  changes  in  our  attitude  and  behavior, — a  •- 
feeling  of  familiarity,  a  greater  facility  in  re-learning,  and  the 
like.  Strictly  speaking  then,  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge 
only  of  the  process  of  imprinting,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
the  subsequent  reproduction  and  the  changed  attitude  on  the 
other;  everything  that  lies  between  these  two  termini  com- 
pletely escapes  our  direct  knowledge.^  In  so  far  then  as  we 
are  limited  to  empirical  observation,  the  sole  manifestations 
of  memory  consist  either  in  a  reproduction  or  in  a  changed 
re-experiencing  or  in  a  modified  re-learning  of  what  has  "^ 
previously  been  experienced  or  learned. 

Now  since  reproduction  must  necessarily  depend,  in  some^^ 
sense,  upon  a  retention  of  impressions,  and  since  our  modified  N. 
acquisition  must  be  due  to  an  after-effect  of  former  contents 
of   consciousness,  memory  may  be  briefly  defined,   for  the 
present,  as  the  capacity  to  retain  perceptions  or  ideas  and\ 
subsequently  to  revive  them,  or  at  least  to  experience  after 


2  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

effects  of  their  iormer  presence  in  consciousness.  And  since 
it  seems  probable  that  an  "after-effect"  is  only  a  species  of 
reproduction,  the  present  consequences  of  former  memorial 
activity  may  all  be  referred  to  briefly  as  reproduction. 

Educational  psychology  regards  memory  as  a  definite  func- 
tion and  capacity  which  serves  certain  educative  purposes. 
General  or  theoretical  psychology,  on  the  contrary,  concerns 
itself,  as  a  rule,  not  with  mental  capacities  or  functions  but 
only  with  mental  processes.  >The  mental  processes  which 
are  fundamental  to  memory  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  im- 
printing of  impressions  and  the  forming  of  associations  among 
ideas,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  reproduction  or  revival  or 
reappearance  of  ideas  in  consciousness;  between  these  two 
processes  lies  the  hidden  intermediate  member,  the  after- 
effect of  former  impressions  or  ideas,' which  is  to  be  conceived 
as  a  latent  survival  of  the  dispositions  and  associations  which 
were  established  by  the  original  imprinting.  It  is  important 
that  association  be  distinguished  from  reproduction.  Asso- 
ciation is  the  initial  formation  of  a  connection  between  ideas 
which  are  present  in  consciousness  simultaneously  or  in  im- 
mediate succession,  or  which  occur  at  least  as  links  in  a  chain 
of  ideas  which  constitutes  some  sort  of  a  unitary  whole  for  us. 
Reproduction,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  appearance  of  ideas 
in  consciousness,  or  the  entrance  of  ideas  into  consciousness, — - 
a  phenomenon  which  is  rendered  possible  in  most  cases  by  a 
previously  established  association  between  these  ideas  and 
other  ideas.  In  order  to  account  for  the  imprinting  and  the 
subsequent  reappearing  of  the  idea,  psychologists  usually 
assume  that  every  perception  or  idea  which  comes  to  con- 
sciousness, even  if  only  once,  leaves  behind  it  a  trace  or 
after-effect.  And  since  this  residuum  has  to  do  with  subse- 
quent revival  it  is  called  a  disposition  to  revival,  i  The  term 
disposition  has  a  dual  significance  here.    It  indicates  that  the 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Meviory  3 

idea  tends  to  recur  to  consciousness  through  the  aid  of  other 
ideas,  or  even  in  consequence  of  its  own  energy;  but  it  also 
indicates  that  .every  revival  of  an  idea  is  f  acihtated  by  impres- 
sions and  by  other  ideas.     *^ 

The  doctrine  of  memory  and  of  its  origin  in  the  association 
and  reproduction  of  ideas  has  undergone  a  considerable  change 
in  modern  psychology.  The  significance  of  memory  has  been 
essentially  broadened  and  extended;  and  attempts  have  been 
made  to  distinguish  memory  more  accurately  from  cognate 
mental  processes. 

The  extension  of  the  meaning  of  memory  takes  its  origin 
from  an  endeavor,  in  itself  perfectly  justified,  to  bring  the 
phenomenon  as  manifested  by  man,  into  relation  with  a  group 
of  related  phenomena  which  occur  elsewhere  in  nature.  It 
has  been  hoped  by  this  means  to  bring  memory  more  nearly 
within  the  range  of  our  comprehension,  and  especially  to 
demonstrate  the  organic  basis  of  memory  dispositions.  •  Thus 
the  physiologists  Hering,  in  i860,  and  Hensen,  in  1877, 
attempted  to  show  that  "memory  is  a  universal  property  of 
organic  matter."  This  view  was  extended  by  Haeckel,  Forel 
and  Mach,  and  more  recently  in  a  comprehensive  volume  by 
Richard  Semon.^  Semon  calls  the  memory  processes  in  general 
"mnemic"  processes*,  and  organic  memory  he  calls  mneme, 
— from  the  Greek  lAaTjtJL-r],  memory.  ;  This  extension  of  the 
meaning  of  memory  receives  its  support  from  the  fact  that 
every  process  or  activity  which  has  once  occurred  in  organ- 
ized matter, — in  nerve,  in  muscle,  or  even  in  simple  cell  or 
in  groups  of  cells, — leaves  behind  it  a  disposition  or  after- 
effect as  a  result  of  which  the  same  activity,  on  being  repeated, 
is  accomplished  more  easily  and  with  a  lesser  expenditure  of 
energy,  and  also  in  somewhat  modified  form.  This  survival 
of  the  dispositional  after-effects  of  every  activity  is  also  the 
^  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


4  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

basis  of  all  of  the  effects  which  result  from  practice;  and  thus 
memory  is  brought  into  relation  with  all  of  the  phenomena 
of  practice.     Now,  it  seems  probable  that  the  basis  of  all 
memory  processes,  in  human  as  well  as  in  animal  conscious- 
ness, is  to  be  sought  in  the  physical  phenomenon  that  former 
impressions  and  ideas, — or  more  strictly  speaking,  the  physi- 
cal parallels  of  these  mental  processes, — do  leave  behind  them 
such  a  disposition  to  a  more  ready  recurrence.    There  is  no 
doubt  that  in  this  respect  the  human  function  of  memory 
suggests  characteristics  which  are  common  to  all  organic 
matter.    But  it  is  only  to  this  rudimentary  and  general  basis 
of  memory  in  parallel  bodily  processes  that  we  can  apply 
this  extended  meaning  of  memory;    and  such  a  procedure 
does  not  help  us  in  the  slightest  degree  to  understand  the 
-  origin  or  nature  of  memory  as  a  mental  process.    We  must 
not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  survival  of  these  enduring 
dispositions  of  impressions  becomes  comprehensible  to  us  only 
when  we  assume  that  material  modifications,  of  a  temporary 
or  permanent  sort,  take  place  in  a  substance  which  itself 
persists  throughout;    and   that   these  modifications   subse- 
quently facilitate  the  recurrence  of  the  activity  to  which 
they  owe  their  existence. 
-^     Dispositions,  in  this  sense  of  a  permanent  modification  of 
an  organ,  do  not  exist  in  the  domain  of  consciousness;   nor 
can  we  speak,  in  any  such  sense,  of  mental  or  psychical  dispo- 
sitions./When  a  muscle  or  a  group  of  muscles  has  made  a 
particular  movement  a  great  many  times,  there  ensues  a 
muscular  change  which  is  continuously  present  as  a  persistent 
modification  of  the  muscle-substance — a  modification  of  its 
mass,  of  its  structure,  or  of  its  chemical  or  molecular  consti- 
tution.   And  these  modifications  constitute  the  basis  of  the 
muscle's  subsequent  capa'city*  to  accomplish  the  same  activity 
in  a  more  easy  fashion.    A  somewhat  analogous  state  of  affairs 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  5 

must  be  assumed  for  nerve-substance,  and  especially  for  the 
nerve-cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex,  to  which  we  ascribe  those 
neural  processes  which  run  parallel  with  the  processes  of  con- 
sciousness. But  we  find  nothing  in  the  domain  of  conscious- 
ness which  is  in  any  way  a  counter-part  of  this  permanent 
modification  of  nerve-substance.  So  far  as  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  are  concerned,  we  see  only  the  results  or  the 
effects  of  the  repetition  of  an  activity  or  an  impression, — for 
instance,  we  see  simply  the  reproduction  or  the  facilitated 
acquisition  of  the  impression.  We  do  not  find  any  permanent 
modification  of  consciousness  itself  which  can  serve  as  a 
basis  for  this  resultant  of  former  activity.  From  this  it  fol- 
lows, firstly,  that  we  cannot  speak  of  psychical  dispositions  ' 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  physical  dispositions. 
Psychical  dispositions  must  consist  solely  in  the  fact  that 
mental  processes  run  their  course  differently  as  a  result  of 
repeated  recurrence.  A  second  consequence  is  that,  in  so 
far  as  their  bodily  aspect  is  concerned,  it  becomes  possible 
to  explain  the  phenomena  of  practice, — and  the  processes  of 
memory  are  phenomena  of  practice,— by  referring  them  back 
to  a  more  general  physiological  principle.  So  far  as  their 
mental  aspect  is  concerned,  on  the  contrary,  such  a  tracing 
back  of  the  processes  of  practice  and  memory  to  more  general 
phenomena  is  impossible.  They  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as 
ultimate  facts;  and  we  can  only  establish  them  as  facts^ 

A  second  extension  of  the  concept  of  memory  is  concerned 
with  the  mental  aspect  of  memorial  phenomena.  This  exten- 
sion owes  its  origin  to  pathology  and  psychiatry  (the  inves- 
tigation of  the  pathological  conditions  of  mental  life);  it  is 
interesting  to  note,  however,  that  it  was  anticipated  by  the 
French  philosopher  Malebranche.t  It  has  been  observed  that 
all  memory  training  has  a  twofold  effect:  a  general  or  func- 
tional effect,  which  is  to  be  regarded  as  essentially  a  i)he- 


6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

nomenon  of  practice;  and  a  special  effect,  which  has  to  do 
with  the  content  or  material  which  is  remembered.  Kraepelin 
refers  to  this  as  a  distinction  between  general  memory  and 
special  memory.^  Whenever  we  train  the  memory  with  any 
sort  of  material  we  bring  about  a  twofold  result:  i.  The 
material  or  content  is  imprinted  upon  our  consciousness,  and 
is  thereby  rendered  capable  of  being  subsequently  repro- 
duced; or  in  other  words,  by  means  of  the  activity  of  memory 
we  acquire  knowledge,  a  stock  of  particular  ideas  whose  per- 
manence of  retention  is  proportionate  to  the  thoroughness  of 
their  imprinting.  2"?  But  we  also  train  the  memory  itself ,  i.  e., 
our  general  retentive  and  reproductive  capacity  is  strength- 
ened and  improved  by  every  act  of  memory.  In  this  regard, 
also,  the  whole  activity  of  memory  appears  as  a  phenomenon 
of  practice,  as  it  does  in  regard  to  memorial  traces  or  dispo- 
sitions. But  our  general  capacity  to  retain  and  to  reproduce 
also  depends,  in  turn,  upon  the  development  of  other  func- 
tions of  consciousness,  especially  upon  the  concentration  and 
persistence  of  attention,  the  effort  of  will,  the  emotional  con- 
dition and  the  like.^ 

Thus  in  training  the  memory  we  always  develop  all  of  these 
other  formal  capacities  of  mind  as  well;  and  hence  in  exer- 
cising the  memory  we  derive  an  advantage  not  only  in  the 
direction  of  an  acquisition  of  knowledge  but  also  in  the  direc- 
tion of  an  improvement  of  all  of  the  general  functions  which 
are  active  in  the  work  of  memory  and  which  make  memory 
possible.  It  was  this  twofold  function  of  memory  which  led 
to  a  distinction  between  general  and  special  memory.    This 

^  E.  Kraepelin,  Der  psychologische  Versuch  in  der  Psychiatric, 
Psychologische  Arhciten,  I.,  1894,  48. 

^Cf.  Ebert  und  Meumann,  Ueber  einige  Grundfragen  der  Psychol- 
ogic der  Ucbungsphanomene  im  Bereiche  des  (Mdachtnisses,  Archiv 
/.  d.  gesajnte  Psychol.  IV.,  1904,  2o8ff.  )^^ 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  7 

distinction,  however,  is  by  no  means  free  from  objection 
because  the  concept  of  a  general  memory  is  a  sheer  logical 
abstraction.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  no  general  memory, , 
but  only  a  number  of  special  memories;  and  the  term  "gen- 
eral memory"  has  had  its  origin   a.   in  the  fact  that  every 
exercise  of  memory  has  this  formal  and  general  effect,  that  we 
develop  it  in  all  of  its  formal  aspects,  not  only  its  capacity 
to  acquire  practice-dispositions  in  the  domain  of  intellect,  but 
also  its  capacity  to  set  attention  and  will  to  work  in  the  service 
of  memory,    h.   But  another  fact  has  given  rise  to  the  con-^ 
cept  of  a  general  memory, — the  fact  that  the  training  of  each  ^ 
special  memory  is  not  confined  to  the  special  memory  which, 
is  trained,  but  that  all  the  other  memories  which  are  quahta- 
tively  similar  or  related  to  this  special  memory  are  trained  as 
a  result  of  its  training. 

The  fact  that  related  functions  of  memory  are  influenced 
by  each  other's  training  in  proportion  to  the  intimacy  of  their 
relation  is  our  chief  justification  for  speaking  of  phenomena  r 
of  general  practice  in  the  domain  of  memory.  The  overlapping 
of  training  to  related  functions,  however,  is  not  a  sufficient 
justification  for  assuming  the  existence  of  a  general  memory. 
In  short,  the  concept  of  a  general  memory  must,  in  my  opin- 
ion, give  place  to  the  twofold  concept  i.  that  all  memory 
training,  besides  its  acquisition  of  content,  also  brings  with 
it  the  cultivation  of  certain  general  functions  which  co-operate 
in  all  memorial  acquisition;  and  2.  that  each  member  of  a 
group  of  special  memories  which  are  related  to  one  another 
shares  in  the  profits  which  are  derived  from  the  training  of 
any  member  of  the  group.^  Of  more  importance  than  this 
extension  of  the  meaning  of  memory  are  the  attempts  which 
have  been  made  to  define  more  accurately  the  nature  of  me- 

'  This  latter  phenomenon  was  pointed  out  by  Ebert  and  Meumann, 
Op.  cit.  200. 


8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

morial  processes  themselves.  Modern  psychology  has  modified 
the  old  view  that  memory  consists  in  a  retention  and  revival 
of  ideas.  It  is  not  true  that  memory  is  simply  a  revival  of 
old  ideas,  and  that  imagination  differs  from  memory  in  that 
the  former  transforms  ideas  and  re-combines  them  in  novel  and 
original  forms.  Every-day  experience,  no  less  than  psycho- 
i;.  logical  investigation,  shows  us  that  memory  also  transforms 
,  /  ideas. 

(.  In  the  first  place,  our  recollection  of  former  experiences  is 
■  invariably  and  necessarily  of  a  more  or  less  fragmentary 
character;  and,  in  the  second  place,  lacunas  in  our  remem- 
brances are  filled,  in  involuntary  fashion,  either  by  our  cus- 
tomary associations  rushing  in  and  fusing  with  our  fragmen- 
tary ideas,  or  by  our  function  of  judgment  adding  its  quota 
to  the  remembered  data.  In  this  way,  using  parts  of  really 
remembered  ideas,  we  build  up  a  mosaic  picture  of  the  whole 
experience  which  we  seem  to  remember.  Rodenwaldt  inves- 
tigated the  memories  of  a  number  of  adults,  employing  as 
his  material  a  picture  of  an  infant  in  a  cradle.  The  majority 
of  his  observers  "remembered"  that  the  color  of  the  cradle 
was  brown  although  it  really  was  a  conspicuous  blue  in  the 
picture.  Such  falsifications  of  memory  are  products  of  the 
fusion  of  habitual  associations.  Since  the  wooden  cradles 
which  we  ordinarily  see  are  brown  and  not  blue,  the  idea  of 
the  brown  color  comes  in  to  supplement  our  memory  of  the 
picture  of  the  cradle,  and  fuses  with  it  if  we  have  forgotten 
V  the  real  color.  The  second  sort  of  transformation  of  our 
remembrances,  which  is  a  product  of  judgment,  occurs 
especially  in  those  cases  where  our  perception  turns  out  to 
have  been  of  a  fragmentary  sort.  In  such  cases  we  always 
endeavor  by  means  of  the  function  of  judgment  to  eke  out 
a  picture  of  the  complete  details  of  the  experience,  and  to 
combine  the  various  components  to  form  such  a  complete 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  9 

context  as  shall  seem  most  probable.  In  combinations  such 
as  these  it  is  extremely  diflicult  to  make  a  clear  distinction 
between  what  is  remembered  and  what  is  contributed  by 
imagination  and  judgment  because  these  parts  blend  together 
to  form  a  unitary  w^hole  for  consciousness.  Striking  illus- 
trations of  this  phenomenon  are  found  in  errors  of  testimony, 
which  will  be  described  in  the  fourth  chapter.  This  process 
has  not  yet  been  sufficiently  investigated  by  psychology. 
We  may  call  it  memorial  assimilation;  it  is  wholly  analogous 
with  perceptual  assimilation  which  is  a  much  more  familiar 
phenomenon.  For  even  in  perception  we  continually  supple- 
ment the  sensory  impressions  of  the  moment  by  customary 
ideas  which  the  former  arouse,  and  which  seek  to  fuse  with 
them. 

/  But  memorial  contents  undergo  other  transformationst 
uhey  enter  into  fusions  with  one  another,  especially  in  cases 
where  two  groups  of  ideas  closely  resemble  each  other.  I 
have  frequently  observed  that  my  memory-images  of  pictures 
by  certain  noted  painters  who  deal  with  similar  subjects,  for 
instance  paintings  by  Jordaens  and  Rubens,  fuse  so  com- 
pletely with  one  another  that  I  wholly  fail  to  hold  them  apart 
in  thought.  And  then  my  remembrance  of  a  particular 
painting  by  Rubens  sometimes  becomes  a  composite  of  the 
memory-images  of  the  picture  in  question  and  of  a  similar 
picture  by  Jordaens.  Phenomena  of  this  sort  frequently 
occur  in  my  experience.  In  general,  it  is  remembrances  of 
similar  impressions  which  combine  with  one  another  in  this 
fashion.  Thus  our  mental  images  of  cities,  of  mountain 
landscapes,  of  similar  faces  of  acquaintances  frequently  fuse 
without  our  being  aware  of  the  blending  until  we  find  an 
opportunity  to  compare  the  remembrance  with  the  original.^ 

'  These   memorial   fusions   of  similar  impressions  were  revealed  in 
striking  fashion  in  Ranschburg's  investigation  of  the  immediate  reten- 


10  The  Psychology  oj  Learning 

This  mutability  of  memory-images  is  inherent  in  the  very 
nature  of  memorial  processes  themselves.  Only  in  very  excep- 
tional cases  are  our  memory-images  mere  revivals  of  single 
perceptions.  They  are,  as  a  rule,  revivals  of  a  multitude  of 
perceptions  which  may  have  been  widely  different  from  one 
another.  Hence  our  idea  of  any  given  object  must  have  come 
about  by  a  fusion  of  various  perceptions  with  their  several 
memory-images.  Even  when  I  have  an  idea  of  a  particular 
thing, — of  a  personal  acquaintance,  for  instance, — this  idea 
is  the  revival  of  numerous  particular  perceptions  in  which 
my  acquaintance  was  seen  from  different  points  of  view,  under 
different  conditions  of  illumination,  in  different  dress,  with 
different  facial  expressions,  with  different  movements,  with 
different  vocal  expressions,  etc.  Indeed,  even  in  those  cases 
where  I  have  seen  a  man  or  a  landscape  but  once,  the  percep- 
tion consists  of  a  great  variety  of  details  of  perception  whose 
contents  differ.  Out  of  these  the  memory-image  is  built  up 
by  a  process  of  fusion.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  memory- 
images  can  never  be  simple  copies  of  things;  their  contents 
must  be  the  product  of  a  certai.i  transformation  or  free  com- 
bination of  several  particular  remembrances  or  perceptions. 
Even  those  things  which  have  been  committed  to  memory  are 
always  acquired  as  the  result  of  a  number  of  acts  of  learning; 
N  and  in  each  act  of  learning  the  idea  of  the  thing  undergoes  a 
'  change.  ^  Hence  here,  too,  the  idea  is  the  product  of  a  fusion 
of  various  impressions. 

Finally,  our  interpretations  of  phenomena  and  their  emo- 
tional values  contribute  to  the  formation  of  memory-images, 
in  that  they  select  certain  of  the  perceived  and  the  remem- 
bered elements.    This  selective  activity  not  only  differs  from 


tion  of  numbers.  P.  Ranschburg,  Ueber  die  Bedeutung  der  Aehnlich- 
keit  beim  Erlernen,  Behalten  und  bei  der  Reproduktion,  Journal  f. 
Psychol,  u.  Neurol.     V.,  1905,  93-127. 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  1 1 

individual  to  individual,  but  even  in  the  same  individual  it 
varies  with  the  progress  of  his  development  and  of  his  knowl- 
edge. Thus  it  comes  about  that  an  idea  depicts  not  merely 
a  thing  but  also  my  reflection  about  the  thing.  Our  inter- 
pretation of  objects,  our  practical  or  theoretical  evaluations 
of  objects  play  a  part  in  the  formation  of  our  complex  ideas 
without  our  making  any  intentional  contribution.  Finally, 
many  ideas  are  not  mere  copies  of  particular  objects;  they 
relate  to  whole  groups  or  classes  of  objects  which  are  repre- 
sented or  symbolized  by  them  in  consciousness.  In  such  cases 
many  objects,  which  may  be  of  wholly  different  sorts,  are  rep- 
resented by  a  single  particular  idea  or  by  the  parts  of  a  partic- 
ular idea;  and  by  this  means  the  idea  acquires  "representa- 
tive universality." 

This  view  of  the  nature  of  the  idea,  which  we  owe  to  experi- 
mental investigation,  is  wholly  difTerent  from  the  naive  view 
of  the  older  psychology  which  regarded  ideas  simply  as  copies 
of  particular  things.  It  follows  that  an  idea  is  not  a  simple 
revival  of  a  definitely  perceived  tiling  but  is  always  the 
product  of  many  perception^  and  of  their  subjective  elabor- 
ation by  the  perceiver.  Hence  every  memory-image  repre- 
sents a  greater  or  lesser  degree  of  subjective  transformation  and 
free  combination  of  impressions  derived  from  perception. 
Applied  to  memory  this  means  that  memorial  activity  does 
not  consist  in  a  simple  revival  of  ideas  of  a  former  object;  but 
that  in  every  reproduction  of  an  idea,  mernory  is  always  influ- 
enced by  numerous  former  perceptions,  by  other  remem- 
brances, and  by  a  su^ective  elaboration  of  former  impressions. 

From  this  it  may  be  inferred  that  particular  memory-ideas 
cannot  be  traced  back  to  particular  dispositions  in  any  such 
fashion  as  to  make  each  memorially  imprinted  idea  correspond 
to  a  single,  definite  disposition;  on  the  contrary,  numerous 
traces  or  after-effects  or  dispositions  of  former  impressiooMk 


v^ 


12  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ideas,  and  the  like  co-operate  in  every  reproduction  of  an 
idea.  Of  course,  this  nature  of  the  memory-idea  renders 
untenable  the  naive  view  of  certain  psychologists,  according 
to  whom  particular  ideas  have  their  seat  in  particular  nerve- 
cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex.  Such  a  complex  functional  process 
as  the  physiological  correlate  or  correlates  of  an  idea  cannot 
take  place  in  a  single  nerve-element. 

It  is  evident  that  our  envisagement  of  the  idea  itself  has 
been  profoundly  modified  by  modern  psychology.  Thus  we 
know  that  any  illustration  such  as  V,  V%  V%  etc.,  which 
represents  the  successive  appearances  of  an  idea  in  conscious- 
ness by  means  of  a  series  of  mathematical  symbols  is  a  purely 
schematic  representation,  because  ideas  are  by  no  means  such 
clear-cut  and  sharply  defined  structures  as  these  symbols 
might  lead  one  to  suppose.^ 

We  know  too  that  in  their  successive  recurrences  to  con- 
sciousness ideas  appear  in  changed  form.\  Every  idea  is  com- 
posed of  a  greater  or  lesser  number  of  partial  ideas ;  and  now 
one,  now  another  of  the  components  stands  out  more  prom- 
inently in  consciousness,  as  a  result  of  the  context  in  which 
it  appears,  or  of  the  direction  in  which  the  attention  is  turned, 
or  of  the  emotion  which  dominates  us  at  the  moment.  Hence 
the  manner  in  which  the  same  idea  comes  to  consciousness 
varies  from  time  to  time.  The  pattern  of  these  changes  is 
not  to  be  envisaged  in  the  form  of  clear-cut  units  arranged  as 
a  series  of  discrete  terms,  such  as  is  represented  by  the  schema 
V,  V,  V%  etc.;  ideas  are  of  a  fluid  character,  and  we  fre- 
quently find  that  there  is  a  constant  transition  from  one  into 
another.  It  is  only  when  the  course  of  thought  changes 
abruptly,   or  when  new  impressions  force '  their  way  into 


f 


^  The  whole  Herbartian  doctrine  of  association  and  reproduction  is 
sed  upon  schematic  seriations  of  clearly  demarcated  ideas;  no  such 
as  are  ever  found  in  the  realm  of  reality. 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  13 

consciousness,  or  when  something  "occurs"  to  us  that  ideas 
or  groups  of  ideas  possess  this  characteristic  of  sharp  demar- 
cation from  the  other  ideas  which  dominated  us  at  the  mo- 
ment of  interruption.  But  that  does  not  happen  in  ordinary 
cases  of  recollecting  and  imagining;  here  the  stream  of  ideas 
continually  pass  over  into  one  another,  as  we  shall  see  in 
greater  detail  later.  l^ 

Even  more  complete  than  the  transformation  in  our  mean- 
ing of  the  idea  has  been  the  transformation  which  modern 
psychology  has  made  in  the  meaning  of  laws  of  association 
and  reproduction, — that  is,  the  laws  which  govern  the  appear- 
ing, the  combining,  and  the  recalHng  of  ideas, — which  were 
regarded  as  the  essential  basis  of  memory.  Attempts  have 
been  made  to  reduce  the  number  of  the  laws  of  association 
by  tracing  them  all  back  to  a  single  fundamental  law;  and 
the  meaning  of  the  term  has  itself  been  modified  in  that,  the 
laws  no  longer  refer  to  inter-connections  between  discrete  and 
sharply  demarcated  ideas,  but  to  the  phenomena  which 
constitute  the  fundamental  basis  of  these  inter-connections, 
that  is,  to  the  establishment  of  dispositions  to  revival.  The 
older  psychology  assumed  that  memorial  activity  is  to  be 
explained  by  means  of  laws  of  association.  These  laws  have 
prevailed  in  psychology  for  upwards  of  two  thousand  years; 
but  experimental  investigation  has  shown,  in  recent  years, 
that  but  sHght  importance  attaches  to  them.  The  laws  were 
formulated  by  Aristotle;  and  they  were  retained  intact  by 
the  mediaeval  philosophers.  At  the  beginning  of  modern 
philosophy  we  find  them  again  in  the  systems  of  Hobbes  and 
of  Locke.  They  were  developed  in  detail  by  Hume,  and  they 
constituted  a  dogma  of  the  English  School  of  Association 
Psychologists.  Since  Hume  these  laws  have  usually  been 
formulated  as  follows:  Ideas  enter  into  association  with  one 
another    i.   when  they  are  contiguous  in  space  or  in  time, 


14  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

(law  of  spatial  or  temporal  contiguity);  2.  when  they 
resemble  one  another,  (law  of  siixdlarity) ;  3.  when  they  are 
in  contrast  with  one  another,  (law  of  contrast) ;  and  4.  when 
they  stand  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  (law  of  cause 
and  effect).  The  law  of  cause  and  effect  is  now  regarded  as 
superfluous;  and  the  law  of  contrast  is  held  to  be  but  a  special 
case  of  the  law  of  similarity  because  similar  ideas  are  always, 
in  some  degree,  different  or  in  contrast.  The  law  of  similarity 
is  usually  reduced  to  the  law  of  contiguity  because  when 
similar  ideas  are  similar  by  reason  of  the  presence  of  common 
components  in  each,  an  apparent  reproduction  by  similarity 
may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  common  components  of  the 
two  ideas  constitute  a  bridge  by  means  of  which  conscious- 
ness passes  over  from  one  to  the  other.  But  these  common 
components  are  associated,  by  contiguity,  with  the  other 
components  of  each  idea.  Hence,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
have  reproduction  by  similarity  only  in  so  far  as  result  is 
concerned;  from  the  point  of  view  of  process,  it  is  a  repro- 
duction by  contiguity. 

Of  all  these  laws  of  association  only  that  of  contiguity  is 
admitted  by  most  modern  psychologists;  but  it  is  easy  to 
show  that  this  law  too  is  wholly  inadequate.  The  law  states 
that  ideas  enter  into  association  as  a  result  of  their  having 
been  in  consciousness  simultaneously  or  in  immediate  suc- 
cession. Now  it  may  readily  be  shown  that  all  ideas  which 
were  present  in  consciousness  simultaneously  or  in  immedi- 
ate succession,  do  not,  by  any  means,  become  associated  and 
do  not  subsequently  reproduce  one  another.  After  seeing  a 
painting  or  a  landscape  I  am  far  from  being  able  to  reproduce 
their  complete  details,  although  all  of  these  details  were  pic- 
tured upon  my  retina  and  were  present  simultaneously  in 
my  consciousness.  This  simple  illustration  shows  that  the 
law  of  rontigiijty  is  inndequate.     It  is  evident  that  other 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  1 5 

causes  must  co-operate  in  order  to  make  simultaneity  in 
consciousness  effective  in  bringing  about  an  association  of 
ideas.  Instead  of  the  old  laws  of  association,  experimental 
psychology  demonstrates  the  special  conditions  under  which 
the  association  and  reproduction  of  ideas  take  place.  In  our 
investigations  of  memory  we  discover  the  exact  conditions 
of  association;  and  in  the  reproductions  to  which  we  have 
recourse  as  a  test  of  retention  we  discover  the  exact  conditions 
of  reproduction.  These  experiments  enable  us  to  formulate 
new  laws  of  association  and  reproduction  which  specify  these 
conditions. 

A  statement  of  these  conditions  and  laws  must  include 
three  factors: 

I.  The  conditions  of  imprinting  and  associating  the  con- 
tents of  consciousness,  or  the  establishment  of  dispositions. 
These  are  the  conditions  of  association  in  the  narrower  sense. 
Both  of  these  phenomena, «|he  formation  of  dispositions  to 
a  subsequent  revival  of  id^,  and  the  connecting  of  an  idea 
with  other  contents  of  consciousness, — may  be  designated  by 
a  single  term:  the  combining  capacity  or  the  associative 
valence  of  the  contents  of  consciousness. 

II.  The  conditions  of  revival  of  mental  processes,  or  the 
coming  into  operation  of  the  dispositions.  These  are  the 
conditions  of  reproduction  in  the  narrower  sense. 

III.  The  conditions  of  forgetting,  or  the  gradual  fading  of 
ideas  and  the  breaking  down  of  associations  and  the  cessation 
of  operation  of  dispositions. 

The  first  and  the  second  of  these  conditions  may  be  brack- 
eted together  as  conditions  of  retention;  and  they  may  be 
set  over  against  the  third,  which  concerns  the  conditions  of 
forgetting. 

I.  The  fundamental  conditions  of  association  in  the  narrow 
sense  are  to  be  found   i.   in  the  temporal  factors  which  come 


1 6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

into  operation  in  association;  it  was  chiefly  these  which  the 
old  law  of  contiguity  attempted  to  specify.  The  temporal 
factors  of  association  are  reducible  to  three:  a.  Every  men- 
tal process  must  have  a  certain  minimal  duration  in  conscious- 
ness, if  it  is  to  estabHsh  a  disposition  to  revival  or  an  asso- 
ciation with  other  contents  of  consciousness.  We  sometimes 
fail  to  retain  fleeting  impressions  in  memory  because  of  their 
momentary  character,  b.  Every  mental  process  must  recur  to 
consciousness  a  certain  number  of  times  if  security  of  retention 
is  to  be  attained.  Impressions  which  have  been  present  to 
consciousness  but  once  are,  in  many  cases,  wholly  forgotten 
unless  they  made  a  strong  appeal  to  the  attention  or  to  the 
feelings,  c.  The  rhythmic  recurrence  of  impressions  and 
ideas  tends  to  reinforce  their  retention.  When  words  or 
tones  are  repeated  in  rhythm  they  are  much  more  durably 
imprinted  upon  consciousness.  These  three  conditions  of 
association  also  constitute  three  fundamental  conditions  for 
increasing  the  permanence  of  associations  and  the  valence  or 
strength  of  dispositions  because  the  longer  a  mental  process 
is  present  in  consciousness,  and  the  more  frequently  and  the 
more  rhythmically  it  returns  to  consciousness,  the  more 
intensive  is  its  effect  upon  memory. 

2.  A  second  group  of  conditions  of  association  is  the 
product  of  the  part  played  by  attention  in  the  processes  of 
consciousness.  The  direction  of  our  attention  to  any  content 
of  consciousness  endows  that  content  with  a  greater  associa- 
tive capacity  or  valence.^The  well-known  fact  that  attention 
is  a  significant  factor  in  associative  learning  is  due  chiefly  to 
this  phenomenon. 

J,  A  third  group  of  conditions  of  association  is  due  to  the 
influence  of  the  feelings;  here  too  is  to  be  included  the  influ- 
ence of  the  organic  sensations  which  originate  in  the  internal 
organs  of  the  body  and  which  are  intimately  connected  with 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  1 7 

the  feelings.  Every  experience  which  was  attended  by  more 
or  less  intensive  feeling  or  emotion  becomes  ipso  facto  endowed 
with  greater  associative  power.  It  is  a  f amihar  fact  that  occur- 
rences which  were  intensively  tinged  with  emotion  are  remem- 
bered more  readily  and  in  more  complete  detail;  a  single 
component  idea, — for  instance,  some  person  who  was  con- 
cerned in  such  an  occurrence, — may  suffice  to  recall  the 
whole  occurrence  to  consciousness.  In  the  domain  of  intel- 
lect, however,  our  feelings  manifest  themselves  chiefly  in  the 
form  of  our  ''interest"  in  certain  matters;  and  interest  is 
one  of  the  most  fundamental  conditions  of  impression  and 
association.  The  extraordinary  significance  which  attaches  to 
interest  in  the  imprinting  of  impressions  and  ideas  upon  the 
mind  of  the  child  has  always  been  a  matter  of  prime  importance 
in  pedagogy.  Nagy  has  recently  called  attention  to  the  sig- 
nificance of  interest  in  the  memorial  work  of  children.^ 

The  second  and  the  third  conditions  are  also  significant 
for  increasing  and  reinforcing  associations.  The  associative 
power  or  valence  of  a  content  of  consciousness  increases  with 
increase  of  attention  devoted  to  it,  and  with  increase  of 
emotion  or  interest  aroused  by  it.  There  are,  however,  certain 
extreme  conditions  of  internal  excitation  which  constitute  an 
exception  to  this  rule.  When  the  concentration  of  attention 
and  the  intensity  of  emotion  exceed  a  certain  limit  they  may 
bring  about  a  decrease  of  associative  capacity;  indeed  they 
may  give  rise  to  a  complete  inhibition  of  association.  It 
seems  probable  that  in  such  cases  the  extraordinary  degree  of 
internal  excitation  consumes  an  excess  of  psycho-physical  en- 
ergy, which  is  withdrawn  from  the  intellectual  processes.  In 
mental  pathology  those  groups  of  ideas  which  are  accompanied 
by  intensive  emotions  and  are,  at  the  same  time,  consolidated 

*  Ladislaus  Nagy,  Die  Ent'cuickclung  des  Interesses  der  Kinder. 
Leipzig,  Otto  Nemnich,  191 2. 


1 8  The  Psychology  of  Lcarnhig 

into  groups  by  the  attendant  emotion  have  come  to  be  called 
emotionally  toned  complexes  of  ideas,  or  more  briefly  "com- 
plexes." (Jung,  Ricklin,  Bleuler,  Freud  and  others.)  That 
is,  the  component  ideas  of  any  experience  which  aroused  our 
emotion  intensively  are  consohdated  by  the  emotion  into  a 
single  idea-complex  which  now  may  itself  acquire  a  special 
significance  for  consciousness.  Occurrences  which  are  accom- 
panied by  intensive  emotions  of  unpleasantness  are  especially 
prone  to  form  such  indissoluble  complexes.  Our  remembrance 
of  a  place  where  we  had  an  especially  unpleasant  experience, 
or  of  a  person  with  whom  we  had  a  particularly  unpleasant 
altercation  may  constitute  such  a  complex.  As  soon  as  any 
fleeting  thought  of  this  place  or  of  this  person  comes  to  con- 
sciousness the  whole  unpleasant  memory-complex  tends  to 
force  itself  into  consciousness.  And  under  certain  circum- 
stances the  unpleasantness  which  attaches  to  such  an  event 
may  become  so  intensive  as  to  be  intolerable.  Pathological 
"suppressions"  may  then  ensue, — that  is,  we  suppress  our 
remembrance  of  the  event  which  may  now  disappear  so 
completely  from  consciousness  that  we  can  no  longer  remem- 
ber the  complex.  The  doctrine  of  the  "suppression"  of  un- 
pleasant memory-complexes  constitutes  an  exceedingly  impor- 
tant phase  of  modern  pathology,  especially  in  hysteria.  This 
doctrine  assumes  that  suppression  gives  rise  to  various  sorts 
of  pathological  symptoms;  it  seems  as  though  the  emotion, 
when  forcibly  suppressed,  were  seeking  to  discharge  itself  in 
some  other  fashion.^ 
The  topics  which  we  have  discussed  from  these  last  tkree 

'  An  excellent  summary  of  the  much  disputed  Freudian  theories 
appears  in  A.  Kronfeld's  monograph  "  Ueber  die  psychologischcn  The- 
orien  Freiids  tind  verwandte  Anschauungen,"  Leipzig,  191 2.  This  mon- 
ograph may  be  found  in  the  Archiv  filf  die  gesamte  Psychologic,  XXII., 
1912,  130-248. 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  19 

points  of  view  constitute  groups  of  memorial  conditions 
because  temporal  relations,  attention,  emotion  and  interest 
are  themselves  complex  phenomena;  and  they  may  exercise 
their  influence  upon  association  in  very  different  ways.  But 
a  detailed  discussion  of  this  topic  would  carry  us  too  far 
afield  into  the  general  psychology  of  memory  and  its  special 
problems. 

All  of  these  conditions  of  association  may  function  for  one 
another,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  in  a  vicarious  or  surrogate 
fashion;  and  this  is  exceedingly  important  for  the  economy 
and  technique  of  memory.  For  instance,  the  fleeting  and 
momentary  character  of  an  impression  may  be  compensated, 
in  part,  by  increased  concentration  of  attention;  frequency 
of  repetition,  intensity  of  emotional  accompaniment  and  con- 
centration of  attention  are,  to  some  extent,  mutually  equiv- 
alent and  interchangeable  factors. 

II.  The  special  conditions  of  reproduction  in  the  narrower 
sense  may  also  be  sub-divided  into  two  chief  groups: 

I.  Subsequent  reproductions  or  revivals  of  contents  of 
consciousness  depend,  of  course,  upon  all  of  the  factors 
which  contributed  to  the  formation  of  associations.  Hence 
all  three  of  the  conditions  of  association  which  we  have 
described  are  also  conditions  of  reproduction.  Every  former 
association  into  which  an  idea  has  entered  endows  the  idea 
with  a  tendency  to  reproduction.  These  tendencies  are  of 
two  sorts:  a.  When  an  idea  enters  into  associative  connection 
with  other  ideas  its  own  tendency  to  reproduction  is  increased 
because  each  of  its  associates  may  now  recaU  it  to  conscious- 
ness. This  we  may  call  a  passive  reproduction  tendency. 
h.  In  forming  associations  with  other  ideas  an  idea  acquires  a 
tendency  to  recall  its  associates  to  consciousness.  This  may 
be  called  an  active  reproduction  tendency.  No  explanation 
of  the  appearance  of  an  idea  in  consciousness  in  any  partic- 


20  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ular  case  can  be  adequate  unless  both  sorts  of  reproduction 
tendency  are  taken  into  consideration. 

Every  idea  may  enter  into  numerous  associations  with 
other  ideas;  and  these  associations  may  differ  in  strength 
and  stability.  Hence  in  explaining  any  particular  case  of 
reproduction  we  must  consider  both  the  sum  of  reproduction 
tendencies  possessed  by  an  idea,  and  the  manner  in  which 
these  tendencies  co-operate  with  one  another.  The  com- 
bined action  of  reproduction  tendencies  depends,  in  part,  upon 
their  content,  and  in  part  upon  their  intensity  or  strength. 
For  instance,  my  idea  of  Schiller  has  entered  into  numerous 
associative  connections  with  other  ideas.  On  hearing  the 
name  Schiller  I  may  think  of  his  youthful  adventures,  of  the 
storm  and  stress  period,  of  classicism  in  poetry,  of  the  roman- 
tic school  of  poets,  of  Schiller's  relations  with  Goethe;  I  may 
think  of  Schiller's  ideaHstic  philosophy, of  his  views  on  aesthet- 
ics, and  the  hke;  I  may  think  of  such  places  as  Weimar  and 
Jena.  Each  of  these  associations  constitutes  a  reproduction 
tendency  which  attaches  to  the  name  of  Schiller;  and  accord- 
ing to  the  context  in  which  the  idea  of  Schiller  comes  to  my 
consciousness  one  or  other  of  these  reproduction  tendencies 
may  become  effective,  either  singly  or  in  co-operation  with 
other  tendencies.  Which  of  these  tendencies  shall  become 
effective  in  a  given  case  depends  upon  the  totality  of  possible 
conditions  of  reproduction,  and  upon  the  content  and  the 
strength  of  the  reproduction  tendencies  which  attach  to  the 
name  Schiller.  Hence  it  may  even  happen  that  when  I  hear 
the  name  Schiller  apart  from  any  definite  context,  as  is 
ordinarily  the  case  in  association  experiments,  so  many  repro- 
duction tendencies  of  this  word  may  crowd  into  consciousness 
together  that  they  may  inhibit  one  another;  and  I  may  be 
unable,  for  a  moment,  to  give  expression  to  an  appropriate 
idea  for  the  very  reason  that  the  name  possesses  such  a 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  21 

wealth  of  associations.  This  phenomenon  of  mutual  inhi- 
bition of  reproduction  tendencies  which  come  into  operation 
simultaneously  is  frequently  observed  in  psychological  exper- 
iments. Matters  are  faciUtated  if  we  give  the  observer  a 
particular  point  of  view  from  which  he  is  to  respond  by  repro- 
ducing a  word  when  he  hears  the  stimulus-word.  For  instance, 
we  may  ask:  Where  was  Schiller  born?  Where  did  he  meet 
Goethe? 

The  several  reproduction  tendencies  of  an  idea  may  rein- 
force one  another;  they  may  inhibit  one  another;  or  their 
effect  upon  one  another  may  be  in  part  reinforcing,  and  in 
part  inhibitory.  In  the  latter  case  opposing  tendencies  may 
appear,  giving  rise  to  "sHps  of  the  tongue,"  "slips  of  the  pen," 
and  the  like.  In  an  association  experiment  I  once  responded 
to  the  stimulus-word  "picture,"  with  the  apparently  mean- 
ingless reaction-word  "Rumens."  This  phenomenon  was  due 
to  the  presence  of  an  idea-complex  which  possessed  two 
reproduction  tendencies.  A  short  time  before  I  had  been 
engaged  in  a  dispute  with  an  acquaintance  regarding  the 
frame  {Rahmen)  of  a  painting  by  Rubens,— which  was  to  me 
unpleasing.  The  remembrance  of  this  incident  made  itself 
felt  in  two  reproduction  tendencies,— a  tendency  to  repro- 
duce the  word  Rahmen  and  the  word  Rubens,  and  this  mixed 
tendency  gave  rise  to  the  reproduction  of  the  word  "Rumens." 

2.  A  second  group  of  conditions  of  reproduction  includes 
two  classes,  both  of  which  are  characterized  by  the  fact  that 
they  are  not  due  to  the  operation  of  former  associations.  A 
chief  error  of  the  older  psychology  of  memory  consisted  in 
supposing  that  ideas  can  return  to  consciousness  only  in 
consequence  of  their  associations.  It  is  now  known  that  this 
view  is  untenable  because,  on  the  one  hand,  the  reproduction 
of  a  particular  idea  in  a  particular  case  is  due  not  to  pre- 
viously acquired  associations  but  quite  as  much  to  factors 


22  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

which  have  to  do  with  the  present  state  of  consciousness; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  in  certain  instances  observe 
the  operation  of  a  wholly  different  set  of  conditions  of  repro- 
duction which  render  possible  the  appearance  in  conscious- 
ness of  "detached"  or  Jreisteigende  ideas.  The  former  class 
of  conditions  may  be  referred  to  as  conditions  which  have  to 
do  with  constellations  and  with  the  state  of  consciousness. 
Here  are  to  be  included  those  conditions  of  reproduction 
which  are  due  to  the  momentary  state  of  the  individual  and 
to  the  momentary  constellation  or  composition  of  conscious- 
ness. The  latter  class  of  conditions  may  be  designated  as 
inducing  or  actualizing  conditions  in  order  to  distinguish 
them  from  previous  associations.  The  modern  psychology 
of  memory  contains  numerous  references  to  these  non-asso- 
ciative conditions  of  reproduction,  but  their  nature  is  still 
obscure. 

a.  What  particular  idea  shall  appear  in 'consciousness  in 
any  particular  case  is  a  matter  which  is  not  determined  solely 
by  the  associative  connections  possessed  by  the  ideas  which 
are  present  at  the  moment;  quite  as  much  influence  is  exerted 
by  the  general  condition  of  the  individual,  his  freshness  or 
fatigue,  the  fact  that  he  is  well-disposed  or  ill-disposed,  the 
total  group  of  impressions  and  ideas  which  are  clearly  or 
obscurely  present  to  his  consciousness,  his  feelings,  and  every- 
thing else  that  may  be  designated  as  his  conscious  constella- 
tion. Hence  the  constellation  conditions  of  reproduction 
include,  as  the  term  indicates,  the  combined  action  of  all  of 
the  non-associative  factors  which  may  acquire  an  influence 
upon  reproduction  at  the  moment  when  reproduction  takes 
place;  this  embraces  all  the  feehngs,  efforts,  ideas,  impres- 
sions, and  the  hke,  which  make  themselves  felt  at  the  moment, 
and  to  these  must  be  added  the  general  condition  of  the  indi- 
vidual.    The  detailed  investigation  of  these  conditions  of 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory '  23 

reproduction  is  one  of  the  future  problems  of  psychology.  At 
present  we  are  in  possession  of  relatively  few  experimental 
observations  which  can  give  us  an  insight  into  these  exceed- 
ingly complicated  conditions  of  reproduction. 

h.  The  apparently  "free"  emergence  into  consciousness  of 
a  (detached)  idea  is  a  phenomenon  which  is  equally  incapable 
of  being  explained  from  former  associations.  And  this  phe- 
nomenon also  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently  investigated;  its 
existence,  however,  can  not  be  doubted.  Ideas  come  into 
consciousness  through  the  medium  of  their  former  associa- 
tions, without  being  aroused  by  the  dominant  ideas  of  the 
moment;  on  the  contrary,  they  break  in  upon  the  prevailing 
train  of  ideas.  The  only  point  concerning  which  there  can 
be  any  doubt  is  the  question  as  to  whether  they  are  not  to  be 
explained  from  a  compHcated  co-operation  of  manifold  factors 
of  association.  Meanwhile  it  is  important  to  describe  these 
phenomena,  making  a  clear  distinction  between  the  specific 
nature  of  this  phenomenon  of  alleged  "free"  ideas  and  the 
question  as  to  whether  they  can  be  explained.  These  two 
problems  are  not  always  distinguished  with  sufficient  clear- 
ness in  psychology.  For  instance,  although  G.  E.  Miiller  has 
established  the  existence  of  phenomena  like  perseverations  as 
facts,  this  does  not  prove  that  they  constitute  a  special  cause 
of  reproduction.  These  considerations  will  be  more  readily 
understood  if  we  cite  the  four  cases  in  which  an  apparently 
free  emergence  of  ideas  can  be  established :  perseveration,  per- 
sistence, iteration  and  automatic  reproduction  (or  reproduc- 
tion as  a  result  of  automatization). 

G.  E.  Miiller  employs  the  term  perseveration  to  designate 
the  following  phenomenon:  An  idea  upon  which  we  have 
concentrated  our  attention  acquires  the  capacity  to  re-enter 
consciousness  immediately  thereafter  and  even  to  break  in 
upon  the  course  of  ideas  to  which  we  have  meanwhile  directed 


24  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

our  attention,  although  it  seems  to  derive  no  associative  sup- 
port from  the  ideas  which  dominate  us  at  the  time  of  its  re- 
entrance.  For  instance,  words  or  syllables  which  we  have 
learned  in  a  memory  experiment  may  subsequently  force 
their  way  into  consciousness  while  we  are  applying  ourselves 
to  the  learning  or  the  reciting  of  a  wholly  new  group  of  syl- 
lables or  words.  Phenomena  like  the  following  are  more 
familiar/ After  reading  an  unpleasant  letter  and  returning 
to  our  work  we  frequently  find  that  the  remembrance  of  the 
letter  interrupts  our  work;  and  the  interruption  may  recur 
again  and  again  with  irresistible  force.  Such  a  remembrance 
(^  has  acquired  persgyesative  power;  it  persists  in  consciousness 
with  its  reproSuctive  tendency,  and  it  breaks  in  upon  our 
prevailing  ideas  although  it  is  not  supported  by  any  associ- 
ative connections  with  them.  In  such  cases  the  entrance  of 
the  unwelcome  idea  seems  to  be  a  "free  emergence,"  because 
it  seems  to  break  in  upon  us  instead  of  being  introduced  in 
an  associative  manner. 

I  cannot  here  discuss  the  difficult  problem  as  to  whether 
such  phenomena  as  perseveration  are  really  incapable  of 
being  explained  from  the  general  laws  of  association.  I  can 
only  point  out  that  in  the  most  of  the  phenomena  of  this 
sort  which  have  been  described  it  is  not  difficult  to  find  an 
explanation  from  the  general  laws  of  association.  The  remem- 
brances of  the  unpleasant  letter  may  have  acquired  their 
reproductive  tendencies  from  the  fact  that  the  emotion  and 
the  mood  produced  by  the  letter,  and  the  concomitant  organic 
sensations  continued  to  persist  after  I  returned  to  my  work; 
and  the  memory-ideas  were  reproduced  from  this  lower 
stratum  of  consciousness  which  had  become  intimately  asso- 
ciated with  the  ideas  of  the  letter.  This  mode  of  reproduc- 
tion would  be  possible  so  long  as  the  mood  persisted.  The 
intrusion  of  syllables  and  words  in  memory  experiments  may 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  25 

be  explained  from  the  fact  that  the  general  situation  has  re- 
mained unchanged  in  the  two  experiments,  and  that  the  new- 
syllables  and  words  contain  numerous  points  of  similarity 
with  the  old.  But  however  that  may  be,  we  do  not  wish  to 
discuss  the  causes  of  "free"  ideas  here;  we  can  only  describe 
the  various  cases  of  "free  emergence"  as  such.  And  in  doing 
so,  it  is  important  to  define  more  clearly  the  meaning  of  per- 
severation or  persistence  of  ideas  because  the  term  has  been 
employed  to  include  wholly  different  phenomena. 
I  I.  By  perseveration  I  mean  only  that  emergence  of  ideas 
which  consists  in  the  fact  that  shortly  after  an  idea  has  dis- 
appeared from  consciousness  it  possesses  the  capacij:y  to  force 
its  way  into  consciousness  again,  and  to  interrupt  the  pre- 
vailing course  of  ideas.  The  essential  conditions  for  this  are 
that  we  have  concentrated  our  attention  long  and  intensely 
upon  the  idea,  that  the  idea  has  excited  our  feelings  inten- 
sively, and  that  the  circumstances  which  formerly  brought 
about  the  reproduction  are  still,  at  least  partially,  present. 

2.  By  persistence  I  mean  a  wholly  different  phenomenon.  It 
designates  the  fact  that  under'  certain  circumstances, — for 
instance,  when  we  are  fatigued  or  otherwise  unfavorably 
disposed  in  body  or  in  mind, — our  ideas  and  our  acti\'ities 
tend  to  become  repetitive  and  persistent  because  we  no 
longer  possess  sujBficient  energy  to  apprehend  difTerences  or 
to  react  in  a  discriminating  fashion.  In  experiments  dealing 
with  the  reproduction  of  ideas,,  a  fatigued  observer  tends  to 
acquire  a  persistent,  form  of  verbal  apprehension,— mere 
successions  of  auditory  ideas  with^iut  meaning, — or  a  stereo- 
typed form  of  verbal  response, — rh>3nes  or  transpositions. 

J.  The  phenomenon  of  iteration  is  diiTerent  from  both  of 
the  foregoing.  It  designates  the  fact  that  ideas  force  their 
way  into  consciousness  and  tend  to  break  in  upon  the  pre- 
vailing course  of  ideas,  which  is  then  characterized  by  a 


26  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

frequent  repetition  of  the  same  ideas.  It  ordinarily  appears 
in  the  form  of  a  repeated  intrusion  of  melodies,  of  rhymes, 
or  even  phrases  or  single  words  which  persist  in  "running 
throu'^jh  one's  mind." 

4.  A  fourth  phenomenon  of  this  group  is  the  free  emergence 
of  ideas  as  the  result  of  an  automatization  and  mechanization 
of  psycliical  and  psycho-physical  functions.  It  manifests  it- 
self most  frequently  in  the  motor  domain,  where  the  role 
of  the  automatized  and  mechanized  functions  is  especially 
noticeable.  At  times  its  effects  seem  to  be  identical  with 
those  of  iteration;  but  it  seems  to  be  due  to  a  wholly  different 
complex  of  causes.  Its  origin  is  invariably  to  be  found  in  the 
frequent  execution  of  activities  which  thereby  become  com- 
pletely automatized.  For  instance,  certain  manipulations  of 
apparatus  have  to  be  repeated  over  and  over  again  in  an 
experiment.  When  a  second  experiment  is  undertaken  we 
involuntarily  repeat  the  manipulations  of  the  former  experi- 
ment. *  Similar  phenomena  may  be  observed  after  shifting 
from  any  activity  in  which  facility  may  be  acquired;  if  after 
conversing  in  French  we  be<rin  a  conversation  in  German,  we 
soon  find  that  we  have  invc-,  ntarily  dropped  back  into  the 
use  of  French. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind,  bowever,  that  all  of  the  laws  of 
association  and  reproduction,  as  well  as  of  the  conditions  of 
memory  in  general,  are  probably  quite  as  valid  for  motor 
as  for  intellectual  processes;  and  hence  we  may  speak  of 
motor  memory  and  of  motor  reproduction.  A  familiar  illus- 
tration is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of  the  practised  pianist. 
His  fingers  are  able  correctly  and  automatically  to  hit  upon 
the  most  appropriate  fingering  even  for  the  different  scales. 

The  terminology  which  is  customarily  employed  in  the 
psychology  of  memory  is  not  wholly  free  from  objection.  The 
term  reproduction  of  ideas  is  misleading  in  that  the  reproduc- 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Memory  27 

tion  of  an  idea  is  not  always  the  mere  revival  of  a  former 
idea.  Unfortunately  we  also  employ  the  term  reproduction 
to  designate  the  free  activity  of  combination  which  is  char- 
acteristic of  productive  imagination  and  thinking,  and  which 
is  essentially  a  matter  of  new  combinations  of  ideas.  And 
even  the  purely  memorial  reproductions  of  former  ideas  are 
genuine  reproductions  only  in  very  rare  instances;  here,  too, 
as  a  rule,  the  impressions  and  ideas  derived  from  our  former 
experience  have  been  re-shaped  and  re-cast.  It  is  incorrect 
to  employ  but  a  single  term  to  designate  all  of  these  varieties 
of  emergence  phenomena.  Moreover,  our  extension  of  the 
meaning  of  the  term  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  designate 
specifically  the  genuine  recurrence  of  any  idea  where  it  is 
our  intention  and  purpose  to  re-experience  the  idea  in  un- 
changed form.  I  shall,  therefore,  apply  the  term  reproduction 
only  to  those  cases  of  appearance  of  ideas  where  a  genuine 
revival  of  former  ideas  actually  occurs,  and  where  the  inten- 
tion to  revive  and  not  to  re-combine  is  present.  My  general 
expression  for  the  entrance  of  ideas  into  consciousness  will 
therefore#iot  be  the  word  reproduction.  But  when  I  want  to 
emph"b.size  the  movement  aspec„  of  ideas  I  shall  employ  the 
terms  "emergence"  or  "entrance"  (or  actualization)  of  ideas 
into  consciousness;  and  when  1  have  in  mind  any  sort  of 
spontaneous  activity  on  the  part  of  the  individual  I  shall 
employ  the  term  "evoking"  (calling  up)  of  ideas. 

The  meaning  of  laws  of  association  has  undergone  a  second 
change.  If  the  nature  of  memory  is  conceived  to  consist  not 
in  some  sort  of  a  storing  of  ideas,  but  in  the  forming  of  dispo- 
sitions to  their  more  ready  revival, — or  expressed  more  gen- 
erally and  more  correctly,  in  the  forming  of  dispositions  to  a 
more  ready  revival  of  everything  that  has  ever  been  present 
to  consciousness, — it  follows  from  this  fundamental  view  that 
the  laws  of  association  and  reproduction  are  to  be  regarded  ( 


28  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

as  laws  which  have  to  do  with  the  formation  and  the  oper- 
ation of  memorial  dispositions.  The  actual  fixative  and  re- 
tentive function  of  memory  must  then  be  regarded  as  con- 
sisting in  the  establishing  and  reinforcing  of  these  dispositions; 
and  the  effect  of  memorial  activity, — that  is,  the  reappearance 
of  former  ideas  in  consciousness,  or  the  more  ready  revival  of 
former  impressions  or  actions, — is  then  to  be  conceived  as  a 
realization  or  actualization  of  dispositions  which  have  been 
formed  at  some  previous  time. 

Hence  all  causes,  conditions  and  laws  of  memorial  function 
are  to  be  represented  as  causes,  conditions  and  laws  of  the 
formation  of  dispositions  and  of  the  actualization  or  coming 
into  operation  of  dispositions.  VThe  whole  psychology  of 
memory  may  then  be  developed  in  the  form  of  a  doctrine  of 
the  laws  of  the  estabhshment  and  the  operation  of  memorial 
dispositions. 

But  however  logical  and  consistent  may  be  our  presenta- 
tion of  a  psychology  of  memory  in  terms  of  the  formation  and 
operation  of  dispositions,  it  suffers  from  one  serious  defect. 
It  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  psychology  of  the  futurf  because 
the  nature  of  these  dispositions  is  but  slightly  known  a5  yet. 
The  introduction  of  such  concepts  as  increase  of  mass,  modi- 
fication of  structure  and  change  of  molecular  arrangement  in 
the  bodily  organs  concerned  furnishes  only  a  partial  insight 
into  their  bodily  substrates.  From  the  psychical  point  of 
view,  memorial  dispositions  consist  in  nothing  more  than 
effects  of  memorial  functioning,— in  changes  which  we  see 
manifesting  themselves  in  ideas  and  courses  of  ideas  rather 
than  in  any  "substrates"  of  ideas. 

Having  attained  this  clearer  conception  of  the  nature  of 
dispositions  we  must  now  describe  the  results  of  the  memorial 
investigations  of  the  past  in  terms  of  the  establishment  and 
the  functioning  of  dispositions;  and  the  same  mode  of  envis- 


The  Modern  Psychology  oj  Memory  29 

agement  must  direct  our  efforts  in  the  future  investigation  of 
memory.  Whenever  a  new  result  is  obtained  we  must  inquire 
whether  it  can  serve  to  define  more  definitely  the  nature  of 
the  physical  and  the  psychical  dispositions  of  memory.  But 
the  present  state  of  our  views  concerning  the  nature  of  dis- 
positions does  not  justify  us  in  presenting  the  whole  psychol- 
ogy of  memory  as  a  theory  of  dispositions  because  we  would 
either  conceive  the  dispositions  as  physiological  substrates 
of  memorial  function, — in  which  case  our  investigation  would 
be  transformed  into  a  physiology  of  memory, — or  we  would 
have  recourse  to  a  vague  and  general  conception  of  disposi- 
tions which  would  include  both  the  physical  and  the  psychical, 
—in  wliich  case  our  psychology  of  memory  would  amount 
to  nothing  more  than  a  collection  of  statements  concerning  a 
vague  and  indefinite  word.  Or  we  might  start  from  the  con- 
cept of  psycliical  dispositions, — the  only  legitimate  concept 
for  our  purposes.  From  this  starting-point  the  whole  theory 
of  dispositions  becomes  identical  with  a  psychology  of  mem- 
ory conceived  and  developed  as  a  theory  of  ideas,  combina- 
tions of  ideas,  and  revivals  of  ideas;  and  we  can  obtain  a 
knowledge  of  the  dispositions,  in  their  psychical  aspects, 
only  when  we  have  determined  what  are  their  effects  by  observ- 
ing ideas  and  the  modified  flow  of  ideas. 

In  my  opinion,  then,  a  theory  of  memory,  association  and 
reproductiopi  should  always  be  brought  into  relation  with 
the  psychical  effects  of  memorial  functioning;  and  these 
latter  may  always  be  discovered  by  an  introspective  study  of 
our  ideas  and  their  course.  But  meanwhile,  in  opposition  to 
the  older  psychology,  we  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  the  nature  of  ideas  and  of  their  modifications  is  itself 
of  a  "dispositional  character," — that  is,  that  they  are  change- 
able mental  processes  which,  under  certain  circumstances, 
may   recur    to    consciousness   in    approximately   similar    or 


30  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

identical  form,  and  that  from  the  psychological  point  of  view, 
memorial  activity  here  consists  simply  in  certain  relatively 
constant  changes  in  the  psychical  conditions  of  this  revival  of 
ideas. 

For  the  psychologist  who  seeks  to  avoid  superfluous  hypoth- 
eses, therefore,  the  doctrine  of  memory  dispositions  is  nothing 
more  than  a  theory  of  persistent  change  in  the  conditions 
under  which  ideas  may  be  reproduced  or  revived. 

It  may  be  asked :  Can  we  not  discover  the  general  nature  of 
memory  from  the  universal  tendency  of  memory  to  form 
associations  between  ideas  in  consequence  of  dispositions  to 
revival?  Here  again  the  only  satisfactory  answer  must  come 
from  the  facts  of  memory  itself.  J  We  find  that  memorial 
activity  tends  to  fuse  into  a  unitary  whole  the  elements,  im- 
pressions or  ideas  which  have  hitherto  not  been  united  for 
consciousness,  i  Hence  memory  eHminates  the  discrete  and 
disconnected  character  of  the  particular  processes  of  conscious- 
ness and  blends  them  into  one.  (The  more  perfectly  the 
associative  function  does  its  work,  the  more  nearly  does  the 
associated  group  of  ideas  become  a  completely  unitary  whole, 
and  the  more  closely  does  the  reproduction  of  such  a  group 
of  ideas  approximate  a  unitary  state  of  consciousness,  j  This 
manifests  itself  in  the  phenomenon  that  in  a  poem  which  has 
been  thoroughly  memorized  we  can  pass  directly  from  any 
part  to  any  other  part.  The  succession  of  elemdits  and  the 
successive  character  of  the  associations  have  been  eliminated ; 
we  have  attained  as  complete  a  mastery  over  such  a  perfectly 
memorized  poem  as  over  any  manifold  whose  parts  are  all 
present  to  consciousness  simultaneously.  The  poem  has 
simply  become  a  single  unit  for  consciousness.  [  And,  in  a 
series  of  nonsense-syllables  which  has  been  securely  learned, 
we  can  pass  over  equally  well  from  the  first  syllable  to  the 
second;  from  the  first  to  the  sixth,  and  from  the  first  to  the 


The  Modem  Psychology  of  Memory  31 

twelfth.  The  successive  character  of  the  syllables  has  been 
eliminated;  the  series  of  twelve  has  become  a  simultaneously 
present  unit. 

And  this  constitutes  the  ultimate  reason  for  the  phenom- 
enon that  impressions  and  ideas  which  were  formerly  discrete 
and  isolated  may  now  reproduce  "one  another."  When  such 
elements  as  German  words  and  their  Enghsh  equivalents,  or 
the  words  of  a  poem,  or  the  syllables  of  a  series  have  been  so 
thoroughly  learned  that  they  really  form  a  unit,  it  is  self- 
evident  that  when  one  part  of  these  elements  appears  the  other 
elements  must  also  appear.  The  complete  unitary  content 
of  consciousness  into  which  these  securely  associated  elements 
have  been  fused  is  revived.  Hence  the  nature  of  memory 
consists  in  its  being  a  formative  activity  which  combines 
processes  of  consciousness,  which  formerly  were  isolated,  into 
a  unitary  state  of  consciousness.  Hoffding  expressed  a  sim- 
ilar view  when  he  designated  the  "fundamental  law"  of  asso- 
ciation as  a  "law  of  totahty."^ 

If  we  carry  this  conception  over  to  the  dispositions  we  may 
say  that  the  function  of  memorial  dispositions  is  essentially 
synthetic  in  character;  their  nature  would  be  designated 
more  accurately  if  we  called  them  unifying  dispositions.  We 
might  also  describe  them  as  fusion  dispositions  because  in 
the  psychology  of  tones  the  production  of  a  unitary  content 
from  a  cifl^e  combination  of  elements  is  designated  a  psychical 
fusion,  where  the  elements  constitute  a  new  unitary  state,  it  is 
true,  but  still  they  persist  as  relatively  independent  elements, 
— for  instance,  the  tones  in  a  chord. 

III.    There  is  in  a  certain  sense  an  opposition  between  the 

conditions  and  laws  of  forgetting  and  the  conditions  and  laws 

of  retention ;  the  two  are  to  be  conceived  somewhat  as  inverse 

or  reciprocal  processes.    The  laws  of  forgetting  have  been  sub- 

*H.  HofFding,  Psychology  (trans.),  1892,  159. 


32  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

mitted  to  experimental  investigation  within  recent  years; 
special  efforts  have  been  made  to  determine  and  to  reduce 
to  definite  laws  the  progress  of  forgetting  with  the  lapse  of 
time.^  It  has  been  found  that  immediately  after  the  act  of 
learning,  the  progress  of  forgetting  is  rapid,  but  thereafter  it 
gradually  becomes  slower  and  slower.  Short  series  of  ideas 
are  forgotten  more  rapidly  than  longer  series;  long  stanzas  of 
poetry  are  remembered  better  than  short  stanzas,  all  other 
conditions  being  equal.  Efhciency  of  retention  is  improved 
by  practice  in  learning  and  reproducing. 

The  phenomena  of  forgetting  may  be  brought  into  relation 
with  the  psychology  of  dispositions.  It  would  be  conceived 
that  memorial  dispositions  gradually  decrease  in  intensity  or 
valence,  losing  their  power  to  bring  about  reproductions  and 
finally  become  "latent."  This  means  that  their  effectiveness 
is  finally  to  be  conceived  as  being  so  shght  that  one  can  no 
longer  be  sure  that  they  still  exist, — because  we  must  never 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  they  manifest  their  existence  only 
by  their  capacity  to  revive  ideas.  Nov/  since,  theoreticall}^, 
complete  forgetting  does  not  take  place  until  an  infinitely  long 
interval  of  time  has  elapsed  we  m.ust  assume  that  a  memory 
disposition,  when  once  established,  never  wholly  perishes  but 
only  becomes  infinitely  weak, — that  is,  its  effectiveness  finally 
exists  only  in  latent  form. 

But  it  must  be  admitted  that  a  dispositional  psya^ology  of 
memory  is  exceedingly  open  to  question.  In  the  first  place,  it 
brings  with  it  the  danger  of  rehabihtating  the  old  doctrine 
that  the  gradually  fading  dispositions  are  entities  which  exist 
in  concrete  and  substantial  form,  and  that  they  are  to  be 

'  H.  Ebbinghaus,  Uelcr  das  Gcdachtnis,  Leipzig,  1885.  P.  Rados- 
sawljewitsch,  Das  Fortschreiten  des  Vergcssens  mii  der  Zeit,  Gottingen, 
1907;  this  monograph  was  also  published  under  the  title  Das  Behaltcn 
und  Vergessen  bei  Kindern  und  Erwachsenen,  Leipzig,  1907. 


The  Modern  Psychology  of  Me^nory  33 

conceived  as  being  somewhat  analogous  to  physical  bodies 
which  wither  and  decay,  or  to  chemical  substances  which 
volatilize  and  decrease  in  mass.  Then,  too,  the  advocate  of 
such  a  theory  tends  j:o  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  all  that  we 
can  ever  know  of  the  phenomena  of  forgetting  is  revealed 
through  its  psychical  effects.  These  effects  consist  exclusively 
either  in  certain  modifications  which  take  place  in  the  ideas 
themselves, — they  become  more  indistinct,  more  fragmen- 
tary, less  distinguishable  from  other  ideas, — or  in  certain 
changes  which  take  place  in  the  conditions  under  which  ideas 
make  their  appearance  in  consciousness, — their  associations 
with  other  ideas  become  unstable  and  insecure,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  their  weakened  associations  they  possess  a  lesser 
tendency  not  only  to  return  passively  to  consciousness,  but 
also  to  participate  actively  in  arousing  other  ideas. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FUNCTIONS   OF  MEMORY 

Since  the  general  principles  of  memorial  functioning  have 
been  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter  we  may  now  raise  the 
question  as  to  whether  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  a  variety 
of  special  functions  within  the  general  function  of  memory. 

The  study  of  consciousness  never  reveals  the  existence  of  a 
memory  as  such;  it  can  only  reveal  the  existence  of  partic- 
ular modes  of  mental  activity  which  possess  memorial  char- 
acteristics,— such  as  the  remembering  of  concrete  objects,  the 
associative  learning  of  verbal  texts,  and  the  Hke.  These 
modes  of  activity  are  classified  under  the  heading  of  memory 
because  they  all  possess  certain  characteristics  in  common 
which  differentiate  them  from  all  other  mental  functions.  It 
is  now  our  problem  to  discuss  these  various  sorts  of  memory 
activity  which  we  too  may  call  memories,  and  then  to  answer 
the  question:  In  what  sense  may  one  speak  of  a  general 
memory  as  an  actual  fact  of  consciousness,  apart  from  and  in 
addition  to  these  several  special  memories? 

In  classifying  memories,  as  in  every  other  sort  of  classifi- 
cation, it  is  possible  to  proceed  in  various  ways,  and  to  employ 
different  principles  of  classification.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  means  employed  in  the  memorial  acquisition  of  data  we 
may  differentiate  three  chief  classes  of  memorial  function, 
which  may  be  called  i.  the  activity  of  noting  impressions 
by  means  of  observation  alone, — or  observational  learning;^ 

^  This  species  of  memorial  acquisition  {das  beobachtcnde  Merken) 
can  scarcely  be  called  learning  in  any  strict  sense  of  the  term.  We 
shall  usually  refer  to  it  as  observational  noting.  The  phenomena  of 
rational  learning  will  be  discussed  under  the  heading  of  associative 
learning;  see  Chapter  VI,  especially  pages  290-313.     Tr. 

34 


The  Functions  oj  Memory  35 

2.  the  activity  of  learning  impressions  in  consequence  of  the 
associations  into  which  they  have  entered, — or  associative 
learning;  j.  the  activity  of  remembering  experiences  in  conse- 
quence of  our  discovering  their  interrelations, — or  rational 
learning. 

J.  Observational  noting.  This  function  of  memory  comes 
into  play  when  we  imprint  the  contents  of  perception  as  such, 
— things,  persons,  the  processes  of  nature, — by  means  of 
observation  in  order  to  incorporate  them  into  our  memory. 
Its  chief  significance  in  the  school-room  is  found  in  the  object- 
lesson,  in  nature  study,  in  geography,— in  short,  wherever  / 
observation  is  the  chief  means  by  which  the  learner  acquires  1 
the  idea  that  he  imprints  upon  his  memory.  Within  the  func- 
tion of  observational  noting  we  must  recognize  differentiations 
which  are  due  to  the  emplo>Tnent  of  different  sense-organs. 
For  instance,  one  may  observe  by  means  of  vision,  hearing,/ 
smell,  taste,  or  by  means  of  the  cutaneous  and  kinaesthetic 
senses.  The  "lower"  senses  need  scarcely  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  work  of  the  school-room,  although  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  it  may  be  important  to  observe  and  to 
remember  the  taste  smd  smell  of  objects  if  they  are  to  be 
apprehended  in  complete  detail. 

Our  knowledge  of  observational  noting,  and  of  its  signifi- 
cance in  contributing  to  our  remembrances  is  due  chiefly  to 
investigations  of  sense-memory,  of  testimony,  and  of  the 
apprehension  and  impression  of  temporal  and  spatial  rela- 
tions; in  recent  years,  however,  the  function  of  observational 
notmg  has  itself  been  submitted  to  experimental  investiga- 
tion. Light  has  been  thrown  upon  this  function  by  certain 
incidental  experiments  where  the  procedure  consisted  in  ask- 
ing an  individual  to  observe  and  to  remember  a  number  of 
objects;  and  information  regarding  this  function  has  also 
been  obtained  from  the  experiences  of  every-day  life  and  of 


36  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  school-room.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  observational 
learning  comes  into  play  wherever  one  is  concerned  with  the 
imprinting  and  remembering  of  any  sensory  material  in  its 
temporal  and  spatial  relations.  Hence  not  only  are  the 
various  forms  of  object-teaching  to  be  included  under  this 
t^pe  of  memory  work,  but  even  such  activities  as  the  learning 
of  a  melody  by  hearing  or  singing  it,  the  learning  of  the 
forms  of  objects  and  of  geometrical  figures  by  drawing  them, 
and  the  like,  are  also  to  be  included  here  because  the  act  of 
observing  is  the  chief  means  of  memorial  acquisition,  and  the 
learning  of  sensory  material  is  the  chief  aim  throughout. 

2.  Associative  learning  is  that  acti\dty  of  memory  which 
might  also  be  called  verhatim  memorization  or  learning  in  the 
narrower  sense.  The  really  effective  factor  in  this  sort  of 
memorial  imprinting  is  not  sense-perception,  single  or  re- 
peated, but  the  attentive  repetition,  in  reproduced  form,  of  a 
given  series  of  ideas.  This  type  of  memorial  imprinting 
occurs  in  all  true  learning,  especially  in  memorizing  the  words 
of  a  text.  In  this  type  of  learning  in  the  narrower  sense,  the 
words  wliich  we  perceive  visually  or  orally  or  by  both  of 
these  means  serve  to  convey  meanings  to  us.  And  it  is  these 
ideas  of  meaning  and  their  logical  connections  which  we  wish 
to  retain  in  memory;  only  in  certain  borderland  cases,  as  in 
the  learning  of  historical  dates  or  foreign  vocabularies  and  in 
the  verbal  memorization  of  formulas  or  poems,  do  we  imprint 
the  words  themselves  upon  memory.  But  even  in  such  cases 
as  the  learning  of  foreign  vocabularies,  we  are  not  concerned 
with  remembering  the  sense-impressions  of  the  visual  or 
auditory  words,  together  with  all  the  incidental  circumstances 
under  which  they  were  presented  to  our  senses;  we  have  no 
desire  to  remember  the  peculiar  character  of  the  print  or  of  the 
script,  the  form  of  the  letters,  or  the  quality  and  the  cadence 
of  the  speaker's  voice;   those  are  matters  of  sense-perception 


The  Functions  of  Memory  37 

and  observational  noting.  The  perception  of  the  word  now 
serves  only  to  bring  to  consciousness  the  verbal  idea  and  its 
meaning;  hence  the  word  as  perceived  by  the  senses  is  only 
a  means  to  an  end,  an  instrument  for  the  arousal  and  imprint- 
ing of  ideas.  Here  we  never  note  the  word  itself  merely  as  a 
sound  or  as  a  picture.  In  short,  the  sensory  content  is  but  a 
means  wliich  serves  to  arouse  and  to  conjoin  an  idea  content} 
and  only  the  latter  is  imprinted  upon  memory,  the  sensory 
content  being  neither  heeded  nor  imprinted.  Thus  in  obser- 
vational noting  the  attention  is  directed  to  the  details  of  the 
sensory  content;  while  in  associative  learning  we  attend  only 
to  the  idea  ofthe  wordsVnd  their  meanings.    Several  different 


characteristics  of  associative  learning  show  that  the  direction 
of  attention  is  here  wholly  different  from  its  direction  in 
observational  noting,  and  that  the  intent  of  the  learning  and 
the  adjustment  of  attention  have  wholly  different  objective 
points  in  the  two  cases.  In  reading  a  text  or  in  listening  to 
words  which  we  read,  we  fail  to  notice  misprints  and  mis- 
pronunciations,— a  proof  that  our  attention  is  concentrated 
not  upon  words,  but  upon  the  ideas  which  they  convey.  In 
observational  noting,  on  the  other  hand,  the  accurate  appre- 
hension of  the  sensory  impressions  themselves  is  the  aim  and 
the  goal  of  the  act  of  learning. 

The  chief  means  employed  by  memory  is  therefore  different 
in  the  two  cases.    In  observational  noting  the  perception  or 
observation  itself  is  the  essential  means  of  imprinting;    in 
associati\e  learning^  on  the  contrary,  the__essential  means4 
consists  in  an  attentive  apprehension,  an  imderstanding,  and  a  \ 
repeg-ted  imprinting  of  the  Meas. 

Every  such  variation  in  purpose  and  in  means  of  learning 
brings  with  it  a  variation  in  the  whole  character  of  the  mem- 
ory process  and  a  variation  in  the  conditions  upon  which  it 
depends.    In  observational  noting  we  are  active  chiefly  in  a 


38  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

perceptual  fashion;  and  attention  comes  into  play  to  analyze 
and  dismember  the  object  perceived.  When  we  learn  by 
reading  or  by  Hstening,  we  are  active  in  an  ideational  fashion. 
And  since  our  attention  is  no  longer  directed  to  the  percep- 
tual content,  this  content  is  received  in  a  cursory  and  indif- 
ferent manner;  it  is  these  ideas  as  such,  and  particularly 
ideas  of  meanings  of  words,  which  now  dominate  our  con- 
sciousness. The  detailed  conditions  of  these  two  activities 
will  be  dealt  with  in  a  subsequent  discussion  of  the  technique 
of  observational  noting  and  of  true  learning. 

3.  Memorial  imprinting  may  be  of  a  third  sort;  it  may  be 
characterized  by  an  act  of  rational  and  reflective  apprehen- 
sion, as  when  it  deals  with  connected  contexts  of  ideas  or 
thoughts.  This  process  of  rational  combining  serves  to  im- 
print a  connected  train  of  thoughts.  This  third  type  of  learn- 
ing comes  into  play  when,  without  memorizing  it  word  for 
word,^e  endeavor  to  remember  the  content  of  a  description! 
an  anecdote,  a  scientific  treatise,  a  lecture,  or  the  like.  When 
material  of  this  sort  is  learned  verbatim,  the  associations 
between  the  words  become  the  chief  factor  upon  which  mem- 
ory relies.  It  is  characteristic  of  rational  learning,  however, 
thatijt  abandons,  in  greater  or  lesser  degree,  its  reliance  upon 
verbal  factors;  an  understanding  of  the  -concrete  or  logical 
relations  among  the  ideas  and  thoughts  now  constitutes  the 
essential  means  of  remembering  the  materialj  The  visual  and 
auditory  perception  of  the  mere  words  plays  a  less  important 
role  in  this  sort  of  imprinting  than  in  associative  learning. 
The  ideas  of  the  words,  indeed  even  the  original  order  of 
presentation  and  the  particular  meanings  which  we  attach 
to  the  words  of  the  original  text  are  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  us;  the  only  essential  thing  is  to  learn  and  subsequently  to 
reproduce  the  thoughts  or  the  context  of  ideas.  That  is,  the 
exact  form  and  the  exact  order  in  which  the  word^and  mean- 


The  Functions  of  Memory  39 

ings  of  the  original  were  arranged  becomes  a  matter  of  no 
moment  to  us;  all  that  is  required  of  us  is  that  we  shall  be 
[able  to  reproduce  in  our  own  words  a  context  of  ideas  whose 
meaning  shall  be  similar  to  the  meaning  of  the  original  textl. 
In  this  sort  of  learning  then[j:he  attention  is  directed  upon 
the  concreJte^or  coherent  train  of  thought]  not  upon  the  medium 
or  form  of  expression. 

This  is  the  method  of  learning  which  is  employed  by  the 
adult  in  dealing  with  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  material 
which  he  wishes  to  remember.  In  the  retention  of  material 
presented  to  him  through  the  medium  of  books,  magazines 
and  the  conversations  of  his  fellow-men,  he  makes  no  attempt 
to  note  accurately  the  words,  the  verbal  order,  or  the  diction; 
the  sole  purpose  of  his  endeavor  is  directed  toward  the  end 
that  he  shall  subsequently  be  able  to  reproduce  thoughts 
equivalent  in  value  and  in  meaning  to  those  expressed  in  the 
original  book  or  article  or  conversation.  Tliis  explains  'why 
the  adult  is  able  to  remember  great  masses  of  material  without 
repeated  memorizations,  while  the  child,  who  is  much  less 
able  to  rely  upon  his  logical  memory,  is  instructed  to  make  at 
least  a  partial  use  of  a  more  verbatim  type  of  learning.  As  a 
rule  the  adult,  in  his  scientific  reading  and  in  his  reflection, 
assumes  that  if  he  once  understands  a  train  of  thought,  this 
will  suffice  for  its  permanent  retention,  and  repeated  imprinting 
is  unnecessary.  However,  when  a  connected  material  has 
thus  been  learned  by  understanding  it  or  by  reflecting  upon 
it,  it  is  well  to  return  to  it  occasionally  and  refresh  the  mem- 
ory by  re\iewing  the  material  as  accurately  as  possible;  but, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  remember  much  which  has  never  been 
reviewed  in  this  manner.  This  extraordinary  capacity  of 
logical  memory  in  adults,  which  enables  the  scientist  to  retain 
almost  the  whole  body  of  knowledge  which  belongs  to  his 
science,  is  to  be  explained  chiefly  from  two  circumstances: 


40  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

a.   The  memorial  material  which  we  here  acquire  need  not 
be  learned  or  remembered  in  the  original  form  in  which  it 
was  presented.     This  saves  the  memory  a  great  mass  of 
detailed  impressions,  such  as  the  particular  words  and  the 
particular  literal  meanings  of  sentences,  their  sequence  and 
their  grammatical  form.    All  of  that  we  allow  to  drop  out  as 
useless  lumber;  we  draw  off  a  sort  of  extract  wliich  contains 
the  essential  points  in  the  development  of  the  thought.    This 
we  imprint  once  more  during  the  process  of  bringing  it  into 
relation  with  general  points  of  view,  which  again  serve  as 
clues  for  a  subsequent  re-acquisition  of  the  particular  details. 
In  this  manner  we  note  in  a  scientific  work  only  the  chief 
thoughts  and  these  in  as  brief  form  as  possible;   with  these 
as  a  starting-point  we  can  readily  reconstruct  the  content 
in  detailed  form,     h.    A  second  reason  for  the  enormous 
capacity  of  memory  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  although 
no  repetition  or  refreshing  of  the  original  content  takes  place, 
still  the  scientific  thoughts  which  we  have  once  mastered  can 
always  be  revived  and  reproduced  because  they  stand  in 
relation   with   numerous   other   contexts   of   thought.     For 
example,  when  I  have  learned  the  essential  content  of  a  work 
on  logic  or  epistemology,  certain  thoughts  contained  in  that 
work  are  recalled  to  mind  whenever  I  read  another  work 
dealing  with  a  similar  topic;  and  by  this  means  they  are  re- 
imprinted  upon  memory.    Hence  anytliing  that  has  become 
assimilated  into  the  context  of  our  conceptional  knowledge 
requires  no  verbal  or  other  detailed  renewal  because  it  has 
entered  into  numerous  logical  relations  with  other  Gonceptual 
contexts,  and  is  reproducible  through  the  medium  of  the 
latter  at  any  subsequent  time. 

From  the  second  point  of  view,  we  distinguish  between 
a.  immediate,  h.  temporary,  and  c.  permanent  retention ;  or 
more  strictly  speaking,  between  a.   the  immediate  reproduc- 


The  Functions  of  Memory  41 

tlon  of  impressions  which  have  just  been  received,  h.  reten- 
tion for  a  short  period  of  time,  after  which  the  material  is 
forgotten,  or  retention  for  a  single  given  interval,  and  c.  per- 
manent incorporation  in  memory,  which  results  irom  an 
intentiorf  to  make  a*  given  content  a  lasting  or  imperishable 
possession  of  mind.  Immediate  retention  should  rather  be 
called  the  restoration,  without  delay,  of  impressions  which 
have  not  yet  wholly  disappeared  from  consciousness;  and 
permanent  retention  might  be  called  the  delayed  revival  of 
impressions  which  had  already  disappeared  from  conscious- 
ness. The  former  represents  immediate,  the  latter,  delayed 
reproduction. 

These  distinctions  are  based  upon  general  considerations 
as  well  as  upon  experimental  observations.  They  have  been 
disputed,  it  is  true,  but,  I  beheve,  for  insufficient  reasons. 
Opponents  of  these  distinctions  usually  maintain  that  these 
three  functions  of  memory  are  not  radically  dififerent,  but 
that  transitions  may  be  found  between  immediate  and  per- 
manent retention.  That  is  self-e\adent;  but  it  does  not 
constitute  a  vahd  objection  to  the  distinction.  In  not  a  single 
instance  where  particular  functions  within  the  intellect  are 
differentiated  can  we  have  to  do  with  wholly  incomparable 
functions  which  possess  no  characteristics  in  common,  and 
which  show  no  transitions  or  gradations  from  one  into  another. 
It  is  possible,  for  instance,  to  indicate  a  great  many  char- 
acteristics which  are  common  to  memory,  to  imagination  and 
to  thought;  and  we  can  find  common  elements  and  transi- 
tional stages  in  external  and  internal  perception,  in  sensation 
and  reproduction,  etc.  It  is  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of 
psychological  classifications  that  they  cannot  refer  to  rad- 
ically different  sub-divisions  of  different  functions  because 
they  are  nothing  more  than  logical  epitomes  of  diflferentiations 
within  a  consciousness  which  is  essentially  unitary;  and  again 


42  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

if  we  make  distinctions  within  a  given  function  they  are,  after 
all,  nothing  more  than  differentiations  of  the  function  itself. 
The  objection  in  question  might  equally  well  be  urged  against 
every  sort  of  psychological  classification.  Immediate  and 
permanent  retention  are  distinguished  by  such  strikingly  dif- 
ferent characteristics  that  no  one  who  clearly  understands 
what  psychological  classification  means  can  doubt  the  validity 
of  their  differentiation. 

The  distinction  between  immediate  and  permanent  reten- 
tion is  based  upon  the  following  reasons :  I.  It  designates,  in 
the  first  place,  a  difference  in  the  intention  with  which  we 
learn  the  material  to  be  remembered.  It  may  be  our  inten- 
tion to  reproduce  it  immediately  after  the  completion  of  the 
act  of  observing  it.  This  is  the  case  when  we  attempt  to 
repeat  letters  or  numbers  which  have  been  pronounced  in 
our  presence  in  order  to  test  our  capacity  for  immediate  reten- 
tion; or  when,  on  a  question  being  asked  us,  we  attempt  to 
retain  the  question  just  long  enough  to  answer  it;  or  when  we 
read  the  names  on  shop-windows,  in  order  to  get  our  bearings 
in  the  business  section  c";  the  city,  etc.  In  none  of  these  cases 
could  any  useful  purpose  be  served  by  a  lasting  retention;  and 
in  such  cases  we  always  make  the  observation  for  immediate 
use,  and  never  retain  it  permanently,  nor  even  for  any  con- 
siderable period  of  time.  In  experimental  investigations, 
immediate  retention  is  usually  tested  by  pronouncing  letters, 
syllables,  or  words,  and  having  the  observer  speak  or  write 
them  without  delay. 

2.  A  second  characteristic  of  immediate  retention  consists 
in  the  fact  that  it  is,  to  some  extent,  a  restoration  of  the 
original  impression  which  has  by  this  time  partially  faded. 
Immediate  recall  makes  use  of  the  dying  away  of  the  original 
impression  itself,  and  hence  it  has  in  some  degree  the  charac- 
ter of  an  after-image,  as  when  a  color  stimijjus  after  QOiasing 


The  Functiofis  of  Memory  43 

to  act  upon  the  retina  is  succeeded  by  an  after-excitation  in 
the  visual  organ  and  in  the  visual  center,  and  tails  off  into  an 
after-image  which  may  last  for  several  minutes.  When  we 
concentrate  our  attention  upon  such  an  after-image  we  are 
able  to  check  its  fading  and  lengthen  its  duration  by  this 
artilicial  means.  In  a  similar  manner,  immediate  retention, — 
for  instance,  the  reproduction  of  words  which  have  just  been 
heard, — employs  all  the  particular  details  of  the  original 
impression.  I  still  seem  to  hear  the  sound  of  the  speaker's 
voice,  the  tempo,  the  rhythm,  and  the  accent;  or  if  the 
words  were  presented  visually,  all  the  details  of  the  incidental 
circumstances  which  attended  the  perception  still  remain  in 
memory,  and  are  all  made  use  of  by  immediate  retention. 
Indeed  this  persistence  of  the  complete  details  of  original 
impressions  really  constitutes  the  chief  aid  in  this  form  of 
retention.  All  of  these  concomitant  circumstances  of  the 
original  impression  fall  away  when  the  reproduction  is  delayed 
for  several  days,  weeks  or  months.  Watt  has  pointed  out 
that  lasting  retention  may  also  arrest  these  details  and  he 
urges  this  as  an  objection  to  the  v^^^t'^^'^tion  which  we  have 
made.  He  overlooks  the  fact,  however,  that  it  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  whether  these  details  may  be  revived  and  renewed,  but 
of  whether  immediate  retention  can  make  use  of  the  fading-out 
tof  the  primary  impression  itself.    This  is  the  essential  point. 

J.  And  with  this  is  connected  a  negative  characteristic  of  i 
immediate  retention.  It  is  the  only  form  of  re\'ival  of  an 
impression  which  takes  place  without  the  original  impression 
being  crowded  out  of  consciousness;  all  permanent  retention 
takes  place  after  the  original  impression  has  been  eflfaced  or 
has  been  forced  out  of  consciousness  by  other  ideas  or  per- 
ceptions. Immediate  retention  is,  therefore,  not  a  genuine 
reproduction,  but  only  a  re-inforcement  or  re-intensification  of 
the  fading  primary  impression.    Against  Watt's  objection  we 


44  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

may  also  urge  the  fact  that  one  finds  it  wholly  impossible  to 
retain  permanently  all  the  details  and  accidental  circumstances 
which  attended  the  original  impression.  It  is  a  chief  charac- 
teristic of  forgetting  that  these  non-essential  details  are  repro- 
ducible only  immediately  after  the  disappearance  of  the 
original  impression;  they  necessarily  disappear  from  memory 
afterwards.  Immediate  retention,  therefore,  still  possesses 
some  of  the  freshness  and  detail  and  completeness  of  the 
original  sense-impression  itself,  which  are  wholly  lacking  in 
the  case  of  delayed  reproduction. 

4.'  An  intensive  and  uniform  concentration  of  attention  is 
the  chief  requisite  for  immediate  retention.  The  essential 
condition  of  permanent  retention,  however,  is  a  product  of 
the  temporal  relations  of  the  process  of  imprinting,  but 
especially  of  an  adequate  duration  and  an  adequate  repetition 
of  the  impression. 

5.  The  effect  of  immediate  retention  is  peculiar  in  that  it 
lasts  for  only  a  brief  period  of  time,  and  that  it  may  readily 
be  obliterated  by  distracting  impressions.  This  indicates  that 
immediate  retention  is  really  nothing  else  than  a  re-inforce- 
ment  of  the  fading  impression.  Thus,  in  experiments  dealing 
with  the  compass  of  immediate  retention  we  find  that  fifteen 
to  twenty  seconds  after  the  stimulation  has  ceased  the  obser- 
ver is  able  to  reproduce  but  little;  and  it  sometimes  happens 
that  everything  is  forgotten  a  few  seconds  later,  especially 
when  the  amount  of  material  presented  approaches  the  limit 
of  immediate  retention.  If  ten  or  twelve  letters  are  pro- 
nounced in  the  presence  of  an  observer,  and  if  the  reproduction 
is  delayed  a  few  seconds,  the  observer  sometimes  finds  that 
he  is  no  longer  able  to  recall  any  of  the  letters.  So,  too,  when 
disturbing  stimuli  or  distractions  of  attention  occur  during 
the  imprinting  or  immediately  after  the  presentation  of  the 
letters,  the  whole  series  of  imprinted  letters  may  disappear 


The  Functions  of  Alemory  45 

immediately  and  completely  from  memory.  These  phenomena 
can  be  explained  only  on  the  assumption  that  no  fixing  of  a 
genuine  memory  disposition  had  as  yet  taken  place;  and  that 
all  that  occurred  was  a  dying  away  and  a  revival  of  the 
primary  impression. 

6.  Our  distinction  is  also  justified  by  the  circumstance 
that  the  capacity  of  immediate  retention  is  a  variable  indi- 
vidual endowment.  Certain  persons  possess  a  remarkable 
capacity  of  immediate  retention  but  a  very  weak  memory  so 
far  as  permanence  of  retention  is  concerned,  and  vice  versa. 
Finally,  the  two  capacities  differ  even  in  children,  at  a  time 
when  the  child's  memory  far  excels  the  adult's  in  permanent 
retention,  and  liis  capacity  of  temporary  retention  is  still  much 
inferior  to  that  of  the  adult.  This  again  shows  that  perma- 
nent retention  does  not  depend  primarily  upon  the  function  of 
attention,  because  attention  is  much  less  highly  developed  in 
children  than  in  adults. 

Temporary  retention  may  be  distinguished  as  a  special 
function  of  memory  only  with  regard  to  two  characteristics: 
The  learner  does  not  here  intend  to  retain  permanently,  but 
only  for  a  limited  time;  and  this  intention  exerts  a  definite 
influence  upon  the  processes  of  imprinting,  and  upon  reten- 
tion itself  as  well.  This  is  the  way  in  which  we  learn  poems 
which  are  to  be  recited  at  a  stated  time,  or  prepare  addresses 
which  are  to  be  delivered  but  once.  Every  public  speaker 
must  set  about  his  work  of  memorizing  with  this  intention 
in  mind.  In  other  respects  the  difference  between  temporary 
and  permanent  retention  is  not  great.  But  we  shall  later 
discover  several  reasons  for  taking  this  difference  into  account. 
It  shows  how  significant  for  retention  is  the  sort  of  attitude  and 
thfi^^rt  of  intention  with  which  we  learn.  We  need  not  consider 
permanent  retention  further  at  this  time,  because  we  shall  de- 
scribe it  more  completely  in  all  of  our  subsequent  discussions. 


46  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

In  the  third  place,  we  may  distinguish  the  functions  of 
memory  from  the  point  of  view  of  subject-matter  retained  or 
of  content  dealt  with.  Here  it  must  be  noted  that  the  differ- 
ences of  memorial  function  whose  existence  we  are  led  to 
assume  by  differences  in  the  content  retained  are  also,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  to  be  regarded  as  functional  differences  in 
memory, — because  there  is  no  such  thing  as  general  memory 
but  only  a  variety  of  special  memories.  When  we  attempt 
to  sub-divide  memorial  functions  in  accordance  with  the 
subject-matter  retained,  numerous  differentiations  of  me- 
morial activity  may,  of  course,  be  assumed;  and  we  must 
gather  the  objects  (and  the  functions)  of  memory  into  groups 
if  we  are  to  avoid  a  too  extended  classification.  From  this 
point  of  view,  we  may  first  distinguish  sensory-concrete 
memory.  This  includes:  a.  The  sense-memories,  which  may 
again  be  sub-divided  upon  the  basis  of  the  different  sense 
departments.  Thus,  we  may  distinguish  tonal  memory, 
memory  for  colors  and  brightness,  memory  for  tastes,  odors, 
pressures,  temperatures  and  kinaesthetic  sensations,  b.  Mem- 
ory for  spatial  and  temporal  impressions'.  Here  we  may  dis- 
tinguish between  memory  for  small,  immediately  perceptible 
extents  of  space  and  of  time, — for  instance,  lines  a  few  centi- 
meters long  or  temporal  intervals  extending  over  a  few  seconds, 
— and  memory  for  complex  spatial  and  temporal  relations. 
c.  Memory  for  concrete  objects  and  processes  as  wholes,  for 
tilings  and  events  in  the  external  world,  as  unitary  groups  of 
sensory  qualities.  From  these  must  be  distinguished  d.  mem- 
ory for  abstract  signs  and  symbols,  for  names,  numbers  and 
abstract  verbal  meanings;  and  e.  memory  of  our  own 
mental  life  and  its  processes.  This  latter  may  again  be  sub- 
divided into  memory  for  products  of  our  ideation  and  think- 
ing, and  m'emory  for  emotions  and  vohtions.  These  latter 
may  also  be  called  emotional  and  volitional  memory.    When 


The  Fu7ictions  of  Memory  47 

volitional  memory  is  concerned  with  external  voluntary 
movements,  motor  associations  contribute  to  its  functioning.^ 

If  we  employ  the  physiological  point  of  view  as  the  basis 
for  differentiating  the  varieties  of  memory  as  regards  con- 
tent, the  special  memories  may  be  classified  into  two  groups: 
I,  The  different  varieties  of  sensory  memory;  and  2.  the 
varieties  and  functions  of  motor  memory.  Everything  which 
concerns  memory  of  sensations,  ideas  and  thoughts  belongs 
to  the  class  of  sensorial  memory  function.  Opposed  to  these 
stands  memory  of  motor  innervation  of  movements.  It 
need  not  be  mentioned  that  motor  processes  leave  traces  or 
dispositions  in  nerve  and  muscle  just  as  do  the  sensory  pro- 
cesses in  the  sensory  nerves.  In  this  sense  we  may,  of  course, 
speak  of  a  motor  memory. 

The  former  classification  from  the  psychological  point  of 
view  is,  however,  more  appropriate  because  it  is  based  upon 
psychical  differences  of  memory  functions,  and  hence  it  cor- 
responds more  closely  with  the  facts  of  the  mental  life.  Thus, 
for  instance,  it  is  better  to  speak  of  a  memory  for  volitional 
acts  than  of  a  memory  for  motor  functions,  because  a  memory 
for  acts  of  will  includes  not  only  the  remembrance  of  motives 
which  comprise  ideas  and  emotions;  it  also  includes  a  memory 
of  the  movements  corresponding  to  the  acts  of  will.  But  if, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  emphasize  the  motor  aspect  of  memory, 
we  dismember  components  which  are  necessary  constituents 
in  the  act  of  will. 

Various  objections  may  be  urged  against  employing  the 
sort  of  content  remembered  as  a  basis  for  a  psychological 
classification  of  memories.  In  the  first  place  it  might  be 
objected  that,  after  all,  we  would  then  be  dealing  not  with 
different  sorts  of  memory  but  only  with  different  sorts  of 
remembered  content.     But  there  are  no  peculiar  sorts  of 

•  Cf.  p.  26. 


48  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

remembered  content  to  which  special  memorial  functions  do 
not  correspond.  ■-  Our  memory  for  numbers  is  something 
different  from  our  space  memory  or  our  tonal  memory.  It 
might  be  objected  further  that  these  differences  of  detail 
could  be  multiphed  indefinitely.  Thus  one  might  also  dis- 
tinguish between  memories  for  different  sorts  of  move- 
ments, such  as  writing  movements,  gymnastic  movements 
and  the  Hke,  or  memory  for  sensation  differences,  etc.  This, 
of  course,  can  not  be  disputed;  but  in  every  classification  it 
is  necessary  that  groups  of  related  processes  be  included 
under  a  single  sub-division.  And  there  are  numft-ous  other 
reasons  which  justify  this  division.  In  the  iirst  place,  me-  - 
morial  functions  differ  from  individual  to  individual.  There 
are  individuals  who  possess  an  unusual  and  one-sided  tonal 
memory;  others,  a  remarkable  memory  fbr  names,  for  num- 
bers, etc.  Secondly,  the  several  memories  differ  in  their  . 
development  in  children,  certain  memories  developing  at  an 
earlier  age  than  others.  Thus,  in  children,  the  memory  for 
emotions  and  the  memory  for  numbers  and  abstract  concepts 
remain  relatively  undeveloped  for  a  considerable  time;  while 
the  memory  for  concrete  objects  precedes  all  others."^  Finally, 
the  various  memories  may  differ  in  characteristic  ways  in  cases  , 
of  pathological  disturbances  of  memory  function.  It  is  found 
that  the  memory  for  certain  particular  objects  may  be  dis- 
turbed or  destroyed  while  the  other  memories  remain  intact. 

^  This  was  shown  by  H.  Netschajeff,  Die  Entwickelung  des  Gedacht- 
nisses  bei  Schulkindern,Zei/5c/«'?/"//.  Psychologie,  XXIV.,  1900,321-351. 


CHAPTER  III 

OBSERVATIONAL    LEARNING:     THE    TECHNIQUE    OF    OBSERVING 

AND   NOTING 

I.   Analysis  of  Observational  Noting 

Observational  noting  comes  into  play,  as  we  have  seen, 
when  by  an  act  of  observation  we  imprint  the  contents  of 
perception, — persons,  things  and  processes, — with  a  view  to 
remembering  them..  It  may  have  to  do  with  the  imprinting 
of  single  sensations, — colors,  pressures,  temperatures,  odors, 
tastes,  sensations  of  movement;  with  groups  and  complexes 
of  sensations, — combinations  of  colors,  tonal  chords,  etc.; 
with  sensation-differences  which  have  been  made  a  special 
object  of  the  act  of  comparing;  with  spatial  relations,  such 
as  the  arrangement,  position,  distance  and  size  of  objects; 
with  forms,  or  specifically  with  differences  of  spatial  relation, 
such  as  the  relative  length  of  lines,  the  relative  areas  of  sur- 
faces; with  temporal  relations  such  as  the  succession  of  par- 
ticular events;  or  with  the  combination  of  spatial  or  temporal 
relations  and  sensations.  For  example,  when  I  note  the  size, 
the  color  and  the  tactual  properties  of  an  object,  I  apprehend 
a  combination  of  spatial  relations  and  sensational  elements; 
when  I  note  a  part  of  a  melody  by  simply  listening  to  it,  my 
noting  includes  the  tones,  the  tempo  and  the  rhythm. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  here  that  in  those  cases  where  we 
note  not  only  the  sensations  or  the  temporal  and  spatial 
elements  in  themselves,  but  also  note  the  total  impressions, 
and  where  therefore,  objects,  events,  successions  of  tones, 
etc.,  must  be  imprinted  as  wholes,  we  never  remember  merely 

49 


50  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  elements  which  constitute  the  whole  but  also  the  total 
impression.  This  total  impression  which  is  superadded  to 
the  elements  as  a  special  increment  has  appropriately  been 
called  the  "form  quality"  {Geslallsqualiiat)  in  an  attempt  to 
express  the  fact  that  a  composite  stimulus, — for  example,  a 
variegated  cube, — makes  a  characteristic  impression  as  a 
whole,  and  to  some  extent  has  a  special  property  or  quality 
as  a  whole  which  is  something  more  than  the  several  attributes 
of  the  elements, — the  color,  the  hardness,  and  the  form  of  the 
surfaces  of  the  cube.  ^ 

As  we  have  already  seem,  observational  noting  plays  an 
exceedingly  important  role  in  memory.  It  comprises  the 
whole  of  sense  perception  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned 
in  the  acquisition  of  information  which  we  wish  to  incorporate 
in  memory. 

To  make  clear  the  mechanism  of  observational  or  concrete 
noting,  it  would  be  necessary  to  discuss  the  whole  psychology 
of  perception  and  observation.  By  observation  I  understand 
a  perception  which  is  distinguished  from  unsystematic  and 
purposeless  sensing  by  the  fact  that  the  observation  always 
has  some  definite  goal  in  view,  which  guides  the  observation 
in  a  particular  direction,  and  which,  during  the  act  of  observ- 
ing, prescribes  the  point  of  view  or  points  of  view  from  which 
the  observed  object  is  regarded.  And  secondly,  in  conse- 
quence of  this,  the  attention  is  directed  toward  a  definite 
selection  of  sense-impressions,  while  those  other  impressions 
which  do  not  fit  in  with  the  purpose  of  the  observation  remain 
unnoticed.  Thirdly,  the  result  of  the  observation  is  also 
subordinated  to  certain  points  of  view  and  is  systematically 
brought  into  relation  with  our  previous  knowledge.  One 
may  say  briefly,  then,  that  observation  is  a  process  of  atten- 
tive and  methodical  sense-perception  which  is  carried  through 
systematically  from  definite  points  of  view. ) 

/ 


Observatio7ial  Lcar7iing  51 

It  would  perhaps  be  well  to  describe  the  various  parts  or 
stages  of  such  a  methodical  observation.  Let  us  choose,  as 
an  illustration,  the  observant  analysis  of  some  art-product 
where  we  purpose  to  determine  the  period  from  which  it 
dates,  the  style  which  characterizes  its  form,  and  perhaps, 
too,  the  master  or  artificer  who  designed  it.  Let  us  suppose 
it  is  an  old  and  artistically  constructed  cabinet.  The  partic- 
ular stages  in  the  observation  may,  of  course,  reach  different 
degrees  of  completeness.  We  shall  here  specify  those  which 
are  psychologically  necessary  if  the  purpose  of  the  observa- 
tion is  to  be  attained,  i.  We  approach  the  observed  object 
with  a^.defijii te.  .purpose  or  goaLidfia,  wliich  plays  the  part  of 
a  guiding  idea  or  of  a  dominant  point  of  view  in  the  observa- 
tion; thus  in  our  illustration  the  purpose  is  to  determine  the 
style,  etc.,  of  the  cabinet.  The  goal-idea  may  be  definite  or 
indefinite;  it  may  assume  the  form  of  a  general  concept  or  of 
a  wholly  concrete  particular  idea.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
observation  we  have  the  goal  before  us  in  a  somewhat  general 
fashion;  but  the  farther  the  observation  proceeds  in  deaHng 
with  the  details  of  the  cabinet,  the  more  do  we  make  use  of 
definite,  particular  goals  of  observation.  Hence,  as  a  rule, 
we  have  a  general,  abstract  goal-idea  at  the  outset  of  our 
observation;  but  it  gradually  gives  place,  during  the  course 
of  the  observation,  to  a  more  and  more  definite  and  logically 
subordinate  goal-idea.  2.  The  object  acts  upon  the  retina 
as  a  group  of  visual  stimuli, — in  this  case  the  color  and  the 
form  of  the  cabinet, — and  gives  us,  at  first,  a  total  and  but 
sUghtly  analyzed  impression  of  the  object.  Not  all  of  these 
stimuh,  however,  have  the  same  effect  upon  consciousness 
because  our  attitude  of  internal  predisposition  and  attention 
toward  all  of  them  is  not  identical  and  uniform;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  stimulus  which  corresponds  with  our  goal-idea  comes 
most  clearly  to  consciousness  and  is  most  especially  noted. 


52  The  Psychology  of  Leanmig 

J.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  goal-idea  directs  our  atten- 
tion to  particular  parts  of  the  object  toward  which  we  turn 
our  regard.  In  our  illustration,  it  is  those  parts  in  which 
the  character  of  the  style  is  most  prominent  which  are  selected, 
for  example,  it  may  be  the  ornamentation  of  the  cabinet. 

4.  Since  our  attention  is  concentrated  upon  particular  par- 
tial impressions  these  are  especially  accentuated  for  conscious- 
ness, and,  to  some  extent,  isolated  or  raised  into  prominence 
from  their  surroundings,  wliile  at  the  same  time  such  partial 
impressions  as  do  not  correspond  with  the  view-point  of, 
observation  are  overlooked  or  remain  unheeded.  At  the 
same  time  the  will  to  imprint  upon  memory  is  directed  upon 
those  impressions  which  correspond  with  the  goal-idea.  Or 
more  strictly  speaking,  the  will  to  imprint  was  already  present 
in  the  predisposition  to  observe  as  a  will  to  note  and  imprint 
everything  in  the  object  which  corresponds  with  the  goal- 
idea  ;  and  the  impressions  corresponding  to  the  goal-idea  now 
participate  in  this  predisposing  will. 

5.  This  brings  it  about  that  a  certain  selection  is  made 
among  the  reproduced  ideas  which  are  aroused  in  conscious- 
ness by  the  sight  of  the  object.  Those  impressions  which  are 
especially  emphasized  by  attention  arouse  more  definite  ideas 
than  those  to  which  we  do  not  attend. 

6.  Among  the  ideas  which  are  aroused  by  the  sight  of  the 
object  and  the  activity  of  attention,  two  sorts  must  be  sharply 
distinguished  from  one  another.  The  one  serves  exclusively 
for  the  cognition,  recognition,  interpretation  and  identifica- 
tion of  what  is  given  us  in  perception.  These  fuse  immediately 
with  the  sense-impressions  to  form  a  unitary  whole,  and 
thereby  give  rise,  now  for  the  first  time,  to  a  unitary  percep- 
tion of  the  external  object, — the  cabinet  in  our  illustration. 
They  are,  therefore,  the  ideas  by  means  of  which  the  funda- 
mental forms  in  the  cabinet  are  cognized,  interpreted  and 


^ 


Observational  Learniiig  53 

identified.  The  other  ideas  do  not  fuse  directly  with  the 
given  impression,  but  they  remain  free  and  independently 
reproduced  ideas  of  memory  and  imagination,  and  persist  in 
consciousness  side  by  side  with  the  impression.  They  are, 
for  instance,  remembrances  of  my  formerly  having  seen  simi- 
lar cabinets,  ideas  of  the  price  or  value  of  the  cabinet,  and  the 
like.  7.  This  introduces  a  two-fold  process:  a.  an  analytic 
sensing  of  the  object,  and  h.  an  internal  elaboration  of  the 
impressions  received.  The  analytic  sensing  of  the  object 
comes  about  a.  as  a  result  of  our  several  repetitions  of  the 
process  described' — our  eyes  and  our  attention  wander  over 
the  whole  object,  point  by  point,  in  the  various  stages  of  our 
observation,  and  again  and  again  we  analyze  its  parts  and  their 
properties  from  the  prevailing  points  of  view  of  observation; 
and  ?i.  as  a  result  of  our  clarifying  and  emphasizing  now 
one  part,  now  another  part,  by  means  of  attention.  Thus  as 
our  observation  progresses,  we  gradually  analyze  the  whole 
object  from  the  prevailing  points  of  view. 

The  completeness  and  accuracy  of  the  observation  obviously 
depends,  in  great  measure,  upon  the  completeness  and  the 
persistence  and  the  energy  with  which  these  repeated  acts  of 
analytic  sensing  are  accomplished.  Our  internal  elaboration 
of  the  impression  begins  with  the  independent  ideas  of  memory 
and  imagination,  or  with  ideas  which  are  aroused  or  repro- 
duced in  us  by  the  sight  of  the  object.  From  these  ideas  our 
elaboration  of  the  impression  takes  its  start.  On  the  one 
hand,  we  bring  what  we  have  just  seen  into  relation  with  our 
previous  knowledge  of  the  various  periods  in  the  history  of 
art;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  also  determine  clearly  what 
novel  and  characteristic  features  are  present  in  the  object 
before  us,  and  bring  them  to  consciousness  as  something  which 
is  new  and  characteristic.  We  find,  for  example,  that  not 
only  are  t%e  familiar  forms  of  the  style  of  the  Baroco  period 


54  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

represented  in  the  cabinet,  but  also  that  the  individuality 
of  a  particular  city,— Danzig,  for  instance, — is  stamped  upon 
it.  Of  course,  every  result  of  our  observation,  not  only  the 
total  result,  but  also  the  results  of  the  various  steps  taken  in 
analytic  vision,  may  itself  be  raised  in  turn  to  become  a  new 
view-point  of  observation. 

8.  As  a  rule,  we  combine  more  or  less  systematically  and 
completely  into  a  total  picture,  what  we  discover  -from  our 
analysis  of  the  object;  and  this  composite  picture  can  then 
express  the  result  of  observation  in  a  synthetic  judgment, 
(synthetic  activity  of  observation).  Thus  in  our  illustration 
we  synthesize  the  results  of  our  observation  into  the  final 
judgment:  "The  cabinet  dates  from  a  particular  period  of 
the  Baroco  era,  and  it  was  constructed  in  the  city  of  Dan- 
zig, etc." 

It  is  important  to  note  that  mere  persistent  looking,  listen- 
ing, etc.,  i.e.,  the  persistence  and  the  energy  with  which  the 
purely  sensory  process  of  observing  is  accompHshed, — in  our 
case  the  purely  visual  fixation  and  the  visual  examination  of 
the  cabinet, — is  of  great  significance  for  the  success  of  obser- 
vation. The  English  aesthetician,  Ruskin,  and  the  German 
physicist,  Lichtenberg,  stated  that  it  was  chiefly  to  their 
training  in  persistent  fixation  that  they  owed  the  "analytic 
power"  of  their  observation. 

In  observational  noting,  then,  one  imprints  upon  memory 
the  data  which  are  acquired  through  observation, — not  merely 
the  total  impression,  but  also  the  particular  details  which 
are  determined  during  the  process  of  observing.  But  it  is 
clear  that  the  work  of  memory  depends,  in  great  measure, 
upon  the  manner  in  which  the  act  of  observing  has  been  done; 
we  can,  of  course,  remember  only  what  we  have  observed. 
And,  too,  our  method  of  observing  may  be  favorable  or  unfav- 
orable for  retention.    There  are  two  groups  of  conditions  upon 


Observational  Learning  55 

which  success  in  observation  depends :  those  conditions  which 
have  to  do  with  the  technique  of  observation  itself;  and  those 
conditions  which  are  especially  significant  for  the  remembering 
of  impressions  which  have  been  acquired  by  means  of  observa- 
tion. 

Since  observational  noting  depends  upon  the  manner  in 
which  the  observing  itself  is  done,  a  technique  or  an  economy 
of  observational  noting  must  be,  at  the  same  time,  a  tech- 
nique or  economy  of  observation,  and  a  technique  or  economy 
of  the  retention  of  observed  impressions.  The  development 
of  an  accurate  method  of  observation  ensures  the  survival 
in  memory  of  reproducible  traces  of  sense-impressions;  and 
this  is  a  preliminary  condition  which  must  be  fulfilled  if 
observational  noting  is  to  be  successful.  The  second  group 
of  conditions  concerns  the  specific  factors  of  retention  and 
reproduction.  In  a  word,  we  must  fulfil  certain  conditions  of 
retention  as  well  as  of  observation  if  we  are  to  succeed  in 
imprinting  the  contents  of  sense-perception  adequately.  These 
two  groups  of  conditions  must  now  be  discussed  more  fully. 

Let  us  first  consider  all  those  conditions  of  observational 
noting  which  are  concerned  in  the  technique  of  observation 
itself.  Here  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  at  the  outset  that  an 
observation  imposes  wholly  different  conditions  and  demands 
upon  the  observer  according  to  the  variable  external  circum- 
stances under  which  it  takes  place.  Three  chief  cases  Taay^ 
be  distinguished:  i.  The  case  where  we  observe  a  resting 
object  which  we  are  able  to  examine  at  leisure,  and  whose 
nature  is  such  as  to  make  it  possible  for  us  to  bring  the 
object  under  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  observation, — 
for  instance,  the  critical  examination  of  a  plant,  or  a  physical 
or  mechanical  model.  2.  A  second  case  is  that  in  which  the 
observed  object  can  be  seen  for  only  an  instant,  and  where 
the  observation  must  be  brief  and  transient.    This  happens 


56  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

when  we  are  called  upon  to  observe  rapidly  moving  objects 
which  appear  in  the  field  of  vision  for  only  a  short  time;  or 
when  stimuli  are  present  to  observation  for  only  an  instant,  as 
when  we  hear  a  momentary  tone  or  noise,  or  see  an  instan- 
taneous flash  of  light.  3.  A  third  case  occurs  when  objects 
can  not  be  brought  under  favorable  internal  or  external  con- 
ditions of  observation.  Illustrations  of  this  case  are  furnished 
by  those  objects  which  we  can  examine  only  from  such  a 
great  distance  that  the  retinal  image  can  not  be  made  clear 
or  intensive.  From  these  three  cases  which  we  have  dis- 
tinguished upon  the  basis  of  external  conditions  of  observa- 
tion, there  may  be  differentiated  three  other  cases  which  are 
distinguished  by  differences  in  internal  conditions  of  obser- 
vation. 
^  In  the  first  place,  we  find  it  possible  in  certain  cases  to 
bring  about  a  careful  mental  preparation  and  hence  to  enter 
upon  our  act  of  observing  with  definite  expectations,  or  goal- 
ideas.  We  shall  call  this  a  case  of  inquiring  observation.  It 
is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  the  whole  process  of  obser- 
vation takes  place  under  the  influence  of  more  or  less  definitely 
conscious  goal-ideas  or  points  of  view  of  observation.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  always  a  voluntary,  and  even  an  arbitrary 
observation;  we  set  out  to  observe  the  object  with  a  perfectly 
definite  purpose  in  view.  Secondly,  the  observation  may  be 
involuntary  or  forced.  This  is  always  the  case  when  a  stimulus 
makes  its  appearance  suddenly  and  attracts  our  attention 
involuntarily  without  our  having  an  opportunity  for  internal 
preparation.  This  sort  of  observation  is  characterized  by  the 
fact  that  its  starting-point  is  not  an  expectation-idea  or  goal- 
idea  which  we  have  set  up  before  us;  it  is  always  entered 
upon  without  such  a  preparation.  Every  involuntary  obser- 
vation of  this  sort  contains  an  element  of  surprise.  When 
upon  a  forest-path  a  bird  suddenly  takes  flight  and  attracts 


Observational  Learning  57 

my  attention,  I  am  forced  to  an  involuntary  observation. 
The  inherent  difficulty  of  involuntary  observation  is  due  to 
the  two  characteristics  which  have  been  mentioned:  a  pre- 
disposing of  consciousness  by  means  of  the  setting-up  of  a 
goal-idea  is  lacking;  and  the  observation  is  always  attended 
by  the  emotion  of  surprise,  which  constitutes  a  disturbing 
factor.  Thirdly,  from  these  two  cases  must  be  distinguished 
a  third  possibility  which  has  been  too  little  heeded  by  psy- 
chologists. This  I  shall  call  passively  expectant  observation.^ 
(In  this  type  of  observation  we  rid  ourselves  of  definite  view- 
points of  observation,  and  have  before  us  only  the  general 
indefinite  purpose  of  observing  whatever  may  happen.  We 
find  ourselves  in  this  condition  of  passive  observation  when 
we  travel  in  a  foreign  country.  We  do  not  know  what  sort 
of  stimuli  will  fall  upon  our  sense-organs;  but  we  propose  to 
make  a  careful  observation  of  every  interesting  feature  in  our 
environment.  In  such  a  case  as  this,  predisposition  by  means 
of  definite  goal-ideas  is  wholly  impossible,  and  would  be  dis- 
advantageous because  it  would  tend  to  cause  us  to  observe 
certain  phenomena  in  a  one-sided  and  partisan  fashion,  while 
other  phenomena  would  be  overlooked.  The  only  goal-idea 
which  we  have  before  us  in  this  case  is  our  intent  to  assume 
the  general  attitude  of  an  observer. 

All  three  of  these  t>7)es  of  observation  may  be  made  more 
clear  by  referring  to  the  different  attitudes  or  adjustments  of 

^  This  third  type  of  observation  is  called  ' abwarfende  BeobacJituitg.' 
Here  the  observer  docs  not  know  in  advance  what  he  is  about  to 
observe;  he  simply  proposes  to  be  on  the  alert,  and  to  discover  in 
good  time  what  it  will  be.  His  attitude  is  one  of  disinterested  curi- 
osity; he  is  passive,  calm,  non-partisan  and  attentive.  This  third 
type  of  observation  differs  from  the  first  type  in  that  the  observer 
approaches  the  observation  without  any  definite  predisposition,  and 
from  the  second  type  in  that  he  may  now  take  his  time,  indeed  he 
awaits  the  observation.  It  is  then  a  passive,  leisurely  observation.  Tr, 


58  ^  The  Psychology  of  Learnmg 

attention  which  precede  the  act  of  observing  in  the  several 
instances.  In  inquiring  observation,  the  attitude  of  atten- 
tion is  relatively  definite,  at  least  it  prepares  the  observer 
for  a  particular  sort  of  stimulus;  and  under  certain  circum- 
stances, it  even  predisposes  him  for  a  perfectly  definite,  par- 
ticular, concrete  impression.  In  involuntary  observation  or 
observation  which  is  taken  by  surprise,  the  attention  is  either 
not  concentrated  upon  the  in-coming  stimulus  at  all,  or  is 
concentrated  there  only  by  sheer  accident.  In  passively 
expectant  observation,  we  adjust  ourselves  only  for  observa- 
tion in  general,  intentionally  refraining  from  any  special 
adjustment;  while  in  inquiring  observation  we  always  adjust 
ourselves  for  observation  as  accurately  and  as  definitely  as 
we  can. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  the  various  sorts  of  internal  and  exter- 
nal conditions  which  we  have  employed  as  a  basis  for  the 
differentiation  of  the  various  types  of  observation  may  com- 
bine in  different  manners.  In  most  cases,  inquiring  or  vol- 
untary observation  can  deal  only  with  resting  objects  which 
we  are  able  to  place  under  most  favorable  conditions  for 
observing;  at  least  in  this  sort  of  observation  we  usually 
endeavor  to  bring  about  this  state  of  affairs.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  advantageous  to  distinguish  these  cases  from  one  another, 
and  to  consider  rules  for  the  technique  of  observation  from 
the  point  of  view  of  external  conditions,  and  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  type  of  observation  which  these  conditions 
bring  about. 

There  are,  however,  certain  internal  conditions  and  espe- 
cially certain  external  conditions  which  are  common  to  all 
types  of  observation;  and  these  play  a  part  in  every  act  of 
observation.  These  general  or  common  conditions  of  all 
observation  are  in  part,  external  or  objective,  in  part,  internal 
or  subjective. 


Observational  Learning  59 

JL.  External  Conditions  of  Observation 

1.  Objects  must  be  presented  to  our  senses  under  favor- 
able conditions  if  our  observation  of  them  is  to  be  accurate 
and  complete;  thus,  visual  objects  must  be  well  within  the 
range  of  vision,  and  they  must  appear  in  favorable  illumina- 
tion; tones  and  noises  must  be  distinctly  audible,  etc.  In 
controlling  the  external  conditions  of  stimulation  we  must 
exclude  all  distractions  which  might  impair  the  action  of 
the  stimuli;  thus  auditory  observations  should  be  made  only 
in  a  quiet  room,  and  with  proper  precautions  as  to  the  con- 
duction and  reflection  of  sound,  etc.  The  detailed  discussion 
of  these  external  conditions  is,  of  course,  not  a  matter  for  the 
psychologist  to  deal  with,  since  they  concern  the  physiological 
and  physical  aspects  of  observation. 

2.  Precautions  must  be  taken  to  adapt  the  sense-organs 
to  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  if  they  are  not  already  in  an 
appropriate  condition  of  adaptation.  Thus  in  visual  observa- 
tion we  must  see  to  it  that  the  eye  is  properly  accommodated 
to  the  visual  object,  and  that  it  is  completely  adapted  to  the 
brightness  of  the  environment;  the  auxiliary  apparatus  of 
attention  and  sense-perception  must  also  be  brought  into 
an  optimal  condition.  For  example,  the  eye  must  be  made 
capable  of  accurately  fixating  the  object  to  be  observed,  and 
of  maintaining  the  fixation, — a  result  which  is  not  always 
easily  attainable  when  moving  objects  are  to  be  observed. 
The  whole  bodily  posture  of  the  observer  must  be  as  well 
adapted  as  possible  to  the  circumstances  of  the  observation. 

j.V  A  further  general  condition  of  accurate  observation  has 
to  do  with  the  acuity  of  the  sensory  apparatus  itself,  or  more 
strictly  speaking,  with  the  sensory  acuity  and  the  physio- 
logical sensiti\aty  of  the  peripheral  and  central  nervous 
mechanism.  This  has  an  extremely  important  bearing  upon 
the  result  of  observation. 


6o  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

4.  There  are  certain  other  conditions  of  observation  upon 
which  depend  its  accuracy  and  its  scientific  value.  Hence  we 
may  call  these  the  conditions  which  have  to  do  with  methods 
of  procedure  in  observing.  Here  belong,  first  and  foremost, 
the  facts  that  observations  should  be  made  repeatedly  and 
under  as  nearly  as  possible  identical  conditions  both  internal 
and  external;  that  observations  should  be  controlled  and 
confirmed  by  other  observers;  that  the  results  should,  so  far 
as  possible,  be  expressed  in  definite  quantitative  terms.  The 
significance  of  these  requirements,  however,  is  logical  and 
methodological  rather  than  psychological. 
b.  Internal  or  Subjective  Conditions  of  Observation 

In  a  discussion  of  the  subjective  conditions  of  observation 
we  must  refer  back  to  the  three  chief  types  of  observation 
which  have  been  differentiated:  inquiring  or  voluntary, 
startled  or  involuntary,  and  passively  expectant.  Each  of 
these  types  of  observation  has  its  own  peculiar  subjective 
conditions.  Let  us  first  take  the  case  of  voluntary  or  inquir- 
ing observation;  and  let  us  suppose  that  we  are  concerned 
with  a  resting  object  which  we  may  observe  at  our  leisure. 
It  is  in  such  cases  as  this  that  training  in  observing  and  not- 
ing can  most  readily  be  acquired. 

Observing  here  begins  with  an  internal  setting-up  of  expec- 
tation-ideas or  goal-ideas  or  points  of  view,  which  conduct 
the  observation  along  particular  paths  and  prepare  the  way 
for  the  selection  of  that  which  is  to  be  observed,  although 
they  by  no  means  finally  determine  the  selection.  Hence  as 
a  first  condition  of  this  sort  of  observation  it  is  to  be  demanded  1 
that  the  observer  shall  proceed  with  definite  goal-ideas  or 
points  of  view.  Moreover,  these  must  be  adapted  to  the  pur- 
pose of  the  observation,  and  to  the  particular  stages  in  the 
progress  of  the  observation.  They  may  accordingly  have 
more  of  the  character  of  general  concepts  or  they  may  have 


Observational  Learning  6i 

the  character  of  concrete  ideas.  As  points  of  view  of  obser- 
vation, general  concepts  are  especially  significant  when  the 
general  goal  of  a  whole  series  of  observations  is  to  be  stated 
or  internally  set  up.  For  instance,  when  the  teacher  makes  use 
of  concrete  objects  he  prescribes  the  analysis  of  the  objects  as 
the  goal  of  observation;  and  he  presents  this  goal  to  his 
pupils  in  the  form  of  a  general  concept  (phanerogam,  crypto- 
gam, etc.).  But  so  soon  as  the  observation  is  accomplished, 
attention  is  directed  more  and  more  to  detailed  points  which 
correspond  to  the  observed  goal;  and  now  to  the  general 
concept  of  the  goal  may  be  added  more  definite  and  more 
concrete  goal-ideas  which  the  observation  proceeds  to  follow 
in  detail.  But  more  concrete  view-points  of  observation, 
which  are  ideated  in  as  definite  form  as  possible,  have  a  sig- 
nificance even  when  a  particular  and  wholly  definite  content 
of  perception  is  to  be  found  or  distinguished  by  means  of  the 
observation;  for  instance,  a  particular  color,  brightness,  form, 
etc.  Meanwhile  it  may  be  seen  that  the  significance  of  the 
goal-idea  varies  greatly  with  the  sort  of  material  observed. 
The  guiding  ideas  increase  in  significance  with  increase  in 
the  complexity  of  the  material  to  be  observed,  because  when 
the  material  contains  many  details  there  is  a  greater  possi- 
bility that  the  observation  will  fail  to  concentrate,  and  will, 
therefore,  dissipate  its  energy.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
observation  is  concerned  simply  with  the  quahty  of  a  partic- 
ular color,  the  directing  idea  has  much  less  significance.  It 
points  out  the  general  direction  which  attention,  and  with  it 
regard,  is  sure  to  follow;  and  its  task  is  then  accomplished 
because  of  the  simplicity  of  the  visual  object  dealt  with. 
Attention  must  now  accentuate  the  observed  content,  and 
make  it  clear  and  distinct  for  consciousness. 

Much  more  important  are  the  conditions  of  observation 

which  have  to  do  with  the  proper  employment  of  the  direct- 
6 


62  The  Psychology  of  Learnmg 

ing  idea.     During  observation,  the  attention  must  be  fixed 
upon  the  goal  idea  or  the  view-point  of  observation;  by  this 
means  a  constant  direction  of  attention  is  assured.     When 
the  attention  is  not  thus  fixated  and  held,  the  goal  is  readily 
lost  sight  of  by  the  observer;  the  attention  wanders  to  other 
objects,  and  there  ensues  a  distracted  or  purposeless  observa- 
tion, although  a  goal  of  observation  may  have  been  set  up  at 
the  outset.    It  is  essential,  furthermore,  that  goal-ideas  should  j 
enter  into  proper  relations  with  the  objects  of  observation. 
This  was  already  demanded,  in  part,  by  a  condition  discussed 
in  the  foregoing  which  specified  that  goal-ideas  should  not 
be  suppressed  by  incoming  impressions;  nor  should  the  former 
stifle  the  latter.    The  observer  is  to  be  on  his  guard  lest  he 
interpolate  subjective  additidns  into  his  objectively  presented 
data;   and  he  should  always  be  ready  to  modify  and  correct 
his  expectation-ideas  to  conform  with  his  objective  findings. 
When  he  deals  with  simple  and  easily  observable  objects  or 
with  objects  which  possess  conspicuous  characteristics,  his 
tendency  toward  subjective  falsification  is  not  so  great;  inves- 
tigations of  the  psychology  of  testimony  show  that  this  ten- 
dency is  much  less  evident  in  observation  than  in  memory. 
The  danger  of  illusory  observation  is  great  in  proportion 
as  the  object  observed  is  complex,  and  in  proportion  as  the 
impressions  received  from  it  are  vague  and  indefinite,  whether 
as  a  result  of  hasty  observation,  or  in  consequence  of  the 
character  of  the  contents  themselves, — as  when  we  observe 
in  faint  illumination  or  from  a  great  distance. 

The  proper  relation  between  the  expectation-idea  and  the 
objective  datum  determines,  in  part,  the  objective  and  fac- 
simile character  of  observation;  but  only  in  ^art,  as  we  shall 
see.  The  more  we  subordinate  the  expectation-idea  to  the 
external  impression,  the  more  objective  and  accurate  is  the 
observation.    The  less  critical  is  our  attitude  in  allowing  this 


Observational  Learning  63 

idea  to  fuse  with  the  impression,  the  greater  is  the  danger 
that  expectation-ideas  which  do  not  correspond  with  sensory 
impressions  will  assimilate  with  the  latter,  and  the  more  sub- 
jective and  false  may  the  observation  become. 

A  second  condition  of  this  type  of  observation  is  furnished 
by  the  circumstance  that  the  goal-idea  oftentimes  determines 
the  point  of  view  from  which  the  data  are  subsequently 
arranged  and  classified.  This  is  especially  Hkely  to  occur  in 
cases  where  the  goal-ideas  refer  to  a  general  abstract  goal,  and 
where  the  result  of  the  observation  conforms  with  the  goal. 

But  it  may  happen  even  in  a  simple  concrete  perception. 
Let  us  suppose  that  two  colors  are  to  be  compared  in  order 
to  determine  their  relative  brightness.  The  goal-idea  is  the 
brightness  difference  of  the  two  colors;  the  result  of  the 
observation  consists  in  the  perception  of  a  greater  brightness 
in  one  of  the  colors.  Thus  the  goal-idea  stands,  in  a  certain 
sense,  both  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  observa- 
tion. But  if  the  observation  reaches  a  result  which  is  at 
variance  with  the  expectation-idea  we  incorporate  the  result 
into  a  judgment  that  our  finding  belongs  not  to  the  goal-idea 
but  to  another  category. 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  result  of  the  observation  must 
always  relate  in  some  way  to  the  dominating  point  of  view  of  \ 
the  observation,  either  positively  or  negatively,  either  in  a 
confirmative,  corrective  or  supplementing  fashion,  if  the  obser- 
vation is  to  be  made  in  a  systematic  fashion. 

Attention  performs  a  four-fold  function  in  the  process  of 
observation;  and  a  systematic  observation  must,  therefore, 
fulfil  four  conditions  in  so  far  as  the  behavior  of  attention  is 
concerned,  i.  The  attention  fixes  in  consciousness  the  goal- 
idea  or  the  view-point  of  observation;  and  by  this  means, 
not  only  does  it  determine  the  selection  of  what  shall  be  ob- 
served and  what  shall  not  be  observed,  but  it  also  causes 


64  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  whole  observation  to  center,  in  a  certain  sense,  about  this 
one  goal;  and  it  sends  us  back  to  the  goal  again  after  each 
successive  step  in  the  observation.  It  is  chiefly  to  this  fixative 
influence  of  attention  that  observation  owes  its  unitary  char- 
acter. 2.  Attention  raises  the  observed  datum  in  the  im- 
pression to  greater  clearness  and  to  a  higher  degree  of  aware- 
ness; and  by  this  means  it  separates  the  observed  content 
from  its  environment.  The  content  is  thereby  isolated  and 
accentuated  for  consciousness,  and  at  the  same  time  every- 
thing which  is  not  to  be  heeded  is  inhibited.  3.  By  this 
means  attention  facilitates  the  reproduction  of  those  ideas 
which  are  directly  aroused  by  the  impression  itself,  which 
have  to  do  with  the  apprehension  and  the  interpretation  of  the 
impression,  and  which  fuse  completely  with  it.  4.  This 
function  of  attention  brings  it  about  that  not  only  do  the 
observed  contents  surge  forward  into  consciousness,  and  not 
only  do  they  arouse  the  idea  which  is  assimilated  with  them, 
but  they  determine  the  selection  of  those  independently 
reproduced  ideas  which  can  attach  to  the  perception;  and 
at  the  same  time  the  formation  of  associations  between  them 
and  the  perception-content  is  faciHtated,  and  the  memorial 
noting  of  the  perception-content  is  aided  and  reinforced. 

The  success  of  every  mental  activity,  including  the  act  of 
observing,  depends  not  only  upon  the  accomplishment  of  the 
component  activities,  but  chiefly  upon  the  co-operation  of 
will.  Win  determines  how  much  energy  and  persistence  shall 
be  devoted  to  the  act  of  observing;  and  upon  these  two  fac- 
tors depends  the  most  important  result  of  the  observation, 
namely,  the  complete  and  thorough  analysis  of  the  objective 
datum.  But  even  the  fulfilment  of  all  of  these  conditions  of 
observation  does  not  constitute  the  really  complete  observa- 
tion of  an  object.  The  most  essential  thing  of  all  is  the  num- 
ber of  steps  in  observation,  or  the  repetition  and  continuation 


\ 


Observational  Learning  65 

of  the  act  of  observing  until  the  object  is  completely  and  ex- 
haustively analyzed  from  the  point  of  view  which  is,  for  the 
moment,  dominant.  Not  until  we  have  gone  over  the  object, 
part  by  part,  from  the  point  of  view  which  is  momentarily 
dominant  do  we  obtain  a  genuine  analysis  which  renders  us 
perfectly  familiar  with  all  of  its  attributes  and  character- 
istics which  appertain  to  that  point  of  view  of  observation. 
This  completeness  of  observation  is  therefore  a  product  of 
the  persistence  and  tenacity  of  our  will  to  observe;  it  is  not  a 
mere  matter  of  concentration  as  such.  From  the  testimony 
of  persons  who  are  distinguished  by  a  supra-normal  capacity 
of  analytical  observation  we  learn  that  they  owe  their  success 
to. this  property  of  will, — to  their  persistence  and  tenacity 
in  observation.  Thus  the  physicist  Lichtenberg  reports  that 
he  has  often  forced  himself  to  fix  his  eyes  upon  an  object 
until  he  discovers  some  particular  characteristic  of  interest; 
Ruskin  relates  that  he  had  trained  himself  from  his  youth  to 
analyze  the  most  insignificant  objects  with  extreme  accuracy 
and  persistence  by  means  of  long-continued  gazing.  Goethe's 
gift  of  observation  consisted  in  a  disposition  to  consider 
things  thoroughly  from  the  most  diverse  points  of  view. 
Here,  then,  a  great  significance  attaches  to  the  purely  sensory 
acts  of  merely  looking,  listening,  and  the  hke. 

General  psychological  reflection  can  not  show  exhaustively 
what  significance  attaches  to  the  view-point  of  observation. 
We  must  discover  it  from  an  appeal  to  experiments  which 
deal  with  the  results  of  observation.  These  show  us  that  a 
systematic  and  methodical  observation  is  attained  chiefly  by 
having  a  great  number  and  variety  of  view-points  or  cate- 
gories of  observation,  and  by  knowing  how  to  employ  them 
in  a  systematic  and  methodical  manner.  This  appears  with 
especial  clearness  from  psychological  experiments  which  deal 
with  the  development  of  observation  through  the  years  of 


66  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

childhood.  From  these  we  find  that  children  in  their  earlier 
years,  at  the  age  of  about  seven  or  eight  years,  still  fail  to 
observe  much  that  the  adult  sees,  because  appropriate  points 
of  view  from  which  to  observe  are  lacking  in  children.  But 
we  also  find  that  certain  adults  although  possessed  of  these 
points  of  view  still  fail  to  observe  accurately  because  they 
do  not  make  a  systematic  use  of  their  view-points.^  A  further 
question  arises  as  to  whether  the  distinctness  and  concrete- 
ness  of  the  goal-idea  exerts  any  considerable  influence  upon 
observation.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  only  those  persons  who 
understand  their  points  of  view  correctly  can  employ  them 
correctly  in  observation.  Hence  children  are  able  to  observe 
only  from  those  view-points  which  are  adapted  to  their  stage 
of  mental  development.  But  apart  from  this,  the  distinctness 
of  the  goal-idea  does  not  seem  to  be  of  great  significance 
because  the  attention  may  be  attracted  in  a  particular  direc- 
tion by  indistinct  goal-ideas,  and  indeed,  often  is  so  attracted 
by  extremely  vague  expectations;  and  the  more  accurate 
discovery  of  the  direction  of  attention  is  facihtated  by  the 
perception-content  itself.  If  a  person  who  has  had  no  experi- 
ence in  psychological  observation  is  asked  to  determine  the 
relative  brightness  of  different  colors,  his  attention  will  be 
guided  by  the  sensory  content  itself  to  that  which  is  to  be 
observed. 

(/  From  all  of  these  considerations  we  see  that  the  conditions 
of  a  perfect  inquiring  observation  are  manifold.  They  may, 
however,  be  classified  into  three  chief  groups:  i.  The  goal- 
idea  and  its  proper  employment;  2.  The  function  of  atten- 
tion; and  3.  The  participation  of  will  in  the  attainment  of 
the  observed  goal.  We  shall  later  deal  with  the  effect  of 
observation  upon  retention;  and  then  we  shall  return  to 
discuss  the  significance  of  these  three  groups. 

*  See  Chapter  II.  2  c. 


Observational  Learning  67 

If  now  we  pass  on  to  the  second  case,  in  which  inquiring  ^ 
observation  is  called  upon  to  employ  itself  not  with  a  resting 
object,  but  with  an  object  which  suddenly  appears  to  view 
and  as  suddenly  disappears,  we  find  that  here  we  are  dealing 
with  conditions  of  observation  which  differ  radically  from 
those  already  described.  In  this  case,  we  must  train  ourselves 
to  obtain  in  an  exceedingly  brief  time  as  definite  an  idea  as  " 
possible  from  a  fleeting  impression,  )  Let  us  suppose  that  we 
wish  to  observe  the  particular  movements  and  the  successive 
postures  of  a  horse  which  passes  rapidly  across  the  field  of 
vision.  The  chief  conditions  which  are  here  essential  to  suc- 
cess are:  a.  We  must  learn  how  to  direct  our  sensory  appa- 
ratus upon  the  moving  object  with  rapidity  and  precision. 
If  it  is  a  question  of  apprehending  an  instantaneous  stimulus, 
such  as  a  momentary  flash  of  Hght  or  a  word  or  picture  which 
is  exposed  for  only  a  instant,  we  must  learn  to  fixate  some 
appropriate  point  rapidly  and  precisely  and  to  hold  our  fixa- 
tion at  the  right  instant,  h.  We  must  be  able  to  make  a 
rapid  adjustment  of  attention  to  the  stimulus,  and,  in  passing, 
to  sweep  the  attention  over  the  stimulus  for  a  brief  time  with 
a  high  degree  of  concentration,  c.  Of  special  importance 
here  is  the  state  of  preparation  with  which  we  enter  upon  the 
act  of  observing.  This  must  not  only  consist  in  our  obtaining 
a  clear  idea  of  the  view-point  of  observation,  but  we  must 
endeavor,  so  far  as  possible,  to  form  a  definite  idea  of  all  the 
minute  circumstances  under  which  the  object  appears,  and, 
if  possible,  of  the  object  itself.  This  latter  operation  is  par- 
ticularly important  when  the  object  to  be  observed  appears 
only  for  an  instant,  and  appears  unexpectedly. 

It  is  of  advantage  if  we  can  accurately  predict  the  moment 
at  which  the  object  will  make  its  appearance;  and  hence  in 
psychological  experimentation  a  more  accurate  observation  is 
secured  if  the  appearance  of  the  stimulus  is  preceded  by 


68 '  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

a  signal  to  attention.  Nor  is  the  duration  of  this  period 
of  internal  preparation  a  matter  of  indifference.  If  it  lastsi. 
too  long  the  concentration  of  attention  flags;  and  if  it  is 
too  brief  the  attention  cannot  rise  to  an  optimal  degree  of 
concentration.  The  effect  of  anticipatory  preparation  is  prob- 
ably a  very  complex  matter;  it  is  usually  regarded  as  con- 
sisting in  a  reinforcement  of  the  external  stimulus  which 
impinges  upon  the  sense-organ,  and  of  the  nervous  excitation 
which  is  thence  transmitted  to  the  cortex, — the  reinforce- 
ment in  turn  consisting  in  a  process  of  facilitation  or  clearing 
the  way  (attentional  faciHtation,  according  to  Exner;  centro- 
sensory  reinforcement,  according  to  G.  E.  Miiller).  In  cases 
of  very  brief  stimulation,  it  is  important  that,  in  the  forma- 
tion of  the  idea  we  should  utilize  not  only  the  primary  impres- 
sion, which  continues  so  long  as  the  stimulus  acts  upon  the 
sense-organ,  but  also  its  immediate  after-effect  in  conscious- 
ness. Visual  observations  reveal  the  presence  of  a  true  after- 
image of  the  stimulus  which  may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
be  perceived  distinctly  with  closed  eyes,  and  which  may  be 
made  use  of  in  reconstructing  the  impression.  But  besides 
this  unitary  after-image,  every  impression  is  characterized  by 
a  gradual  fading  from  consciousness;  and  this  stage  of  fading, 
during  which  many  of  the  concrete  details  of  the  impression 
disappear,  we  can  learn  to  make  use  of  systematically.  An- 
other important  condition  consists  in  the  fact  that  immediately 
after  the  observation  is  ended,  and  while  the  after-effect  of 
the  primary  stimulation  still  persists  in  some  degree,  we  are 
able  to  give  a  complete  account  of  what  we  have  observed, 
and  indeed,  we  can  sometimes  depict  the  details  in  a  graphic 
sketch. 

It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  all  of  these  conditions  of 
observation  assume  that  the  observer  possesses  certain  capac- 
ities which  may  readily  be  developed  and  perfected  by  prac- 


Observational  Learning  69 

tice.  I  Thus,  in  the  present  type  of  observation,  it  is  easy 
to  de\ise  exercises  to  pro\'ide  training  in  fixating  stimuli 
which  appear  suddenly,  in  following  moving  objects  by 
movements  of  the  eye,  in  adjusting  the  attention  to  instan- 
taneous stimuli,  and  in  describing  what  has  been  perceived. 
And  these  exercises  also  furnish  an  opportunity  for  us  to 
train  and  develop  all  of  the  component  functions  which  play 
a  part  in  the  observation  of  instantaneous  impressions. 
A  /  The  next  type  deals  with  surprised  or  involuntary  obser- 
/  vation.  This  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  the  initial 
stage  of  the  process  of  observation  does  not  here  consist  in 
an  expectation-idea  or  a  goal-idea  upon  which  our  attention 
is  directed,  but  that  the  action  of  the  stimulus  upon  our 
sense-organs  constitutes  the  initial  step  in  the  act  of  observ- 
ing. Consequently  it  is  an  observation  in  which  internal 
preparation  is  lacking;  and  everything  which,  in  the  former 
case  of  inquiring  observation,  is  accomplished  by  means  of 
subjective  preparation  must  here  be  accomplished  during  the 
process  of  observation  itself  if  a  definite  result  is  to  be  obtained. 
In  involuntary  or  startled  observation,  then,  antecedent 
reinforcement  is  lacking ;  and  this  lack  accounts  for  the  absence 
of  arbitrariness  because  the  arbitrary  character  of  an  obser- 
vation is  due  to  our  anticipating  the  purpose  of  the  observa- 
tion, and  to  our  bringing  about  the  observation  by  an  act  of 
will  in  consequence  of  our  goal-idea.  Surprised  observation 
has,  therefore,  a  passive  and  involuntary  character.  We  do 
not  bring  it  about  of  our  own  initiative;  it  is  initiated  by 
external  stimuli  which  force  themselves  upon  our  conscious- 
ness. Since  surprise  or  even  fright  is  present  in  most  cases 
of  involuntary  observation,  it  is  a  difficult  observation  to 
make.  The  success  of  such  an  observation  depends  chiefly 
upon  two  circumstances,  a  subjective  and  an  objective: 
a.  The  rapidity  with  which  we  succeed  in  fulfilling  all  of 


yo  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  subjective  conditions  of  observation, — the  adjustment  of 
attention,  the  attainment  of  a  definite  point  of  view  from 
which  to  observe,  the  adaptation  and  accommodation  of  the 
sense-organ  to  the  object,  h.  It  also  depends  upon  whether 
the  phenomenon  which  surprises  us  and  attracts  our  atten- 
tion remains  within  the  range  of  observation,  or  whether  it 
soon  disappears  again.  If  during  a  walk,  I  am  impelled  to 
observe  a  bird  by  its  suddenly  appearing  before  me  and 
attracting  my  attention,  and  if  the  bird  soon  vanishes  from 
my  field  of  vision,  the  success  of  the  observation  depends 
upon  a  fulfilment  of  the  subjective  conditions  which  have 
been  described.  But  if  the  bird  perches  upon  a  near-by  tree, 
my  surprised,  involuntary  observation  gives  way  to  an  obser- 
vation of  the  inquiring,  voluntary  type. 

It  is  conceivable  that  training  in  involuntary  observation 
may  be  acquired;  but  practice  is  more  difficult  to  obtain  here 
than  in  inquiring  observation.  It  is  to  be  recommended  that 
training  of  this  sort  be  not  attempted  in  the  school-room; 
pupils  may  be  taken  out  for  walks  where  every  opportunity 
which  presents  itself,  as  when  moving  objects  suddenly  come 
into  view,  should  be  utiHzed.  Practice  in  involuntary  observa- 
tion may  be  conceived  to  consist  in  making  the  transition  to 
the  voluntary  type  of  observing  as  abruptly  as  possible.  The 
more  rapidly  we  overcome  the  surprise  and  fulfil  all  the  con- 
ditions for  inquiring  observation, — rid  ourselves  of  former 
thoughts,  adapt  our  attention  rapidly  to  the  new  impression, 
fix  our  eyes  upon  the  object,  and  the  like, — the  more  rapidly 
do  we  succeed  in  making  the  observation. 

It  is  clear  that  in  involuntary  observation  the  attention 
has  another  very  special  function  to  perform,  namely,  to 
disengage  itself  abruptly  from  the  thoughts  which  occupied 
it  up  to  that  time;  and  we  know  from  the  psychology  of 
attention  that  this  disengagement  from  previous  concerns  is 


Observational  Lcarnhig  71 

rendered  difficult  by  the  phenomenon  which  is  commonly 
referred  to  as  adjustment  {Einstellung). 

When  we  have  been  occupied  for  a  time  with  any  activity, 
our  attention  becomes  adjusted  to  that  activity,  and  we  acquire 
a  tendency  to  continue  in  the  same  direction; — or,  negatively 
expressed,  it  becomes  difficult  to  turn  from  this  activity  and 
pass  over  to  any  other.  Hence  the  abrupt  transition  to 
involuntary  observation,  in  cases  where  stimuli  come  to  us 
suddenly  and  surprise  us,  presupposes  the  capacity  to  make 
a  rapid  change  in  the  adjustment  of  attention.  That  means, 
however,  that  the  attention  must  be  able  not  only  to  dis- 
engage itself  abruptly  from  its  former  stimuli  or  from  thoughts 
which  are  dominantly  before  it,  but  also  to  adapt  itself  to  new 
stimuli.  It  is  possible  then,  to  prepare  for  this  sort  of  observ- 
ing by  acquiring  practice  in  rapidly  shifting  the  adjustment  of 
attention,  or  by  training  in  abrupt  transition  from  one  activity 
to  another. 

The  present  type  of  involuntary  observation  manifests  still 
another  characteristic;  and  we  ffiid  that  this  one  is  more 
difficult  to  turn  to  account  pedagogically  than  those  charac- 
teristics which  have  already  been  described.  Since  subjec- 
tive preparation  is  lacking  in  involuntary  observation,  the 
external  stimulus  itself  not  only  arouses  those  appercei\dng 
ideas  which  fuse  with  the  impressions,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  furnishes  the  points  of  \dew  from  which  the  observation 
is  made.  The  view-points  come  into  being  only  during  the 
act  of  observing  itself,  but  in  most  cases,  definite  points  of 
view  are  wholly  lacking  in  involuntary  observation;  indeed, 
it  undoubtedly  happens  in  numerous  instances  that  they  are 
not  constituted  until  later,  when,  after  the  event,  we  proceed 
to  work  over  or  to  elaborate  a  fleeting  impression  which  has 
come  upon  us  unexpectedly.  Consequently,  what  we  shall 
observe  and  what  we  shall  note  in  this  type  of  observation 


72  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

is  largely  a  matter  of  chance.  In  such  cases  our  habitual 
associations, — our  habitual  modes  of  interpreting  sense- 
impressions  in  terms  of  familiar  ideas, — must  naturally  pre- 
dominate; that  is,  those  ideas  which  are  usually  associated 
with  the  impressions  must  assert  themselves  with  special 
vigor.  And  it  is  therefore  to  be  expected  that  in  cases  of 
involuntary  observation  we  should  be  much  more  Hkely  to 
confine  ourselves  to  familiar  views  of  things  than  to  notice 
strange  and  novel  features  in  the  perceived  object. 

We  shall  later  learn,  from  experimental  investigations,  to 
what  extent  our  sense-impressions  are  suppressed  by  our  cus- 
tomary ideas.  This  cannot  be  determined  by  reflection  alone. 
It  might  turn  out,  for  example,  that  customary  ideas  will 
assert  themselves  less  vigorously  simply  because  the  invol- 
untary observation  of  a  momentary  stimulus  arouses  the 
activity  of  attention  more  intensively  than  does  the  inquiring 
observation  of  resting  objects  which  we  may  examine  so  long 
as  we  please. 

Less  well-known  and  less  heeded  in  psychology  is  the  type 
"^  of  expectant  observation;  and  yet  it  is  probably  of  paramount 
importance  for  our  mental  life.  Our  attitude  of  subjective 
predisposition  toward  a  phenomenon  may  be  of  such  a  sort 
that  we  intend  to  observe  only  in  a  general  way,  or  to  observe 
anything  that  may  happen,  without  setting  up  a  goal-idea. 
Indeed,  we  do  not  even  need  to  think  of  any  particular  group 
of  phenomena  as  the  goal  of  our  observation.  This  is  an 
attitude  which  we  frequently  assume  during  our  travels  in 
foreign  countries  because  we  do  not  know  in  advance  what 
novel  or  interesting  experiences  we  shall  encounter.  In  this 
case,  no  definite  goal-idea  or  view-point  is  present;  it  is  our 
intention  only  to  be  prepared  for  observation  in  general.  The 
auxiliary  apparatus  of  observation  comes  into  action  only  in 
a  very  diffuse  and  general  fashion;    we  allow  the  eyes  to 


Observational  Learnmg  73 

wander  about,  although  we  are  accustomed  to  fixate  them 
upon  something.  We  listen,  but  we  do  not  listen  for  sounds 
from  any  particular  part  of  our  environment,  etc.  This  type 
of  expectant  observing  seems  to  be  characteristic  of  certain 
individuals,  while  others  cultivate  the  distinctive  t}^e  of 
inquiring  observation.  It  is  said  of  Goethe,  for  instance,  that 
he  had  developed  his  expectant  observation  in  the  highest 
degree.  This  sort  of  observation  is  especially  well  adapted 
to  obvia,te  all  tension  and  excitation  during  the  process  of 
observing,  while  inquiring  observation  is  never  free  from 
expectant  tension  and  internal  excitation.  For  this  very 
reason,  expectant  observation  is  particularly  capable  of  secur- 
ing objectively  vahd  results;  and  this  characteristic  is  inten- 
sified by  the  fact  that  the  observer  does  not  make  use  of  any 
definite  point  of  view  or  expectation-idea  whose  employment 
might  falsify  his  objective  impression.  Expectant  observa- 
tion is,  therefore,  particularly  advantageous  when  we  are  in 
the  presence  of  wholly  novel  and  unfamiliar  phenomena  and 
do  not  yet  know  what  they  may  present  to  us.  The  manner 
in  which  expectation-ideas  and  points  of  view  become  effective 
in  this  type  of  observation  brings  it  into  intimate  relation,  in 
certain  respects,  with  involuntary  observation.  In  both  cases, 
the  particular  point  of  view  must  be  furnished  during  the  act 
of  observation  itself,  and  must  be  a  product  exclusively  of  the 
external  stimulus;  while  in  inquiring  observation  the  point  of 
view  is  only  partially  developed  during  the  act  of  observing. 
Passively  expectant  observation  might  also  be  perfected 
by  practice.  Its  chief  conditions  are:  a.  The  observer  must 
hold  himself  free  from  definite  expectation-ideas;  but  he 
must  be  i&  a  receptive  mood  for  external  stimuli,  and  he  must 
assume  an  energetic  attitude  toward  the  act  of  observing. 
h.  He  must  be  capable  of  obtaining  the  proper  points  of  view 
from  the  objectively  given  data,  during  the  act  of  observing; 


74  The  Psychology  of  Leanimg 

and  these  points  of  view  enable  him  to  distinguish  that  which 
is  novel  and  peculiar  from  that  which  is  famiHar  and  cus- 
tomary. 

Now  it  is  evident  that  each  of  the  above  conditions  of  accu- 
rate observing,  in  its  various  possible  forms,  is  at  the  time  an 
important  pre-condition  and  pre-supposition  of  observational 
noting,  because,  of  course,  we  are  able  to  note  only  what  we 
have  observed  clearly,  and  we  retain  impressions  more  readily 
in  proportion  as  we  have  fulfilled  the  conditions  of  accurate, 
objective,  complete  and  distinct  observation. 

But  our  procedure  in  observing  may  be  such  that  it  fulfils 
certain  conditions  which  are  specifically  concerned  in  the  re- 
tention and  subsequent  reproduction  of  impressions.  And 
these  may  be  stated,  in  part,  from  a  general  consideration  of 
memory  for  sensory  data,  but  in  part  they  must  be  derived 
from  experiments  in  observational  noting.  The  general  con- 
ditions which  are  derived  from  the  nature  of  noting  itself 
may  be  formulated  first,  in  order  that  we  may  explain  them 
more  fully  later,  in  the  light  of  experimental  data.    The  most 

1  important  and  most  general  condition  is  that  the  observation 
must,  as  a  matter  of  course,  be  carried  on  from  the  outset 
with  the  deliberate  intention  not  of  grasping  the  impressions 
merely  for  the  moment,  but  of  retaining  them  permanently. 
This  directing  influence  of  will  and  of  subjective  attitude 
during  the  act  of  observing  determines,  in  general,  the  effect 
of  observation  upon  memory.  If  we  have  the  will  to  imprint 
the  observed  data  upon  memory  in  order  that  we  might 
subsequently  be  able  to  reproduce  them,  we  actually  retain 
them  more  readily;  and  when  the  will  to  remember  is  lacking, 
the  incorporation  into  memory  fails  to  take  place,  or  if  it 
does  occur,  it  is  a  matter  of  sheer  accident.  This  is  probably 
to  be  explained  from  the  fact  that,  when  the  will  to  remember 
is  present,  we  assume  a  somewhat  different  attitude  toward 


Observational  Learning  75 

the  observation.  In  the  first  place,  we  dwell  upon  the  impres- 
sions longer  than  is  necessary  for  mere  apprehension;  and 
we  can  sometimes  notice  here  that  we  observe  the  impressions 
individually  and  discretely.  It  is  especially  to  be  noted  that 
we  designate  them  by  names,  and  we  concentrate  the  atten- 
tion upon  them  more  accurately.  Secondly,  we  make  a 
stronger  effort  to  bring  them  into  relation  with  one  another, 
as  when  in  imprinting  a  landscape  upon  memory  we  note 
carefully  the  relative  sizes,  distances  and  directions  of  its 
parts,  and  subsequently  employ  these  spatial  relations  to 
reinforce  memory.  When  it  is  our  purpose  to  remember  we 
search  more  for  connections  among  all  of  the  individual 
impressions  in  order  by  this  means  to  secure  more  secondary 
aids  for  memory.  It  is  probable,  too,  that  the  will  to  remem- 
ber reacts  upon  attention  in  that  we  endeavor  to  raise  to 
greater  clearness  and  definiteness  the  impressions  which  are 
to  be  retained. 

It  seems  probable  then  that  the  will  to  remember  what  is 
being  observed  brings  with  it  a  characteristic  attitude;  and 
that  this  attitude,  in  turn,  h  especially  favorable  for  the 
operation  of  those  factors  which  give  rise  to  a  formation  of 
associations  among  ideas.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  most 
fundamental  condition  of  association  is  to  be  found  in  the 
temporal  relations  of  the  idea.  We  estabhsh  particularly 
secure  and  stable  associations  between  those  impressions 
which  have  longest  been  present  in  consciousness  and  which 
have  most  frequently  been  repeated;  and  those  ideas  are 
most  readily  reproduced  which  have  entered  into  numerous 
associative  relations  with  one  another.  All  three  of  these 
conditions  are  a  product  of  the  will  to  imprint  the  data  of 
observation,  which  leads  us  to  dwell  longer  upon  impressions, 
to  focus  the  attention  upon  them  repeatedly,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  associate  all  their  subsidiary  impressions  with  them 


76  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

memorially.  And  here  again  is  seen  the  dual  activity  of 
memory:  for  the  individual  impression  we  create  as  lasting 
a  disposition  to  revival  as  possible;  and  we  also  endeavor 
to  connect  or  to  associate  the  impressions  with  one  another. 

In  imprinting  objects  upon  memory  by  bringing  them  into 
associative  relations  with  one  another  we  fulfil  yet  another 
important  condition  of  noting  and  remembering.  We  not 
only  estabUsh  associative  coimections  between  objectively 
given  data,  but  we  also  bring  the  data  into  relation  with  our 
current  ideas  and  with  our  general  body  of  knowledge.  These 
relations  are  in  part  of  a  purely  associative  nature, — pure 
connections  of  ideas;  they  are,  in  part,  of  a  logical  sort,  and 
consist  in  the  ascription  of  relations  to  the  impressions.  These 
two  activities  furnish  us  with  a  unitary  comprehension  of  the 
impressions.  The  more  we  understand  objectively  given 
data  and  comprehend  their  logical  and  objective  relations,  the 
more  readily  can  we  retain  and  reproduce  them.  Impressions 
which  are  something  more  than  the  elementary  material  of 
mere  sensation  can  be  retained  and  reproduced  if  they  are 
understood  in  the  sense  described.  Thus,  for  example,  we 
remember  the  lines  of  a  drawing,  or  the  outline  of  an  object 
only  when  we  have  understood  the  principles  embodied  in 
their  construction.  No  one  is  able  to  remember  an  arabesque 
from  the  purely  visual  picture  as  such  without  getting  clearly 
before  his  mind  the  plan  of  its  design  and  the  principle  of  its 
construction. 

This  is  true  also  of  the  temporal  relations  of  impressions. 
They,  too,  are  a  chief  aid  to  memory  because  they  bring  to 
consciousness  the  temporal  arrangement  of  the  impressions, 
indicating  which  of  the  events  occurred  earlier  and  which 
later,  and  showing  in  how  far  certain  processes  occurred 
simultaneously,  and  by  how  long  intervals  of  time  the  impres- 
sions were  separated  from  one  another. 


Observational  Learning  77 

The  spatial  and  temporal  relations  of  stimuli  attain  defin- 
iteness  only  when  we  note  their  quantitative  relations,  as 
spatial  and  temporal  distances  and  intervals  and  proportions ; 
we  do  not  obtain  a  definite  idea  of  them  until  we  reduce 
them  to  numerical  statement.  The  noting  and  estimating  of 
quantitative  relations  in  spatial  and  temporal  impressions  are 
also  important  aids  to  memory, — probably  for  the  twofold 
reason  that  the  ideas  themselves  are  thereby  made  more 
definite,  ,and  that  such  a  conceptual  knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tions of  number  and  magnitude  combines  with  the  remem- 
brance and  furnishes  it  with  a  secondary  support. 

The  completeness  of  the  analysis  which  is  made  during 
the  process  of  observing  is  of  paramount  importance  for  the 
retention  of  impressions.  It  is  important,  in  the  first  place, 
because  it  guards  against  lacunas  in  memory,  and  by  this 
means  it  lessens  the  danger  of  gaps  being  filled,  without  our 
being  aware  of  the  substitution,  by  customary  associations 
and  by  imaginative  adjuncts;  secondly,  because  a  complete 
observation  gives  rise  to  many  more  associations  of  impres- 
sions with  ideas  and  with  one  another.  We  know,  too,  that 
those  impressions  which  are  most  intimately  related  to 
emotion  and  to  interest  are  most  readily  observed  and  no^ed. 
But  it  is  impossible,  by  means  of  reflection  alone,  to  discover 
any  definite  principle  concerning  what  part  is  played  by 
emotion  in  observational  noting.  We  shall  see,  however,  that 
experimental  investigations  have  yielded  interesting  results 
bearing  upon  this  topic. 

All  of  these  conditions  of  observation  and  of  observational 
noting  may  be  made  clear,  by  general  psychological  consider- 
ations, from  the  nature  of  observation  and  of  memory;  but 
in  addition  to  this,  experimental  investigation  has  revealed 
the  intimate  nature  of  observational  noting  from  various 

points  of  view. 

7 


CHAPTER  IV 

OBSERVATIONAL  LEARNING  {Continued) 

2.   The   Experimental   Investigation   of  Observational   Noting 

Most  of  the  experiments  upon  which  the  following  dis- 
cussions must  be  based  were  not  undertaken  for  the  purpose 
of  investigating  normal  observational  noting  itself.  They 
have  dealt,  in  part,  with  a  somewhat  different  group  of 
psychological  problems;  in  part,  they  have  been  undertaken 
by  psychiatrists  and  psychopathologists  who  have  been 
interested  in  pathological  disturbances  of  memory.  But  the 
results  of  these  investigations  are  available  for  our  present 
purposes  because  they  give  us  an  insight  into  certain  char- 
acteristics of  observational  noting. 

It  was  not  until  recently  that  psychologists  turned  their 
attention  to  the  experimental  investigation  of  the  factors 
which  play  a  part  in  the  act  of  observational  noting.  Their 
experiments  are  concerned  either  with  the  retention  and 
reproduction  of  simple  sensations, — especially  colors  and 
tones,  and  hence  they  may  be  referred  to  as  experiments  in 
sense-memory, — or  they  deal  with  the  retention  and  repro- 
duction of  spatial  relations  and  temporal  relations, — in  which 
case  they  may  be  called  experiments  in  the  memory  of  space 
and  time,  or  in  spatial  and  temporal  estimation.  We  have  a 
relatively  small  number  of  investigations  of  the  observational 
noting  of  complex  impressions,  such  as  the  noting  of  combina- 
tions of  forms  and  colors ;  not  until  recently  have  psychologists 
undertaken  the  investigation  of  the  retention  and  reproduc- 
tion of  complex  objects.    All  of  these  experiments  have  yielded 

78 


^.^-^  Observatio7ial  Learning  79 

results  which  are  instructive  for  the  student  of  pedagogy. 
We  shall  present  a  brief  survey  of  their  essential  features;  and 
then  we  shall  summarize  the  conclusions  which  may  be  drawn 
from  them,  in  so  far  as  they  have  a  bearing  upon  the  training 
and  the  techniciuc  of  observational  noting. 

a.   Investigations  of  Sense-Memory 

Let  us  first  describe  the  methods  and  results  of  the  experi- 
ments which  deal  with  sense-memory.  In  tests  of  sense- 
memory  we  may  regard  the  retention  of  a  single  sensation  as 
the  simplest  case;  then,  in  progressive  order,  the  retention  of  a 
sensation-difference  or  a  combination  of  sensations;  then  the 
retention  of  the  spatial  and  temporal  relations  of  sensations; 
and  finally,  the  retention  of  complex  spatial  and  temporal 
impressions.  Two  modes  of  procedure  are  possible  in  these 
investigations:  i.  A  particular  stimulus  may  be  presented  to 
the  observer, — a  tone  of  a  certain  pitch  and  intensity,  a  color 
of  a  certain  saturation  and  brightness, — and  the  attempt  may 
be  made  to  determine  whether  the  same  stimulus  can  be 
recognized  after  temporal  intervals  of  variable  length.  This 
is  the  method  of  Recognition.  Here  it  is  necessary,  of  course, 
to  employ  not  only  the  original  stimulus,  but  also  to  introduce 
others  which  differ  from  it.  The  first  impression  is  usually 
called  the  standard  impression,  or  if  referred  to  its  objective 
cause,  the  standard  stimulus;  and  the  second  is  called  the 
comparative  impression  or  the  comparative  stimulus.  2.  A 
method  of  Production  or  Reproduction  may  be  employed. 
After  a  definite  interval  has  elapsed  the  observer  is  here  re- 
quired to  reproduce  the  standard  color  or  the  standard  tone 
by  means  of  an  apparatus  adapted  to  the  purpose.  In  either 
case,  the  observer's  errors  may  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  the 
accuracy  of  recognition  and  discrimination  in  the  former  case, 
and  of  reproduction  in  the  latter  case.    The  error,  together 


y 


80  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

with  the  length  of  interval  elapsing  between  stimulus  and 
reproduction,  expresses  the  accuracy  of  sense-memory.  Of 
course,  if  such  experiments  are  to  give  us  a  really  accurate 
measurement  of  memory  function,  various  precautions  must 
be  observed  in  the  conduct  of  the  experiments;  especially  is 
it  necessary  to  make  numerous  determinations  under  identical 
conditions,  internal  and  external,  and  to  preserve  a  constancy 
of  attention  throughout.  The  evaluation  of  the  results  in- 
troduces numerous  mathematical  complications ;  but  it  seems 
unnecessary  to  discuss  them  here.  We  may  in  general,  regard 
the  fraction  ji  as  an  approximate  measure  of  the  accuracy  of 
memory,  where  c  is  the  number  of  correct  estimations  and  n 
the  total  number  of  estimations.  By  a  variation  of  time- 
interval  (seconds,  days,  or  weeks)  we  are  able  to  extend  the 
experiments  to  include  both  immediate  and  permanent 
retention. 

Using  a  method  of  this  sort,  in  the  psychological  laboratory 
at  Leipzig  in  1886,  Wolfe  ^  performed  a  series  of  experiments 
upon  memory  for  tones,  and  succeeded  at  that  early  date  in 
determining  the  most  important  characteristics  of  sense- 
memory.  Wolfe's  chief  result, — which  has  been  confirmed  by 
other  investigators,  although  the  numerical  data  obtained  by 
the  latter  may  have  been  somewhat  different  in  consequence  of 
differences  in  experimental  conditions, — may  be  stated  as 
follows:  The  accuracy  of  tonal  reproduction  depends,  in  two 
respects,  upon  the  length  of  time  which  has  elapsed  between 
the  standard  and  the  comparative  tones,  i.  The  interval 
must  not  be  too  short,  for  if  the  comparative  tone  comes  too 
soon, — within  a  fraction  of  a  second  after  the  standard  tone, — 
it  is  found  that  consciousness  has  not  yet  finished  working- 
over  the  standard  tone,  and  comparison  is  thereby  rendered 

^  H.  K.  Wolfe,  Untersuchungen  fiber  das  Tongedachtnis,  Philos. 
Studien,  III.,  1886,  534ff. 


Observational  Learning  8i 

difficult.  It  turns  out  that  about  two  seconds  is  the  time  which 
must  elapse  if  the  observer  is  to  make  an  accurate  discrimina- 
tion between  the  two  tones.  It  is  evident  that  immediate  re- 
tention is  in  operation  throughout  in  these  experiments,  and 
the  investigation  is  rather  a  test  of  sensory  discrimination 
than  of  the  temporal  capacity  of  memory, — the  first  sensation 
being  still  present  to  consciousness  in  the  form  of  an  after- 
effect when  the  second  appears  (successive  comparison). 
2.  When  the  time  interval  exceeds  two  seconds,  the  earlier 
impression  fades  and  the  accuracy  of  reproduction  and 
recognition  decreases, — rapidly  at  first,  then  more  and  more 
slowly.  With  an  interval  of  one  minute,  the  uncertainty 
becomes  so  great  that  the  second  tone  is  estimated  correctly 
in  only  about  one-half  of  the  cases.  It  turns  out,  too,  that 
favorable  and  unfavorable  lengths  of  time-interval  alternate 
with  one  another;  forgetting,  therefore,  does  not  progress  in  a  | 
constant  and  uniform  fashion,  but  shows  a  series  of  upward' 
and  downward  fluctuations.  Thus,  it  may  come  about  that 
tonal  estimation  is  less  accurate  after  an  interval  of  fifteen 
seconds  than  after  twenty-five  seconds.  These  phenomena 
demand  explanation;  and  two  possible  explanations  present  / 
themselves,  a.  One  might  be  tempted  to  regard  the  whole  ' 
process  of  remembering  andj^forgetting  as  a  product  of  atten- 
tion.J  Forgetting  would  then  begin  at  the  moment  when  the 
impression  leaves  the  focus  of  consciousness;  and  the  various 
periods  of  recognition  or  reproduction  which  are  characterized 
by  greater  accuracy  could  be  explained  by  correlating  them 
with  fluctuations  of  attention.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
attention  itself  can  not  function  with  a  constant  degree  of 
concentration  even  for  a  very  brief  period  of  time,  but  nor- 
mally manifests  fluctuations  of  intensity.  If,  now^^the  revival 
of  the  tone  occurs  at  a  period  where  favorable  conditions  of 
attention  are  present,  the  tone  will  be  recognized  i  or  repro- 


82  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

duced  more  accurately  than  when  the  revival  coincides  with  a 
subsiding  of  attention.  Observers  themselves  report  this 
continuous  alternation  of  waxing  and  waning  attention.  It 
is  even  possible  to  distinguish  shorter  and  longer  fluctuations; 
and  both  of  these  may  be  of  significance  for  the  reproduction 
of  impressions,  h.  We  might  assume  that  the  decrease  of 
]  retention  and  the  increase  of  forgetting  are  due  to  the  gradual 
(^  obhteration  of  the  memorial  dispositions  tliemselves;  and 
that  the  dispositions  or  traces  which  remain  after  the  stimulus 
is  gone  do  not  become  the  prey  of  the  variable  behavior  of 
attention,  but  themselves  are  subject  to  a  general  law  of 
gradual  fading  with  the  lapse  of  time.  In  that  case,  the 
I  fluctuation  of  attention  would  exert  only  a  secondary  influence 
'  upon  the  accuracy  of  reproduction.  In  my  opinion,  the  second 
hypothesis  is  much  more  probable,  chiefly  for  the  reason  that 
a  relatively  accurate  reproduction  is  possible  after  attention 
has  been  diverted  from  the  impression  and  the  stimulus  has 
ceased  to  act  upon  consciousness.  We  shall  later  make  the 
acquaintance  of  various  other  facts  concerning  the  repro- 
duction of  ideas,  which  support  this  view. 

Numerous  other  investigations,  similar  in  form  to  Wolfe's, 
have  been  undertaken  more  recently;  but  no  results  which 
are  essentially  new  in  principle  have  been  discovered.  Heiden- 
hain  investigated  memory  for  colors;  Lewin,  for  colors  and 
other  visual  stimuli;  Radoslawow,  memory  for  extents  of 
visual  space  (lines  and  distances  between  points);  Baldwin, 
Shaw  and  Warren,  and  Binet  and  Henri  investigated  the 
retention  of  lines  and  simple  linear  figures  for  different  inter- 
vals of  time.  Baldwin  and  Shaw  had  their  observers  draw 
geometrical  forms  from  memory  or  select  them  from  other 
figures  {Recognition  Method  and  Selection  Method).  Binet  and 
Henri  had  their  observers  select  and  recognize  lines  and  spatial 
forms.    Numerous  other  psychologists  have  made  analogous 


Observational  Learning  83 

investigations  in  which  temporal  intervals  of  brief  duration 
(one  fifth  of  a  second  to  five  seconds,  and  even  more)  were 
employed  as  data  to  be  remembered;  in  these  experiments 
tlie  remembered  datum  was  either  reproduced  after  the  lapse 
of  different  periods  of  time,  or  it  was  compared  with  another 
interval.  These  experiments  yielded  the  remarkable  result 
that  only  very  brief  temporal  intervals, — probably  not  more  \ 
than  two  seconds, — are  capable  of  being  immediately  per- /J 
ceived;  that  an  interval  of  approximately  half  a  second  is 
most  accurately  retained  and  reproduced, — this  is  the  average 
interval  between  steps  in  walking,  and  is  for  that  reason  an 
interval  with  whose  reproduction  .we  have  most  experience; 
and  that  in  our  reproductions  we  over-estimate  intervals  of 
less  than  one  half-second,  while  we  under-estimate  intervals 
from  one  half-second  to  twenty-five  seconds/ 

The  most  important  results  in  all  of  these  experiments  were  I 
that  the  progress  of  forgetting  is  rapid  at  the  outset,  and  then  1 
more  slow;   and  that,  with  every  sort  of  stimulus  employed, 
the  taihng-off  of  the  original  impression  is,  in  all  probabiHty, 
an  irregular  and  fluctuating  process.     If  we  could  discover 
the  causes  of  these  irregularities  in  the  progress  of  forgetting, 
the  nature  of  forgetting  would  no  longer  remain  a  mystery. 
As  already  mentioned,  forgetting  begins  at  the  instant  when  \ 
the  attention  is  turned  away  from  the  impression,  for,  at  that 
instant,  the  impression  begins  to  fall  to  a  lower  degree  of 
awareness;  and  since  it  is  no  longer  made  secure  in  conscious- 
ness by  attention,  it  may  now  be  suppressed  or  dislodged  by 
other  impressions  or  ideas.     Forgetting  does  not,  however,    , 
consist  solely  in  a  distraction  of  attention;  it  probably  con- 
sists in  I.  a  dislodging  of  the  forgotten  impression  from  con-  ' 

^  For  a  discussion  of  the  striking  similarity  between  these  illusions 
of  time  and  illusions  of  visual  space  see  my  paper  in  Wundt's  Philos. 
Studien,  IX.,  X.,  1894. 


84  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

sciousness  by  other  impressions  or  ideas,  and  2.  in  a  conse- 
I  queiit  fading  of  its  after-effect  or  disposition  to  revival  be- 
cause the  impression  is  no  longer  present  to  consciousness. 
This  weakening  of  the  after-effect  of  the  primary  impression 
or  of  the  tendency  toward  revival  probably  constitutes 
genuine  forgetting;  and  the  revival  of  the  after-effects  by 
renewed  reproduction,  either  through  the  agency  of  a  repeated 
stimulation  or  of  a  simple  reproduction  of  ideas,  constitutes  a 
genuine  restoration  of  the  disposition  which  in  turn  gives  rise 
to  a  permanent  retention  of  the  impression.  It  is  the  waning  of 
the  disposition  which  proceeds  more  rapidly  at  first,  more 
and  more  slowly  later;  and  just  for  this  reason,  the  renewal 
or  restoration  of  a  disposition  is  more  successful  the  more 
immediately  it  follows  the  waning  of  the  original  impression. 
Experiments  which  have  dealt  with  the  influence  of  atten- 
tion upon  the  process  of  noting  are  closely  related  with  those 
which  have  dealt  with  sense-memory.  They  show  us  that  the 
predisposing  function  of  attention  which  fixes  and  secures  a 
goal-idea  is  also  subject  to  just  such  normal  fluctuations  as 
are  characteristic  of  sense-memory.  When  in  reaction  ex- 
periments/ a  signal  is  given  to  warn  the  observer  that  the 
stimulus  is  about  to  come,  the  length  of  the  interval  which 
elapses  between  the  warning  signal  and  the  stimulus  is  a  matter 
of  considerable  significance.  It  has  been  determined  that  the 
1  signal  must  precede  the  stimulus  by  about  two  seconds  in 
order  to  secure  an  optimal  condition  of  attention  for  the 
reception  of  the  stimulus.     Shorter  intervals  do  not  give 

^  The  simple  reaction  experiment  is  arranged  as  follows:  The 
observer  responds  to  a  pre-arranged  stimulus  by  making  a  pre-arranged 
movement, — depressing  a  telegraph  key,  or  the  like.  The  time  which 
intervenes  between  the  application  of  the  stimulus  and  the  beginning 
of  the  reagent's  movement  is  measured,  and  designated  his  "reaction- 
time." 


Observational  Learning  85 

sufficient  time  for  concentrating  and  adjusting  the  attention; 
when  the  interval  is  longer,  the  concentration  of  attention 
begins  to  wane  before  the  stimulus  appears.  We  shall  see 
that  the  state  of  preparation  is  of  prime  significance  for  obser- 
vation and  observational  noting. 

Even  from  this  small  group  of  experiments  it  is  possible  to 
deduce  important  rules  for  the  technique  of  observational 
noting.  I.  We  see  that  it  is  of  advantage  to  recall  the  goal- 
idea  to  consciousness  in  accurate  and  definite  form  a  short 
time  before  the  observation  begins;  but  care  must  be  taken 
that  this  time  is  neither  too  long  nor  too  short.  This  becomes 
important  in  cases  of  instantaneous  stimuh,  where  we  have  but 
Httle  time  during  the  observation  itself  to  bring  the  view- 
point of  observation  clearly  to  mind;  for  example,  in  our 
illustration  of  inquiring  observation  with  abrupt  and  fleeting 
stimuli. 

2.  We  find  that  all  sense-impressions  pass  through  two  I 
stages  of  forgetting.  The  first  phase  is  to  some  extent  only  a  I 
waning  of  the  original  impression;  during  this  period  the 
impression  can  most  readily  be  revived  in  accurate  form,  and 
hence  it  can  be  re-estabHshed  in  memory  most  easily  by  re- 
newed observation.  From  this  it  follows  that  for  the  tech- 
nique of  observational  noting  it  is  advantageous  to  imprint 
stimuh  accurately  during  the  observation  itself,  wherever 
that  is  possible,  or,  in  any  case,  immediately  afterward.  And 
this  is  the  procedure  which  we  involuntarily  adopt  whenever 
'  we  wish  to  secure  a  lasting  memory  of  complex  stimuh.  We 
repeat  the  observation  with  the  intention  of  noting  the  im- 
pression while  the  object  is  still  before  us;  or  we  close  the 
eyes  for  a  moment  and  later  return  to  the  object  after  at- 
tempting to  reproduce  it  independently.  The  second  stage  of  I 
forgetting  is  of  longer  duration.  During  this  period  the  im- 
pression, which  has  already  faded  in  some   degree,   slowly 


86  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

and  gradually  becomes  weaker  and  weaker.  From  observa- 
tions of  my  own  learning  and  retention  of  very  complex  visual 
stimuli,  such  as  a  painting  or  the  facade  of  a  building,  I  have 
determined  that  the  first  period  of  forgetting  also  manifests 
the  following  characteristics:  a.  The  memory-image  has 
much  more  freshness,  and  is  in  every  way  qualitatively  more 
like  its  original  than  it  is  subsequently;  h.  the  memory-image 
is  here  very  much  richer  in  detail  than  during  the  second 
period  of  forgetting.  Hence,  whenever  we  are  called  upon  to 
remember  complex  impressions,  it  is  expedient  to  begin  a 
reconstruction  of  the  memory-image  as  soon  as  possible  after 
the  disappearance  of  the  primary  impression;  and  wherever 
possible,  to  write  down  a  complete  description  of  the  details 
because  these  will  subsequently  be  lost  from  memory. 

h.   The  Experimental  Investigation  of  Observing  and  Noting 

A  chief  condition  of  accurate  observing  and  observational 
noting  consists  in  the  proper  behavior  of  attention  during  the 
act  of  observing,  and  especially  in  its  capacity  to  be  distracted 
or  to  resist  distraction  in  the  presence  of  disturbing  stimuli. 
In  the  complex  function  to  which  the  name  "attention"  has 
been  applied,  modern  psychology  differentiates  a  variety  of 
attributes.  Individuals  differ  from  one  another  in  the  relative 
prominence  of  particular  attributes,  and  these  variations  may 
constitute  thorough-going  individual  differences  of  attention 
and  of  total  mental  endowment.  The  attributes  which  are 
most  important  for  our  present  purposes  are  intensity  of  con-  I 
centration,  and  inhibition  of  distractions.  These  constitute 
the  basis  of  individual  capacity  to  concentrate  and  its  op- 
posite,— individual  tendency  to  succumb  to  distraction.  Ex- 
perimental psychology  has  endeavored  to  measure  these 
capacities  in  the  hope  of  discovering  a  means  of  measuring 
attention.     One  of  the  most  rehable  methods   consists  in 


Observational  Learning  87   '' 

having  the  individual  perform  rival  mental  acts  simultaneously. 
In  the  simplest  case,  the  attention  is  attracted  in  several 
directions  at  the  same  time  by  rival  stimuli,  and  we  endeavor 
to  observe  the  change  in  sensory  impression  which  results.  A 
somewhat  more  complex  case  occurs  when  we  endeavor  to 
carry  on  several  activities  simultaneously.  By  this  means, 
capacity  to  concentrate  is  measured  directly,  and  tendency 
to  suffer  distraction  is  measured  indirectly  when  we  determine 
the  amount  of  decrease  of  mental  efficiency  which  results 
from  the  introduction  of  rival  impressions  or  activities. 
Kraepehn  holds  that  distractibility  and  capacity  to  resist 
distraction  can  themselves  be  measured  by  the  introduction 
of  temporary  or  permanent  distractions  while  mental  work  is 
being  done. 

Since  the  attention  may  become  accustomed  or  adapted 
to  distracting  stimuli,  Kraepelin  believes  that  continuous  dis- 
tractions enable  us  to  measure  the  individual's  adaptation 
capacity.  A  great  many  investigations  dealing  with  this 
problem  have  been  carried  on  in  the  Cornell  laboratory  under 
the  direction  of  Professor  E.  B.  Titchener.  In  these  experi- 
ments, impressions  of  various  sorts  were  subjected  to  dis- 
tracting influences,  the  object  of  the  investigation  being  to 
determine  what  is  the  effect  of  the  distractions.  These  ex-  . 
periments  show  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  divert  the  attention 
by  means  of  distracting  stimuli.  Three  cases  must  be  dis- 
tinguished: I.  Unless  an  actual  distraction  takes  place  an 
external  stimulus  does  not  necessarily  disturb  the  attention 
at  all,  either  in  the  sense  of  diverting  it  from  the  activity  upon 
which  it  is  engaged  or  in  the  sense  of  impairing  its  functional 
activity.  In  this  case,  the  tendency  to  distraction  is  overcome 
by  an  increased  concentration  of  attention;  and  one  may 
either  completely  conpcnsate  the  distracting  influence  or  one 
may  more  than  compensate  it,  i.e.,  the  concentration  of  atten- 


88  The  Psychology  of  Leanimg 

tion  may  increase  to  such  an  extent  that  not  only  is  distraction 
avoided  but  the  original  efficiency  of  attention  is  actually 
increased.  2.  The  disturbing  stimulus  may  not  really  dis- 
tract the  attention  but  still  may  interfere  with  its  function 
because  the  observer  is  obliged  to  concentrate  too  intensively 
if  he  is  to  maintain  a  uniform  degree  of  attention  in  the 
presence  of  the  distraction.  Here  the  energy  of  attention  is 
diminished,  but  the  attention  is  not  diverted  from  the  work  in 
hand.  3.  The  attention  may  really  be  distracted;  it  may 
turn  and  occupy  itself  with  the  disturbing  stimulus,  or  it  may 
turn  to  some  other  objective  point,  in  which  case  an  essential 
impairment  of  its  function  or  indeed  a  complete  interruption 
of  its  original  activity  may  be  expected  to  ensue. 

The  Cornell  experiments  show  that  different  individuals 
conduct  themselves  differently  in  the  presence  of  a  distraction 
of  the  attention.  For  example,  certain  observers  pause  in 
their  adding  when  a  distracting  stimulus  is  introduced,  and 
during  the  pause  a  definite  awareness  of  the  distracting 
stimulus  comes  abruptly  to  consciousness;  others,  on  the 
contrary,  can  not  be  so  interrupted.  In  the  latter  case,  one 
finds  that  the  observer  is  but  dimly  aware  of  the  disturbing 
stimulus;  in  certain  instances  he  is  not  aware  of  it  at  all. 

In  these  experiments,  concentration  is  measured  by  the 
simultaneous  performance  of  homogeneous  activities.  Other 
investigators  have  had  recourse  to  the  simultaneous  per- 
formance of  heterogeneous  activities,  and  have  measured 
concentration  from  the  cessation  of  these  activities  (Binet 
and  Henri,  Paulhan,  Sharp).  For  instance,  one  is  asked  to 
read  and  to  write  at  the  same  time,  or  to  read  and  to  draw  a 
continuous  spiral,  and  the  like.^ 

^  E.  B.  Titchener,  Lectures  on  the  Elementary  Psychology  of  Feeling 
and  Attention,  New  York,  1908.  A.  Binet,  La  concurrence  des  etats 
psychiques,  Rev.  phil.  XXIX.,  1890.     F.  Paulhan,  La  simultaneite  des 


Observational  Learning  89 

Other  experiments  have  investigated  the  influence  exerted 
by  distracting  stimuli  upon  motor  reactions  or  upon  simple 
movements  such  as  are  made  in  beating  time.  Swift  found 
that  homogeneous  stimuli  have  a  greater  distracting  power 
than  heterogeneous  stimuli, — when  visual  stimuli  are  intro- 
duced they  have  a  more  pronounced  effect  upon  reactions  to 
visual  than  to  auditory  stimuli. 

Binet  and  Jastrow  employed  reading,  adding,  and  other 
mental  activities  in  an  effort  to  disturb  tapping  movements. 
The  amount  of  distraction  is  found  to  vary  with  the  com- 
plexity of  the  tempo.  Simple  time-marking  soon  becomes 
automatic,  and  the  movements  of  beating  tune  are  disturbed 
but  Kttle,  or  not  at  all,  by  the  simultaneous  execution  of  mental 
operations;  more  dif&cult  tempos  are  very  much  disturbed, 
however,  probably  because  they  do  not  so  readily  become 
automatic  but  make  a  greater  demand  upon  attention  through- 
out. 

These  experiments  bring  to  light  two  important  points: 
the  distracting  influence  of  a  secondary  stimulus  is  probably 
greater  in  proportion  as  the  two  stimuli  which  are  simul- 
taneously present  are  similar  in  character;  and  the  effect  of 
distraction  is  lessened  in  proportion  as  one  of  the  activities 
in  question  can  be  mechanized. 

The  most  important  experiments  of  this  group  we  owe  to 
the  Kraepelin  school  at  Heidelberg  and  at  Munich.  Vogt' 
investigated  the  distractibility  of  normal  individuals,  because 
distractibility  of  attention  and  power  to  resist  distraction 
seemed  to  him  to  be  a  characteristic  s>Tnptom  of  certain 
mental  disorders.    From  a  comparison  of  normal  and  abnormal 

actes  mentales.  Rev.  scientif.  XXXIX.,  1887.   S.  E.  Sharp.    Individual 
Psychology,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychol.    X.,  1899. 

^  R.  Vogt.  Ueber  Ablcnkbarkeit  und  Gewohnungsfahigkeit,  Kracpe- 
lin's  Psychol.  Arbcitcn.    III.,  1899,  62-201. 


90  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

individuals  Vogt  concludes  that  the  efficiency  of  attention 
may  be  estimated  in  terms  of  the  pertinacity  with  which  the 
individual  clings  to  *' goal-ideas"  or  points  of  view  in  observing 
and  in  observational  noting.  Upon  the  capacity  to  hold 
definite  goal-ideas  resolutely  before  one,  depends  in  great  meas- 
ure one's  capacity  of  concentration.  "The  greatest  capacity 
of  concentration  is  present  when  the  more  specific  goals  are 
subordinated  to  a  more  general  goal."  Yet  Vogt  is  of  the 
opinion  that  the  power  to  hold  fast  to  the  goal-idea  in  ob- 
servational noting  is,  in  large  measure,  dependent  upon  the 
emotional  life  of  the  individual.  On  the  one  hand,  complete 
indifference  and  disinterestedness  is  an  impediment  to  the 
setting  up  of  goal-ideas;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  emotional 
life  must  not  be  subject  to  great  variations  of  intensity  if 
this  capacity  to  concentrate  the  attention  is  to  be  present. 
The  efiicacy  of  the  goal-idea  is  recognized  by  Vogt  to  consist 
in  a  selecting  or  choosing  of  what  shall  come  to  consciousness 
during  the  act  of  observing.  To  it  is  due  the  fact  "that  only 
those  external  stimuli  or  those  ideas  which  accord  with  the 
direction  of  the  goal  can  come  to  clear  consciousness."  The 
significance  of  the  goal-idea  for  observing  and  noting  will  be 
made  clearer  in  what  follows. 

Vogt  also  endeavored  to  measure  the  distracting  influence 
which  other  processes  coming  to  consciousness  during  mental 
activity  exert  upon  the  result  of  the  latter.  The  effect  of  dis- 
traction was  investigated  in  motor  reactions,  and  in  experi- 
ments upon  apprehension,  upon  the  association  of  ideas  and 
upon  the  function  of  memory.  The  distractions  consisted  in 
the  apprenhension  of  stimuli,  in  reaction  movements  and  in 
memorization.  For  example,  the  observer  was  asked  to  read 
nonsense-syllables  or  to  add  numbers  while  he  was  engaged 
in  tapping  in  unison  with  the  beats  of  a  metronome ;  and  his 
power  to  resist  distraction  was  measured  in  terms  of  the  effect 


Observational  Learning  91 

which  artificially  introduced  distractions  exert  upon  his 
efficiency  in  the  task  upon  which  he  is  engaged.  Distracti- 
bility  is  identical  with  susceptibility  to  disturbing  influences; 
hence  in  measuring  this  susceptibility  we  obtain  an  indirect 
measurement  of  his  power  of  concentration.  Vogt  believes 
that  the  simultaneous  and  really  efficient  accomplishment  of 
two  activities  by  means  of  the  attention  is  impossible.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  attention  never  splits  into  two  halves  which 
then  function  in  an  identical  fashion;  but  every  simultaneous 
achievement  of  two  activities  is  due  either  to  one  of  them 
having  become  mechanized  to  such  an  extent  that  it  demands 
little  or  no  attention,  or  to  our  ability  to  alternate  rapidly 
from  one  activity  to  another.  Now,  it  would  be  a  matter  of 
importance  if  we  could  obtain  a  clearer  insight  into  the  mental 
procedure  which  takes  place  when  we  seem  to  do  several 
things  simultaneously  because,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  atten- 
tion is  obhged  to  occupy  itself  with  different  impressions  at 
approximately  the  same  time,  in  many  cases  of  observation 
and  of  observational  noting.  Vogt's  experiments  give  us 
information  concerning  certain  phases  of  this  problem. 

These  experiments  yield  numerous  results  which  are  similar 
to  the  data  reported  by  the  American  and  French  investi- 
gators whose  work  has  already  been  described.  They  show 
that  the  effect  of  the  subsidiary  activity  varies  with  the  nature 
of  the  chief  activity  which  engages  the  attention  of  the  ob- 
server. For  instance,  the  execution  of  simple  tapping  or 
writing  movements  in  unison  with  the  beats  of  a  metronome, 
or  with  the  sound  of  a  bell  which  is  struck  at  every  fourth 
beat  of  a  metronome  (beating  nineteen  times  per  minute)  does 
not  diminish  one's  power  to  apprehend  nonsense  syllables; 
nor  is  apprehension  decreased  by  the  act  of  reading  certain 
specified  letters  {e,  n,  u,  s,)  from  a  printed  page.  But  when 
the  observer  is  required  to  mark  these  letters,  a  distinct  dis- 


92  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

traction  results.  The  distraction  is  found  to  be  but  little  in- 
creased when  the  secondary  operation  consists  in  adding  pairs 
of  numbers  and  recording  their  sum.  It  is  considerably  greater, 
however,  when  the  observer  is  required  to  add  continuous 
series  of  numbers, — an  operation  which,  of  course,  demands  a 
much  greater  concentration  of  attention  because  the  various 
partial  sums  must  be  retained  in  memory.  Finally  the  memo- 
rization of  syllables  and  lists  of  numbers  is  impaired  most  of 
all  by  a  subsidiary  task. 

There  is  one  point,  especially,  in  these  investigations  which 
has  a  special  interest  in  connection  with  our  general  problem. 
*In  both  Titchener's  and  Vogt's  experiments,  it  was  found  that 
the  effect  of  distraction  is  least  when  one  is  engaged  in  the 
perception  of  sensory  stimuli, — that  is,  observation  and 
observational  noting  are  much  less  disturbed  by  secondary 
activities  and  secondary  stimuli  than  is  any  other  sort  of 
mental  function.  Vogt  expressed  it  as  follows:  "Hence  we 
see  that  the  processes  of  perceptipn  and  apprehension,  which 
are  aroused  by  external  stimuli,  suffer  much  less  from  the 
effects  of  distraction  than  do  the  reaction  movements  which 
are  based  upon  volitional  processes,  or  less  than  tasks  of 
reading  and  adding  which  are  accompanied  by  associative  and 
memory  processes.  The  more  demand  an  activity  makes  upon 
the  combination  of  many  slightly  practised  associations  of 
ideas,  or  the  more  it  demands  the  arousal  of  remembrances, 
the  more  susceptible  is  it  to  distraction." 

It  does  not  seem  to  be  difficult  to  explain  this  phenomenon. 
During  the  act  of  observing,  memory  constantly  receives  aid 
from  external  stimuli;  the  turning  of  the  eye  or  the  ear  toward 
the  stimulus  suffices  for  an  immediate  re-discovery  of  the 
point  of  contact  with  the  previous  activity.  For  this  very 
reason  we  are  more  independent  of  distraction  in  perception 
than  in  other  mental  functions.    This  fact  is  of  great  peda- 


Observational  Learning  93 

gogical  significance  because  it  shows  that  concentration  of 
attention^and  the  important  property  of  resistance  and  non- 
distractibility  can  most  readily  be  employed  in  observation 
and  in  the  apprehension  and  noting  of  sense-impressions. 
Hence  a  simultaneous  apprehension  of  several  impressions, 
or  a  simultaneous  accomplishment  of  subsidiary  activities 
while  we  are  engaged  upon  the  observation  of  a  stimulus 
serves  as  an  appropriate  means  for  a  formal  training  in  the 
concentration  of  attention  and  in  the  resisting  of  distractions. 

An  additional  step  in  the  progress  of  our  knowledge  of 
observational  noting  came  with  the  systematic  investigation, 
by  the  pupils  of  Kraepehn,  of  the  capacity  to  perceive  and  to 
note  under  different  conditions.  Finzi'^  investigated  the 
dependence  of  observational  noting  and  retention  upon  the 
sort  and  the  amount  of  material  presented.  He  also  dealt 
with  the  influence  of  different  aids  to  imprinting,  and  the 
influence  of  the  time  interval  which  elapses  between  the  first 
imprinting  and  the  reproduction;  and  he  turned  his  attention 
chiefly  to  the  degree  of  subjective  assurance  with  which  diff'er- 
ent  observers  give  their  testimony. 

Finzi  worked  exclusively  with  visual  stimuli,  Philippe 
having  already  investigated  the  noting  of  tactual  impres- 
sions.^ Philippe  blindfolded  his  observers  and  had  them  handle 
an  object;  then,  after  a  definite  number  of  hours  or  days, 
they  drew  pictures  of  the  object.  This  method,  however,  is 
very  unsatisfactory;  from  the  results  of  the  investigation 
we  see  only  in  general  that  the  accuracy  of  memory-images 

'  J.  Finzi.  Zur  Untersuchung  der  Auffassungsfahigkcit  und  Merk- 
fahigkeit.  Kraepclin^s  Psychol.  Arbeiten,  III.,  1900,  289-384.  See 
also  J.  Finzi,  Die  Schwankungen  der  geistigen  T'dtigkeit,  Wiesbaden, 
1903. 

^  J.  Philippe.   Sur  Ics  transformations  des  nos  images  mentales, 
Revue  philos.  XLIII.,  1897,  481. 
8 


94  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

.  decreases  with  the  lapse  of  time.  Finzi  employed  letters, 
nmnbers  and  nonsense-syllables,  written  upon  cards.  These 
were  presented  by  means  of  an  apparatus  devised  for  the 
purpose,  the  duration  of|  the  exposure  being  only  about  one- 
fiftieth  of  a  second.  After  the  exposure,  the  observer  was 
asked  to  state  what  he  had  observed;  and  this  was  usually 
done  after  a  very  brief  interval,  either  immediately  after, — 
in  this  case  observation  was  tested  rather  as  an  act  of  noting, — 
or  at  the  end  of  two,  four,  eight  or  fifteen  seconds,  and  in  one 
series  after  two  to  five  minutes.  This  investigation  therefore 
also  dealt  essentially  with  the  immediate  fading  of  the  impres- 
sion. Finzi  distinguished  between  experiments  in  appre- 
hending and  in  noting.  In  the  former,  the  observer's  report 
of  what  he  had  seen  was  made  immediately  after  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  numbers,  letters  or  syllables;  in  the  latter  experi- 
ment, the  reproduction  was  not  made  until  after  the  lapse  of 
one  of  the  intervals  just  mentioned.  The  observers  were 
instructed  to  obtain  as  clear  an  impression  as  possible  of  the 
object  upon  the  card,  to  fi^xate  the  attention  upon  it,  and  not 
to  allow  it  to  escape  from  the  focus  of  attention.  In  order  to 
facihtate  this,  the  observer  sat  silent  and  motionless  during 
the  interval  between  the  presentation  and  the  reproduction, 
directing  his  eyes  throughout  upon  the  point  where  the 
stimulus  had  appeared.  This  is  a  very  important  circum- 
stance in  the  determination  of  the  process  of  forgetting  be- 
cause a  forgetting  or  a  fading  of  the  impression  occurs  even 
when  the  attention  endeavors  to  hold  fast  to  the  remembrance 
of  the  impression. 

The  following  excerpt  from  Finzi 's  results  is  important  for 
our  purposes.  In  measuring  what  an  observer  has  accom- 
pHshed,  we  must  distinguish  between  the  amount  and  the 
reliability  of  his  performance.  The  amount  of  his  performance 
is  determined  by  the  sum  of  all  the  statements  which  he 


Observational  Learning  95 

furnishes  regarding  the  impressions;  the  reliability  is  cal- 
culated from  the  number  of  correct  statements  or  their  ratio 
to  the  total  number.  One  must  be  careful  to  avoid  falling 
into  the  gfcTtf  of  ascribing  a  highly  accurate  sense-memory 
to  those  individuals  who  make  a  great  many  statements  re- 
garding what  they  have  remembered.  A  much  more  im- 
portant result  is  the  ratio  which  detennines  the  fidelity  or 
reliability  of  their  statements. 

As  regards  the  number  of  stimuli  to  be  employed,  Finzi 
reports  that  a  large  number  is  unfavorable  to  perception 
because  the  act  of  perceiving  readily  becomes  difficult  or  con- . 
fused  in  such  cases;  yet  he  finds  that  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  presented  data  is  not  so  disadvantageous  to  the 
function  of  memory  Greater  differences  were  found  in  the 
acquisition  and  retention  of  particular  sorts  of  impressions. 
Numbers  are  apprehended  more  readily  than  letters  but  they 
are  not  retained  so  well.  Letters  are  apprehended  and  noted 
more  readily  when  they  appear  in  nonsense  syllables  than 
when  they  appear  as  isolated  letters.  In  the  investigation  of 
noting  it  was  found  that  single  observations  have  an  influence 
upon  one  another, — a  phenomenon  which  must  be  regarded 
as  especially  important  in  associative  learning.  For  instance, 
it  is  not  advantageous  to  present  a  great  many  similar  objects 
in  immediate  succession  to  the  same  observer ;  the  individual 
impressions  have  a  tendency,  in  such  cases,  to  become  con- 
fused with  one  another  and  reproduction  is  impaired.  Appre- 
hension or  observation  is  less  subject  to  this  type  of  confusion 
than  is  memorial  activity,  such  as  reproduction. 

As  regards  the  temporal  interval,  Finzi  found  the  state  of 
affairs  for  his  complex  material  to  be  wholly  similar  to  that 
reported  by  the  earlier  investigators  who  had  employed  simple 
impressions.  There  are  certain  very  brief  intervals, — eight 
to  thirty  seconds,— for  which  the  reproduction  of  impressions 


96  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

is  easy  and  certain;  but  even  these  differ  somewhat  in  amount 
and  in  reliability  of  reproduction.  Here  again,  then,  we  see 
that  the  best  reproduction  does  not  take  place  immediately 
after  the  first  fading  of  the  impressions.  This  proves  again 
that  forgetting  is  not  due  solely  to  a  diverting  of  attention 
but  that  it  is  a  phenomenon  sui  generis,  probably  identical 
with  the  fading  out  of  the  traces  or  dispositions  left  by  the 
primary  impressions.  The  amount  of  impression  was  greatest 
at  the  end  of  6  to  30  seconds;  the  intensity  of  impression  was 
greatest  after  4  to  15  seconds.  AppHed  practically  to  per- 
ception, this  means  that  about  10  to  15  seconds  should  elapse 
after  the  primary  impression  if, we  wish  to  obtain  a  report 
which  is  at  once  ready  and  reliable.  In  teaching,  we  should 
therefore  always  allow  pupils  a  certain  time  in  which  to  work 
over  the  perception-content  in  a  purely  memorial  fashion,  and 
not  begin  to  question  them  immediately  after  the  act  of  per- 
ception has  ceased.  This  phenomenon  is  closely  allied  with 
reproduction  itself.    The  readiest  answer  to  a  question  and  the  ^ 

I    first  ideas  which  occur  to  one  when  one  hears  a  remark  are 

[^    least  likely  to  be  correct.^ 

Importance  also  attaches  to  Finzi's  statement  regarding  the 
different  means  of  imprinting;  but  these  were,  unfortunately, 
investigated  without  an  accurate  determination  of  the  idea- 
tional types  of  his  observers.  When,  as  in  Finzi's  experiment, 
one  is  called  upon  to  note  numbers,  letters  or  syllables,  it  is 
possible  to  proceed  in  three  or  four  different  ways.  One  may 
imprint  upon  memory  the  visual  images,  or  the  auditory  and 
vocal-motor  images,  or  the  vocal-motor  images  alone.  One 
observer  endeavors  to  remember  the  visual  images  of  the  let- 
ters, another  says  them  over  to  himself,  another  hears  them  in 
imagination,  while  others  speak  and  hear  them  at  the  same 

^  E.  Meumann.    Vorlesimgen  zur  Einjuhrung  in  die  experimentellen 
P'ddagogik,  Zweiter  Aiijl.,  1912,  I.,  516. 


Observational  Learning  97 

time.  In  general,  it  was  found  in  Finzi's  experiments  that 
retention  by  means  of  \asnal  im?<;e3  gives  the  most  reliable 
results.  This  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the  fact  that  visual 
images  were  the  memory  material  which  conformed  most 
closely  with  the  stimulus,  for  his  method  of  presentation  was 
visual.  But  it  is  probable  that  the  same  rule  holds  for  observa- 
tional noting  as  for  retention  in  general.  Every  observer  must, 
so  far  as  possible,  discover  his  own  peculiar  mode  of  remember- 
ing and  employ  chiefly  that  means  which  corresponds  with  his 
own  ideational  t^'pe.  But  the  nature  of  the  stimulus  is  also 
important.  Visual  stimuli  are  retained  better  by  means  of 
visual  images;  auditory  stimuli  better  by  means  of  auditory 
images,  etc.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  the  most  advan- 
tageous retention  is  that  in  which  the  individual  endeavors 
to  reach  a  compromise  between  his  own  ideational  type  and 
the  sort  of  stimulus  presented  to  him.  A  visualizer  will 
naturally  be  obliged  to  rely  upon  visual  imagery  in  deahng 
with  visual  stimuli ;  an  observer  who  images  in  auditory  terms 
will,  in  such  a  case,  endeavor  to  employ  his  feeble  visual 
imagery  so  far  as  he  can,  but  he  will  reinforce  them  wherever 
possible  by  means  of  auditory  images. 

Do  we  remember  better  when  we  rely  solely  upon  impres- 
sions and  ideas  wliich  correspond  to  our  ideational  t3-pe? 
Or  is  it  more  advantageous  to  have  recourse  to  as  many  sorts 
of  imagery  as  possible?  Two  American  psychologists,  Muen- 
sterberg  and  Bigham,  have  attempted  to  show  experimentally 
that  it  is  more  advantageous  to  employ  as  many  sorts  of  images 
as  we  can.  Results  obtained  by  Segal  and  by  myself  show  that 
it  is  more  advantageous  for  the  observer  to  depend  upon  his 
own  ideational  t>pe  and  upon  the  images  corresponding  there- 
to, so  far  as  he  can,  and  to  attempt  to  effect  a  compromise 
between  these  and  the  modality  of  the  presented  datum  only 
when  the  latter  does  not  coincide  with  his  ideational  type. 


98  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

The  former  occurs  when  a  person  of  the  visual  type  has  to 
deal  with  visual  stimuli;  and  the  latter  when  he  deals  with 
auditory  stimuli. 

It  may  be  added  that  Finzi  also  made  a  study  of  the  dis- 
traction of  attention  during  the  act  of  observation  which 
constituted  the  chief  topic  of  his  investigation.  Attention  may 
be  distracted  either  while  the  observation  is  in  progress 
(Wundt's  diverting  method),  or  after  the  observation  has  been 
completed  (Wundt's  obliteration  method), — the  aim  being, 
in  the  latter  case,  to  obHterate  the  primary  impression  before 
the  act  of  reproduction  begins.  The  former  experiments  were 
obviously  concerned  with  the  immediate  retention  of  an  ob- 
served datum  and  with  the  behavior  of  attention  during  the 
observation  itself;  the  latter  dealt  with  the  delayed  reproduc- 
tion or  the  recognition  of  an  impression  after  it  had  been 
crowded  out  of  consciousness.  We  have  already  seen  that  it 
is  extremely  difficult  to  distract  the  attention,  and  that  dis- 
traction is  least  effective  in  the  case  of  sense-impressions. 
Finzi  found  that  the  effect  of  distraction,  and  its  subjective 
compensation  by  the  observer  depend  upon  the  means  by 
which  not  only  the  noting,  but  also  the  distracting  itself  is 
,  accomplished.  The  observer  who  is  accustomed  to  work  with 
visual  images  is  most  distracted  by  subsidiary  activities  which 
also  make  use  of  visual  images.  The  individual  whose  cus- 
tomary procedure  in  the  act  of  learning  consists  in  pronounc- 
ing the  letters  or  syllables  is  distracted  most  when  his  vocal 
apparatus  is  called  into  play  by  the  distracting  stimulus.  In 
general,  therefore,  it  turns  out  that  those  distracting  stimuli 
have  the  most  pronounced  effect  which  most  closely  resemble 
the  impressions  to  be  noted  or  the  means  employed  by  the 
observer  in  noting  them. 

It  may  be  added  that  Finzi  found  that  visual  imagery  is 
subject  to  relatively  Kttle  falsification  in  reproduction;    and 


Observational  Learning  99 

when  we  remember  that  visual  learning  is  also  most  advan- 
tageous for  the  recognition  of  letters,  visual  noting  seems  to 
excel  in  every  respect.  Since  we  have  to  do  chiefly  with  visual 
material  not  only  in  practical  life  but  also  in  the  school-room, 
it  follows  that  visual  impressions  are  of  greatest  signiflcance 
for  our  consciousness  even  during  the  observing  itself;  it 
follows  also  that  children  should  be  trained,  so  far  as  possible, 
to  employ  visual  imagery  in  noting  impressions. 

Concerning  the  subjective  assurance  with  which  individuals 
report  their  observations,  it  may  be  said  in  general  that  sub- 
jective assurance  is  greatest  soon  after  the  observation  is 
completed,  and  that  it  decreases  with  the  lapse  of  time.  The 
decHne  of  assurance  is  attended  by  characteristic  phenomena, 
— correct  statements  are  made  with  a  feehng  of  uncertainty, 
and  erroneous  statements  with  a  feeling  of  certainty.  Then, 
too,  subjective  certainty  manifests  an  individual  variation. 
In  the  case  of  one  observer,  Finzi  found  that  as  many  as  one- 
third  of  his  false  statements  were  made  with  a  feeling  of  cer- 
tainty that  they  were  correct.  The  feehng  of  certainty  is 
therefore  by  no  means  a  rehable  index  of  the  fidehty  of 
memory, — an  observation  which  has  been  confirmed  by  the 
investigations  of  testimony  by  Stern  and  others,  and  by 
observations  in  criminal  psychology  made  by  Gross  and 
others.  ^  "  Even  those  parts  of  the  memory-image  which  have 
been  smuggled  in  subsequently  may  be  accompanied  by  a 
feehng  of  absolute  certainty."  In  these  and  numerous  other 
experiments,  it  is  shown  that  one  is  always  incHned  to  supple- 
ment incomplete  memory-images  so  that  they  may  give  the 
same  general  impression  as  the  original  phenomenon;  and 
the  addition  which  judgment  or  imagination  makes  to  memory 

^  H.  Gross.  Criminal  Psychology  (trans.),  Boston,  1911;  Mnemo- 
technik  im  Unterbewusstscin,  Arc/iivf.  Kritninalanthropologic,  XXIX., 
1907. 


100  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

can  not,  in  many  cases,  be  distinguished  from  the  genuine. 
It  is  unfortunate  that  we  do  not  know  how  the  feeling  of  cer- 
tainty originates  in  our  remembrances.  Finzi  advances  the 
hypothesis  that  the  distinctness  of  the  memory-image  plays 
a  leading  role  in  giving  rise  to  it, — the  more  distinct  the  image 
the  more  convinced  are  we  of  its  fidehty.  It  is  possible  that 
certain  sensations  also  play  a  part  here,  such  as  organic  sen- 
sations which  may  produce  the  feeling  in  question.  The  feel- 
ing of  assurance  is  probably  most  illusory  "in  cases  where  the 
perception  itself  was  inaccurate,  or  the  elapsed  interval  was 
long,  and  the  opportunity  for  falsification  by  means  of  ideas, 
external  influences  and  emotions  was  most  abundant." 
(Finzi.) 

It  is,  of  course,  important  that  when  we  train  children  in 
•  observational  noting,  we  should  direct  their  attention  to  the 
illusory  character  of  the  feeling  of  certainty,  in  order  that  they 
may  soon  reach  the  conviction  that  the  only  reliable  test  which 
we  have  for  the  accuracy  of  our  memory  of  sense-impressions 
is  a  return  to  the  sense-impressions  themselves,  and  a  com- 
parison of  the  remembrance  with  the  object  of  perception. 
In  later  experiments,  Finzi  reported  a  remarkable  phenomenon 
which  has  been  confirmed  by  others,  namely,  that  when  re- 
I  production  takes  place  after  a  long  interval,  the  subjective 
assurance  is  again  increased  although  the  objective  correctness 
of  the  memory  has  now  decreased. 

We  may  still  inquire  what  phase  of  observational  noting 
profits  most  from  training, — the  accuracy  and  reliability  of 
perception  and  imprinting,  or  the  number  of  imprinted  data? 
Finzi  is  of  the  opinion  that  reliabihty  is  increased  more  by 
■  training  than  is  the  amount  noted.  Thus  the  formal  and 
functional  aspect  of  memory  derives  more  profit  from  training 
than  does  the  material  aspect. 

A  particularly  important  result  of  Finzi 's  investigation  is 
\ 


Observational  Learning  S      lOi 

c. 

his  discovery  that  the  most  4iirerse  individual  characteristics 
may  exist  in  combination,  in  observational  noting.  Thus, 
for  instance,  an  especially  great  distractibility  of  attention 
and  a  great  capacity  for  training  and  habituation  may  be 
present  in  the  same  individual;  and  we  may  find  a  combina- 
tion of  increased  compass  of  memory  with  increased  fidelity 
and  trustworthiness,  etc.  We  have,  as  yet,  no  definite  knowl- 
edge as  to  the  interdependence  of  these  individual  char- 
acteristics. It  is  probable,  however,  that  they  are  relatively 
independent  of  one  another,  because  in  the  same  individual 
we  may  find  a  great  distractibility  of  attention  and  yet  not- 
withstanding this  a  great  capacity  for  training  in  its  formal 
and  material  aspects. 

Finzi's  experiments  have  been  extended  in  many  direc- 
tions by  later  investigators.  Schneider,  Reinhold  and  Kraus 
employed  Finzi's  apparatus  in  a  study  of  the  sensory  appre- 
hension of  the  insane.  Kraus  found  that  the  diminished-  ^ 
memorial  capacity,  in  a  mental  disorder  which  is  known  by 
the  name  of  Korsakoff's  disturbance  of  memory,  may  be  due 
chiefly  to  a  retardation  in  the  rate  of  the  process  of  apprehen- 
sion. This  shows  us  again  how  important  it  is  that  the  primary 
duration  of  impressions  in  consciousness  should  be  sufliciently 
long  if  they  are  subsequently  to  be  reproducible.  Wolfskehl 
investigated  the  gradual  fading  of  the  image  of  groups  of 
letters  in  the  case  of  mentally  abnormal  patients;  Kramer 
investigated  the  same  phenomenon  in  normal  adults.  Wolf- 
skehl believes  that  he  was  able  to  show  that  noting  capacity 
decreases  a  short  time  after  the  presentation  of  the  material, 
or  more  strictly  speaking,  that  the  memory-image  fades  at 
this  time;  on  the  contrary,  Kramer  found,  as  did  Finzi,  that 
irregularly  periodic  fluctuations  in  the  fidehty  of  the  memory- 
image  appear  at  dift'ercnt  intervals.  A  uniform  initial  decrease 
and  a  subsequent  increase  does  not,   however,  occur;    an 


102  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

increase  in  the  fidelity  of  the  memory-image  is  found  to  be 
present  shortly  after  the  stimulation  takes  place.  Kramer 
made  a  determination  of  the  progressive  course  of  reproduc- 
tion after  noting,  at  intervals  of  five  seconds,  for  a  total 
period  of  ninety-five  seconds. 

Kramer  discovered  that  one's  capacity  for  noting  is  im- 
proved by  practice  and  that  different  types  of  noting  may  be 
shown  to  exist.  The  most  diverse  individual  characteristics 
may  be  present  in  the  noting  of  the  same  individual,  as  Finzi 
also  had  found.  Kramer  cites  the  following  combinations: 
I.  amount  very  great,  rehabihty  moderate;  2.  amount  very 
sHght,  reliability  very  slight;  3.  amount  moderately  great, 
reliability  moderate;  4.  amount  not  very  great,  reliabiHty 
great.  ^ 

The  determination  of  such  combinations  of  individual  char- 
acteristics may  be  of  importance  in  teaching;  they  show  the 
teacher  what  divergences  are  to  be  eliminated  in  his  pupils. 
Ranschburg  and  Boldt^  found  that  capacity  to  apprehend  and 
to  note  is  present  in  increased  degree  in  cases  of  abnormally 
agitated  emotional  fife. 

Ranschburg  has  introduced  important  innovations  in  the 
testing  of  noting.  His  method  of  pairs  of  words  is  especially 
useful  in  combination  with  the  method  of  correct  associates 
{Trefermethode).  Pairs  of  significantly  related  words  are 
presented  to  the  observer  in  auditory  or  visual  fashion;  and 
he  is  subsequently  asked  to  respond  with  the  second  member 
of  the  appropriate  pair  when  he  hears  the  first  member  of 
that  pair.    His  correct  associates  are  recorded,  together  with 

1  All  of  these  investigations  were  published  in  Kraepeliri's  Psychol- 
ogischen  Arbeiten. 

2  P.  Ranschburg,  Das  kranke  Gedachtnis,  Leipzig,  191 1.  K.  Boldt, 
Studien  iibcr  Merkdefekte,  Monatsschr.j.  Psychiat.  u.  Neurol.  XVII., 
1905. 


Observational  Learning  103 

his  association-time  wliich  may  be  measured  by  means  of  a 
stop-watch.  This  method  is  capable  of  a  variety  of  uses,  in 
that  syllables  may  be  substituted  for  words  in  order  to  test 
mechanical  retention,  and  the  test  may  be  extended  to  include 
delayed  instead  of  immediate  reproduction.  Ranschburg  has 
de\'ised  an  ingenious  apparatus  for  the  visual  presentation 
of  words  and  syllables;^  he  employed  this  apparatus  in  an 
investigation  of  the  relative  efficiency  of  verbal  memory  in 
normal  and  sub-normal  pupils.  He  found  that  these  two 
classes  of  pupils  are  sharply  differentiated  by  the  results  of 
this  method.  Sub-normal  pupils  are  characterized  by  a  lesser ' 
number  of  correct  associates,  and  by  a  slower  reproduction; 
their  reproductions  contain  many  words  which  are  not  sig- 
nificantly related  to  the  words  which  aroused  the  reproduc- 
tions. 

His  investigation  of  abnormal  memory,  in  paralysis,  delir- 
ium, etc.,  shows  that  the  process  of  apprehension  and  imprint- 
ing may  be  unimpaired  in  a  patient  whose  other  mental  func- 
tions are  seriously  impaired;  but  delayed  reproduction  or 
genuine  retention  is  always  defective  when  apprehension  and 
imprinting  are  defective.  This  proves  again  that  imprinting 
and  retention  are  psychically  distinct  processes.  Since  im- 
printing is  usually  measured  in  terms  of  immediate  repro- 
duction, psychopathology  warrants  a  differentiation  between 
temporary  and  permanent  retention. 

Investigations  of  the  memory  of  mental  defectives  show 
that  the  pathology  of  memory  may  make  important  contribu- 
tions to  the  solution  of  the  problems  in  which  we  are  interested. 
It  enables  us  to  compare  the  observational  noting  of  normal 
and  abnormal  indi\iduals;  and  such  a  comparison  is  illumi- 
nating because  it  shows  us  the  factors  upon  which  the  success- 
ful accompHshment  of  observant  noting  depends.  Then,  too, 
^  This  apparatus  is  described  on  page  loS  of  this  volume. 


104  '^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  study  of  the  abnormal  mind  enables  us  to  analyze  the 
process  of  noting  in  a  much  more  thorough-going  fashion 
than  is  possible  by  means  of  introspection  alone.  Since,  in 
certain  cases,  the  impairment  is  found  to  include  only  a  part 
of  the  group  of  component  processes  which  are  concerned  in 
the  act  of  noting,  we  are  furnished  with  a  means  of  isolating 
certain  of  the  components  from  the  group;  and  we  discover 
that  processes  which  seem  to  introspection  to  be  simple  and 
unanalysable  are  really  composed  of  more  elementary  com- 
ponents. The  experiments  of  Finzi,  Ranschburg,  Goldstein 
and  Boldt  yield  two  chief  results,  in  so  far  as  the  composition 
of  the  process  of  observational  noting  is  concerned.  /.  The 
essential  factors  which  contribute  to  successful  noting  seem 
to  be:  concentration  of  attention;  a  rigid  adherence  to  a 
goal  of  observation;  a  certain  rapidity  of  imprinting;  a  keen 
interest  in  the  object  observed;  an  active  attention;  a  rich 
store  of  ideas  with  which  the  observed  content  may  be  brought 
into  relation;  an  easy  mobility  and  a  ready  command  of 
these  relation-ideas;  and  an  integrity  of  memory  itself. 
2.  Noting  is  found  to  consist  of  a  number  of  relatively  inde- 
pendent component  processes;  and  in  cases  of  mental  disease 
the  impairment  may  be  restricted  to  one  or  other  of  the 
components.  The  following  components  may  be  enumerated : 
capacity  to  concentrate  the  attention  and  to  become  a  con- 
centrated individuahty;  the  whole  process  of  apprehending 
and  imprinting;  the  vivid  immediate  "after-effect"  of  stim- 
ulation; the  normal  development  of  genuine  processes  of 
reproduction  in  which  the  definite  and  correct  verbal  desig- 
nation of  the  observed  content  plays  a  leading  part;  and  the 
lasting  retention,  or  the  persistence  and  fidelity  of  the 
memorial  dispositions  which  have  been  laid  down  by  the 
process  of  noting. 

Now  the  technique  of  noting  must  aim  to  develop  all  of 


Observational  Learni?ig  105 

these  component  processes  of  noting.  Since  experimentation 
can  show  us  which  of  them  are  ill-developed  in  a  given  indi- 
\idual,  we  possess  a  means  of  remedying  defects  in  the  indi- 
vidual's endowment  by  prescribing  training  of  a  special  sort. 
A  comparison  of  immediate  and  delayed  reproduction  is 
especially  illuminating  in  this  regard.  Errors  in  immediate 
reproduction  indicate  that  imprinting  is  defective;  and  indi- 
viduals who  are  prone  to  such  errors  should  be  given  a  special 
training  in  observing.  Errors  in  delayed  reproduction,  if  they 
occur  in  combination  with  efficient  immediate  reproduction, 
indicate  an  unrehable  memory;  individuals  in  whom  this 
defect  is  found  should  be  given  special  exercises  in  memory 
training. 

Investigations  which  have  dealt  with  the  retention  and  the 
re\ival  of  complex  sensory  material  show  a  wholly  different 
state  of  affairs.  In  every-day  life  and  in  the  school-room 
this  sort  of  observational  noting  is  much  more  frequently 
employed  than  is  the  imprinting  of  simple  sensory  material. 
But  still  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  latter  sort 
of  imprinting  contains  the  elements  of  the  former,  and  that 
in  the  noting  of  complex  impressions  we  are  always  concerned 
with  the  noting  of  elements;  yet  in  the  apprehending  and 
imprinting  of  complex  impressions  a  wholly  new  feature  is 
added, — the  apprehending  and  imprinting  of  a  total  impres- 
sion of  a  complex  sort, — and  the  elements  are  in  most  instances 
imprinted  only  as  component  parts  of  this  total  impression. 
Experiments  dealing  with  complex  stimuli  have  shown  us  the 
signaficance  of  another  group  of  subjective  conditions  of  obser- 
vational noting,  particularly  that  of  the  view-points  of 
observation,  of  the  direction  of  the  observer's  interest,  and  of 
other  individual  characteristics  of  the  observer. 


io6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

c.   The  Investigation  of  Testimony  and  Noting 

Only  within  recent  years  has  our  experimental  technique 
been  extended  to  include  the  noting  of  this  sort  of  material, 
the  investigation  of  testimony,  among  other  causes,  furnish- 
ing the  impetus.  The  investigation  of  testimony  consists  in 
presenting  to  the  observer  a  picture,  a  concrete  object,  a 
.process  or  an  event,  and  in  having  him  describe  his  experience 
'after  the  objective  stimulus  has  been  removed.  The  observer 
is  given  a  definite  time  during  which  the  picture  or  object 
may  be  examined;  and  the  period'of  exposure  is  short,  usually 
less  than  one  minute,  in  order  that  attention  may  be  keenly 
concentrated  throughout.  During  the  presentation  the  obser- 
ver must,  in  accordance  with  instructions  given  him  in  advance, 
imprint  the  object  upon  his  consciousness  as  accurately  as 
possible.    Then  it  is  withdrawn,  and  immediately  afterwards 

(  a  complete  description  of  the  object  is  recorded  in  writing. 
Here,  in  conformity  with  a  suggestion  by  Stern,  we  must 
distinguish  between  a  spontaneous  and  independent  descrip- 
tion or  report,  and  an  interrogation  or  cross-examination. 
The  report  comprises  the  testimony  offered  by  the  observer 
\in  a  voluntary  and  spontaneous  manner,  without  aid  of  any 
sort.  As  a  rule  the  interrogation  follows  the  report,  taking 
the  form  of  a  systematic  questioning  addressed  by  the  experi- 
menter to  the  observer.  The  aid  received  from  the  experi- 
menter's questioning  may  be  combined  with  an  attempt  to 
determine  whether  the  observer  is  susceptible  to  suggested 
impressions  which  were  not  received  during  the  presentation; 

»  in  other  words,  (the  observer's  suggestibility  may  be  investi- 
gated.] Both  the  report  and  the  interrogation  may  come  at 
different  intervals  after  the  material  has  been  presented. 
If  they  come  immediately  af^er  the  presentation,  we  make  a 
test  of  observation  and  its  effect  as  manifested  in  the  imme- 


Observational  Learning  107 

diate  retention  of  complex  impressions.    If  they  do  not  come 
until  after  a  considerable  time  has  elapsed,  we  deal  with  true  / 
memory;    and  from  a  comparison  of  the  results  obtained 
after  the  lapse  of  different  intervals  we  may  determine  the 
progress  of  the  forgetting  of  complex  material. 

These  investigations  of  testimony  are  also  investigations 
of  observational  noting,  for  the  observer  has  explicit  instruc- 
tions so  to  imprint  the  material  that  he  may  give  the  fullest 
possible  testimony  concerning  it.  For  instance,  in  Stern's 
experiments  the  following  instructions  were  given  to  the  chil- 
dren who  served  as  observers:  "I  should  hke  to  find  out  if 
you  have  a  good  memory.  I  am  going  to  show  you  a  picture; 
and  you  are  to  look  at  it  carefully.  I  shall  give  you  ample 
time  to  note  everything  which  it  contains.  Afterwards  you 
will  describe  all  that  you  saw."  If  in  the  description  which 
followed,  the  cliild  came  to  a  point  where  he  hesitated  he  was 
told  to  "Think  again;  perhaps  you  will  remember  something 
else."  When  he  could  find  no  more  to  report  he  was  asked, 
"Does  nothing  else  occur  to  you?"  When  finally  he  rephed 
in  the  negative,  his  report  was  taken  to  be  finished  and  the 
interrogation  began. 

The  picture  which  Stern  employed  was  a  colored  print  of  a 
peasant's  room,  from  a  portfolio  of  pictures  published  by 
Schreiber  in  Esshngen.  Other  investigators  have  employed 
somewhat  different  pictures,  in  some  cases  more  complex. 
Lobsien's  picture  ropf^ented  a  boy  engaged  in  fishing. 
Oppenheim  used  two  pictures  from  Schreiber's  collection; 
one  of  them  s>TnboHzed  water,  and  the  other  showed  peasants 
at  work  in  a  field.  Experiments  of  this  sort  have  been  made 
by  Stern,  Wreschner,  Lobsien,  Marie  Diirr-Borst,  Roden- 
waldt  and  others.  ^ 

So  far  as  our  purposes  are  concerned,  these  investigations 
'  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


io8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  testimony  have  the  disadvantage  that  the  effect  of  obser- 
vation upon  testimony  itself  has  not  been  submitted  to  an 
adequate  investigation.  These  experimehts  therefore  yield 
little  more  than  a  statistics  of  testimony  from  which,  of  course, 
certain  important  conclusions  bearing  upon  observing  and 
noting  may  be  drawn ;  but  they  do  not  contribute  directly  to  a 
solution  of  our  problem. 

From  the  investigation  of  testimony  there  has  developed 
a  group  of  experiments  which  deal  directly  with  the  noting 
capacity  of  adults,  normal  and  a,bnormal,  and  of  school- 
children.   Experiments  of  this  latter  sort  were  conducted  by 
Bogdanoff,  and  by  Bernstein  and  Bogdanoff;^    others  were 
undertaken  by  Boldt,  Netschajeff,  Brodmann,  Ranschburg, 
Goldstein,  Lobsien,  and  by  Schroebler  and  the  author.  Among 
these  we  must  mention,  first  of  all,  the  pioneer  experiments 
of  Ranschburg  and  Goldstein  because  these  writers  call  atten- 
tion to  a  number  of  extremely  important  objective  conditions  I 
of  observing  and  of  noting,  and  contribute  to  an  accurate' 
analysis  of  the  processes  employed  in  these  two  functions. 
Ranschburg  improved  the  technique  of  experimentation""in 
this  field  by  introducing  a  very  useful  apparatus  which  he] 
calls  the  mnemometer.    This  is  a  small  box  with  an  aperture 
in  the  lid,  under  which  rotates  a  disc  driven  by  a  spring. 
Numbers,  words,  pictures,  etc.,  pasted  upon  the  disc  can  be 
made  to  appear  and  to  disappear,  in  successive  order  behind 
the  aperture,  at  any  desired  rate  of  speed.     Ranschburg's 
results  show,  first  of  all,  that  the  ease  and  accuracy  of  obser-  \ 
vational  noting  depends  in  great  measure  upon  the  character  i 
of  the  objective  stimuli,  particularly  upon  whether  the  stimuli  I 
differ  from  one  another  or  contain  similar  or  identical  elements. 
His  experiments  led  to  the  formulation  of  the  important 
•j»law  that  impressions  are  apprehended  more  rapidly  and  more 
^  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  vohime. 


Observational  Learning  109 

correctly  in  proportion  as  their  stimuli  are  diverse;  and  they 
are  apprehended  less  readily  and  less  correctly  in  proportion 
as  their  stimuli  are  similar  or  identical.^  This  law  may  be 
demonstrated  from  the  apprehension  of  series  of  numbers. 
Several  groups  containing  from  two-place  to  six-place  num- 
bers were  exposed  for  periods  of  one-third  of  a  second  in  the 
mnemometer,  some  of  the  groups  containing  wholly  differ- 
ent digits  (210  864),  and  some  containing  similar  or  identi- 
cal digits  (471  038)  (929  968).  It  was  found  that  groups 
containing  similar  or  identical  digits  were  erroneously  per- 
ceived much  more  frequently  than  those  containing  wholly 
different  digits.  There  were  also  certain  remarkable  subsid- 
iary results.  For  example,  errors  seldom  occurred  at  the  left 
side  of  the  column;  approximately  ninety  per  cent,  of  the 
false  readings  occurred  in  the  right  half  of  the  group  of 
digits.^  The  final  digits  of  the  numbers,  however,  were  per- 
ceived correctly  in  almost  every  instance. 

In  these  erroneous  perceptions  certain  fundamental  types 
of  error  recur  with  great  frequency.  Similar  digits  tend  to 
fuse  with  one  another  in  reproduction;  for  instance,  3  is 
often  confused  with  8,  9  with  6,  2  and  o  with  9.  "The  dimly 
perceived  digits  either  lose  certain  of  their  finer  details  or 
they  appropriate  other  details."  For  example,  194  607  was 
read  instead  of  194  907;  491  238  instead  of  491  938,  etc. 
When  two  similar  digits  stood  side-by-side  and  one  of  them 
was  imperfectly  perceived,  the  latter  was  transformed  into 
the  former, — a  very  frequent  type  of  error.  One  digit  was 
substituted  for  another  which  bore  no  resemblance  to  it,  as' 
4  for  9,  7  for  8,  etc.    Again  when  a  digit  was  imperfectly  per- 

^  P.  Ranschburg,  Ueber  Hemmung  gleichzeitigcr  Rcizwirkungen, 

Zeitschr.f.  Psychol.,  XXX.,  1902,  39-86. 

^  This  may  possibly  be  due  to  the  influence  of  our  having  learned 

to  read  from  left  to  right.  • 

9 


no  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ceived,  a  digit  which  was  similar  to  one  of  its  neighbors  was 
substituted  for  it,  thus  8ii  824  was  read  811  224;  or  the 
digit  next  in  numerical  sequence  was  substituted  for  the 
imperfectly  perceived  digit.  Ranschburg  refers  to  these  as 
/simple  errors,  employing  the  term  complex  error  to  indicate] 
transpositions  and  the  Hke.  It  was  found  that  certain  series^ 
were  read  on  the  whole  correctly  and  others  incorrectly;  and 
in  particular,  it  was  found  that  when  digits  containing  straight 
lines, — I,  4,  7, — stood  in  the  third,  fourth  or  fifth  places,  the 
reading  was  especially  accurate.  This  also  shows  to  what  an 
extent  ready  and  correct  apprehension  depends  upon  the 
objective  character  and  the  external  arrangement  of  the 
stimuli.  The  almost  invariable  absence  of  error  at  the  left 
of  the  column  of  digits  is  referred  by  Ranschburg  to  the 
habitual  direction  of  the  progress  of  attention,  as  in  our 
reading  from  left  to  right. 

The  results  may  then  be  summarized  in  this  statement: 
"Illusions  in  the  apprehension  of  complex  stimuli  are  due  to 
two  causes:  a.  the  composition  of  the  series, — homogeneous 
elements  increasing  the  illusion;  and  h.  th^  behavior  of 
attention,  which  seems  to  turn  first  to  the  beginning  or  left- 
hand  side  of  a  series  of  graphic  signs.  This  behavior  in  turn 
is  a  product  of  habit  and  training,  and  seems  to  follow  a 
regular  law.  "In  a  minimal  period  of  time,  the  attention  is 
able  to  grasp  a  greater  number  of  sensations  or  ideas  when 
they  are  aroused  by  heterogeneous  stimuli  than  when  they 
owe  their  origin  to  homogeneous  stimuli,"  or  "The  thresh- 
old for  the  apprehension  of  simultaneous  or  immediately 
successive  heterogeneous  stimuli  is  lower  than  for  homogeneous 
stimuli  presented  under  identical  conditions."  Ranschburg 
refers  to  this  as  the  law  "in  accordance  with  which  appre- 
hension is  rendered  more  difficult  by  the  presence  of  identical 
elements."    Many  other  investigations  justify  the  conclusion 


) 

:) 


Observational  Learning  III 

that  this  law  holds  for  simultaneously  perceived  as  well  as 
for  successively  perceived  stimuU.  Ranschburg  seeks  the 
cause  of  this  phenomenon  in  the  circumstance  that  similai 
or  like  elements  inhibit  one  another  in  the  process  of  appre- 
hension. They  are  unable  to  hold  their  own  in  the  struggle 
with  their  heterogeneous  rivals  for  possession  of  the  narrow 
field  of  consciousness.  This  is  expressed  by  Ranschburg  in 
the  significant  statement  that  "intensity  and  affective  tone 
being  equal,  the  dissimilar  members  of  a  group  of  stimuli 
which  act  upon  consciousness  at  exactly  or  approximately 
the  same  time  are  given  the  preference;  while  those  which 
are  similar  or  identical  inhibit  one  another."  This  formula- 
tion is  employed  by  Ranschburg  to  give  special  emphasis  to 
the  fact  that  the  inhibition  of  homogeneous  stimuli  operates  in 
utter  independence  of  all  the  conditions  of  noting  which  owei 
their  origin  to  the  intensity  and  the  emotional  tone  of  stimuli.       . 

All  of  this  has  a  distinct  pedagogical  significance.  It  shows  * 
us  that  material  which  is  to  be  presented  concretely  must 
be  selected  carefully  in  so  far  as  its  objective  difficulty  is 
concerned;  and  that  concrete  material  is  perceived  more 
readily  and  more  significantly  in  proportion  as  it  is  composed 
of  simple  elements, — digits  containing  straight  lines, — and  of 
dissimilar  elements.  It  is  also  of  importance  to  pedagogy 
that  the  observer  finds  greater  difficulty  and  requires  more 
concentration  in  apprehending  groups  which  are  "encum- 
bered" with  similar  elements  than  in  apprehending  groups 
which  are  made  up  exclusively  of  heterogeneous  elements. 

A  number  of  important  experiments  by  Goldstein  ^  dealing 
with  observational  noting  in  the  insane,  are,  in  a  sense,  a 
supplement  to  those  of  Ranschburg.  They  are  a  continuation 
of  previous  investigations  by  Diehl  and  Bernstein,  Ransch- 

^  K.  Goldstein,  INIerkfahigkeit,  Gedaichtnis  und  Assoziation,  Zeitschr. 
j.  Psychol.,  XLI.,  1906,  38-47;   117-144. 


112  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

burg  and  Boldt,  but  they  go  much  farther  in  the  analysis  of 
the  processes  employed  in  noting.  In  a  first  series  of  experi- 
ments, Goldstein  presented  to  his  (abnormal)  subjects  twenty- 
three  stimuli  or  objects  to  be  noted,  in  successive  order, — 
three  significant  words,  three  familiar  objects,  three  uncol- 
ored  pictures,  three  colored  pictures,  three  two-place  numbers, 
two  street  addresses,  three  colors  (skeins  of  yarn),  and  three 
coins.  The  observers  were  allowed  to  regard  these  objects 
until  they  felt  that  they  had  imprinted  every  detail  clearly 
upon  memory;  then  after  intervals  of  one  minute,  five  min- 
utes and  twenty-four  hours,  Goldstein  determined  how  much 
was  remembered.  In  a  second  series  of  experiments,  single 
objects  were  presented;  and  these  were  described  after  very 
brief  intervals, — five,  ten,  twenty,  forty,  and  sixty  seconds. 
'^ere  again  two  different  sorts  of  stimuli  were  employed, —  in 
one  case,  stimuli  which  gave  least  opportunity  for  associative 
connections;  and  in  the  other  case,  stimuH  which  were  rich 
in  associations.  The  former  objects  included  two-place,  odd 
numbers;  and  the  latter,  a  colored  picture  whose  content 
was  familiar  to  the  observer.  In  the  case  of  the  picture, 
retention  was  tested  by  the  method  of  recognition ;  in  the  case 
of  the  numbers,  a  reproduction  of  the  digits  themselves  was 
demanded.  In  a  third  series  of  experiments,  the  time  which 
intervened  between  observation  and  reproduction  was  filled 
with  distracting  stimuli;  similar  stimuli  being  employed  in 
half  the  experiments,  and  dissimilar  stimuli  in  the  other  half. 
The  distraction  took  the  form  either  of  a  naming  of  pictures 
(after  numbers  or  pictures  had  been  perceived),  or  of  simple 
arithmetical  calculations. 

These  experiments  aimed  to  make  a  test,  in  certain  cases,  / 
chiefly  of  immediate  retention  and  imprinting  itself,  and  inj 
other  cases,  chiefly  of  the  true  retention  which  had  been 
accomplished  by  means  of  associative  aids.    The  investiga- 


Observational  Learning  1 13 

tion  yielded  the  important  result  that  the  same  observer  I 
may  show  a  creditable  capacity  in  "noting  for  only  a  short  1 
time,"  that  is,  in  immediate  retention,  but  a  poor  capacity  in 
noting  for  a  longer  time;  and  that  noting  by  means  of  simple 
imprinting    (when   numbers   are   presented   and   associative    i 
ideas  are  lacking)  may  be  poor  in  an  observer  whose  noting    I 
by  means  of  associative  aids  (pictures)  is  highly  developed. 
It  was  found,  further,  that  even  when  an  individual  possesses 
a  good  capacity  for  imprinting  and  associating,  his  acquisi- 
tion of  concrete  material  may  still  be  very  imperfectly  devel- 
oped;   this  is  the  case  when  he  proves  to  be  an  individual   I 
who  lacks  interest  in  the  experiment  and  does  not  will  to  / 
acquire  information. 

These  results  give  us  a  clearer  insight  into  the  nature  and 
the  component  processes  of  the  act  of  noting.  They  show 
us  I.  that  in  the  act  of  noting,  the  process  of  imprinting 
(called  "simple  imprinting"  by  Goldstein)  possesses,  to  a 
certain  extent,  a  significance  which  is  independent  of  the 
formation  of  associations.  We  must,  therefore,  distinguish 
between  the  simple  or  direct  imprinting  of  stimuli  which  is 
relatively  independent  of  the  formation  of  associations,  and 
noting  which  is  accompUshed  by  means  of  the  formation  of 
associations.  The  former  process  gives  rise  to  a  direct  recep^ 7 
tion  of  impressions;  the  latter  to  a  reception  through  thm 
medium  of  familiar  ideas.  The  two  activities  cooperate  in 
every  act  of  sense-perception;  but  now  the  one,  now  the 
other  may  predominate.  Pure  direct  imprinting  comes  into 
operation  especially  when  we  are  dealing  with  impressions 
which  are  relatively  lacking  in  associations,  and  when  the 
time  for  perceiving  is  very  short.  In  cases  of  the  opposite 
sort,  associative  noting  predominates. 

These  experimental  findings  furnish  another  confirmation 
for  my  distinction  between  immediate  and  lasting  retention. 


1 14  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

jimmediate  retention  depends  much  more  upon  the  process 
jof  imprinting  than  upon  the  formation  of  associations,  because 
the  latter  is  precluded  by  lack  of  time  under  the  conditions  of 
the  experiment.     Immediate  retention  may  be  strong  in  an 
individual  whose  lasting  retention  is  weak,  and  vice  versa; 
and  this  non-correlated  distribution  of  the  two  functions  of 
memory  is  to  be  referred  to  the  effect  of  imprinting  and  of  1 
associating.     Immediate  retention  appears  to  be  the  special  1 
effect  of  imprinting,  while  lasting  retention  is  the  special  \ 
effect  of  association.    Immediate  retention  and  the  effect  of  \ 
kmprinting  are  correlates.     Indeed,  the  associative  function 
may  be  seriously  impaired  in  the  insane  without  immediate 
retention  being  sympathetically  affected.    And  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  capacity  for  imprinting  and  capacity  for  asso- 
ciative noting  may  show  different  degrees  of  training  and 
development  in  the  same  individual. 

As  regards  the  effect  of  distraction  during  the  period  which 
intervenes    between    presentation    and    reproduction,    Gold- 
stein found  that  in  all  of  his  observers  distraction  gave  rise! 
to  a  more  serious  impairment  in  the  retention  of  numbers' 
than  in  the  retention  of  pictures;    and  that  distraction  by 
means  of  a  homogeneous  stimulus, — i.e.,  when  pictures  were 
introduced  after  pictures  had  been  observed,— is  more  effect- 
ive than  distraction  by  means  of  a  heterogeneous  stimulus. 
He  recognizes  that  this  phenomenon  is  analogous  with  Ransch- 
burg's  finding  that  homogeneous  impressions  and  ideas  inhibit 
one  another  more  than  heterogeneous.    But  at  the  same  time, 
it  shows  that  distraction  has  a  more  disturbing  effect  in  imme-^ 
diate  retention;    and  this  accords  with  Goldstein's  further 
observation  that  the   "formation  of  associations  actually  hasi 
a  disturbing  effect  upon  noting  capacity  for  shorter  intervals."' 
This  shows  the  pure  imprinting  of  impressions  to  be  a  special 
process  which  has  its  own  peculiar  conditions  and  results. 


Observational  Learning  115 

Goldstein's  observations  give  us  still  more  information 
concerning  the  component  processes  which  constitute  obser- 
vational noting.  We  see,  namely,  that  this  act  consists  in  a 
cooperation  of  i.  the  concentration  of  attention;  this  prob- 
ably is  of  the  nature  of  a  general  condition  upon  which  depend 
not  only  the  result  of  the  imprinting  and  the  formation  of 
associations,  but  also  and  chiefly  the  imprinting  itself;  2.  the 
process  of  imprinting;  j.  the  formation  of  supporting  asso- 
ciations, which  constitutes,  for  the  most  part,  the  incorpora- 
tion of  the  content  of  perception  into  our  body  of  former 
ideas,  and  renders  possible  the  establishment  of  associative 
connections;  4.  the  will  to  observe  and  to  note.  The  will 
to  observe  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  different  direction  of  the 
will  from  that  which  is  present  in  noting.  Its  presence  is 
seen  in  the  individual's  interest  in  the  acquisition  of  the  con-j 
Crete  material;  and  its  absence  manifests  itself  in  an  indif- 
ference on  the  part  of  the  learner.  To  these  must  be  added 
as  additional  conditions  of  observational  noting  the  objec- 
tive relations,  homogeneous  or  heterogeneous,  of  the  stimuli) 
which  Ranschburg  specified,  and  the  significance  of  the 
intensity  and  emotional  tone  of  stimuli,  which  have  long  been! 
known  to  psychology.  Hence  we  find  a  multitude  of  cooper- 
ative processes  and  conditions  in  noting. 

It  is  a  matter  of  prime  importance  that  each  of  these  fac- 
tors appears  to  have  its  special  influence  upon  the  results  of 
the  whole  process  of  noting.  There  are  only  two  of  the  fac- 
tors, however,  which  are  to  be  regarded  as  genuine  functions 
of  memory,  namely,  imprinting,  and  the  forming  of  associa- 
tions. Imprinting  clearly  has  the  chief  significance  in  the 
immediate  reproduction  of  impressimis;  while  the  formation 
of  associations  is  chiefly  significant  flor  permanent  retention, 
(after  the  impressions  have  wholly  disappeared  from  con- 
sciousness)  or  for  the  genuine  function  of  memory.     Yet 


ii6  y:  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

investigations  of  the  insane  show  that  associative  noting  is,  in 
its  very  nature,  dependent  upon  the  excellence  of  the  associa- 
tion mechanism,  or  upon  the  quality  of  the  individual's  func- 
tion of  association  and  reproduction.  Imprinting  and  imme- 
diate retention,  on  the  other  hand,  are  independent  of  this; 
that  is,  they  may  function  normally  even  when  the  associa- 
tive mechanism  is  pathologically  impaired. 
*  Just  as  these  experiments  give  us  an  insight  into  the  process 
of  noting,  others,  such  as  those  of  Bernstein  and  Bogdanoff, 
are  especially  illuminating  regarding  the  effect  of  noting  and, 
in  particular,  of  the  retention  of  complex  impressions  as  a 
result  of  observational  noting.  They  have  an  especial  value 
in  that  the  material  which  they  employed  is  closely  related 
to  that  with  which  children  are  concerned  in  the  school-room. 
Bernstein  did  not  employ  ordinary  pictures,  but  simple  geo- 
metrical figures  which  had  been  drawn  upon  a  screen.  The 
screen  was  marked  off  into  nine  squares,  arranged  in  three 
rows;  and  each  square  contained  a  figure.  The  figures  were 
simple  forms,  as  a  square  with  one  diagonal,  a  two-armed 
cross,  two  triangles  with  their  apexes  joined,  etc.  For  ease 
of  observation  the  screen  was  framed,  and  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  observer.  The  cliildren  who  served  as  observers 
were  allowed  to  examine  the  group  of  figures  for  a  period  of 
thirty  seconds;  che  observational  noting  or  the  retention  of 
the  material  was  then  tested  by  a  method  of  recognition. 
There  was  now  laid  before  the  observer  a  sheet  containing 
twenty-five  simple  geometric  figures,  among  which  appeared 
the  nine  original  figures  distributed  in  irregular  order,  together 
with  nine  others  which  resembled  them  somewhat,  and  seven 
wholly  new  figures.  The  procedure  consisted  in  having  the 
observer  identify  the  figures  which  he  had  seen  in  the  original 
series  upon  the  screen.  The  method  assumes  "that  those 
figures  which  were  imprinted  accurately  upon  memory  will 


y 


Observational  Learning  1 17 

now  be  identified  without  error,  and  that  therefore  the  num- 
ber of  figures  identified  upon  the  second  sheet  will  correspond 
with  the  number  retained  in  memory."  If  this  number  is 
brought  into  relation  with  the  total  number  of  figures  observed 
upon  the  original  screen,  then  we  shall  have  the  ratio  f  as  a 
measure  of  the  observer's  noting  capacity.  "If  the  observer 
selects  from  the  second  group  any  figures  which  were  not 
present  in  the  original  series,  the  number  of  false  identifica- 
tions must  be  brought  into  relation  with  the  proportion  of 
correct  identifications,  f -/,  that  is,  the  relative  number  of 
correct  and  of  false  statements  constitutes  what  we  may 
call  the  co-efiicient  of  noting."  (Bernstein.)  Similar  experi- 
ments had  previously  been  made  with  abnormal  subjects  by 
Bogdanoff ;  he  and  Bernstein  together  continued  the  investi- 
gation with  children, — twenty-eight  observer.s  between  the 
ages  of  seven  and  fifteen  years, — in  one  of  the  high  schools  of 
Moscow. 

Their  results  give  us  much  valuable  information  relating  to 
the  psychology  of  observational  noting,  although  being  influ- 
enced by  current  investigations  of  testimony,  the  experimenters 
were  unfortunately  content  to  give  an  inadequate  numerical 
statement  of  their  data,  and  did  not  make  a  sufficiently  thor- 
ough investigation  of  the  process  of  observing  itself. 

From  all  of  these  experiments  we  see  that,  in  general,  the 
number  of  correct  statements  increases  fairly  regularly  with 
increase  in  the  age  of  the  child.  Bernstein  extended  his 
investigation  to  include  a  test  of  "passive  attention";  that  is, 
after  each  experiment  he  asked  his  observers  whether  they 
could  state  how  many  figures  appeared  upon  the  second  sheet. 
Since  the  children  had  had  no  reason  to  expect  that  this 
question  would  be  asked  them,  it  may  be  assumed,  in  the 
majority  of  cases  at  least,  that  they  did  note  this  feature 
deliberately  or  intentionally.     In  any  case,  such  a  question 


Ii8 


The  Psychology  oj  Learning 


must  yield  very  uncertain  results  because,  of  course,  the 
deliberate  and  intentional  imprinting  of  the  number  of  figures 
upon  the  second  sheet  might  have  taken  place,  and  because 
it  was  not  difficult  for  the  children  to  calculate  the  number 
of  figures  from  the  general  appearance  of  the  sheet  since  it 
contained  five  rows  and  each  row  contained  five  figures.  For 
these  reasons  the  numerical  data  obtained  from  the  answers 
to  this  question  show  that  "passive  attention"  is  very  irreg- 
ular in  its  development. 

One  is  surprised  to  find  that  some  of  the  observers  made  a 
great  many  erroneous  identifications;  indeed,  certain  of  the 
eighteen-year-old  observers  marked  upon  the  second  sheet  as 
many  as  six  figures  which  bore  no  resemblance  to  the  original 
figures.  And  even  when  the  number  of  errors  was  not  so 
great,  it  is  surprising  that  certain  figures  which  had  not  been 
seen  in  the  original  series  were  sometimes  "identified."  In 
general,  however,  it  turns  out  that  noting  capacity  improves 
with  increase  of  age;  it  reaches  its  maximum  in  the  fifteenth 
year,  and  subsequently  decHnes.  Additional  experiments 
with  thirty-five  adults  showed  that,  on  the  ayerage,  adults 
are  more  efficient, — their  averages  being  7.6  correct  and  .8 
erroneous  identifications.  But  at  the  age  of  fifteen  the  aver- 
age number  of  correct  statements  is  8.2.  The  results  are 
shown  in  the  following  table: 


8 

9 

10 

II 
12 


>~  1 

■§  s 

8 

8 

8 

7-8 

8.3 


CO   ' 


6 

6.4 

6.6 
6.9 
7-1 


<i  2  o 

lit, 

?;  0  s  5 

S    S    'a    K 


2 
1.6 

1.4 

•9 
1.2 


<» 

ao 


'^S  ^    ^ 


^^'i. 


<ij 


i^  '^ 


S  5  s 


13 

Adults 


8-5 
8.4 
8.8 
8.4 


►^  r^  .%      -^  rh  "^    S 


7-5 
8 

8.2 

7.6 


i.o 

.4 
.6 

.8 


Observational  Learning  1 19 

The  important  feature  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  correct 
identifications  increase  in  proportion  as  the  erroneous  iden- 
tifications decrease.  This  relation  gives  one  the  impression 
that  correct  and  erroneous  ideas  suppress  one  another.  It  is 
remarkable,  too,  that  younger  children  make  relatively  few 
correct  statements  and  a  very  large  number  of  false,  a  feature 
which  is  especially  noteworthy  since  the  number  of  impres- 
sions to  be  noted  was  only  nine.  This  indicates  that  capacity 
to  observe  and  to  note  is  but  slightly  developed  in  the  earlier 
years. 

Boldt's'  investigation  is  not  so  important,  because  only 
six  objects  were  presented.  This  number  is  decidedly  too 
small.  Netscha Jeff's  method  ^  consisted  in  displaying  twelve 
colored  pictures  of  large  size,  and  as  nearly  as  possible  of 
similar  coloring.  Each  picture  was  shown  for  five  seconds; 
then  the  child  was  asked  to  pick  it  out  from  among  a  group 
of  thirty-six  pictures.  Here,  too,  the  accuracy  of  recognition 
was  found  to  increase  with  age. 

The  actual  investigations  of  testimony  are  in  some  respects 
more  instructive  than  the  investigations  of  noting  capacity 
which  we  have  mentioned,  because  they  have  endeavored  to 
make  a  more  accurate  evaluation  of  the  psychological  sta- 
tistics of  testimony.  There  are  three  groups  of  these  experi- 
ments which  must  especially  be  mentioned  here:  /.  The 
pioneer  investigations  of  Stern  and  Wreschner,  the  former 
dealing  with  children  and  youths,  the  latter  with  adults. 
2.  Rodenwaldt's  experiments  with  soldiers  must  be  brought 
into  comparison  with  this  first  group.  Rodenwaldt  investi- 
gated the  testimony  of  adults  of  about  the  same  age  as 
Wreschner's,  but  of  a  lesser  degree  of  intelligence.    3.  The 

*  K.  Boldt,  Studien  iiber  Merkdcfckte,  Monatschr.  f.  Psychiat.  u. 
Neurol.,  XVII.,  1905,  07-114. 

^A.  Netschajcff,  Uebcr  Aufassimg,  Berlin,  1904. 


1 20  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

third  group  of  experiments  concerns  the  important  question 
as  to  whether  testimony  and  capacity  to  observe  and  to  note 
can  be  trained  and  improved  by  practice.  This  question  was 
investigated  by  Oppenheim,  Borst,  Baade,  Lipmann,  Ransch- 
burg,  Schrobler,  Meumann,  and  others.^ 

We  have  already  described  the  method  employed  in  Stern's 
experiments.  His  material  consists  exclusively  of  the  colored 
picture  of  the  peasant's  room.  This  picture  represents  a 
simple  peasant's  hut,  in  which  a  man  in  shirt-sleeves  and  col- 
ored vest  is  sitting  at  a  table.  The  family  is  beginning  their 
meal.  The  husband  has  a  plate  before  him,  and  in  his  right 
hand  a  spoon.  He  is  looking  toward  his  wife,  who  stands  at 
his  right  and  is  in  the  act  of  setting  a  pitcher  on  the  table. 
Opposite  the  wife  and  to  the  left  of  the  husband,  a  small 
child  is  sitting  upon  a  bench,  with  a  plate  before  him;  he  is  in 
the  act  of  bringing  a  spoon  to  his  mouth.  Beside  him  and  at 
his  left  is  a  dog.  At  the  side  of  the  table,  which  is  turned 
toward  the  spectator,  is  the  wife's  chair,  and  upon  the  table, 
her  plate  and  spoon.  The  supper-dishes  are  upon  the  central 
part  of  the  table.  To  the  left  is  a  blue  cradle  containing  a 
baby.  A  large  bed  stands  in  the  background;  and  upon  the 
wall  are  three  pictures  and  a  crucifix.  The  window  has  a 
partially  lowered  shade  and  a  pair  of  rose-colored  curtains; 
plants  can  be  seen  through  the  window.  Upon  the  wall,  to 
the  right,  is  a  Black  Forest  clock;  the  room  has  a  timbered 
ceiling. 

Rodenwaldt  has  justly  remarked  that  this  picture  is  not 
altogether  appropriate  for  experiments  in  testimony.  The 
clothing  of  the  family,  the  beard  of  the  peasant,  and  partic- 
ularly the  woman's  dress  are  most  unusual.  Then,  too,  the 
perspective  of  the  picture  is  exaggerated  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  floor  must  seem  to  children  to  be  non-horizontal. 
^  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


Observational  Learning  12 1     ^ 

It  was  Stern  who  furnished  the  chief  points  of  view  for  the 
evaluation  of  experimental  data,  in  wliich,  for  the  most  part, 
he  has  been  followed  by  other  investigators,  although  there 
have  been  certain  essential  variations  in  the  computation  of 
results.  Distinctions  have  been  made  between  the  amount  ; 
and  the  accuracy  of  testimony,  and  between  free  or  spon- 
taneous testimony  and  that  which  is  obtained  when  sponta- 
neous memory  is  aided  by  interrogation  or  cross-examination. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  spontaneous  testimony  is  alwa3's 
much  more  limited  in  scope  and  content  than  total  testi- 
mony, the  latter  term  referring  to  the  combined  spontaneous 
and  interrogatory  product,  or  to  the  total  amount  reproduced. 
Thus,  when  an  observer  reports  his  experience  spontaneously, 
his  report  by  no  means  represents  the  complete  content  which 
was  left  in  his  memory  by  the  original  sensory  impressions. 
There  is,  as  Stern  points  out,  a  mass  of  mental  content  in 
addition  to  this  spontaneous  product  which  can  be  repro- 
duced only  at  the  instigation  of  an  external  impulse.  Indeed, 
in  many  instances,  the  spontaneous  portion  amounts  to  only 
one-half  of  the  total  remembrance.  Spontaneity  is  meas- 
ured by  a  fraction  which  expresses  the  ratio  between  the 
amount  of  spontaneous  content  and  of  total  content:  f, 
where  cs  indicates  the  number  of  correct  spontaneous  state- 
ments, and  ct  the  total  number  of  correct  statements. 

For  the  purpose  of  the  present  discussion,  we  shall  utilize 
only  those  results  of  the  investigation  of  testimony  which 
afford  us  an  insight  into  the  conditions  of  observational  noting. 
These  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  In  the  first  place. 
Stern's  experiments  show  that  a  determining  factor  in  the 
result  of  observation  and  of  the  report  of  what  has  been 
observed  consists  in  the  point  of  \'iew  from  which  the  observa-  ' 
tion  was  made;  that  is,  it  is  important  that  the  observer 
should  possess  and  should  properly  utilize  all  of  the  points  of 


122  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

view  which  contribute  to  a  complete  analysis  of  the  observed 
object.  This  comes  to  light  more  clearly  in  Stern's  experi- 
ments where  he  employed  children  of  different  ages.  His 
results  enable  us  to  correlate  the  different  points  of  view  or 
categories  of  observation  with  the  age  of  the  observer,  because 
certain  categories  of  retention  have  not  yet  been  acquired 
and  mastered  by  the  young  child.  Hence  it  is  possible  to 
differentiate  various  stages  of  development  in  observational 
noting  according  to  the  dominance  or  absence  of  particular 
points  of  view  of  observation. 

Accordingly  Stern  distinguishes  several  levels  or  stages  in 
the  development  of  observation.  The  first  stage,  which  pre- 
vails at  about  the  age  of  seven  years,  Stern  designates  as  the 
substance  stage;  here  the  child  enumerates  persons  and  things 
without  coherent  connection.  Next  in  order  comes  the  action 
stage,  which  extends  to  about  the  tenth  year;  here  the  chief 
objects  of  attention  are  the  activities  of  people.  The  third  is 
the  relation  stage,  where  chiefly  the  relations  of  things,  and 
particularly  their  spatial  relations,  attract  attention;  this 
stage  makes  its  appearance  at  about  the  twelfth  to  the  four- 
teenth year.  Finally,  from  about  the  fourteenth  year  onward 
comes  the  quality  stage,  where  the  properties  of  things  are 
observed  and  analyzed.  The  following  description  of  the 
peasant's  room  by  a  seven-year-old  girl  illustrates  the  sub- 
stance stage:  "A  man,  a  woman,  a  cradle,  a  bed,  a  boy,  a  chair, 
a  bench,  a  doll,  three  pictures,  a  cross,  a  window,  a  boot-jack, 
a  table,  a  plate,  a  dish."  The  following  report  by  a  nineteen- 
year-old  student  illustrates  the  quality  stage:  "A  room  with 
ceihng  of  wood,  probably  oak;  upon  one  of  the  walls  there 
hangs  a  picture,  with  gilded  frame,  of  a  small  house  and  a 
tree.  A  window  with  a  shade  partly  rolled  up,  and  a  picture 
upon  it.  In  the  foreground, 'a  table  with  brown,  turned  legs, 
etc."    The  results  of  these  investigations  of  testimony  and 


Observational  Learning  123 

numerous  experiences  from  every-day  life  show  that  what  we 
perceive  in  an  object  is  determined  chiefly  by  the  points  of 
view  or  categories  or  directing  ideas  from  which  we  observe 
it.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  familiar  experience  that  when  a 
la^inan  and  a  person  who  is  trained  in  some  particular  art  or 
trade  or  profession  observe  the  same  phenomena  the  profes- 
sional man  always  sees  much  more  than  the  layman.  The 
former  has  a  great  many  special  points  of  view  from  which  he 
observes  things;  and  these  are  relatively  lacking  in  the  case 
of  the  layman.  We  shall  see,  however,  that  the  mere  presence 
of  points  of  view  is  relatively  unimportant;  much  more 
depends  upon  their  proper  utihzation,  and  upon  the  observer's 
efficiency  and  perseverence  in  the  act  of  observing.  For,  by 
intensity,  persistence  and  thoroughness  of  observation  the 
observer  may  acquire  view-points  from  the  objective  material 
itself. 

An  important  question  arises  here:  What  proportion  of  the 
observer's  testimony  belongs  to  each  of  the  different  cate- 
gories? An  answer  to  this  question  would  enable  us  to  deter- 
mine what  items  are  selected  by  observers  of  different  ages,  of 
different  levels  of  mental  development,  of  different  degrees  of 
education;  and  what  items  each  observer  would  therefore 
imprint  especially  upon  memory,  for  testimony  is  a  product  of 
observation  and  noting.  In  this  respect,  Rodenwaldt's  ex- 
periments constitute  an  exceedingly  important  supplement  to 
those  of  Stern.  Let  us,  however,  first  consider  Stern's  results. 
This  investigator's  answer  to  our  question  is  contained  in  his 
discussion  of  "spontaneity  values,"  by  which  he  means  the 
ratio  of  the  number  of  items  included  in  the  spontaneous 
description  to  the  total  number  of  items  contained  in  the 
original  picture.  This  conception  is  not  wholly  free  from 
objection,  however,  because  one  can  never  be  sure  of  just  what 
is  to  be  regarded  as  the  actual  content  of  the  presented  object. 


124  ^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

According  to  Stern  the  *' spontaneity  value "  is  "a  measure  of 
the  selection  made  by  the  observer,  and  therefore  an  index  of 
the  independent  and  spontaneous  interest  which  a  given 
category  of  items  is  able  to  arouse  in  him."  This  may  be  ex- 
pressed otherwise  as  follows:  Whenever  anything  is  observed 
spontaneously,  a  selection  is  made  among  the  observed  data; 
and  this  selection  may  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  the  dominant 
interests  of  the  observer.  Stern  found  three  chief  categories 
of  items  which  are  preferred  above  all  others:  i.  Persons  are 
much  more  spontaneously  observed  and  noted  than  things. 
2.  Things  are  much  more  spontaneously  observed  than  the 
properties  and  relations  of  things,  that  is,  substance  is  much 
more  interesting  than  accident,  j.  Spatial  arrangement  is 
much  more  readily  observed  than  color.  Indeed,  the  latter  is 
ignored  to  an  extraordinary  degree;  children  and  young 
people  generally  agree  in  paying  little  heed  to  colors. 

Wreschner  obtained  similar  results.  He,  too,  found  that 
the  compass  of  memory  is  less  for  data  of  an  objective  than  of  a 
personal  sort,  and  that  colors  are  but  sHghtly  noticed.  It  is 
significant  in  this  connection  that  many  features  in  the  picture 
of  the  peasant's  room  which  made  a  striking  appeal  to  the 
senses,  for  instance,  vividly  colored  objects,  did  not  attract 
attention.  As  Stern  points  out,  it  is  not  by  any  means  the 
intrusiveness  of  the  stimulus  itself  which  attracts  the  attention. 
When  left  entirely  to  itself,  observation  directs  the  attention 
not  to  the  intensity  or  the  quality  of  the  stimulus  but  primarily 
to  those  features  which  are  of  practical  significance,  that  is, 
which  have  greatest  interest  as  practical  concerns  of  Ufe.  Stern 
adds  that  among  our  practical  interests  the  personal  are  para- 
mount; hence  he  asserts  that  the  selection  of  that  which  we 
observe  volufttarily  and  spontaneously  is  made  in  accordance 
with  a  principle  which  may  be  designated  a  "practico-anthro- 
pocentric  evaluation." 


Observational  Learning  125 

This  conception  is  essentially  narrowed  by  Rodenwaldt's 
findings.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  Rodenwaldt  ex- 
perimented exclusively  with  adults  (soldiers).  He,  too,  found 
that  the  practical  point  of  view  is  dominant  in  observation; 
the  features  preferred  are,  however,  not  personal  relations, 
but  things  throughout.  One  even  finds  that  his  observers 
begin  their  description  of  the  picture  with  a  detailed  enumer- 
ation of  objects  and  their  properties, — table,  bed,  ceihng, 
floor,  etc. ;  and  that  not  until  later  and  quite  incidentally  do 
they  speak  of  persons  and  their  actions.  This  phenomenon 
is  doubtless  due  to  a  difference  in  the  age  and  in  the  mental 
development  of  the  observers  in  the  two  cases.  With  increas- 
ing age  one's  interest  in  personal  matters  declines,  and  one's 
interest  in  tilings  begins  to  preponderate.  Nevertheless, 
Rodenwaldt  found  that  things  are  more  accurately  and 
more  fully  observed  than  are  the  quaHties  and  relations  of 
things;  and  among  things  and  quahties  the  practically  sig- 
nificant preponderates, — for  example,  spatial  relations  pre- 
dominate over  colors. 

In  general,  then,  it  must  be  said  that  in  cases  where  atten- 
tion has  not  been  specifically  trained,  it  is  not  genuinely 
attracted  by  sensations  and  their  attributes  as  such,  but  by 
objects  of  practical  interest  or  of  practical  significance  (Stern, 
Rodenwaldt). 

We  are  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  this  statement  is 
true  only  of  indi\iduals  who  have  not  received  systematic 
training  in  observation.  The  experiments  of  Stern  and  Roden- 
waldt deal  only  with  the  spontaneous  or  free  and  unconstrained 
type  of  observation.  If  we  examine  the  observation  of  the 
scientist  or  the  artist,  we  invariably  find  evidence  of  the  in- 
fluence of  training  in  that  more  heed  is  given  to  that  which 
conforms  to  their  scientific  or  artistic  interests. 

These  earlier  investigations  of  testimony  laid  the  founda- 
10 


126  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

tion  for  an  illuminating  group  of  experiments  which  have 
since  been  undertaken.    The  later  investigations  aimed  to  deal 
chiefly  with  the  following  problems:  a.  Can  the  testimony  of 
the  child  be  so  modified  by  training  that  he  will  begin  at  an 
early  age  to  employ  those  points  of  view  which  Stern  found 
to  be  present  only  at  a  later  age?    h.  Experiments  in  testi- 
mony must  be  checked  and  controlled  by  experiments  in 
observation.    The  child  should  be  required  to  observe  objects 
from  particular  categories  or  points  of  view  while  still  in  the 
presence  of  the  objects.    And  these  experiments  should  be 
of  two  sorts.    In  the  first  group  the  child  must  be  left  wholly 
to  his  own  guidance;  in  the  second  group  the  points  of  view 
are  to  be  indicated  to  him.    Not  until  we  are  able  to  compare 
and  to  contrast  free  and  directed  observation,  together  with 
the  subsequent  remembrance  of  the  observed  data  in  the  two 
cases,  shall  we  be  able  to  determine  whether  and  to  what 
degree  the  child  is  capable,  at  a  particular  stage  of  his  de- 
velopment, of  employing  a  particular  category  or  point  of 
view  of  observation.     This  problem  of  observation  was  in- 
vestigated  by   Meumann   and   Schrobler,   and    the  investi- 
gation was  continued  by  Schrobler  alone  in  an  extensive 
series  of  experiments.     The  observers  were  boys  and  girls 
from  six  to  fourteen  years  of  age;  and  the  materials  consisted 
of  pictures,  stuffed  animals  and  sculptured  figures.    It  turned 
out  that  two  forms  of  free  observation  must  be  employed. 
In  one  case,  only  the  most  general  questions  are  to  be  asked; 
for  instance:  " Can  you  tell  me  what  you  saw? "  In  the  other 
case,  the  experimenter  is  to  resort  to  artifices  in  order  to 
encourage  the  child  to  talk  about  the  object, — for  instance: 
"How  would  you  describe  to  your  mother  what  we  have 
shown  you  today?"    It  is  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  such 
artifices  because  the  descriptions  furnished  by  many  children 
in  free  observation  are  exceedingly  meagre;    older  children 


Observational  Learning  127 

describe  even  more  briefly  than  younger  children,  the  latter 
feeling  less  restraint  in  this  experiment.  Well-marked  indi- 
vidual variations  were  present  both  in  free  and  in  directed 
observation.  In  free  observation  the  children  reported  but 
Uttle,  and  after  looking  about  in  a  groping  fashion  for 
some  time  they  finally  announced  that  they  had  finished; 
but  so  soon  as  we  passed  over  to  directed  observation  they 
seemed  to  feel  pleased  and  relieved,  and  their  reports  became 
much  more  detailed  and  extensive.  One  can  plainly  see  that 
these  children  can  observe,  but  notwithstanding  all  of  their 
object-teaching,  they  have  acquired  so  Httle  method  of 
observation  that  they  are  helpless.  They  have  no  means  of 
finding  their  way  about  amid  the  wealth  of  detail,  nor  of 
assuming  any  definite  points  of  view.  And  even  in  directed 
observation  it  is  evident  that  although  points  of  view  are 
furnished  to  them  they  simply  fail  to  see  certain  things 
which  never  escape  the  notice  of  adults. 

This  shows  that  pupils  are  in  need  of  systematic  guidance 
in  observation;  they  must  learn  to  observe  methodically. 
Our  present  system  of  object-teaching  emphasizes  material 
content  in  a  one-sided  fashion;  it  furnishes  the  pupil  with 
facts  but  with  no  training  in  observing.  And  not  until 
he  possesses  the  latter  can  he  succeed  in  observing  in  an 
independent  manner.  Experiments  which  have  dealt  with  the 
educability  of  perception  give  us  an  insight  into  our  present 
problem.  These  experiments  have  been  arranged  in  two  dif- 
ferent ways:  i.  Children  are  actually  guided  in  the  proper 
and  systematic  use  of  particular  points  of  view  of  observa- 
tion, and  they  are  encouraged  to  work  carefully,  con- 
scientiously and  with  good  will.  2.  Experiments  of  similar 
character  follow  one  another,  errors  being  pointed  out  and 
corrected  after  each  experiment.  Obviously,  the  former 
method  alone  is  educative  in  any  genuine  sense;   the  object 


128  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

which  the  latter  method  seeks  to  attain  is  self-help,  and  for 
that  reason  this  method  is  more  appropriate  for  adults  than 
for  children.  Experiments  of  the  former  sort  have  been  under- 
taken by  Oppenheim  and  Borst,  of  the  latter  sort  by  Breuk- 
ink,  Baade,  Lipmann,  and  others.  Within  a  period  of  three 
months  Oppenheim  made  three  tests  of  a  group  of  thirty 
girls  from  ten  to  twelve  years  of  age,  employing  the  picture 
method  devised  by  Stern.  After  each  test  free  reports  and 
interrogatory  reports  were  recorded;  then  the  picture  was 
again  shown  to  the  observer  who  was  now  asked  to  discover 
her  own  errors.  Finally,  the  experimenter  pointed  out  any 
errors  that  she  had  herself  not  been  able  to  discover.  The 
observer  was  then  admonished  to  observe  accurately  in  future 
and  to  make  her  report  as  complete  and  as  correct  as  possible. 
This  process  of  education  resulted  in  an  essential  improve- 
ment in  subsequent  reports.  The  errors  decreased  from 
twenty-six  per  cent,  in  the  first  experiment  to  seventeen  and 
one-half  per  cent,  in  the  third  experiment.  But  the  improve- 
ment in  quality  was  much  less  marked  in  the  spontaneous 
descriptions  than  in  the  interrogatory  reports.  While  the 
former  increased  progressively  in  amount  but  not  in  accuracy, 
the  latter  became  errorless;  and  the  observer's  capacity  to 
resist  suggestion  steadily  increased. 

Oppenheim's  method  did  not  provide  for  any  real  education 
of  observation  and  description,  because  mere  indication  of 
errors  and  admonition  to  improve  do  not  constitute  educa- 
tion; guidance  as  to  mode  of  procedure  in  accurate  observa- 
tion was  wholly  lacking.  Education  is  possible  only  when 
observers  are  systematically  instructed  in  the  use  of  particular 
points  of  \'iew  in  observation. 

Borst  made  the  pioneer  attempt  to  educate  indi\aduals  in 
the  acts  of  obser\dng  and  describing.  Her  experiments  were 
conducted  in  the  public  schools  of  Zurich;  her  observers  were 


Ohscrvational  Learning  129 

sixteen  pupils,  six  and  seven  years  of  age.  The  pupils  were 
instructed  to  employ  definite  categories  in  observing.  These 
categories  were  first  explained  clearly  to  the  children  who 
were  then  given  practice  in  using  them.  The  describing 
capacity  of  the  unpracticed  child  was  determined  at  the 
outset;  this  preliminary  test  was  followed  by  practice  experi- 
ments with  pictures,  all  as  nearly  equally  difficult  as  possible. 
Then  the  effect  of  practice  was  tested  by  showing  new  pic- 
tures and  noting  the  differences  in  these  later  descriptions  by 
the  pupil.  Three  methods  of  education  were  employed: 
I.  Method  oj  general  guidance.  This  consisted  in  teaching  the 
children  to  employ  particular  points  of  view  of  observation 
and  to  make  a  systematic  observation,  from  one  point  in 
the  picture,  of  all  the  details  from  the  different  points  of 
view  which  came  into  consideration.  2.  Method  oj  raising 
,  the  apperceptive  masses.  Here  the  children  were  made  familiar, 
after  the  first  experiment,  with  the  sensory  material  to  be 
observed;  they  were  given  formal  instruction  concerning 
colors,  forms,  relations  of  magnitude,  etc.,  and  concerning  the 
naming  of  these  impressions,  j.  Method  of  influencing  the 
will.  Here  an  appeal  was  made  to  the  feelings  and  the  will 
of  the  observers;  their  interest  was  aroused,  a  desire  to  im- 
prove was  inculcated,  and  especially  was  the  feeling  of  respon- 
sibility intensified. 

A  very  definite  improvement  in  description  resulted  from 
the  third  method.  The  first  method  actually  impaired  the 
reports, — a  negative  result  which  is  to  be  explained  from  the 
fact  that  mere  admonition  to  observe  systematically  from 
different  points  of  view  makes  a  severe  demand  upon  chil- 
dren of  this  age,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  experiments  were 
not  sufficiently  long-continued. 

Experiments  of  the  second  sort  were  made  in  great  numbers 
by  Breukink.    His  method  consisted  in  a  frequent  repetition 


\ 


130  The  Psychology  of  Lcarnmg 

of  tests  in  testimony  with  a  great  number  and  variety  of 
educated  and  uneducated  individuals,  —  nurses,  students, 
teachers  and  instructors  of  school  and  university  rank, 
together  with  their  wives;  and  his  material  consisted  of 
pictures  which  were  projected  upon  a  screen  by  means  of  a 
lantern.  The  object  was  to  determine  whether  the  later 
descriptions  showed  an  improvement.  The  reliability  of 
testimony  became  greater  and  greater  with  the  progress  of 
the  experiments;  and  Breukink  assumes  that  this  finding 
establishes  the  educability  of  testimony.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  factor  at  work  was  not  education  but  practice  in 
observing  and  describing;  yet  it  is  interesting  to  discover 
that  practice  improves  these  two  functions.  His  experiments 
do  not  show  us,  however,  what  would  be  accompUshed  by 
children  under  similar  conditions.  Borst  had  already  per- 
formed almost  identical  experiments  with  adults,  and  had 
concluded  that  a  certain  improvement  in  testimony  can  be 
attained  in  adults. 

Baade  and  Lipmann  have  since  undertaken  an  investiga- 
tion of  educabiHty.  Their  method  consisted  in  presenting  a 
class  demonstration  of  physical  phenomena,  and  their  ob- 
servers were  children;  their  results  proved  to  be  essentially 
different  from  those  of  their  predecessors.  A  simple  physical 
phenomenon  was  demonstrated  twice;  after  the  first  demon- 
stration the  errors  in  the  pupils'  descriptions  were  pointed 
out,  and  the  demonstration  was  then  repeated.  This  feature 
of  their  method  is  open  to  objection  because  a  stimulus  lacks 
novelty  when  repeated;  and  this  factor  has  a  great  influence 
upon  the  process  of  apperception  in  children,  for  which  reason 
the  second  observation  must  of  necessity  be  less  accurate. 
Nor  did  it  turn  out  that  the  testimony  of  the  observers  was 
improved  by  this  second  dempnstration.  This  shows  that 
improvement  due  to  practice  does  not  depend  merely  upon 


Observational  Learning  131 

repetition,  but  may  confidently  be  expected  to  occur  only 
when  the  will  to  make  a  systematic  improvement  is  aroused, 
and  when  a  certain  guidance  as  to  how  to  improve  by  practice 
has  been  furnished,  or  when  the  (adult)  observer  can  himself 
furnish  that  guidance. 

The  cliild's  capacity  to  observe  has  recently  been  investi- 
gated by  Nctschajcff  and  van  der  Torren.  But  their  experi- 
ments, although  of  interest  for  the  theory  of  observation, 
make  no  contribution  to  the  technique  of  learning. 

Investigations  of  the  descriptive  powers  of  normal  as  com- 
pared with  abnormal  children  have  been  undertaken  by 
Ranschburg,  Romer,  Dosai-Revesz  and  Moravcsik.  Here 
again  it  was  found  that  immediate  retention  may  be  "sur- 
prisingly good"  in  mental  defectives  where  permanent  reten- 
tion is  seriously  impaired;  and  that  improvement  in  noting 
with  increase  of  age  reaches  its  Hmit  at  fourteen  years  in 
mental  defectives,  often  reverting  soon  after  the  age  of  fif- 
teen to  the  level  of  the  child  of  eleven  or  twelve  years. 

It  would  be  a  matter  of  prime  importance  if  these  investi- 
gations of  testimony  could  show  us  which  factors  in  the  act  of 
observation  are  especially  significant  for  retention.  The  more 
important  results  of  these  investigations  have  been  included 
in  the  foregoing  summary;  but  certain  inferences  which 
follow  from  these  and  other  experiments  may  now  be  men- 
tioned.   ' 

I.  Investigations  by  means  of  the  tachistoscope  have  given 
us  a  certain  insight  into  the  significance  of  the  temporal 
factor,  especially  the  significance  of  rapidity  and  brevity  of 
perception,  as  well  as  the  importance  of  repeated  observa- 
tion. In  these  experiments,  letters,  syllables,  numbers,  simple 
geometrical  figures,  combinations  of  colors,  or  even  complex 
pictures  are  observed  under  conditions  of  exceedingly  brief 
presentation.    The  application  of  this  experimental  procedure 


y 


132  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

to  the  analysis  of  the  act  of  reading  is  especially  important; 
here  the  method  usually  consists  in  having  the  reader  make 
repeated  observations  of  a  word  or  nonsense  syllable  which 
is  presented  for  only  an  instant  (about  four  or  five  one- 
thousandths  of  a  second).  The  results  of  these  experiments 
show  that  an  exact  visual  fixation  and  a  subjective  prepara- 
tion of  attention  are  of  paramount  significance  for  accuracy- 
of  observation;  and  that  the  observer  must  guard  against 
too  definite  anticipation-ideas  and  against  an  assimilation  of 
anticipation-ideas  with  incoming  sense-impressions.  The  more 
the  observer  is  inclined  to  expect  a  particular  group  of  sense- 
impressions, — that  is,  the  more  definite  the  points  of  view 
from  which  he  enters  upon  the  observation,  and  the  less 
capable  he  is  of  critically  testing  and  inhibiting  the  assimila- 
tion of  view-point  and  sensation, — the  more  inaccurate  and 
treacherous  will  be  his  observation,  a.  All  of  these  experi- 
ments show  that  we  tend  to  incorporate  our  expectation- 
ideas  into  our  perception  of  objects,  and  that  these  two  sorts 
of  mental  content  are  more  readily  fused  into  a  unitary  whole 
when  our  anticipation-ideas  are  definite,  when  our  perceptions 
are  fleeting  and  indefinite,  and  when  we  fail  to  assume  a  critical 
attitude  and  to  differentiate  beweeen  the  subjective  and  the 
objective  components  of  perception.  Or  in  other  words,  the 
attainment  of  an  accurate  and  objectively  vaHd  perception 
depends  rather  upon  the  proper  utilization  than  upon  the 
mere  presence  of  view-points  of  observation.  We  even  find 
that  those  observers  who  rid  themselves  completely  of  all 
ideas  of  expectation  observe  more  during  an  instantaneous 
exposure  than  those  who  have  definite  view-points,  b.  This 
is  also  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  we  find  two  types  of  observer, 
— a  subjective  and  an  objective.  The  former  type  is  inclined 
to  blend  expectation-ideas  with  sense-impressions,  and  in  the 
subsequent  elaboration  of  the  impression,  to  interpret  it  by 


Observational  Lear?iing  133 

a  process  of  guessing  and  conjecture.  Then  the  product  of 
his  interpretation  completely  supplants  what  was  actually 
seen;  and  he  finds  it  difficult  or  even  impossible  to  distinguish 
his  (objective)  perception  from  his  (subjective)  interpreta- 
tion. The  objective  type  of  observer,  on  the  contrary,  makes  a 
sharp  distinction  between  what  he  has  objectively  perceived 
and  what  he  has  subjectively  added  to  this  datum.  He  is 
able  to  give  an  account  of  each  of  these  components  inde- 
pendently, and  is,  therefore,  more  cautious  and  conservative 
in  the  blending  and  interpreting  of  his  sense-impressions. 

When  the  brief  exposure  of  a  visual  object  is  repeated 
several  times,  we  find  that  the  single  perceptions  supplement 
and  reinforce  one  another  in  part,  but  only  in  part.  Supple- 
mentation and  reinforcement  seem  to  occur  more  readily  in 
proportion  as  the  single  perceptions  were  accurate,  and  in 
proportion  as  the  observer  is  con\inced  of  their  accuracy. 
The  single  perceptions  reinforce  one  another  less,  the  more 
fleeting  and  inaccurate  and  difficult  they  were,  and  the  less 
subjective  assurance  attaches  to  them.  Very  fleeting  percep- 
tions of  the  same  object,  for  instance,  of  a  word  read  by 
instantaneous  exposure,  often  appear  in  successive  observa- 
tions to  be  wholly  discrete  individual  data,  each  coming  to 
the  observer  as  a  new  and  original  perception. 

2.  Stern  believes  that  accuracy  in  observation  and  descrip- 
tion depends  chiefly  upon  the  objective-point  toward  which 
the  observer's  interest  is  directed.  Interest  attaches,  in  the 
main,  to  persons;  and  in  consequence,  the  reliability  of 
spontaneous  testimony  concerning  persons  is  especially  great. 
It  is  also  true  that  in  testimony  obtained  by  cross-examination 
the  reliability  is  especially  high  when  persons  are  concerned. 
And  not  only  are  things  attended  to  more  spontaneously 
than  properties  and  relations  of  things,  but  the  former  are 
retained  better  than  the  latter.    Spatial  relations  are  attended 


134  '^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

to  more  spontaneously  than  colors;  statements  regarding 
colors  are  much  less  rehable  than  statements  concerning 
spatial  relations.  Numerical  relations  are  but  little  heeded, 
and  testimony  regarding  them  is  correspondingly  unreliable. 
If  this  result  were  confirmed  it  would  show  that  a.  the 
selection  of  that  which  is  to  be  observed  and  remembered  is 
determined  by  the  interest  and  by  the  dominant  direction 
of  will;  and  that  this  is  just  what  is  best  imprinted  upon 
memory  and  best  retained.  Interest  then  seems  to  be  a 
fundamental  condition  not  only  of  attention  but  of  memory 
as  well.  b.  It  appears  that  every  observer  adopts  a  proced- 
ure of  critical  selection  among  the  observed  data  during  the 
act  of  observation  itself;  this  selection  is  not  by  any  means 
determined  exclusively  by  the  view-point  of  observation,  but 
chiefly  by  the  unconscious  participation  of  his  evaluation  of 
these  view-points.  Even  the  individual  whose  point  of  view 
consists  in  a  desire  to  observe  colors  pays  more  attention  to 
spatial  relations,  notwithstanding  his  point  of  view,  because 
he  regards  spatial  relations  as  being  more  important;  and  they 
therefore  imprint  themselves  indehbly  upon  him.  In  numer- 
ous experiments  I  have  found  that  observers  continually 
assume  and  employ  such  view-points  of  value;  especially  do 
they  fail  to  observe  what  seems  to  them  to  be  superfluous  or 
valueless,  and  yet  their  view-points  of  value  may  never 
come  clearly  to  their  consciousness,  c.  This  dimly  conscious 
evaluating  of  view-points  of  observation  extends  its  influence 
even  to  remembering,  and  in  a  two-fold  manner:  indirectly, 
because  we  observe  in  accordance  with  our  evaluation;  and 
directly,  in  that  a  similar  selection  of  data  takes  place  also  in 
our  remembering  where  that  which  seems  to  be  least  valuable 
remains  relatively  unheeded  and  is  least  likely  to  be  recalled. 
This  explains  the  phenomenon  that,  in  consequence  of  the 
extension  of  our  knowledge,  a  datum  may  sometimes  become 


Observational  Learning  135 

more  valuable  than  it  formerly  was,  and  we  now  attempt 
with  all  our  power  to  recall  it  accurately  to  memory  and  fix  it 
there,  d.  Interest  or  the  ascription  of  values  which  plays  a 
leading  role  in  observational  memory  and  testimony  exerts 
a  two-fold  influence:  advantageous,  in  so  far  as  observation 
and  memory  are  promoted  in  the  direction  of  interest;  dis- 
advantageous, in  so  far  as  it  produces  an  inclination  to  make 
too  many  statements  from  the  chosen  point  of  view.  Apper- 
ception may  then  become  so  abundant  as  to  stifle  observation 
and  remembrance.  For  this  reason,  spontaneous  testimony 
usually  errs  in  the  direction  of  the  prevailing  interests.  Stern 
refers  to  these  as  errors  of  interest;  he  distinguishes  them 
from  errors  of  indifference  which  occur  in  cross-examination, 
and  insists  that  the  two  sorts  of  errors  are  due  to  different 
causes.  In  his  opinion,  errors  of  interest  owe  their  origin  to 
a  too  broad  and  many-sided  interest  which  encroaches  upon 
the  domain  of  the  actually  observed  data.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  typical  errors  which  occur  during  interrogation 
are  errors  of  indifference  because  they  originate  in  a  too  slight 
intensity  of  interest;  they  owe  their  origin  to  the  fact  that 
the  observer  fails  to  make  a  critical  distinction  between  what 
he  remembers  and  what  he  does  not  remember.  From  this 
we  see  how  careful  one  must  be  in  arousing  children's  interests 
in  particular  view-points  of  observation,  because  by  means 
of  these  may  be  produced  an  increase  in  the  amount  of  de- 
scription at  the  expense  of  its  accuracy.  Here  again  we  find 
that  the  essential  thing  is  not  merely  to  inculcate  a  point  of 
view  of  observation,  and  to  arouse  the  child's  interest  in  it; 
the  chief  desideratum  consists  in  inculcating  a  proper  method 
of  utilizing  the  point  of  view.  But  this  in  turn  depends 
chiefly  upon  two  factors:  the  estabhshing  of  a  point  of  view 
with  adequate  security,  and  holding  to  it  persistently  through- 
out the  ajialysis  of  the  observed  datum.    To  these  two  factors 


136  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

may  be  added  a  third:  When  the  preferred  point  of  view  is 
chosen  we  must  learn  to  make  a  critical  discrimination  be- 
tween the  objective  datum  and  our  subjective  contribution, 
between  the  component  which  we  actually  remember  and  the 
component  which  is  a  subjective  supplement  to  the  remem- 
brance. 

J.  There  is  still  a  most  important  question  to  be  consid- 
ered. In  what  manner  do  imagined  components  most  readily 
come  to  preponderate  over  observed  and  remembered  com- 
ponents? Rodenwaldt  has  justly  remarked  that,  quite  apart 
from  the  circumstance  as  to  whether  distinctively  suggestive 
questions  are  asked,  the  mere  interrogation  itself  constitutes 
a  suggestion.  Hence  when  observational  noting  is  used  in  the 
school-room  it  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  that  even  the  form 
of  the  questions  themselves  may  be  very  significant.  Every 
question  of  the  teacher  exercises  a  certain  suggestive  influence 
upon  the  pupil,  an  influence  which  may  be  conveyed  through 
vocal  inflection,  through  the  grammatical  form  of  the  ques- 
tion, etc.  Stern  finds  that  the  introduction  of  a  "not," — for 
example :  "  Was  there  not  a  stove  in  the  picture?  " — constitutes 
the  essential  form  of  suggestive  questioning.  We  know  also 
from  the  experiences  of  Stern,  Binet  and  Henri,  and  others, 
that  children  show  different  types  of  suggestibility.  An  indi- 
vidual of  one  type  is  led  by  the  suggestive  question  to  correct 
his  description,  another  hesitates  in  his  description,  another 
is  inclined  to  modify  his  description  in  the  direction  of  oppo- 
sition to  the  suggestion,  and  still  another  allows  himself  to 
be  misled  into  giving  a  false  description.  All  of  this  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  teaching  by  means  of  observational 
noting. 

4.  Interest  in  what  is  observed  is  by  no  means  exclusively 
a  practical  interest;  a  very  strong  theoretical  interest  also 
makes  itself  felt.    Regarding  this  point,  my  interpretation  of 


Observational  Learning  137 

Stern's  results  is  somewhat  different  from  that  given  by  Stern 
himself.  We  find  that  those  features  which  contribute  to  an 
understanding  of  the  picture  are  especially  observed  in  order 
that  they  may  be  elevated  to  view-points  of  observation  and 
that  they  may  be  remembered  better  in  consequence  of  this; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  that  which  is  unessential  for  the 
understanding  of  the  picture  and  the  treatment  of  the  situ- 
ation is  readily  overlooked.  This  explains  the  remarkable 
phenomenon  that  the  dog  is  frequently  omitted  from  the  hst 
of  chief  objects,  although  children  have,  as  a  general  rule,  an 
especially  great  interest  in  animals.  The  dog  is  not  necessary 
for  an  understanding  of  the  general  situation, — the  evening 
meal  of  the  peasant  family.  In  experiments  where  pictures 
were  drawn  from  memory  I  have  repeatedly  found  that  that 
which  is  not  necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  situation 
is  very  frequently  ignored.  This  shows  that  attention  is  not 
by  any  means  controlled  exclusively  by  practical  but  also  by 
theoretical  interests.  We  attend  to  that  which  makes  things 
comprehensible  to  us,  and  to  that  which  seems  to  be  of  value 
to  us. 

5.  In  addition  to  these  chief  points,  certain  subordinate 
conclusions  which  have  pedagogical  significance  may  be  drawn 
from  these  experiments.  For  instance,  failure  to  note  colors 
indicates  that  the  color-sense  is  trained  in  an  extremely  defec- 
tive manner  in  modern  teaching.  Stern's  results  show  that  in 
spontaneous  descriptions  one-sixth  of  the  statements  regard- 
ing color  are  erroneous,  while  in  interrogatory  reports,  one- 
half  are  erroneous.  Observation  of  quantitative  relations  is 
equally  in  need  of  training;  children  must  be  drilled  in  quan- 
titative statement.  Descriptions  which  involve  number  and 
quantity  remain  relatively  imperfect  even  in  the  adult;  and 
yet  our  observations  of  space  and  time  attain  definiteness 
only  w^hen  subjected  to  quantitative  statement.    In  the  obser- 


138  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

vation  of  the  temporal  relations  of  actions  and  movements  it  is 
particularly  important  to  train  the  eye  and  the  attention  in 
the  noting  of  brief  and  constantly  changing  processes.  Lip- 
mann  found  that  descriptions  of  conditions  contained  less 
than  one  per  cent,  of  error,  while  descriptions  of  actions  con- 
tained more  than  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  error. 

6.  We  shall  quote  only  one  of  the  results  obtained  by 
Stern  in  his  investigation  of  the  correlation  between  age  and 
efficiency  in  observational  noting.  He  found  that  spontaneous 
observation  shows  ati  extraordinary  increase  in  volume  with 
increasing  age  of  the  child.  Spontaneous  description  more 
than  doubles^  in  amount  between  the  ages  of  seven  and  four- 
teen, and  it  increases  almost  three-fold  between  seven  and 
nineteen,  while  the  total  amount  of  description  increases  by 
fifty  per  cent,  up  to  the  fourteenth  year,  and  in  subsequent 
years  does  not  increase  at  all.  Hence,  as  Stern  says,  the  in- 
crease of  spontaneity  in  observing  and  noting  is  one  of  the 
most  essential  characteristics  of  mental  development.  More- 
over, it  manifests  itself  also  in  increasing  power  to  resist 
suggestion, — that  is,  the  more  his  spontaneous  observation 
increases  in  amount,  the  less  is  txie  observer  open  to  suggestive 
influence. 

If  now  we  bear  in  mind  how  significant  for  the  child  is  his 
spontaneous,  independent  and  active  observation  of  what  he 
sees  for  himself,  we  shall  again  realize  that  the  attention  may 
develop  of  itself  in  this  direction.  What  it  needs  is  not  aid 
in  the  discovery  of  points  of  view,  but  rather  guidance  in  the 
proper  and  systematic  utilization  of  its  point  of  view. 


CHAPTER  V 

ASSOCIATIVE  learning:   the  technique  and  economy  of 

LEARNING 

In  observational  noting  we  employ  sense-perception  as  the 
primary  and  essential  means  of  imprinting  material  upon 
consciousness;   an  acquisition  of  the  content  of  perception  is 
here  the  real  goal  of  our  endeavor.    But  in  memorization  or 
in  learning  in  the  narrower  sense,  our  procedure  is  wholly 
different.    It  is  true  that  the  material  to  be  learned  is  still 
presented  in  the  form  of  sensory  stimuli;    and  we  may  still 
speak  of  visual,  auditory,  motor  and  other  forms  of  presenta- 
tion,   a.  But  in  learning,  sense-perception  is  no  longer  th^ 
essential  means  employed  in  the  mental  acquisition  of  the 
material.    It  is  only  the  external  point  of  contact  with  the 
material;    and  the  objects  of  perception, — the  letters  and 
words  which  we  see  and  hear, — serve  only  as  symbols  which 
designate  meanings.    They  are  stimuli  which  arouse  in  us  a 
mental  reproduction  of  the  meanings  which  have  become 
associated  with  them.    h.   Sense-perception  no  longer  serves 
for  an  acquisition  of  contents  of  perception  but  contents  of 
ideas,  for  it  is  meaning-contents  with  which  we  are  now  con- .. 
cerned.'   c.   In  consequence  of  this,  sense-perception  now  ful-i 
fils  the  function  not  of  painstaking  observation  but  only  of 
hasty  impression;  and  we  seek  to  apprehend  its  content  with 
just  sufficient  accuracy  to  insure  the  arousal  of  the  appro- 
priate ideas,    d.  For  this  reason,  attention  is  directed  not  to 
the  letters  and  words  which  constitute  the  contents  of  per- 
ception, but  to  the  meanings  which  they  convey,    e.   In  the 
act  of  learning,  the  will  is  not  directed  upon  the  imprinting 

139 


140  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  the  contents  of  perception,  but  upon  an  understanding 
and  retention  of  the  meanings  of  these  contents.  /.  The 
memorial  result, — the  retention  and  reproduction  of  meanings, 
— ^is  dependent  not  upon  a  perception  of  the  letters  and  the 
words  but  upon  wholly  different  factors, — upon  the  under- 
standing of  the  trains  and  contexts  of  ideas,  and  upon  repeat- 
edly running  through  the  series  of  ideas  which  the  objective 
symbols  arouse  in  us. 

All  of  this  makes  true  learning  a  radically  different  sort  of 
mental  function  from  observational  noting.  Hence  even  in 
the  school-room,  observational  noting  is  treated  as  a  wholly 
different  sort  of  task  from  learning;  and  in  psychological 
experimentation,  also,  the  investigation  of  learning  is  assigned 
to  a  special  group  of  experiments  to  which  the  rather  inappro- 
priate name  of  memory  experiments  is  usually  given.  Fol- 
lowing the  classification  of  memory  functions  which  we 
have  already  made,  we  shall  refer  to  them  as  experiments  in 
learning. 

Between  the  observational  noting  of  sensory  impressions 
and  the  associative  learning  of  coherent  contexts  of  words 
and  ideas  there  stands,  as  a  transition  stage,  a  function  which 
comes  into  operation  in  teaching  more  frequently  than  any 
other, — the  immediate  retention  of  trains  of  ideas  in  which,! 
as  a  rule,  words  serve  as  bearers  and  vehicles  of  meanings.  I 
This  function  comes  into  operation  in  the  dictating  of  words, 
numbers  and  sentences,  in  questions,  in  mental  calculations, 
in  every  form  of  discourse  and  response.  These  materials 
must  always  be  held  in  consciousness  until  such  time  has 
elapsed  as  is  necessary  for  the  apprehension  of  the  context  of 
ideas.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  chief  process  involved  here  is 
the  apprehension  of  the  connected  trains  of  ideas;  but  this 
is  rendered  possible  only  through  the  agency  of  immediate 
retention,  which  brings  about  a  fixation  of  ideas  by  means  of 


Associative  Learning  (li^ 

attention.  This  activity,  in  turn,  differs  from  observational 
noting  and  from  real  repetitive  learning.  It  differs  from  the 
former  in  that  the  attention  is  not  directed  upon  sense- 
impressions  which  are  here  only  a  means  to  the  apprehension 
of  trains  of  ideas;  and  from  the  latter  in  that  the  intention 
here  is  not  to  produce  a  memorial  result, — permanent  reten- 
tion,— but  only  a  perceptual  result, — a  mere  grasping  by 
apprehension.  And  whatever  memorial  result, — immediate 
retention, — is  attained,  serves  only  as  a  means  to  an  end, — the 
end  being  the  act  of  apprehension. 

The  experimental  investigations  which  have  a  bearing  upon 
this  mental  function  in  pupils  have  dealt  chiefly  with  the 
immediate  retention  of  words,  letters,  syllables,  words  and 
numbers,  words  arranged  in  incoherent  groups,  sentences, 
stanzas  and  parts  of  stanzas  of  poetry,  groups  of  names  and 
dates,  lists  of  words  with  their  equivalents  from  another  lan- 
guage, and  the  like. 

The  most  suitable  method  for  the  investigation  of  this 
function  is  the  one  which  I  have  already  referred  to  as  the 
''method  of  immediate  retention."  It  would  be  better  to 
give  it  another  name  since  immediate  retention  is  itself  the 
object  of  the  investigation.  English  authors  have  spoken  of 
it  as  "prehension";  and  Pohlmann  has  translated  this  term 
"span  of  memory."  I  shall  call  it  the  method  of  single 
memory-span  because  I  am  accustomed  to  think  of  a  span  as 
a  spatial  extent  and  not  as  a  process  or  activity.  ^  When  we 
determine  how  many  letters  can  be  retained  after  a  single 

^Ebbinghaus  calls  it  the  "method  of  remembered  items,"  but  this 
term  is  misleading,  because  it  conveys  the  impression  that  the  observer 
is  always  called  upon  to  remember  isolated  items;  and  we  shall  sec 
that  he  much  more  frequently  endeavors  to  remember  the  total  impres- 
sion and  to  retain  the  items  only  as  component  parts  of  the  total 
impression.  Cf.  H.  Ebbinghaus,  Psychologic,  I.,  646. 
11 


y 


142  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

presentation,  and  carry  the  test  through  successively  with 
gradually  increasing  numbers  of  letters  until  the  limit  of 
prehension  is  reached,  we  may  be  said  to  be  stretching  the 
memory  as  though  it  were  a  spring,  and  measuring  its  span 
or  power  of  expansion.  J 

The  application  of  the  method  of  single  memory  span  has 
been  developed  in  various  directions.  Binet  and  Henri  pre- 
sented a  uniform  number  of  words  (seven)  to  tlieir  observers 
and  had  them  write  all  that  were  retained.  I  have  preferred 
the  successive  method,  presenting  three,  four,  five  items, 
successively  and  continuing  until  I  reached  the  limit  beyond 
which  the  observer  could  no  longer  reproduce  without  error, 
or  until  one-third,  or  one-half  of  the  items  were  lacking  in  the 
reproduction.  If  it  is  desired  to  employ  the  method  in  full 
completeness,  all  possible  methods  of  presentation  must  be 
employed, — auditory,  visual,  auditory-motor  with  vocaliza- 
tion by  the  observer,  and  visual  auditory-motor  with  vocaliza- 
tion and  visualization  by  the  observer,  etc.;  and  various  sorts 
of  material  must  be  presented,— nonsense  syllables,  signifi- 
cant words,  numbers,  concrete  objects,  and  words  of  variable 
meaning, — in  order  to  test  the  influence  of  verbal  meaning 
upon  immediate  retention.  Different  tests  of  reproduction 
must  also  be  introduced, — recognition,  comparison  with  new 
stimuli,  selection,  reconstruction  of  a  presented  series  when 
the  items  are  re-presented,  oral  and  written  reproduction.' 

Several  of  the  results  of  these  experiments  are  of  value  for 
pedagogy  and  for  an  economy  of  memory.  The  sort  of 
material  presented  is  of  great  influence  upon  immediate 
retention.  In  my  experiments,  nonsense  material,  particularly 
nonsense  syllables,  was  retained  much  less  perfectly  than 
material  which  has  meaning;    but  nonsense  syllables  were 

^  For  a  summary  of  methods  of  testing  memory  see  A.  Pohlmann, 
Experimentelle  Beitrage  zur  Lehre  vom  Gedachtnis,  Berlin,  1906,  2ff. 


Associative  Learning  143 

retained  better  than  mere  groups  of  letters.  Children  from 
seven  to  nine  years  of  age  usually  have  an  immediate  reten- 
tion of  only  two,  at  most,  three  nonsense  syllables.  In  order 
to  avoid  repetition  I  shall  here  mention  no  other  results  of 
these  investigations,  and  shall  refer  the  reader  to  my  later 
discussion  of  the  efficiency  of  memory  in  children.  Regard- 
ing the  pedagogical  bearing  of  these  results  the  following 
statement  may  be  made.  An  especially  important  question 
to  be  considered  is:  In  how  far  is  immediate  retention  aided 
by  meaning,  or  by  an  understanding  of  the  material?  Binet 
and  Henri  found  that  the  retention  of  words  which  had  been 
noted  as  parts  of  a  sentence  is  very  much  more  perfect  than 
the  retention  of  isolated  words.  When  a  Hst  of  seven  isolated 
words  was  presented,  only  five  of  them  were  correctly  repro- 
duced, on  the  average;  but  of  a  sentence  containing  thirty- 
eight  words,  which  readily  fell  into  seventeen  logically  con- 
nected groups,  fifteen  groups  were  reproduced;  and  of  a 
sentence  whose  seventy-four  words  fell  into  twenty-four 
groups,  eighteen  groups  were  reproduced.  In  Ebert  and  Meu- 
mann's  experiments  practiced  observers  succeeded  in  cor- 
rectly reproducing  sentences  of  thirty-six  words.  In  my  own 
experiments  with  several  hundred  children  in  the  public 
schools,  I  employed,  in  a  first  series,  simple  words  of  every- 
day use;  and  in  a  second  series,  unfamiliar  abstract  terms. 
The  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the  words  proved  to 
have  a  marked  influence  upon  retention.  Words  whose 
meanings  were  readily  understood  were  much  better  retained 
than  difficult  or  unintelKgible  words. ' 

The  method  of  presenting  the  material  is  also  of  influence. 
One  must  be  cautious,  however,  in  drawing  conclusions  as  to 
the  effect  of  presentation  in  immediate  retention,  from  experi- 

I  E.  Meumann,  Intclligenzpriifungen  an  Kindern  der  Volksschule, 
Zcilschr.f:  cxp.  Padagogik,  I.,  1905,  35-ioi- 


144  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ments  on  lasting  retention  where  real  learning  is  concerned 
because  the  process  of  apprehension  operates  under  wholly 
different  conditions  in  the  two  cases.     From  comparative 
experiments  I  have  found  it  impossible  to  state  that  any  par- 
ticular method  of  presentation  is,  in  all  cases,  the  most  favor- 
able for  immediate  reproduction.    The  advantages  accruing 
to  any  particular  method  depend,  in  paf  t,  upon  the  sort  of 
material  presented,  in  part,  upon  the  ideational  type  of  the, 
observer,  and  in  part,  upon  the  mode  of  presentation  its.elf^ 
This  may  be  illustrated  from  the  experimental  literature. 
Pohlmann^  repeated  the  experiments  of  Binet  and  Henri  and 
found  that  in  the  presentation  of  isolated  words  the  tempo 
of  speech  is  an  important  factor,  especially  with  individuals 
of  the  visual  type.    We  shall  see  presently  that  persons  who 
make  use  of  visual  imagery  in  their  thinking  develop  any 
given  train  of  ideas  less  rapidly  than  individuals  of  the  audi- 
tory type;   and  this  is  especially  true  when  the  former  are 
obliged  to  transform  the  auditory  images  of  the  presented 
words  into  visual  images.    In  conformity  with  this,  Pohlmann 
found  that  an  observer  of  the  visual  type  is  hampered  in  his 
visualizing  by  a  rapid  auditory  presentation  of  the  words.  ^ 
The  observer  from  whom  this  result  was  obtained  reported 
the  following  introspection:   "During  the  auditory  presenta- 
tion of  the  words  I  endeavor  to  apprehend  them  in  visual 
form  also.    I  do  not  succeed,  however,  with  more  than  the 
first  half  of  the  series  because  they  are  read  to  me  too  rapidly; 
I  usually  succeed  only  with  about  the  first  three  or  four  words. 
In  the  reproduction  which  immediately  follows,  I  have  more 
confidence  in  dealing  with  these  first  few  words;  and  I  repro- 
duce the  latter  part  of  the  series  solely  by  means  of  the  rapidly 
fading  auditory  image."    I  have  frequently  obtained  similar 
introspections  from  observers  of  the  visual  type.     We  see 
■    I  A.  Pohlmann,  Op.  cit.,  yiff.  ^  A.  Pohlmann,  Op.  ciL,  73. 


Associative  Learning  145 

from  this  that  in  auditory  presentation  every  tempo  is  not 
appropriate  to  every  type  of  imagery.  For  persons  of  the 
auditory  type  a  relatively  rapid  tempo  is  more  advantageous. 
For  visualizers  a  slow  tempo  is  necessary  if  their  visual  images 
are  to  assume  distinct  and  definite  form;  and  only  when  this 
condition  is  fulfilled  can  their  ideation  be  clear  and  definite.  ) 

Pohlmann  devoted  a  special  investigation  to  the  problem: 
Do  individuals  actually  have  accurate  and  distinct  images  of 
the  concrete  contents  of  words?  He  found  that  this  is  not 
invariably  the  case.  ^  This  result  was  to  be  expected  from 
our  knowledge  of  the  psychology  of  thinking  by  means  of 
words;  for  even  in  ordinary  speaking  the  concrete  word- 
meanings  come  to  us  in  extremely  fleeting  and  transitory 
fashion.  This  question,  however,  is  wholly  different  from  the 
one  mentioned  above,  namely:  Is  the  retention  of  words 
aided  by  an  understanding  of  their  meaning?  We  may 
understand  the  meaning  of  the  words  without  bringing  their 
concrete"  idea-contents  clearly  to  consciousness;  indeed,  in 
ordinary  reading  and  speaking,  and  especially  in  rapid  reading 
and  speaking,  we  normally  have  the  sense  of  the  words  dis- 
tinctly before  us  although  the  detailed  idea-content  is  present 
only  in  vague  and  fleeting  fashion.  The  possession  of  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  meaning  of  a  word  presupposes  only 
that  we  have  made  the  verbal  meaning  clear  to  consciousness 
at  some  former  time;  it  subsequently  comes  up  in  more  and 
more  vague  form.  And  what  we  have  present  to  conscious- 
ness is  only  the  logical  and  associative  relations  of  one  word 
to  others.  \ 

A  further  pedagogical  significance  attaches  to  a  charac4 
teristic  feature  of  immediate  retention,  which  consists  in  the\ 
fact  that  all  verbal  and  ideational  material  which  has  been\ 
heard  but  once  soon  disappears  again  from  consciousness; 
'  A.  Pohlmann,  Op.  cit.,  77  and  79. 


T   146  The  Psychology  of  Learnmg 

and  indeed  under  certain  circumstances  it  is  almost  immedi- 
ately forgotten.  If  we  dictate  to  an  observer  a  series  of  words 
whose  number  is  about  the  limit  of  his  capacity  of  immediate 
retention,  and  if  after  the  presentation  there  should  occur  a 
distraction,  it  frequently  happens  that  the  whole  list  of  words 
is  forgotten  forthwith. 

The  rapidity  of  this  forgetting  is  increased  by  various  fac- 
tors which  occasionally  cooperate.    Words  which  have  been 
presented  orally  disappear  more  rapidly  from  consciousness 
under  the  following  circumstances:   a.  When  they  have  not 
been   clearly  apprehended.     Words  which  have  not  been 
heard  distinctly  or  which  are  not  accurately  transformed  by 
the  observer  into  his  own  typical  sort  of  imagery  disappear 
most  readily  from  consciousness,    b.   When  the  meaning  of 
the  word  is  not  at  once  apparent  to  the  observer.    Thus  it 
frequently  happens  that  dull  pupils  cannot  answer  questions 
for  the  simple  reason  that  they  do  not  fully  understand  the 
words  employed;  and  in  consequence,  their  inimediate  reten- 
tion is  unable  to  hold  the  question  in  consciousness.     On 
account  of  this  fading  of  their  ideas  from  consciousness  they 
find  it  impossible  to  reflect  upon  the  question.     This  consti- 
tutes a  reason  for  the  frequent  repetition  of  questions  and  for 
the  asking  of  incidental  and  subordinate  questions.     Muller 
and  Pilzecker  have  shown  that  homogeneous  reproduction- 
tendencies  reinforce  one  another.     This  furnishes  a  psycho- 
logical justification  for  the  repeating  and  the  supplementing 
of  questions  by  the  teacher,  because  these  two  expedients  re- 
inforce and  strengthen  the  reproduction  tendencies  possessed 
by  similar  verbal  material  and  similar  idea  groups,    c.  Tlie 
effect  of  fatigue  must  also  be  mentioned  here.     The  compass 
of  immediate  retention  decreases  rapidly  when  the  observer 
is  mentally  fatigued,  a  phenomenon  which  is  due  to  his  un- 
favorable physiological  disposition.     I  once  had  my  own  im- 


Associative  Learning  147 

mediate  retention  tested  at  a  time  when  I  was  very  much 
fatigued,  and  was  obliged  to  discontinue  the  test  because  the 
compass  of  my  retention  was  so  abnormally  small. 

The  amount  of  material  which  is  presented  for  immediate 
retention  is  an  influential  factor  in  determining  the  individ- 
ual's capacity.  The  presentation  of  too  many  letters^  or 
words  may  confuse  the  pupil  and  give  rise  to  an  inhibition  of 
attention,  which  in  turn  brings  about  a  complete  forgetting 
of  the  presented  data.  Hence  it  frequently  happened  that 
pupils  who  retained  the  complete  list  of  seven  words  were 
able  to  reproduce  only  one  or  two  words  when  the  list  was 
increased  to  eight.  In  such  cases  the  attention  follows  the 
presentation  only  up  to  a  certain  point;  then  the  observer 
suddenly  becomes  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  is  unable  to 
follow  so  many  words.  And  the  consciousness  of  this  fact 
immediately  has  a  debilitating  effect  upon  his  retention,  and 
even  drives  out  the  words  which  he  has  already  imprinted 
upon  his  memory.  This  is  a  phenomenon  which  has  frequently 
been  referred  to  as  retroactive  inhibition. 

A  further  question  which  is  equally  important  for  pedagogy 
and  for  psychology  concerns  the  influence  exerted  upon 
immediate  retention  by  the  mode  of  presentation  employed. 
The  pedagogical  importance  of  this  question  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  teacher  has  to  deal  at  every  turn  with  the  influ- 
ence of  different  methods  of  presentation;  and  this  influence 
may  vary  greatly  with  variation  in  the  sort  of  material  pre- 
sented, and  in  the  age  and  endowment  of  the  pupil.  The 
question  is  important  psychologically  because  it  shows  us  in 
how  far  the  internal  attitude  and  subjective  procedure  of  a 
person,  particularly  his  operations  with  different  memory 
elements,  are  influenced  by  the  mode  of  presentation  or  by 

^  E.  Meumann,  Intclligenzpriifungen  an  Kindern  der  Volksschulc, 
Zeitschr.f.  exp.  P'ddagogik,  I.,  1905,  35-101. 


148  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  sort  of  stimuli  employed.  It  cannot  therefore  surprise 
us  when  we  learn  that  numerous  authors  have  turned  their 
attention  to  this  problem.  Various  points  of  view  must  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  discussing  the  methods  of  present- 
ing material  for  immediate  retention,  as  for  example,  the  point 
of  view  as  to  whether  it  is  better  to  question  or  to  develop, 
as  to  the  effects  of  description  and  narration,  etc.  These 
questions  concerning  the  form  of  teaching  have  scarcely  been 
approached  as  yet  in  pedagogic-psychological  investigations. 
Experimenters  have  been  concerned  rather  with  another 
point  of  view, — that  of  "mode  of  sensory  presentation,"  or 
more  strictly  speaking,  with  the  question:  What  effect  has 
the  dominant  sort  of  stimulus,  by  means  of  which  the  material 
is  presented  to  the  pupil,  upon  his  capacity  to  reproduce  imme- 
diately?   Several  possibiHties  come  in  for  consideration  here : 

1.  The  several  parts  of  the  material  may  be  presented 
simultaneously  or  successively,  but,  since  the  auditory 'organ 
receives  all  of  its  stimuli  successively,  this  distinction  can  be 
carried  through  only  in  the  case  of  visual  presentation,  and, 
to  some  extent,  with  tactual  presentation. 

2.  The  material  may  be  presented  to  one  or  to  several 
senses  simultaneously.  It  may  be  perceived  simply  by  means 
of  the  visual,  or  the  auditory,  or  the  tactual,  or  the  kinses- 
thetic  sense.  Or  it  may  be  presented  simultaneously  to  the 
eye  and  the  ear  by  a  method  of  exposing  and  pronouncing; 
simultaneously  to  the  visual  and  motor  senses,  by  having 
the  observer  make  appropriate  muscular  movements  of  speak- 
ing, writing,  etc.,  during  the  exposure;  simultaneously  to  the 
auditory  and  motor  senses,  by  a  combination  of  pronouncing 
by  the  experimenter  and  by  the  observer;  simultaneously  to 
the  visual,  auditory  and  motor  senses,  by  a  combined  exposure 
and  dictating  by  the  experimenter  and  pronouncing  by  the 
observer. 


Associative  Learning  149 

J.  We  must  not  fail  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  method  of 
presentation  does  not  by  any  means  determine  the  method 
which  will  be  adopted  by  the  observer  in  his  perception  and 
apprehension  of  the  material.  This  latter  is  a  Joint  product 
of  the  mode  of  presentation  and  of  the  ideational  type  of  the 
observer.  If  we  present  any  material  orally  to  a  number  of 
pupils,  only  those  who  belong  to  the  pure  auditory  type  will 
apprehend  it  in  terms  of  auditory  images;  the  visualizers  will, 
so  far  as  possible,  transform  it  into  visual  images,  and  the 
observers  who  belong  to  the  auditory-motor  type  will  pro- 
nounce the  words  to  themselves  during  the  presentation. 

One  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  an  accurate  investigation  of  the 
effect  of  different  modes  of  presentation  is  due  to  this  circum- 
stance; and  it  is  an  obstacle  which  is  exceedingly  difficult 
to  overcome  in  class-experiments  in  the  schools.  In  such  ex- 
periments, a  variety  of  ideational  types  is  always  present; 
^nd  hence  we  can  never  know  to  what  extent  the  method  of 
acquisition  and  of  reproduction  conforms  with  the  method 
of  presentation.  The  mode  of  acquisition  and  reproduction 
may  perhaps  always  be  regarded  as  'a  compromise  between 
the  ideational  type  and  the  mode  of  presentation. 

A  second  difRculty  in  these  experiments  is  solely  a  matter 
of  method.  The  experimenter  always  finds  himself  con- 
fronted by  two  alternatives  in  his  choice  of  method.  He  may 
present  his  material  exactly  or  approximately  as  is  done  in 
the  ordinary  work  of  the  school-room;  or  he  may  arrange 
to  restrict  his  observer  to  the  use  of  but  a  single  sense-depart- 
ment in  the  acquisition  and  retention  of  the  material.  In 
the  former  case,  we  find  it  impossible  to  isolate  the  mental 
effect  of  the  various  sorts  of  sensory  presentation  in  any  def- 
inite fashion,  because  when  we  dictate  the  list  of  words  we 
leave  the  observer  free  to  pronounce  them  to  himself  or  not 
as  he  will;  hence  we  have  no  guarantee  that  particular  mental 


150  The  Psychology  oj  Learning 

processes  are  isolated  by  the  pupil  in  any  such  fashion  as 
the  experiment  demands.  If  the  second  alternative  be 
chosen,  the  presentation  shows  a  wide  departure  from  the 
ordinary  procedure  of  the  school-room;  but  an  insight  is 
obtained  into  the  manner  in  which  particular  sensory-motor 
processes  operate  in  memory.  The  former  method  of  con- 
ducting the  investigation,  if  employed  exclusively,  has  the 
advantage  of  being  able  to  show  us  how  the  several  modes 
of  presentation  really  affect  persons  of  different  imaginal 
endowment;  but  it  admits  of  no  unequivocal  interpretation 
of  the  experimental  results.  The  second  method  assures  an 
unequivocal  interpretation,  but  it  leaves  us  uncertain  as  to 
whether  our  findings  may  be  appHed  to  the  practical  work  of 
the  school-room.  It  seems  to  follow,  then,  that  the  only  way 
to  reach  a  definite  solution  of  our  problem  is  to  employ  a 
combination  of  the  two  modes  of  procedure.  Segal'  has 
recently  attempted  to  make  a  complete  separation  between 
the  various  "sense-memories"  in  different  methods  of  pres- 
entation; but  I  cannot  wholly  accept  his  results  for  the 
reason  that  his  observers  were  too  few  in  number.  More- 
over, I  have  myself  employed  Segal's  method  on  numerous 
occasions,  and  shall  speak  of  it  elsewhere.  Segal  is  the  only 
author  who  has  pubHshed  any  experimental  data  dealing 
with  the  behavior  of  the  different  ideational  types  when 
material  is  presented  to  them  which  may  be  reproduced  in 
various  ways.  How,  for  example,  does  the  visualizer  proceed 
when  he  is  asked  to  reproduce  purely  auditory  material,  such 
as  simple  tones?  What  is  the  procedure  of  an  individual  of 
the  auditory  type  when  he  is  called  upon  to  reproduce  colors? 
How  do  the  two  of  them  proceed  when  they  are  obliged  to 
retain  and  to  reproduce  words  which  have  been  presented  by 

I  J.  Segal,  Ueber  den  Reproduktionstypus  und  das  Reproduzieren 
von  Vorstellungen,  Archiv.J.  d.  gesamte  Psychol.,  XII.,  1908,  124-236. 


Associative  Learning  151 

various  methods  and  which  may  be  reproduced  in  various 
forms?  These  prehminary  questions  must  be  answered  before 
we  can  reach  a  definite  interpretation  of  the  experimental 
findings  which  deal  with  the  various  methods  of  presenting 
memory  material.  ^V 

All  of  the  investigations  which  have  been  undertaken  in  1 
this  field  suffer  from  either  of  the  defects  which  we  have 
mentioned;  and  numerous  other  objections  may  be  urged 
against  them.  An  insufficient  number  of  observers  has  been 
employed;  and  the  investigations  have  been  limited,  in  a 
one-sided  fashion,  to  collective  (class-room)  experiments.  Only 
by  combining  the  class  experiment  with  the  individual  exper- 
iment can  we  ever  attain  to  a  satisfactory  interpretation  of 
results. 

The  most  extensive  experimental  attempt  to  answer  our 
questions  with  school-children  has  been  made  by  Pohlmann. 
This  investigator  employed  familiar  significant  material, — 
two-syllable  names  of  concrete  objects,  and  concrete  objects 
themselves.  He  made  use  of  six  methods  of  presentation: 
I.  He  presented  the  objects  visually, — key,  funnel,  sugar, 
purse,  mirror,  candle,  etc.  2.  He  presented  the  objects  vis- 
ually and  at  the  same  time  pronounced  their  names.  j>  He 
pronounced  the  names  alone.  4.  He  presented  the  names 
visually.  5.  He  combined  the  visual  and  the  auditory  pres- 
entation of  the  names.  6.  He  combined  the  visual  presen- 
tation of  the  names  with  pronunciation  by  the  observer. 
Ten  words  and  ten  objects  were  employed.  His  observers 
were  pupils  from  nine  to  fourteen  years  of  age,  ten  of  each 
age,  making  a  total  of  sixty  observers.  The  stimuli  were 
presented  but  once;  and  they  were  reproduced  immediately 
in  writing.  The  experiments  were,  therefore,  an  investiga- 
tion of  immediate  retention. 

Pohlmann  found  that  the  retention  of  objects  is  much 


152  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

more  successful  than  that  of  words,— a  phenomenon  which 
has  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  use  of  demonstration  material 
in  teaching.  The  results  with  auditory  presentation  were,' 
on  the  average,  much  better  than  with  visual  presentation; 
and  auditory-visual-motor  presentation  gave  the  poorest 
results  of  all.  Pohlmann  adds:  "Under  the  conditions  of 
my  experiments,  the  participation  of  the  motor  function 
influenced  the  results  unfavorably,  for  the  purely  auditory- 
visual  method  of  presentation  was  much  more  effective." 

Data  obtained  from  such  group  investigations  as  these  are 
of  relatively  sHght  significance  because  the  much  more  impor- 
tant individual  results  are  obscured  by  being  incorporated 
into  a  total  mass.  These  results  show,  however,  that  the 
superiority  of  auditory  presentation  holds  only  in  the  lower 
classes  of  the  schools;  beyond  the  intermediate  classes  visual 
presentation  gradually  gains  the  ascendency  and  in  the  upper 
classes  the  relations  are  reversed,  visual  presentation  being 
more  advantageous  here. 

This  state  of  affairs  is  undoubtedly  a  product  of  the  pre- 
vaiHng  methods  of  teaching,  because  instruction  is  addressed 
more  to  the  ear  in  the  case  of  younger  pupils,  while,  in  the 
case  of  older  pupils,  the  visual  sense  is  more  concerned.  Pohl- 
mann^ also  investigated  the  comparative  retention  of  words 
and  of  concrete  objects,  for  intervals  of  twenty-four  hours 
and  three  days.  Here  again  it  turns  out  that  the  best  results 
are  obtained  with  objects,  words  being  forgotten  much  more 
readily.  For  the  retention  of  words,  the  visual-auditory- 
motor  is  again  the  least  effective  mode  of  presentation,  and 
the  auditory- visual  the  most  effective;  the  purely  auditory 
method  stands  intermediate  between  these  two  extremes, 
with  visual  presentation  but  little  superior  to  the  auditory- 
visual-motor  method. 

^  A.  Pohlmann,  Op.  cit.,  150-157. 


Associative  Learning      '  153 

Pohlmann  concludes  from  these  results  "that  the  weaken- 
ing effect  of  time  is  considerably  greater  in  the  case  of  verbal 
than  of  concrete  presentation,"  an  inference  which  is  not 
only  justified  by  his  results,  but  which  is  also  of  practical 
significance  to  the  teacher. 

When  the  same  material  was  presented  three  times,  instead 
of  once,  as  in  the  experiments  described  above,  the  best  reten- 
tion was  found  to  follow  from  auditory-visual  and  purely 
auditory  presentation. 

A  wholly  different  state  of  affairs  is  revealed  by  the  use  of 
unfamiliar  and  non-significant  material.  Pohlmann  investi- 
gated the  immediate  retention  of  nonsense  syllables  and  found 
that  visual  presentation  now  has  a  decided  advantage  over 
all  other  methods,  a  result  which  my  own  experiments  have 
confirmed.  I  believe  that  the  chief  reason  for  this  is  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  in  the  purely  auditory  apprehension 
of  unfamiliar  words  it  is  difficult  to  analyze  the  syllables  into 
their  phonetic  elements.  The  sound  elements  of  words  are 
much  more  arbitrarily  constituted  than  the  visual  elements; 
and  moreover  the  phonetic  analysis  must  here  be  carried  over 
into  the  visual  elements  of  the  written  words.  Pohlmann 
believes  that  auditory  presentation  makes  a  stronger  appeal 
to  the  attention;  and  that  when  articulation  is  clear  and 
distinct,  the  auditory  word  is  more  "penetrating"  than  the 
visual.  I  have  no  faith  in  this  doctrine  of  "penetrative 
power"  of  sense  impressions,  as  formulated  by  G.  E.  Miiller; 
it  has  received  no  confirmation  from  the  experimental  inves- 
tigation of  attention. 

In  additional  experiments,  where  numbers  were  employed 
as  stimuli,  Pohlmann  again  found  visual  presentation  to  be 
more  advantageous  than  auditory. 

When  he  varied  the  rate  of  presentation  it  was  found  that 
an  increased  rapidity  of  pronunciation  weakens  the  retention 


154  ^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

considerably;  but  the  relative  effects  of  the  several  modes  of 
presentation  were  here  but  little  changed. 

Pohlmann  obtained  a  remarkable  result  in  his  experiments 
in  a  girls'  school,  where  visual  presentation  proved  to  be  more 
advantageous  even  for  familiar  material.  Does  this  indicate 
that  girls  (and  women)  are  more  dominantly  visual  than 
boys?  Or  is  it  due,  as  Pohlmann  believes,  to  the  fact  that  a 
more  frequent  appeal  is  made  to  the  visual  sense  by  teachers 
in  girls'  schools? 

This  investigator's  results  throw  light  upon  the  differences 
which  are  due  to  successive  and  to  simultaneous  presentation 
of  visual  material.  Muensterberg  and  Bigham  had  found 
that  simultaneous  presentation  is  more  favorable  to  reproduc- 
tion; while  Hawkins  reports  that  "young  pupils  are  not  able 
to  imprint  so  much  material  upon  memory  in  simultaneous 
presentation  as  in  successive."  Pohlmann^  discovered  in 
agreement  with  Hawkins,  that  "average  results  show  suc- 
cessive presentation  to  be,  on  the  whole,  more  advantageous 
for  memory."  This  is  probably  to  be  explained  from  the 
fact  that  the  function  of  attention  was  regulated  better  here 
than  where  several  stimuli  were  present  at  the  same  time. 

Pohlmann's  experiments  are  unquestionably  of  great  ped- 
agogical value.  Above  all  else,  they  show  us  the  importance 
of  methods  of  presentation  for  different  sorts  of  material.  They 
do  not,  however,  furnish  a  final  verdict  concerning  our  prob- 
lem, because  they  fail  to  provide  for  a  complete  separation  of 
the  component  processes  which  constitute  apprehension.  With 
regard  to  tliis  matter,  Pohlmann  misinterprets  his  experimen- 
tal findings.  Thus  he  maintains,  for  instance,  in  opposition 
to  W.  A.  Lay,  that  an  inhibition  of  vocalizg,tion  by  holding 

I  C.  J.  Hawkins,  Experiments  on  Memory  Types,  Psychol.  Review, 
IV.,  1897,  292.  A.  Pohlmann,  Experimenielle  Beitrage  zur  Lehre  vom 
Ged'dchtnis,  Berlin,  1906,  181. 


Associative  Learning  155     \ 

the  tongue  pressed  against  the  teeth  is  a  distracting  factor. 
I  am  convinced,  as  a  result  of  numerous  controlled  experi- 
ments, that  pupils  become  accustomed  to  this  unusual  con- 
dition after  a  few  experiments;  and  with  most  pupils  it  does 
not  constitute  a  distraction.  The  final  verdict  as  to  the  value 
of  different  methods  of  presentation  cannot  be  rendered  until 
the  conditions  of  experimentation,  which  I  mentioned  above, 
are  fulfilled.  Regarding  Pohlmann's  own  pedagogical  infer- 
ences it  may  be  said  that,  in  agreement  with  myself,  he  holds 
that  in  the  treatment  and  evaluation  of  pupils  their  ideational 
types  .must  be  taken  into  account,  but  not  in  teaching  itself, 
because  every  pupil  should  be  trained  to  work  with  methods 
of  presentation  which  are  not  the  most  convenient  for  him. 
And  since  visual  presentation  has  been  shown  to  be  especially 
advantageous  with  unfamihar  words,  Pohlmann  correctly 
infers  that  visual  presentation  has  great  significance  in  the 
teaching  of  foreign  languages;  and  that  the  purely  auditory 
method  or  vocal  method,  which  is  now  being  recommended, 
is  one-sided  and  unwarranted. 

Let  us  now  consider  real  learning  by  means  of  repetition, 
or  learning  in  the  narrower  sense,  together  with  its  conditions 
and  its  technique. 

The  whole  doctrine  of  the  conditions  and  methods  of  learn- 
ing is  based  upon  the  experimental  investigation  of  memory. 
These  investigations  have  undertaken  to  make  a  quantitative 
determination  of  memorial  function  in  order  by  this  means  to 
obtain  a  clear  insight  into  the  conditions  which  are  favorable  * 
and  unfavorable  to  memorial  activity.  There  are  two  chief 
starting-points  from  which  the  function  of  memory  may  be 
investigated,  i.  We  may  investigate  learning  in  the  nar- 
rower sense  of  learning  by  rote, — or,  to  express  it  in  psycho- 
logical terms,  the  formation  of  lasting  associations  between 
ideas,  and  chiefly  between  verbal  ideas.    In  our  attack  upon        I 


>^     156  The  Psychology  0}  Learning 

this  problem,  we  determine  what  is  the  effect  of  association 
upon  acquisition  and  retention;  that  is,  the  effect  of  learning 
is  tested  and  determined  quantitatively  in  various  cases, — 
and  we  investigate  the  learning  process  itself,  or  the  formation 
of  associations  in  the  process  of  learning.  Only  by  means  of 
such  a  quantitative  determination  can  we  compare  the  influ- 
ences exerted  by  the  various  factors  and  conditions  of  learn- 
ing; for  so  long  as  v/e  are  restricted  to  mere  description, — 
and  description  in  such  indefinite  terms  as  "better"  or  "not 
so  good," — of  the  result  of  learning  or  the  accuracy  of  reten- 
tion, an  exact  comparison  of  the  results  of  the  various  con- 
ditions of  learning  is  impossible. 

.^  Not  only  is  it  possible  to  investigate  the  reproduction  which 
is  due  to  a  process  of  learning,  but  the  reproduction  of 
those  ideas  which  are  not  the  product  of  a  deliberate 
formation  of  associations, — the  free  flow  of  ideas, — has  also 
been  opened  up  to  experimental  investigation.  The  repro- 
duction of  the  free  flow  of  ideas  has  been  investigated 
by  Gal  ton,  by  Wundt  and  his  pupils,  by  Ziehen,  and  more 
recently  by  the  Wiirzburg  group  of  psychologists  and  by  the 
present  writer.  But  it  is  to  Ebbinghaus  that  we  owe  the 
first  development  of  the  methods  by  means  of  which  learn- 
ing,— the  real  function  of  memory, — is  investigated  experi- 
mentally. Notwithstanding  many  improvements  which  have 
been  added  to  the  methods  of  Ebbinghaus,  especially  by  G.  E. 
Mliller  and  his  school,  the  measurement  of  memory  remains 
essentially  the  same  in  principle  to  this  day.  And  it  was 
Ebbinghaus,  too,  who  obtained  the  pioneer  results  in  the 
experimental  psychology  of  memory.^ 

The  methods  which  Ebbinghaus  introduced  for  the  inves- 
tigation of  memory  may  be  made  clear  by  the  following  con- 
siderations.    In  the  investigation  of  any  memory  function, 
^  The  reader  is  referred  to  the  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


Associative  Lear7iing  157 

such  as  the  memorization  of  any  simple  material,  we  must 
fulfil  two  prime  conditions.  On  the  one  hand,  the  external 
and  internal  conditions  of  the  act  of  learning  must  be  kept 
as  constant  as  possible  throughout,  and  they  must  be  under 
the  control  of  the  experimenter ;  at  the  same  time,  they  must 
be  so  chosen  that  not  only  the  conditions  themselves,  but  also 
the  effect  of  the  learning  may  be  capable  of  being  determined 
quantitatively.  On  the  other  hand,  the  material  to  be  learned 
must  present  a  uniform  degree  of  difficulty  throughout  its 
whole  content.  If,  for  example,  we  wish  to  determine  what 
is  the  relative  influence  exerted  upon  the  learning  and  reten- 
tion of  a  poem  by  number  of  repetitions  and  by  concentration 
of  attention,  and  particularly  to  what  extent  an  increased 
concentration  of  attention  may  result  in  decreasing  the  num- 
ber of  repetitions,  it  is  necessary  that  we  make  a  comparison 
of  the  processes  of  acquisition  in  at  least  two  cases.  In  the 
first  case,  we  heap  up  the  repetitions  and  pay  no  particular 
heed  to  the  intensity  of  concentration;  in  the  second  case, 
we  endeavor  to  hmit  the  repetitions  to  as  small  a  number  as 
possible,  striving  to  compensate  the  decrease  in  number  of 
repetitions  by  an  increased  intensity  of  concentration.  We 
shall  see  later  that  the  effect  upon  memory  is  different  in  the 
two  cases.  But  if  we  wish  to  determine  exactly  what  part 
of  the  resulting  effect  upon  memory  is  due  to  attention  and 
what  to  number  of  repetitions,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that 
all' of  the  internal  and  external  conditions  of  learning,  save 
only  the  two  which  we  have  varied  dehberately,  should  have 
remained  constant  throughout.  Or  in  other  words,  all  other 
factors  of  learning  excepting  only  these  two  must  remain 
unchanged  throughout.  For  not  until  these  conditions  have 
been  fulfilled  can  we  say,  for  instance,  that  the  better  reten- 
tion in  the  case  of  the  more  frequent  repetitions  is  to  be 

regarded  as  a  product  solely  of  this  one  changed  condition 
12 


158  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  learning.  For  this  reason,  the  stanzas  of  poetry  must 
have  been  equally  difficult  in  the  two  cases;  because  if  we 
do  not  fulfil  this  requirement,  it  is  wholly  impossible  to  deter- 
mine exactly  what  was  the  effect  of  the  changed  condition 
of  learning.  If,  then,  we  are  to  obtain  really  comparative 
results,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  employ  material  which 
presents  a  uniform  degree  of  difficulty  throughout.  The 
internal  conditions  vmder  which  the  observer  works  must  also 
remain  constant.  It  is  necessary  therefore  to  preserve  a 
constancy  and  uniformity  of  bodily  and  mental  vigor,  of 
psychophysical  disposition,  of  inclination  to  learn,  of  emo- 
tional tone,  of  attention,  and  of  interest  in  the  material.  If 
this  should  prove  to  be  impossible,  we  must  record  the  fluc- 
tuations and  subsequently  attempt  to  evaluate  them  and  to 
utilize  them  in  the  interpretation  of  such  variations  as  may 
have  occurred  in  our  results.  Variation  in  internal  conditions 
and  particularly  the  variable  influence  of  distractions  may 
be  excluded  by  an  appropriate  arrangement  of  our  experi- 
mental conditions.  By  means  of  the  latter,  we  are  able  also 
to  control  the  external  conditions  of  learning.  For  this 
reason,  experiments  should  always  be  made  at  the  same  hour 
of  the  day,  in  the  quiet  of  the  laboratory,  and  with  only  the 
experimenter  and  the  observer  present.  One  of  the  most 
important  internal  conditions  consists  in  the  fact  that  the 
degree  of  training  or  skill  in  learning  the  material  selected 
should  be  the  same  in  every  observer  who  takes  part  in  the 
investigation.  For  this  reason,  it  is  customary  to  devote  a 
certain  time  to  prehminary  practice  before  the  comparative 
experiments  begin,  and  in  this  preliminary  period  to  train 
the  observer  until  the  number  of  repetitions  required  for  a 
given  task  of  learning  has  become  constant,  from  which  we 
may  infer  that  he  has  reached  a  state  of  maximum  or  approxi- 
mately maximum  practice. 


Associative  Learning  159 

As  a  result  of  his  many  years  of  experience  in  experimenta- 
tion, the  psychologist  is  able  to  fulfil  most  of  these  require- 
ments. For  instance,  a  constancy  of  attention  may  be 
facilitated  either  by  habituating  the  observer  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  experiment,  or  by  recourse  to  certain  expedients 
in  experimental  procedure  which  aid  one  in  obtaining  a  max- 
imum and  uniform  concentration  of  attention.  If  we  arrange 
to  have  the  learning  done  under  adverse  circumstances,  for 
example,  by  exposing  words  and  syllables  for  only  an  exceed- 
ingly brief  period  of  time,  the  observer  must  either  concen- 
trate his  attention  uniformly  to  its  highest  pitch  in  successive 
exposures,  or  he  will  completely  fail  to  perform  the  task 
assigned  to  him.  To  be  sure,  our  mental  life  is  subject  to 
changing  conditions  of  such  extreme  complexity  that  we 
cannot  hope  in  every  instance  to  obtain  exactly  the  same  re- 
sults from  identical  experimental  conditions.  For  instance, 
if  after  having  met  all  the  requirements  prescribed  above  we 
ask  the  observer  to  memorize  stanzas  of  poetry  on  different 
days,  and  if  the  stanzas  are  selected  as  carefully  as  may  be, 
to  insure  a  uniform  degree  of  difficulty,  we  •shall  still  succeed 
only  in  very  rare  instances  in  finding  that  any  given  observer 
requires  exactly  the  same  amount  of  time  and  the  same 
number  of  repetitions  in  his  various  memorlzations. 

This  obstacle  is  overcome  by  frequently  repeating  the  same 
experiment  and  by  striking  an  average  from  the  results  of 
all  the  experiments.  We  repeat  each  experiment  on  many 
different  days,  and  take  the  arithmetical  mean  of  the  various 
experimental  findings,  or  one  of  the  other  mean  values  in 
current  use.  It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  such  an  average 
is  justified  only  when  the  particular  cases  from  which  it  was 
obtained  "are  effects  of  the  same  system  of  causes"  (Ebbing- 
haus) ;  but  this  identity  of  cooperating  causes  is  just  what  is 
provided  by  our  experimental  conditions. 


i6o  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

Among  the  external  conditions  of  memory  measurement 
the  choice  of  memorial  material  is  of  prime  importance. 
I.  The  materials  employed  in  any  series  of  measurements 
must  be  of  equal  difficulty  throughout.  If  we  compare  one 
stanza  of  a  poem  with  another,  we  shall  always  find  differ- 
ences in  the  construction  of  the  sentences,  in  the  diction,  in 
the  uniformity  with  which  the  logical  context  is  distributed 
over  the  whole  stanza,  and  the  like,— variations  which  con- 
stitute a  different  degree  of  difficulty  in  the  memorization  of 
each  stanza.  This  inequality  is  even  greater  in  prose  selec- 
tions, because  these  are  still  less  uniform  in  their  structure. 
Hence,  strictly  speaking,  we  should  be  obliged  to  perform 
our  experiments  in  memory  with  an  ideal  material  which  is 
free  from  these  irregular  variations.  2.  The  material  which 
we  employ  in  the  investigation  of  memory  must,  however, 
fulfil  yet  another  condition;  we  must  be  able  to  manufac- 
ture it  in  great  quantities  because  most  memory  experiments 
extend  over  weeks  and  months,  and  demand  a  new  and 
equally  difficult  material  for  each  day's  experiments.  3.  The 
material  must  be  capable  of  accurate  quantitative  grada- 
tion, because  otherwise  the  memory  function  would  not  be 
quantitatively  determinable  in  particular  instances.  4.  The 
material  must  be  of  such  a  character  that  the  errors  made  in 
reproducing  it  may  be  enumerated,  added,  compared  and 
otherwise  submitted  to  systematic  mathematical  treatment. 
This  requirement  also  is  lacking  in  most  school  material,  such 
as  poems,  prose  selections,  lists  of  words,  etc.  And  finally, 
5.,  the  material  must,  so  far  as  possible,  be  so  constituted 
that  its  elements  have  not  already  entered  into  associations 
with  one  another,  in  order  that  all  associations  may  be  formed 
during  the  course  of  the  experimentation  itself. 

It  was   such   considerations  as  these  which  led  Ebbing- 
haus  in    1879   to   the   conviction   that   all  memory  experi- 


Associative  Learning  i6i 

ments  should  deal  with  an  artificially  constructed  material 
which  may  be  built  up  in  accordance  with  a  perfectly  definite 
plan. 

A  sharp  distinction  must  be  drawn  between  material  which 
is  a  purely  artificial  product  and  that  which  results  from  the 
artificial  transformation  of  such  significant  material  as  is  to 
be  found  in  the  school-room.  As  material  of  the  former  sort 
Ebbinghaus  chose  nonsense  syllables,  which  he  constructed  by 
inserting  a  vowel  or  diphthong  between  a  pair  of  consonants, 
care  being  taken  to  avoid  similarity  with  famiHar  words  of 
one's  own  or  of  a  famiUar  foreign  language.  Such  material  is 
illustrated  by  the  following  syllables:  sef,  naz,  kug,  rix,  gan. 
Nonsense  syllables  such  as  these  seem  to  provide  ideal  con- 
ditions for  memory  experiments  for  the  reason  that  equally 
long  series  may  be  assumed  to  be  equally  difficult  to  learn  (in 
experiments,  series  of  twelve  syllables  are  usually  employed) , 
and  that  by  following  the  scheme  of  construction  suggested 
by  Miiller  and  Schumann  a  large  supply  of  these  syllables 
may  be  prepared.  G.  E.  Miiller  has  composed  2,304  different 
syllables  which  are  suitable  for  use.  In  general  then  we  may 
say  that  the  difficulty  attaching  to  a  series  is  measurable  in 
terms  of  its  length  alone;  and  that  therefore  the  number  of 
syllables  in  the  series  expresses  the  amount  of  learning  that 
is  to  be  done.  We  shall  find  later  that  this  statement  must 
be  quahfied.  Then,  too,  nonsense  syllables  do  not  possess 
associations  with  other  words  as  do  the  ordinary  words  of 
the  language.  Every  error  made  in  reproduction  may  readily 
be  expressed  quantitatively  because  of  the  uniform  construc- 
tion of  the  syllables.  Moreover,  the  syllables  may  be  so 
chosen  that  difficulty  of  pronunciation  is  equally  distributed 
over  the  various  series,  similar  sounds  which  might  aid  mem- 
ory in  unequal  degree  being  avoided.  The  syllables  have  no 
internal  bond  of  union,  so  that  they  may  be  assumed  to  make 


1 62  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

a  constant  and  uniform  appeal  throughout  to  attention, 
emotion  and  interest. 

And  yet  even  this  material  is  defective  in  certain  respects. 
The  observer's  associations  still  read  meaning  into  the  sylla- 
bles occasionally;  and  a  series  in  which  this  takes  place  is,  of 
course,  more  readily  learned.  For  several  reasons,  which 
cannot  readily  be  explained,  a  series  of  nonsense  syllables  is 
sometimes  found  to  be  more  easy  or  more  difficult  than  usual. 
But  we  may  observe  that  all  these  secondary  expedients  for 
retention,  such  as  the  formation  of  significant  associations, 
gradually  and  invariably  retreat  to  the  background  as  the 
experiment  progresses,  and  that  most  observers  learn  in  a 
mechanical  fashion.  This  material  has  only  a  modicum  of 
meaning.  Hence  it  can  be  used  only  for  the  investigation  of 
mechanical  learning;  it  is  not  appropriate  for  an  investiga- 
tion of  that  type  of  learning  which  is  aided  by  meaning.  It 
is  important,  however,  to  determine  the  fundamental  laws  of 
memory  for  even  this  simplified  type  of  mechanical  learning. 
Indeed  when  a  relatively  simple  material  which  can  be  learned 
mechanically  is  employed  in  experiments,  the  operation  of 
the  reproduction-tendencies  of  ideas  appears  even  more  dis- 
tinctly than  when  significant  material  is  employed,  because 
the  various  reproduction-tendencies  may  cut  across  one 
another  and  impede  one  another  in  the  latter  case.  We  shall 
see,  however,  that  the  extension  of  memory  experiments  to 
significant  material  has  recently  been  found  to  be  possible  in 
increasing  degree. 

Ebbinghaus's  ^  procedure  with  nonsense"  syllables  was  as 
follows:  Each  series  was  memorized  by  repeatedly  reading 
it  aloud,  from  beginning  to  end,  as  a  whole, — never  in  parts. 
Meanwhile  he  permitted  a  free  alternation  between  reading 
and  reciting  from  memory,  for  he  experimented  upon  himself 
^  H.  Ebbinghaus,  JJebcr  das  Gcd'dchlnis,  Leipzig,  1885. 


Associative  Learning^  163 

alone.  He  controlled  the  rapidity  of  reading  and  reciting  by 
speaking  in  a  tempo  of  "150  beats  to  the  minute,"  having 
previously  practised  this  tempo  with  a  metronome  or  a  watch. 
He  memorized  rhythmically,  grouping  the  syllables  by  threes 
and  by  fours  and  pronouncing  the  first,  fourth,  seventh,  etc., 
— or  the  first,  fifth,  ninth,  etc.,  with  a  moderate  accentuation. 
He  continued  to  learn  until  he  was  able  to  recite  the  series 
%\athout  error,  stopping  when  he  felt  that  he  had  memorized 
the  material.    We  shall  discuss  his  results  presently. 

His  initial  experiments  suffered  from  numerous  defects, 
which  he  himself  recognized  in  part.  The  first  defect  con- 
sisted in  the  fact  that  he  served  both  as  learner  and  as  experi- 
menter. In  consequence  of  this  it  was  possible  for  precon- 
ceived opinions  to  influence  his  results;  and  the  conduct  of 
his  experiments  was  also  rendered  more  difficult.  Nor  were 
his  lists  of  syllables  free  from  objection.  He  determined  to 
leave  the  construction  of  his  series  to  chance;  accordingly  he 
wrote  the  syllables  upon  cards,  shuffled  the  cards  and  selected 
at  random  from  the  pack.  It  must  have  happened  that  sig- 
nificant syllables  appeared  occasionally,  or  that  successive 
syllables  were  similar  in  sound,  etc.  Then,  too,  Ebbinghaus 
simply  read  off  the  series  of  syllables  which  appeared  upon 
the  cards.  This  made  it  possible  for  his  eye  and  his  attention 
to  sweep  back  over  the  parts  which  he  had  already  read. 
Now,  if  the  learner  is  allowed  to  glance  back  over  his  Kst  of 
syllables,  it  becomes  impossible  to  count  the  actual  number 
of  repetitions  employed.  An  accurate  enumeration  of  repe- 
titions is  possible  only  when  a  purely  successive  presentation 
is  employed,  for  only  then  will  the  recorded  number  of  repe- 
titions represent  the  actual  number  of  single  readings;  G.  E. 
Miiller  was  led  by  Ebbinghaus's  own  experiments  to  improve 
the  experimental  procedure  in  many  ways. 

During  the  years  1887  to  1892,  Miiller,  in  collaboration 


164  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

with  Schumann,  worked  out  a  modified  method.  These  two 
investigators  always  employed  a  procedure  in  which  an  experi- 
menter performed  experiments  upon  an  observer.  The  experi- 
menter constructed  the  series  of  syllables,  superintended  the 
experiment  and  recorded  the  results;  the  observer  was 
required  only  to  learn  the  syllables  and  to  report  his  intro- 
spections. Miiller  and  Schumann  also  introduced  "improved 
and  refined  series  of  syllables,"  or  normal  series.  In  order  to 
exclude  syllables  which  are  difficult  to  pronounce  they  made 
use  of  only  sixteen  initial  consonants,  twelve  vowels  (and 
diphthongs) ,  and  twelve  final  consonants.  From  these  letters 
they  constructed  2,304  nonsense  syllables;  and  of  these, 
ninety-four  were  subsequently  discarded  because  of  difficulty 
of  pronunciation,  so  that  a  total  of  2,210  syllables  was  em- 
ployed in  the  investigation.  All  distracting  factors  within 
the  series  were  eliminated,  as,  for  instance,  the  combination 
of  successive  syllables  into  significant  words.  They  also 
aimed  ^  to  introduce  uniform  conditions  of  learning  by  en- 
deavoring to  compel  a  purely  successive  reading  by  means  of 
an  ingenious  device.  This  consisted  in  writing  the  syllables 
with  uniform  spacing,  upon  bands  of  paper,  passing  the  paper 
around  a  drum  and  rotating  the  drum  at  a  uniform  rate  of 
speed  by  means  of  an  accurate  clock-work  device.  A  screen 
was  set  up  before  the  drum;  and  an  aperture  in  the  screen, 
at  the  height  of  the  observer's  eye,  enabled  the  syllables  to 
be  read,  one  at  a  time.  During  the  slow  rotation  of  the  drum 
the  syllables  came  into  view  successively;  and  in  consequence 
of  this  arrangement  the  observer  was  prevented  from  seeing 
several  syllables  at  a  time  and  imprinting  them  simultan- 
eously. This  arrangement  is  very  important.  When  we 
memorize  by  reading  syllables  from  a  sheet  of  paper  which 

'  The  procedure  which  was  followed  in  constructing  the  syllables  is 
described  in  Appendix  I.  at  the  end  of  this  Volume. 


Associative  Learni?ig  165 

lies  before  us,  we  never  learn  in  a  purely  successive  or  con- 
tinuously progressive  manner.  The  eye  sweeps  over  a  great 
part  of  the  material,  and  the  regard  hastens  on  in  advance  of 
the  vocalization,  or  sweeps  back  again  to  what  has  been  read; 
and  irregularities  in  the  behavior  of  the  learner  are  thereby 
introduced. 

Miiller  and  Schumann  also  employed  rhythmic  learning 
consistently  throughout,  usually  making  use  of  trochaic 
rhythm;  and  finally  they  obtained  a  more  reliable  measure- 
ment of  retention,  of  forgetting,  and  of  the  amount  of  work 
done  in  learning.  Ebbinghaus  had,  in  the  main,  determined 
only  the  time  spent  in  the  initial  learning  and  in  re-learning. 
Now  if  the  reading  had  been  done  at  an  absolutely  uniform 
rate,  and  if  the  pauses  between  the  several  readings  had  been 
exactly  equal,  his  unit  of  measurement  would  have  sufficed; 
and  the  number  of  repetitions  could  be  computed  from  the 
time  expended  in  learning.  But  it  is  impossible  to  obtain 
such  a  uniform  procedure  on  the  part  of  the  learner;  and  it 
is  always  better,  therefore,  to  take  the  number  of  repetitions 
as  a  measure  of  learning  and  retention.  Various  means  of 
measuring  memory  function  may  be  employed,  however;  and 
each  of  them  has  its  own  significance. 

The  act  of  learning  may  be  measured  either  in  terms  ofj 
the  learning- time,  or  in  terms  of  the  number  of  repetitions 
which  are  necessary  to  produce  a  first  errorless  recitation,  01 
in  terms  of  the  amount  of  fatigue  present  in  the  observer 
after  the  learning  has  been  completed.  As  our  unit  for  meas- 
uring retention,  we  may  take  either  the  number  of  errors  in 
reproduction,  combined  with  the  time  which  has  elapsed 
before  reproduction  is  begun;  or  we  may  determine  the  saving 
of  time  and  of  repetitions  on  re-learning;  or  we  may  deter- 
mine the  learner's  capacity  to  specify  what  syllable  follow^ 
any  syllable  named  by  the  experimenter.    The  former  method 


1 66  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

is  called  the  Saving  Method  {Ersparnismethode) ,  the  latter 
the  Method  of  Correct  Associates  {Trefermethode).  Each  of 
these  methods  has  a  somewhat  different  significance  attaching 
to  it.  By  means  of  the  saving  method  we  are  able  to  show 
that  traces  of  the  after-effect  of  the  learning  are  present  in 
memory  even  when  a  free  reproduction  is  no  longer  possible. 
For  example,  a  list  of  twelve  or  fourteen  nonsense-syllables  is 
usually  so  far  forgotten  after  twenty-four  hours  that  very 
few  persons  can  recall  it  without  error.  But  if  the  observer 
is  set  to  re-learn  the  series  we  find  that  his  saving  of  repetitions 
is  in  most  cases  fairly  large,  frequently  eighty  to  ninety  per 
cent.  This  method  enables  us  to  demonstrate  that  the  after- 
effect of  learning  still  persists  after  weeks  and  months,  even 
when  free  reproduction  is  no  looger  possible.  The  method 
of  correct  associates  has  a  different  object  in  view.  If  after 
the  lapse  of  twenty-four  hours  we  name  the  first,  third,  fifth, 
or  seventh  syllable  of  the  series,  and  have  -the  observer  repro- 
duce the  even-numbered  syllables, — the  other  member  of  the 
pair  of  syllables,  in  each  case,— we  are  clearly  not  determin- 
ing whether  the  series  as  a  whole  is  still  clinging  to  his  mem- 
ory. This  method  shows  us  the  stability  of  the  association 
between  syllable  and  syllable.  Moreover,  the  method  of 
correct  associates  furnishes  us  with  a  means  of  determinmg 
how  the  concentration  of  attention  was  distributed  over- the 
series  during  the  act  of  learning.  If  we  employ  this  method 
after  five  readings  of  a  series,  we  discover  which  syllables  are 
already  imprinted  and  which  are  not.  We  frequently  find 
that  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  series  can  be  correctly 
reproduced  before  the  middle  part  of  the  series  is  learned. 
From  this  we  may  conclude  that  attention  is  most  intensively 

[concentrated  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  learning, 

•while  it  relaxes  at  the  middle  of  the  series. 

Mliller  and  Pilzecker  subsequently  (1892  to  1900)  intro- 


Associative  Learning  iG'j 

duced  yet  another  method  of  measurement  which  they  call 
the  method  of  time  and  correct  associates.  Here  they  meas- 
ured the  time  which  elapses  "between  the  apprehension  of 
the  presented  syllable  and  the  reproduction  of  the  associated 
syllable,"  i.e.,  they  employed  the  method  of  correct  associates, 
and  at  the  same  time  measured  the  time  required  for  repro- 
duction. The  object  of  this  measurement  was  to  determine 
"whether  those  associations  which  have  greatest  strength, 
and  which  yield  the  greatest  number  of  correct  associates 
require,  in  general,  the  shortest  reproduction-times."  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  the  time  which  an  observer  requires  for  the 
reproduction  and  the  pronunciation  of  the  associated  syllable 
must  increase  when  the  reproduction  falters;  and  it  would 
be  of  psychological  interest  to  determine  whether  brevity  of 
reproduction-time  is  an  unequivocal  criterion  of  the  stability 
of  the  association  between  two  syllables. 
'  Mliller  and  Pilzecker  also  introduced  an  improved  method 
for  presenting  the  syllable  upon  whose  appearance  the  observer 
is  required  to  reproduce  another  syllable.  They  fastened 
the  paper  band  carrying  the  syllables  around  a  twelve-sided 
drum.  A  screen  with  a  small  sht  hid  the  whole  drum  except- 
ing the  syllable  which  appeared  behind  the  slit.  By  means 
of  an  electro-magnetic  device  the  drum  could  be  rotated 
through  thirty  degrees  to  expose  a  new  syllable  at  the  instant 
when  a  shutter  in  front  of  the  sHt  was  opened  and  the  syllable 
was  exposed  to  the  observer.  An  electric  contact  set  a  chron- 
oscope  into  motion;  and  at  the  first  instant  of  the  observer's 
pronunciation  of  the  associated  syllable  the  chronoscope  was 
stopped  by  means  of  a  lip-key.  This  arrangement  enabled 
the  experimenter  to  determine  the  reproduction-time  for  the 
pronunciation  of  the  associated  syllable. 

The  experimental  methods  which  have  been  described  were 
considerably    modified    for    the    presentation    of   significant 


■I  68  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

material.  Before  I  describe  these  modifications,  however,  let  me 
discuss  the  results  of  the  experiment  whose  method  has  just 
been  outlined.  An  experimental  investigation,  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  case,  begins  with  the  simplest  and  most  elemen- 
tary relations.  A  determination  of  these  relations  furnishes 
a  foundation  for  the  treatment  of  more  complex  problems. 
But  we  begin  with  the  simplest  case  for  the  reason  that  we 
must  endeavor  to  measure  the  part  played  by  each  component 
cause  in  the  complex  system  of  causes  of  mental  functions; 
and  also  because  it  is  only  in  the  case  of  simple  processes  that 
we  can  adequately  observe  the  causes  which  are  at  work. 
Even  when  we  proceed  in  this  fashion,  we  find  that  a  certain 
factor  which  is  difficult  to  control  interferes  in  every  series 
of  experiments,  namely,  the  individual  variation  of  the  ob- 
server. EarHer  psychologists  usually  ignored  these  individual 
differences,  treating  them  as  special  sorts  of  deviation  from 
normality,  or  even  as  "errors."  In  recent  times,  however, 
these  individual  differences  of  observers  have  come  to  be  an 
important  feature  in  psychology.  They  furnish  us  with  a 
means  of  tracing  differences  in  individual  endowment  to  their 
fundamental  psycho-physical  conditions;  and  this  brings  us 
nearer  to  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  human  individuality. 
Sometimes  these  differences  can  be  reduced  to  certain  con- 
stantly recurring  "types";  and  when  we  shall  have  succeeded 
in  determining  these  mental  types,  we  shall  have  paved  the 
way  for  an  interpretation  of  the  results  of  our  psychological 
experiments. 

The  problem  of  typical  differences  is  of  paramount  interest 
for  pedagogical  practice;  it  alone  can  furnish  us  with  a  definite 
basis  for  the  characterization  and  treatment  of  pupils.  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  I  begin  my  discussion  of  investigations  of 
memory  with  a  description  of  the  individual  differences  which 
we  find  in  the  memorial  function  of  both  adults  and  children. 


Associative  Learning  169 

An  analysis  of  these  differences  which  will  reveal  the  most 
elementary  and  fundamental  properties  of  intellect  will  at  the 
same  time  furnish  a  foundation  upon  which  to  base  all  of  our 
subsequent  discussions.  * 

I.   Memory  Types,  Learning  Types,  and  Ideational  Types 

Anyone  who  has  conducted  experiments  in  memory  upon 
even  a  small  number  of  individuals  of  approximately  the 
same  age  must  have  been  struck  by  the  great  differences  of 
memory  function  of  his  observers.  The  fidelity  of  retention, 
the  length  of  the  interval  after  which  a  trace  of  the  learned 
material  still  persists,  the  rapidity  with  which  forgetting 
begins,  the  rapidity  of  learning  itself,  and  the  like, — all  of 
these  vary  between  wide  limits  in  different  individuals.  In 
the  main,  however,  there  are  two  fundamental  differences 
which  seem  to  be  the  most  important  practically :  the  different 
rapidity  of  learning,  and  the  difference  in  fidelity  and  per- 
manence of  retention.  It  is  possible  that  the  cause  of  the 
latter  is  to  be  found  in  the  former.  Let  us,  therefore,  begin 
with  differences  in  the  rate  of  learning  in  different  individuals. 
These  differences  are  exceedingly  great;  and  they  give  rise 
to  memory  types,  which  are  wholly  different  in  their  modes 
of  operation.  ^  Learners  may,  in  general,  be  classified  into  two 
groups:  rapid  learners  and  slow  learners,  v  The  rapid  learner  is 
characterized  not  merely  by  his  ability  to  reach  his  goal, — 
errorless  recitation, — more  rapidly;  but  his  mode  of  learn- 
ing, the  effect  of  his  learning  upon  retention,  his  mode  of  re- 
learning,  his  span  and  adaptation  of  attention,  his  curve  of 
forgetting, — all  of  these  are  different  from  those  which  one 
finds  in  the  slow  learner.  In  a  word,  the  rapid  and  the  slow 
learner  each  represents  a  characteristic  mental  type  which 
may  be  determined  experimentally  in  its  essential  attri- 
butes. 


lyo  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

When  memory  experiments  are  made  with  nonsense- 
syllables,  the  rapid  learner  is,  of  course,  revealed  by  his  ability 
to  acquire  an  errorless  reproduction  in  a  shorter  time  and 
with  fewer  repetitions.  Let  us  illustrate  this  phenomenon 
by  the  citation  of  numerical  results  which  will  also  show  the 
magnitude  of  the  difference  between  the  two  types  of  learner. 
In  one  of  my  experiments,  a  slow  learner,  Z.,  required  56 
repetitions  in  order  to  memorize  12  nonsense  syllables,  while 
a  rapid  learner  of  approximately  the  same  age.  P.,  required 
only  eighteen  repetitions  for  the  memorization  of  the  same 
series.  After  a  month's  practice,  Z.  required  25  repetitions 
for  a  similar  series,  while  P.  required  6  repetitions  for  this 
similar  series.  F.,  a  rapid  learner,  required  26  repetitions  at 
the  outset,  and  8  repetitions  after  36  days'  practice.  W.,  one 
year  older  than  F.,  learned  this  same  series  with  20  repetitions 
at  the  beginning,  and  with  12  repetitions  after  36  days' 
practice.  In  children,  these  types  appear  no  less  distinctly 
and,  contrary  to  expectation,*  they  remain  constant  even  with 
different  sorts  of  material.  \  The  typical  differences  persist 
no  matter  whether  the  material  to  be  learned  is  of  a  signifi- 
cant or  a  meaningless  sort,  although  with  significant  material 
the  two  types  no  longer  differ  so  widely,  because  interest  and 
special  aptitude  for  certain  materials  play  a  part  in  learning. 
The  individual  who  learns  nonsense-syllables  slowly  is  also 
slow  in  his  acquisition  of  poems,  prose  selections,  vocabularies, 
dates,  etc.  G.  E.  Miiller,  to  be  sure,  insists  that  with  poems 
he  is  able  to  concentrate  his  attention  much  more  rapidly  than 
with  nonsense-syllables,  but  the  very  reverse  is  true  of  other 
individuals.  But  these  are  differences  which  do  not  mask 
the  learning  type.  We  shall  see  that  there  is  only  one  factor 
which  is  able  to  conceal  nearly  all  of  these  differences  in  learn- 
ing, and  that  is  practice  continued  through  many  years.  This 
has  a  levelling  effect  upon  all  of  the  mental  functions;  and  it 


Associative  Learning  171 

is  able  to  obliterate  almost  all  differences  of  connate  endow- 
ment in  the  domain  of  memory.  In  order  to  show  that  these 
typical  differences  are  present  even  in  children,  we  may  men- 
tion that  B.  (thirteen  years  old)  learned  a  stanza  of  poetry 
with  an  average  of  eight  repetitions,  while  M.  (same  age) 
learned  the  same  stanza  with  twelve  repetitions;  and  of 
course  the  learning-time  is  also  considerably  shorter  for  rapid 
than  for  slow  learners.  In  these  determinations  of  the  num- 
ber of  repetitions,  and  of  their  effect  upon  the  first  possible 
reproduction,  we  see  at  once  another  characteristic  of  the 
rapid  learner.  He  also  begins  sooner  to  forget,  so  that 
we  may  formulate  the  rule:^  He  who  learns  rapidly  also 
forgets  rapidly.^  In  our  experiments  it  was  found  that  P. 
was  unable  to  reproduce  a  series  of  syllables  two  minutes 
after  learning  it;  hence,  as  rapid  learners  usually  do,  he 
requested  that  he  might  be  allowed  to  begin  his  recitation 
immediately  after  he  had  attained  the  ''feeling  of  certainty." 
The  typically  rapid  learner,  then,  is  usually  a  rapid  forgetter, 
and  his  manner  of  reciting  during  reproduction  reveals  the 
rapid  onset  of  forgetting,  the  reproduction  being  restive  and 
in  more  rapid  tempo  than  the  learning.  This  shows  us  that 
the  rapid  learner  possesses,  in  the  success  of  his  first  correct 
recitation,  no  guarantee  of  permanent  retention,  a  fact  which 
may  constitute  a  serious  danger  for  children.  The  whole 
method  of  memorizing,  in  the  case  of  a  typically  rapid  learner, 
aims  to  secure  a  transitory  and  temporary  retention  rather 
than  a  permanent  one.  His  recitation  from  memory  bears  a 
closer  resemblance  to  immediate  retention  in  that  it  employs 
the  after-effect  of  impressions  which  have  just  been  received 
with  a  view  to  reproducing  by  means  of  these.  Immediate 
retention  by  means  of  after-effects  which  have  not  yet  died 
away  from  consciousness  is,  however,  as  we  have  seen  a 
highly    specialized    mental    phenomenon    which    must    be 


1 72  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

distinguished  from  lasting  retention  or  genuine  reproduction.^ 
Immediate  retention  depends  upon  other  means  than  mediate 
retention,  the  impressions  having  wholly  disappeared  from 
consciousness  in  the  case  of  the  latter,  while  the  former  has 
recourse  chiefly  to  the  dying  away  of  the  original  stimuli. 

The  retention  of  the  rapid  learner  bears  a  close  resemblance 
to  that  purely  immediate  retention  which  is  possible  only  so 
long  as  the  direct  after-effect  of  the  sensory  impressions  of 
the  learned  material  still  persists.  Hence  we  find,  too,  that 
the  rapid  learner  makes  use  of  all  conceivable  devices  in  his 
immediate  reproduction  of  the  learned  material,— cadence, 
rhythm  and  accentuation  employed  in  presentation,  auditory 
after-images  of  words  in  their  original  timbre,  more  rarely 
their  visual  images,  and  the  like.  ^  '  The  state  of  affairs  is 
wholly  different  in  the  case  of  the  slow  learner.  He  requires  a 
longer  time  for  learning,  employs  more  repetitions,  and  not 
infrequently  expresses  a  desire  to  allow  the  learned  material 
to  "soak  in"  for  a  time.'  He  reproduces  with  a  high  degree 
of  assurance,  and  in  a  tempo  which  is  usually  slower  than 
that  in  which  he  learned;  and,  even  after  several  minutes,  he 
is  still  able  to  reproduce  with  the  same  assurance  as  during 
his  first  recitation. 

Both  of  these  types  of  learning  are  characterized  by  numer- 
ous other  features.  The  individual  who  learns  rapidly  and 
forgets  rapidly  is,  as  a  rule,  unable  to  supply  a  missing  syl- 
lable by  reflection;  every  attempt  to  do  so  is  attended  by  a 
consciousness  of  the  utter  futihty  of  the  effort.  The  slow 
learner  frequently  succeeds  in  finding  a  missing  syllable  after 

^  See  pp.  4iff.  of  this  volume. 

2  Memory  experiments  have  failed  to  take  immediate  retention 
sufficiently  into  account.  It  appears,  however,  that  certain  psychol- 
ogists make  allowance  for  its  influence  in  delaying  recitation  for  a 
time,  up  to  two  minutes,  after  learning. 


Associative  Learning  173 

a  moment's  reflection,  and  recalls  it  in  definite  form.  The 
rapid  learner  retains  the  first  syllable  of  the  series  with  special 
accuracy;  and  if  it  escapes  him  in  the  reproduction,  the  whole 
series  is  usually  lost.  The  slow  learner  is  sometimes  able  to 
begin  his  reproduction  at  any  point  in  the  series,  and  to  recon- 
struct it  in  a  forward  or  a  backward  direction.  The  mode  of 
learning  also  is  different  in  the  two  cases.  The  slow  learner 
spends  a  great  deal  of  time  upon  the  mere  reading  of  the 
series;  the  rapid  learner  soon  begins  his  attempt  to  ''recall," 
merely  glancing  at  the  syllables  in  order  to  test  and  control 
his  continuous  attempts  to  reproduce,  which  run  on  in  advance 
of  the  syllables  read.  *  The  attention  of  the  rapid  learner  is 
more  readily  distracted  by  trivial  incidents  of  all  sorts,  to 
which  the  slow  learner  pays  not  the  slightest  heed.  The 
emotional  tone  during  the  learning  is  different  in  the  two 
types.  ^  The  rapid  learner  is  enthusiastic;  he  learns  with  a 
feeling  of  excitation  and  of  pleasure,  and  with  a  vivid  desire 
to  reach  his  goal  rapidly.  The  slow  learner  is  more  indiffer- 
ent,^ especially  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  experiment  where 
he  may  even  feel  an  unpleasurable  tenseness  and  anxiety  lest 
he  do  not  reach  his  goal  without  a  too  great  expenditure  of 
time.  The  profit  which  the  slow  learner  derives  from  prac- 
tice is,  in  most  cases,  relatively  much  greater  than  that  which 
accrues  to  the  rapid  learner.  In  a  long-continued  series  of 
experiments,  Z.,  mentioned  above,  required  56  repetitions  at 
the  outset,  but  after  several  months'  practice  he  required  only 
19  repetitions;  while  P.,  in  the  same  series  of  experiments, 
reduced  his  repetitions  from  18  to  8. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  on  account  of  his 
rapid  forgetting  the  rapid  learner  is  at  a  disadvantage  in 
relearning  or  refreshing  his  former  impressions.  Correspond- 
ing to  his  rapidity  in  the  learning  of  new  material,  is  his 
rapidity  in  the  re-learning  of  old  material.    He  is  able  to  make 

13 


174  ^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

abundant  use  of  the  slightest  traces  which  may  have  survived 
from  the  original  learning.     P.  frequently  made  a  greater 
saving  of  repetitions  in  re-learning  than  Z.    On  the  other  hand, 
the  rapid  learner  is  always  found  to  be  at  a  disadvantage 
when  called  upon  to  reproduce  freely  without  re-learning. 
Quite  as  surprising  is  the  characteristic  difference  of  the  two 
types  in  the  reproduction  of  sensory  material  which  has  just 
previously  been  read  or  heard.    The  rapid  learner  possesses 
a  considerably  more  efficient  "immediate  retention."    In  our 
experiments,  the  largest  number  of  nonsense-syllables  which 
could  be  reproduced  correctly  after  once  hearing  them  was 
eight  for  P.,  but  only  three  for  Z.     A  similar  difference  is 
found  in  children;    a  pupil  of  the  rapid  type  succeeded  in 
reproducing  six,  while  a  slow  learner  of  about  the  same  age 
recalled  only  three  syllables  in  immediate  reproduction.    It 
appears,  however,  that  two  sub-types  are  found  among  rapid 
learners.     There  are  individual  cases  of  rapid  learners  who 
are  able  to  retain  well.    These  individuals  clearly  possess  the 
most  efficient  sort  of  memory.    It  is  the  rapidly  learning  and 
rapidly  forgetting  individual  who  depends  most  upon  imme- 
diate retention,  and  who  at  the  same  time  seeks  to  obtain  a 
fleeting  and  transitory  memorial  effect.    In  the  rapid  learner 
who  also  retains  well,  we  find  a  combination  of  rapid  acquisi- 
tion with  a  will  to  imprint  permanently. 
*  What  constitutes  the  basis  of  these  differences  of  memory 
type  or  learning  type?    At  present,  we  can  say  only  that  the 
chief  cause  of  the  difference  is  to  be  found  in  fundamental 
differences  of  attention. '  It  is  chiefly  the  rapidity  of  accom- 
modation or  central  adaptation  to  the  activity  in  question 
for  the  moment,  or  to  the  material  in  hand,  which  gives  rise 
to  the  different  effect  of  learning.    The  rapid  learner  possesses 
a  capacity  to  accommodate  his  attention  immediately  to  the 
peculiar  demands  of  the  activity  of  the  moment.    Within  a 


Associative  Learning  175    X 

very  brief  time  he  has  already  reached  his  maximum  degree 
of  concentraion;  he  does  not  find  it  necessary  to  struggle 
with  the  typical  distress  of  "beginning,"  with  reluctance, 
with  disinclination,  with  wandering  wits,  and  the  like.  The 
result  of  this  is  that  the  initial  repetitions  immediately  attain 
their  complete  or  almost  complete  effect  for  memory;  and 
no  part  of  his  work  fails  to  produce  a  memorial  result.  The 
individual  who  adapts  himself  slowly  must,  on  the  contrary, 
expend  several  repetitions  at  the  outset  in  attaining  a  com- 
plete adaptation  to  the  activity  and  to  the  material  before 
him,  and  in  overcoming  distracting  ideas  and  feelings  of 
unpleasantness.  He  reaches  his  maximal  concentration  only 
by  a  gradual  process;  and  his  first  few  repetitions  are  of 
Httle  value,  in  so  far  as  their  etlect  upon  retention  is 
concerned. 

The  obverse  of  this  difference  in  accommodation  of  atten- 
tion is  to  be  seen,  however,  in  the  fact  that  the  rapid  adapter 
soon  loses  his  accommodation  again.  But  no  serious  damage 
results  from  this  lapse  because  he  very  soon  regains  posses- 
sion of  his  accommodation. '  This  is  especially  evident  in  the 
effect  of  pauses.  Brief  pauses,  introduced  into  the  act  of 
learning,  are  usually  welcomed  by  both  types  of  learner; 
but  they  are  long  avoided  by  the  slow  learner  because  he 
fears  that  he  may  lose  his  adaptation  to  the  activity  of  mem- 
orizing. The  advantage  derived  from  relaxing  during  a 
pause  seems  to  him  to  be  illusory  if  he  must  recoup  the  loss 
by  a  subsequent  re-adaptation  of  attention.  Is  it  of  advan- 
tage to  be  able  to  accommodate  the  attention  rapidly?  We 
must  answer  that  both  this  capacity  and  its  opposite  have 
their  advantages  and  their  disadvantages.  The  individual 
who  adapts  rapidly  is  able  to  pass  abruptly  from  one  activity 
to  another,  a  feat  which  is  more  difficult  for  the  slow  adapter. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  latter  is  able  to  proceed  with  undimin- 


1 76  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ished  energy  and  concentration  after  brief  pauses  because  his 
adaptation  persisted  throughout  the  pauses. 

The  adaptation  of  attention  to  the  activity  and  to  the  con- 
tent which  engage  us  for  the  moment  brings  with  it  a  phe- 
nomenon which  is  significant  for  all  mental  work;   we  may 
refer  to  it  as  our  "adjustment"  {Einstellung)  to  the  activity 
of  the  moment.     By  this  we  understand  that  every  long- 
continued  activity  arouses  in  us  a  tendency  to  persist  in  the 
same  activity.     This,  of  course,  makes  it  more  difficult  for 
us  to  pass  over  to  other  activities.     Our  behavior  may  be 
compared  with  that  of  an  optical  instrument  which  has  been 
adjusted  for  a  particular  distance,  and  therefore  images  all 
nearer  or  farther  objects  indistinctly,  or  not  at  all;  or  with  a 
railway  train  which  is  forced  along  a  particular  track  by  means 
of  a  switching  device, — an  analogy  which  was  first  employed 
by  Exner.  *  Attention  and  will  constitute  the  switching  mech- 
anism of  mind;  '  but  it  is  especially  attention  which  puts 
forth  its  greatest  energy  in  the  direction  in  which  it  has  once 
started.    What  d'jes  not  lie  in  that  direction  may  enter  the 
field  of  consciousness,  it  is  true,  but  it  can  never  reach  the 
focus  of  consciousness.  *  The  more  our  attention  becomes 
adjusted  to  an  activity,  the  stronger  is  the  fixedness  of  ten- 
dency, the  more  difiicult  is  it  to  pass  from  an  initial  activity 
to  any  other,  the  more  does  concentration  increase,  the  more 
successfully  does   the  mental  operation  progress,   and   the 
greater  is  the  after-effect  upon  memory.'    This  is  the  chief 
cause  of  the  difference  between  rapid  and  slow  learners;  but 
there  are  secondary  causes  also.  'The  purpose  or  intention 
with  which  we  enter  upon  the  work  of  learning  has  a  prime 
significance!    The  more  we  intend  to  obtain  not  merely  a 
transient  but  a  lasting  effect,  the  more  is  this  desired  effect 
produced.    There  is  also  a  significance  attaching  to  the  sort 
of  means  which  we  employ.    The  more  extensively  we  make 


Associative  Learning  177 

use  of  secondary  means,  such  as  special  auditory  and  visual 
remembrances  derived  from  non-essential  circumstances  which 
attend  the  learning,  the  more  transient  is  the  retention.  The 
learner's  habituation  to  slow  or  to  rapid  work  also  plays  a 
part;  we  should  therefore  accustom  ourselves  to  working 
rapidly.  And  it  is  possible  that  there  are  also  fundamental 
individual  differences  in  the  rapidity  with  which  memory 
dispositions  take  shape.  Finally,  the  ideational  type  of  the 
learner  is  also  a  significant  factor. 

These  typical  differences  in  rapidity  of  learning  reveal  the 
existence  of  two  readily  distinguishable  types  of  mental  work 
in  general;  and  these  types  appear  to  have  their  foundation 
in  certain  elementary  properties  of  attention,  which  are  not 
uniformly  distributed  throughout  the  human  family.  The 
attention  which  adapts  itself  slowly  to  its  work  is,  at  the  same 
time,  an  attention  which  cHngs  tenaciously  to  its  work,  shift- 
ing only  with  difficulty,  and  offering  the  most  secure  guarantee 
for  the  permanence  and  fideHty  of  the  content  which  it  ac- 
quires. With  this  is  intimately  related  yet  another  funda- 
mental difference  in  the  attention  of  different  individuals, 
which  we  may  call  a  difference  in  the  concentration  and  dis- 
tribution of  attention.  Every-day  experience  teaches  us  that 
certain  of  our  fellow-men  are  more  capable  of  attending  to 
several  things  at  once;  the  attention  of  these  individuals  has 
a  greater  power  of  distribution.  Other  individuals  resolutely 
avoid  attending  to  many  things  at  any  one  time,  preferring 
to  concentrate  more  intensively  upon  the  few  things  to  which 
they  do  attend.  To  this  type  of  attention  we  ascribe  a  high 
power  of  concentration,  t  Concentration  and  distribution  are 
therefore,  to  a  certain  extent,  mutually  exclusive  because 
wide  distribution  of  attention  is  accompanied  by  but  sHght 
intensity  of  concentration  upon  particular  details;  but  we 
ordinarily  find  that  it  is  also  associated  with  a  breadth  of 


1 78  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

interest,  a  high  degree  of  susceptibiHty  and,  since  it  usually 
goes  hand-in-hand  with  abrupt  adaptation,  with  rapid  acqui- 
sition. From  this  outHne  it  is  easy  to  complete  the  picture  of 
a  highly  concentrated  and  narrowly  distributed  attention. 

These  two  fundamental  characteristics  of  attention  equip 
their  possessors  for  different  callings,  and  constitute  the  basis 
of  different  talents  and  endowments.  'The  broad,  inclusive, 
rapidly  adapting,  and  as  rapidly  shifting  attention  qualifies 
one  for  journalism,  diplomacy,  the  medical  and  the  teaching 
professions;  it  is  fundamental  to  the  artistic  endowment,  to 
the  capacity  of  improvising,  to  readiness  in  repartee.  Con- 
centrated attention  is  a  necessary  condition  of  specifically 
scientific  endowment. 

The  opinion  of  certain  psychologists  that  these  two  char- 
acteristics necessarily  exclude  each  other  is  erroneous.  Atten- 
tion is  capable  of  being  developed  in  any  direction;  practice 
increases  both  its  intensity  of  concentration  and  its  extent  or 
compass.  Yet  it  must  be  granted  that  we  find  it  easier  to 
develop  the  attention  in  but  a  single  one  of  these  two  direc- 
tions. One  must  not  overlook  the  fact,  however,  that  even  a 
distributed  attention  can  apply  itself  with  a  high  degree  of 
concentration  to  particular  details.  An  attention  which  is  at 
once  distributed  and  intensive  seems  to  represent  the  highest 
degree  of  concentration,  if  by  concentration  we  mean  the 
energy  with  which  attention  can  be  turned  upon  its  object. 
The  opposite  of  concentration  in  this  sense  does  not  consist 
in  distribution  but  in  distractibihty.  Moreover,  concen- 
tration may  mean  limitation;  and  only  when  understood  in 
this  sense  is  it  opposed  to  distribution. 

These  fundamental  properties  of  attention  exercise  their 
influence  upon  learning  more  in  the  mastering  of  bulky 
amounts  of  material  than  in  short  series  of  syllables.  This 
may  explain  how  it  comes  about  that  in  cases  of  large  amounts 


Associative  Learning  179 

of  material  the  superiority  of  the  rapid  learner  to  the  slow 
learner  frequently  decreases  and  may  wholly  disappear.  When 
the  task  is  long,  the  slow  adapter  gradually  gains  a  greater 
advantage  over  the  rapid  adapter  because  the  former  usually 
possesses  the  less  extensive  but  the  more  intensive  concentra- 
tion. Another  illustration  will  show  what  role  the  adaptation 
of  attention  plays  in  the  Hfe  of  the  pupil.  Burgerstein  asked 
a  whole  class  of  pupils  to  memorize  stanzas  of  poetry;  and 
the  task  was  continued  for  a  full  hour,  the  time  required  by 
each  pupil  for  the  memorization  of  each  stanza  being  noted. 
It  was  found  that  during  the  first  half-hour  the  duller  pupils 
memorized  much  more  slowly  than  the  brighter  pupils;  but 
this  difference  gradually  decreased  to  the  vanishing  point  as 
the  work  progressed;  and  all  of  the  pupils  learned  the  later 
stanzas  in  approximately  the  same  time.  This  result  may  per- 
haps be  explained  by  assuming  that  a  slow  adaptation  goes 
hand-in-hand,  in  many  cases  at  least,  with  a  lesser  degree  of 
mental  endowment.  Indeed,  Binet  has  attempted  to  show 
that  rapidity  and  degree  of  adaptation  of  attention  may  be 
employed  as  criteria  of  intelligence  in  school-children.  But 
on  repeating  Binet's  experiments,  Winteler  found  this  result 
to  be  only  partially  confirmed. ' 

A  group  of  variations  which  have  been  called  Memory- 
types  are  in  many  ways  closely  related  with  these  learning 
t>'pes.  This  unfortunate  term^  refers  to  certain  thorough- 
going diversities  in  the  content  of  the  ideas  of  different  indi- 
viduals; and  it  would  therefore  be  more  appropriate  to  call 
them  ideational  t>'pes.     I  shall  attempt  to  make  clear  the 

*  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

""  Others  have  referred  to  them  as  types  of  intuition,  sensory  types 
and  even  as  speech  types.  I  believe  that  the  expression  "idcational- 
types"  is  the  only  appropriate  term  to  apply  to  them,  because  they 
relate  primarily  to  ideation  in  the  narrower  sense. 


1 80  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

nature  of  these  ideational-types,  and  to  discuss  the  question 
of  their  relation  to  types  of  learning.  Fundamental  differ- 
ences in  the  content  of  sense-impressions  from  which  the 
ideas  of  individuals  are  built  up  were  first  brought  to  the 
notice  of  psychologists  by  the  psycho-pathological  observa- 
tions of  Charcot,  and  more  particularly  by  the  investigations 
of  his  assistant,  Ballet.  ^  According  to  Charcot's  view,  repro- 
duced ideas  are  not  always  derived  from  the  same  sense- 
department.  In  the  act  of  thinking,  certain  individuals  employ 
chiefly  the  ideas  of  concrete  objects  which  they  have  per- 
ceived, while  others  employ  words  chiefly, — the  thinking  of 
the  latter  group  of  individuals  being  referred  to  as  "internal 
speech."  It  is  found,  too,  that  different  individuals  recall 
verbal  images  to  consciousness  in  different  forms;  one  hears 
the  auditory  images  of  words,  while  another  has  a  mental 
revival  of  the  muscular  sensation  arising  from  the  adjustment 
of  his  vocal  apparatus,  or  he  may  actually  innervate  the  vocal 
muscles  in  his  internal  speech;  and  yet  another  sees  before 
him  the  visual  images  of  written  or  printed  words.  Accord- 
ingly we  may  distinguish  an  auditory,  a  motor  and  a  visual 
type  of  ideation.  Of  course,  combinations  of  all  these  vari- 
eties of  ideation  may  occur  as  "mixed  types,"  or,  less  accu- 
rately expressed,  as  "indefinite  types  "  More  recent  investi- 
gation has  made  many  modifications  in  the  earlier  conception 
of  ideational  types,  to  which  we  shall  turn  in  the  next  section. 
Now  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  these  diverse  character- 
istics of  ideation  give  rise  to  different  sorts  of  learning,  and 
that  the  latter  are  related  to  the  learning-types  which  we 
have  mentioned. 

,    Even  the  apprehension  of  sensory-impressior'.';,  which  con- 
stitutes the  first  step  in  the  act  of  learning,  must  be  different 

^  J.  M.  Charcot,  L'econs  stir  les  maladies  du  systeme  ncrveux.    Paris, 
1873.    G.  Ballet,  Le  langage  interieiir,  Paris,  1888. 


Associative  Learning  i8i 

f 
in  individuals  whose  modes  of  ideation  are  difTerent.  The  vls- 
ualizer  imprints  upon  his  consciousness  a  picture  of  the 
printed  or  written  word  and  of  the  spatial  arrangement  of 
its  parts.  He  notes  their  position  by  means  of  his  memory 
for  location;  he  remembers  the  lines  as  they  appeared  upon 
the  printed  page,  and  he  knows  approximately  how  the  more 
important  or  interesting  parts,  at  least,  are  distributed  upon 
the  pages.  Before  his  "mind's  eye"  there  arises  a  picture  of 
a  poem  divided  into  stanzas  and  lines,  etc.  The  individual 
who  belongs  to  the  auditory  or  to  the  motor  type  immedi- 
ately transforms  the  visual  pictures,  obtained  from  reading, 
into  heard  or  spoken  words;  and  these  auditory  or  motor 
images  he  substitutes  for  the  visual  images  of  the  printed  or 
written  words.  The  process  of  learning  or  imprinting  is  even 
more  radically  different  in  the  various  ideational  types.  In 
the  auditory  and  motor  types,  the  process  of  imprinting  con- 
sists in  the  formation  of  series  of  successive  auditory  or  vocal 
images  of  spoken  words,  or  series  of  successive  innervations 
of  the  vocal  muscles,  which,  in  turn,  are  accompanied  by 
sensations  or  images  of  movements;  or  he  makes  a  mental 
note  of  the  "melody"  of  what  is  spoken  to  him,  and  he  remem- 
bers the  sounds  and  the  rhythmic  sequence  of  the  words  and 
syllables  which  he  memorizes.  And  in  this  melody  the  va- 
rious sounds  then  assume  their  proper  auditory  and  rhythmic 
positions.  Now,  in  the  act  of  reproduction,  the  auditory  or 
motor  individual  is  unable  to  present  the  whole  series  simul- 
taneously to  his  consciousness;  his  only  alternative  is  to 
allow  the  successively  learned  items  to  run  their  course  again 
in  successive  order,  in  the  form  of  either  concrete  or  verbal 
images.  The  individual  who  remembers  visually  proceeds  in 
a  wholly  different  fashion.  The  syllables  or  letters  which 
are  to  be  remembered,  he  arranges  side  by  side  in  the  form  of 
visual  images;   and  the  result  of  this  internal  vision,  namely 


1 82  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

his  visually  ideated  series  of  letters,  he  can  see  before  him 
either  simultaneously  or  in  successive  sections.  In  the  act 
of  reciting  he  simply  directs  his  mental  regard  upon  the 
series;  his  retention  is  simultaneous  rather  than  successive. 
It  is  exceedingly  difficult  for  an  individual  of  the  auditory 
type  to  recite  a  memorized  series  backward,  because  his 
associations  between  the  terms  of  the  series  were  formed 
almost  wholly  in  a  purely  successive  order;  and  successive 
associations  always  operate  more  strongly  in  the  direction  in 
which  they  were  formed  than  in  the  reverse  direction.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  strongly  visual  individual  is  distinguished  by 
an  ability  to  reproduce  his  associated  groups  of  letters,  etc., 
backward  almost  as  easily  as  forward.  He  experiences  no 
difficulty  in  running  his  internal  glance  in  a  backward  direc- 
tion over  what  lies  in  the  field  of  his  mental  vision. 

Unfortunately  we  possess  as  yet  no  investigations  which 
have  made  a  special  study  of  the  relative  fidehty  of  retention 
by  the  various  ideational  types.  But  from  incidental  results 
obtained  in  other  investigations  of  memory  we  can  see  clearly 
that  visual  memory  is  slower  but  more  sure  and  reliable.^ 
The  individual  who  learns  visually  also  experiences,  as  a  rule, 
'a  more  vivid  feeling  of  certainty.'  In  experiments  with  non- 
sense syllables,  we  very  frequently  observed  the  manner  in 
which  the  various  observers  recall  forgotten  syllables  by  a 
process  of  reflection.  Most  observers  report  that  the  forgot- 
ten vowel  or  diphthong  first  floats  into  view;  and  in  cases 
where  forgotten  consonants  also  "occur"  to  the  learner,  they 
too,  usually  make  their  appearance  in  visual  form.     But  if 

^  According  to  Pohlmann,  this  is  especially  true  for  nonsense  syl- 
lables; and  according  to  Finzi,  it  is  true  also  for  concrete  objects. 
The  statement  seems  to  me  to  be  self-evident.  Compare  the  investi- 
gations of  immediate  retention  and  of  observant  noting  which  we  have 
already  discussed. 


Associative  Learni7ig  183 

this  does  not  happen,  the  feeling  of  uncertainty  still  persists. 
This  is  in  accord  with  Finzi's  observation^  that  in  experiments 
on  apprehending  and  noting,  visual  images  are  less  subject 
to  falsification  than  auditory  images.  It  is  probable  then, 
that  visual  images  are  retained  more  faithfully  than  any  other 
sort  of  content.  My  own  experiments  show  that  the  reten- 
tion of  numbers,  and  consequently  mental  calculatlan,  is 
accomplished  more  slowly  but  much  more  correctly  when  the 
digits  are  ideated  also  as  visual  images  than  when  they  are 
reproduced  only  in  the  form  of  auditory-motor  verbal  images. 

From  this  we  must  suppose  that  exceedingly  slow  learning 
is  to  be  explained  from  two  fundamental  differences  of  dis- 
position and  endowment, — from  the  slow  adaptation  of  the 
individual's  attention  to  the  activity  upon  which  he  is  en- 
gaged, and  from  the  predominance  of  visual  ideation,  under 
which  we  have  still  to  consider  all  of  the  secondary  factors 
which  have  been  mentioned. 

In  how  far  is  it  possible  to  eliminate  these  differences  in 
endowment  which  constitute  the  basis  of  memory  function? 
This  is  an  important  question  for  pedagogy  but  we  have  as 
yet  no  decisive  or  final  experiments  dealing  with  the  topic. 
Yet  in  all  of  our  investigations  we  find  that  the  elementary 
attributes  of  attention  are  capable  of  almost  unlimited  im- 
provement in  every  direction,  if  only  they  are  submitted  to 
an  adequate  training.  *  Rapidity  of  adaptation,  and  the  inten- 
sity and  compass  of  concentration  may  be  developed  to  a  high 
degree;  and  any  particular  sort  of  ideating  can  be  acquired 
by  training,  if  there  is  not  a  complete  dearth  of  ideational 
elements  from  the  corresponding  sense-department  in  the 
individual's  consciousness  at  the  outset.  I  myself  am  domi- 
nantly  non-visual  in  my  ideation  of  verbal  material.  All  of 
my  learning  at  school  was  auditory-motor;    I  have  never 

^  J.  Finzi,  Ibid.,  p.  377. 


184  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

been  able  to  remember  places  in  books,  and  the  orthographic 
images  of  foreign  words  have  given  me  great  difficulty  in  all 
cases  where  the  spelling  does  not  conform  with  the  pronun- 
ciation. In  psychological  experimentation  I  have  cultivated 
visual  ideation  to  such  a  degree  that  I  am  now  able  to  solve 
arithmetical  problems  by  means  of  auditory  or  of  visual 
images  as  I  prefer;  I  can  learn  a  group  of  letters,  numbers  or 
syllables,  by  means  of  auditory,  visual  or  motor  imagery. 
I  always  find  that  visual  noting  and  computing  is  essentially 
slower  but  more  sure ;  I  seldom  make  a  mistake  in  visual  com- 
puting. 

It  was  the  French  psychologists  who  first  called  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  elimination  of  differences  in  memory- 
types  by  devoting  a  special  training  to  ill-developed  types  of 
ideating  always  brings  with  it  a  certain  loss  in  one's  connate 
type.  Thus,  the  individual  of  the  auditory  t}^e  suffers  a 
certain  loss  of  auditory  imagery  when  he  trains  his  visual 
ideation.  This  is  just  what  our  every-day  experience  with 
the  one-sided  development  of  capacities  would  lead  us  to 
expect.  But  the  loss  is  only  a  temporary  one;  the  person 
who  submits  to  training  gradually  acquires  a  capacity  to 
work  with  all  of  the  means  of  ideation  which  he  has  practised. 

These  considerations  indicate  that  each  ideational  type 
possesses  certain  advantages  and  certain  disadvantages.  When 
^  the  visualizer  learns  by  means  of  observation  he  is»condemned 
to  Iv/ork  relatively  slowly;'  tho  auditory-motor  individual 
always  seems  to  possess  a  less  reliable  but  a  more  rapid  mem- 
ory.' And  although  the  visual  memory  is  less  likely  to  falsify 
its  single  ideas,  still  the  visualizer  is  more  prone  to  blunder 
when  he  learns  whole  groups  of  ideas.  In  reproducing  large 
groups  of  impressions  he  is  more  subject  to  errors  of  position, 
although  his  retention  of  single  impressions,— letters,  sylla- 
bles and  words,— is  better;  on  the  other  hand,  the  individual 


Associative  Learning  185 

who  belongs  to  the  auditory  type  is  more  likely  to  confuse 
words  of  similar  sound.  The  auditory-motor  individual  profits 
from  his  successive  procedure  in  forming  associations;  he 
does  not  so  readily  confuse  the  order  of  the  parts  of  his  material 
as  the  visualizer  does.  From  this  it  must  be  inferred  that  a 
perfect  memory  must  have  its  foundation  in  an  all-round 
development  of  ideation.  The  teacher  should  note  the  diver- 
sities of  memory  which  are  due  to  a  relative  lack  of  one  or 
other  sort  of  ideational  content;  and  he  should  seek  to  elim- 
inate these  defects  by  appropriate  training. 

We  must  not  fail  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  most  of 
the  experiments  which  we  have  described  were  made  with 
adults,  twenty  to  forty  years  of  age,  and  in  psychological 
laboratories.  Since  the  mind  of  the  child,  especially  in  so  far 
as  memory  is  concerned,  is  much  more  plastic,  one  would 
expect  that  if  the  adult  can  acquire  such  a  high  degree  of 
cultivation  of  memory  and  of  the  elementary  attributes  of 
attention,  the  schools  should  be  able  to  attain  much  greater 
results.  And  this  expectation  is  fulfilled,  according  to  the 
findings  of  Radossawljewitsch,  who,  in  an  investigation  of 
the  memory  of  eleven  school-children  from  seven  to  thirteen 
years  of  age,  found  that  the  ideational  t^-pes  of  children  are 
modified  by  long-continued  learning.  All  of  his  observers 
gradually  approached  more  and  more  closely  to  the  auditory 
(probably  the  auditory-motor)  type  of  memory,  because  in 
his  experiments  the  learning  was  done  solely  by  a  method  of 
reading  and  sotto  voce  pronunciation.  Radossawljewitsch 
observed  this  phenomenon  in  himself  also.  In  my  own  experi- 
ments with  nonsense  syllables,  I  have  repeatedly  found  that 
my  ideational  type  always  takes  the  following  form  after  a 
long  period  of  learning:  .  I  retain  chiefly  in  auditory-motor 
fashion,  and  reinforcement  by  means  of  visual  images  is  a 
wholly  secondary  matter.     Anything  that  has  been  learned 


1 86  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

verbally,  however,  is  usually  retained  solely  in  auditory- 
motor  terms,  with  auditory  imagery  dominating. '  Teaching 
should  therefore  be  supplemented  by  formal  training,  which 
unfortunately  is  unknown  in  the  modern  curriculum.  'Gifted 
educators  of  all  ages  have  demanded  purely  formal  mental 
training.'  Pestalozzi  developed  the  concentration  of  his 
younger  pupils  by  having  them  perform  simple  manual  exer- 
cises during  their  learning.  Froebel's  whole  system  of  kinder- 
garten plays  is  permeated  with  the  idea  of  giving  the  child 
formal  exercises  in  order  to  develop  his  capacities.  The  ma- 
terial employed  in  these  exercises  is  a  matter  of  relative  indif- 
ference, in  so  far  as  subsequent  education  is  concerned;  its 
acquisition  is  only  a  secondary  purpose  of  the  training. 
Laboratory  investigations  of  the  development  of  the  mental 
functions  of  adults  show  us  what  an  enormous  loss  is  entailed 
in  modern  education  as  a  result  of  its  prevailing  emphasis 
upon  content  as  the  essential  aim  in  teaching.  In  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  students  in  our  universities  must  be  taught 
to  see  correctly  and  to  hear  correctly,  that  they  scarcely 
know  what  their  mechanical  memory  is  capable  of  accom- 
phshing,  that  accuracy  and  fidelity  of  description  are  not 
developed  until  they  come  to  our  laboratories  for  experi- 
ments, that  elementary  differences  of  endowment  are  levelled 
down  so  little  during  the  first  twenty  years  of  their  lives, — in 
view  of  all  of  these  facts,  it  appears  that  our  modern  system 
of  education  fails  to  fulfil  the  demands  both  of  science  and 
of  practical  Hfe.  This  state  of  afifairs  has  contributed  to 
the  success  of  certain  advocates  of  mnemonics,  whose  meth-i 
ods  are  guilty  of  shocking  psychological  blunders  but  yield 
abundant  renown  to  their  authors. '  The  memory  of  modern  j 
man  is  wholly  neglected  in  so  far  as  its  formal  aspect  is  con- 

I  P.  Radossawljewitsch,  Das  Behalten  imd  Vergessen  bei  Kindern 
und  Erwachsenen,  Leipzig,  1907,  169. 


Associative  Learning  187 

cerned;    even  an  improper  memory  training  is  better  than 
none  at  all. 

Our  generation  keenly  feels  this  fundamental  need  of  a 
formal  training  of  our  mental  capacities  by  means  of  appro- 
priate methods.  This  seems  to  be  the  only  reason  which  can 
account  for  the  luxuriant  crop  of  modern  literature  in  which 
certain  individuals  undertake  to  show  their  fellow-men  "the 
right  way  to  do  mental  work,"  to  teach  them  "  the  art  of  never 
forgetting"  by  a  system  of  mnemonics,  and  to  "make  men 
strong"  by  courses  of  instruction.  Our  next  discussion  will 
deal  with  the  psychological  development  of  methods  of  teach- 
ing which  may  supply  this  need,  in  one  direction  at  least. 

2.   More  Detailed  Description  of  Ideational  Types  and  Memory 
Types,  and  their  Fundamental  Characteristics 

In  our  preceding  discussions,  typical  differences  in  the  ways 
in  which  different  people  "think," — or,  more  correctly, 
ideate, — and  retain,  have  been  brought  into  relation  with 
typical  differences  in  learning.  Our  knowledge  of  these 
ideational  types,  which  have  only  been  hastily  sketched  in 
the  preceding  section,  constitutes  at  once  the  basis  of  a  psy- 
chology of  memory  and  of  a  pedagogy  of  learning,  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  latter  term.  Every  sort  of  memory 
process  runs  its  course  differently  in  individuals  of  different 
mental  types;  and  different  methods  of  learning  come  into 
being  because  one  or  other  of  the  general  conditions  of  learn- 
ing leads  more  readily  to  the  desired  goal,  and  likewise 
because  there  are  individual  ways  of  learning.  Hence  before 
we  proceed  to  develop  a  doctrine  of  the  technique  and  econ- 
omy of  learning,  it  is  appropriate  to  undertake  a  more  exact 
analysis  of  those  interesting  differences  of  ideating  and  remem- 
bering which,  strangely  enough,  were  not  appreciated  until 
the  modern  era  of  psychology  and  psychiatry. 


1 88  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

The  investigations  of  these  individual  differences,  like  the 
investigation  of  so  many  other  problems  which  have  been 
raised  by  modern  psychology,  have  by  no  means  reached 
their  final  stage  as  yet;  still  we  already  possess  a  wealth  of 
interesting  observations  and  experimental  data  which  give 
us  some  insight  into  the  complex  mechanism  which  the 
individual  employs  in  his  memory  work. 

I  shall  attempt  briefly  to  describe  the  ideational  types 
under  the  following  headings:  a.  An  analysis  of  rare  cases 
of  extremely  one-sided  memorial  endowment  such  as  we  occa- 
sionally find  in  noted  artists,  rapid  calculators,  chess-players, 
and  others  of  highly  developed  talents.  I.  A  discussion  of 
certain  pathological  conditions  of  mental  life.  c.  A  descrip- 
tion of  the  differences  between  the  memory  of  the  child  and 
of  the  adult,  d.  A  discussion  of  methods  of  determining 
memory  types. 

All  persons  appear  to  think  ^  in  either  of  two  wholly  differ- 
ent forms.  These  forms  do  not,  however,  alternate  with  each 
other  in  a  fortuitous  and  purposeless  fashion ;  but  each  comes 
into  operation  on  certain  definite  occasions  and  for  the  reali- 
zation of  certain  definite  ideational  purposes.  We  all  think 
either  in  concrete  images  of  former  perceptions  of  objects  or 
processes,  or  we  think  in  words  which  we  speak  to  ourselves. 
In  the  former  case,  consciousness  is  dominated  by  residua, 
after-effects,  or  traces  of  former  sense-perceptions,  and  more 
or  less  original  and  novel  combinations  of  these.  This  form 
of  ideating  is  therefore  called  concrete  or  objective  ideating. 
The  ideas  which  dominate  us  in  this  case  are  subdivided,  by 
psychology,  into  ideas  of  imagination  and  ideas  of  memory. 
They  are  ideas  of  memory  when  they  appear  to  us  to  be 
subjective  copies  of  objects  or  processes  which  we  have  for- 

I  The  word  "think"  will,  in  what  follows,  be  used  as  a  general  term 
to  include  every  sort  of  ideational  activity. 


Associative  Learning  189 

merly  experienced.  In  ideas  of  imagination  this  trans- 
subjective  reference  to  former  impressions  is  lacking;  and  in 
the  adult,  ideas  of  imagination  have  not  infrequently  been 
found  to  have  come  into  being  from  numerous  combinations, 
cleavages,  variations  and  fusions  of  former  ideas  of  memory; 
so  that  they  seem  to  be  exceedingly  complex  structures,  in 
which  now  one,  now  another,  component  idea  predominates 
in  consciousness,  in  consequence  of  the  cohesion  and  constel- 
lation of  ideas.  ^ 

Verbal  thinking  or  thinking  in  words  is  wholly  different 
from  this  sort  of  ideation;  and  it  also  takes  place  under  cir- 
cumstances which  are  different  from  those  under  which  con- 
crete or  objective  ideation  occurs.  Indeed,  the  two  sorts  of 
intellectual  function  are,  in  a  certain  sense,  mutually  exclu- 
sive and  antagonistic  to  each  other,  as  we  shall  see.  We 
think  chiefly  in  concrete  or  objective  terms  when  we  give 
free  rein  to  our  imagination,  when  we  have  no  definite  prob- 
lem before  us  or  when  the  problem  is  of  a  purely  concrete 
sort,  when  we  go  back  over  our  remembrances  without  attempt- 
ing to  recall  any  particular  person  or  event.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  think  in  words  in  the  form  of  an  unspoken,  internal 
speech  when  we  deliberately  follow  a  definite  train  of  thought; 
when  we  reflect  upon  scientific  problems,  and  especially  when 
our  real  thinking  comes  into  operation  in  the  form  of  judg- 
ments; when  we  converse  or  argue  with  anyone;  when  we, 
in  any  way,  put  ourselves  in  the  position  of  a  speaker;  and 
particularly  when  we  reproduce,  in  words,  a  verbal  context 
which  we  have  learned.  But  it  seems  to  be  chiefly  the  con- 
trast between  concrete  imagination  and  abstract  thought 
which  constitutes  the  contrast  between  the  two  forms  of 

^  A  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  ideas  of 
memory  and  of  imagination  may  be  found  in  Meumann's  Intelligenz 
und  Wille,  Leipzig,  1908. 
U 


190  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ideation.  In  many  persons,  perhaps  in  all,  the  two  forms  of 
thinking  are  directly  opposed  to  each  other.  The  more  con- 
cretely my  imagination  works,  the  more  do  my  verbal  images 
retreat  to  the  background  of  consciousness;  the  more  intent 
I  am  upon  following  an  abstract  train  of  thought,  the  more 
do  I  think  in  terms  of  internal  speech.  The  two  sorts  of 
ideation  are  also  opposed  in  habituation  and  in  incHnation. 
For  days  and  weeks  at  a  time  my  internal  speech  predomi- 
nates; and  for  equally  long  periods,  concrete  imaginations 
or  persistent  remembrances  crowd  my  auditory-motor  imagery 
int©  the  background.  It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  fundamental 
differences  of  individual  endowment  should  have  their  founda- 
tion in  the  opposition  between  these  two  sorts  of  ideating. 
Artists  and  musicians  seldom  show  an  inclination  toward 
scientific  thinking;  and  leaders  in  science  are  usually  indif- 
ferent artists.'  From  the  introspective  analysis  of  numerous 
individuals  of  both  groups,  one  can  see  clearly  that  concrete 
ideation  is  dominant  in  the  artist,  while  verbal  thinking  is 
dominant  in  the  scientist. 

The  sort  of  activity  which  we  have  designated  briefly  as 
internal  speech  or  verbal  thinking  is,  in  all  probability,  every- 
where a  thinking  process  in  which  verbal  meanings  are  faint 
and  indistinct,  and  in  which,  under  certain  circumstances, 
they  may  even  be  absent  from  consciousness.  The  internally 
spoken  word  is  the  mental  representative  of  the  meaning  of 
the  word ;  it  is  a  substitute  for  a  more  accurate  envisagement 
of  verbal  meaning.  And  we  shall  see  that  the  manner  in 
which  words  are  imaged  and  employed  as  symbolic  repre- 
sentatives of  meanings  may  be  wholly  different  in  different 
individuals. 

In  both  sorts  of  ideation,  in  concrete-objective  and  in  verbal 
thinking,  wide  individual  variations  occur.  These  are  chiefly 
and  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  the  concrete  sensory  com- 


Associative  Learning  191 

ponents  of  which  words  and  ideas  are  made  up  differ  radically  ^ 
V  from  individual  to  individual.  /In  the  visualizer  the  parts  of  O 
^  concrete  or  verbal  images  consist  wholly  or  chiefly  of  memorial 
residues  of  visual  experiences;  in  the  auditory  individual,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  auditory  images  are  dominant;  and  in 
the  motor  individual,  vestiges  of  movement  sensations  or 
actual,  if  weak,  repetitions  of  former  movements  constitute 
■  the  essential  content  of  consciousness.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind,  however,  that  an  individual  who  possesses  chiefly  con- 
crete visual  imagery  does  not,  for  that  reason,  proceed  exclu- 
sively in  a  visual  fashion  in  his  verbal  thinking,  that  is,  he 
does  not  think  solely  in  terms  of  visual  images  of  written  or 
printed  words.  The  differences  between  the  ideational  types 
are,  remarkably  enough,  of  a  much  more  complex  sort;  for 
instance,  the  concrete  visual  type  of  ideation  may  co-exist  in 
any  indi\adual  with  verbal  ideation  of  another  sort, — with 
vocal-motor  or  with  verbal  auditory  imagery.  The  asymmet- 
rical development  of  individual  endowment  in  ideation  and  in 
retention,  which  we  are  accustomed  to  call  ideational  type, 
must  therefore  be  discussed  both  from  the  point  of  view  of 
concrete  ideating  and  of  verbal  thinking. 

Individual  differences  do  not  present  so  many  remarkable 
features  in  the  former  as  they  do  in  the  latter;  and  a  greater 
pedagogical  significance  also  attaches  to  individual  varia- 
tions of  verbal  thinking.  We  shall  therefore  devote  but  a 
very  brief  discussion  to  the  typical  differences  of  concrete- 
objective  ideation. 

First  of  all,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  manner  in  which  an 
individual  ideates  his  sensory  impressions  and  his  objects  of 
perception,  in  concrete  form,  is  in  every  instance  determined 
by  two  factors:  the  character  of  the  impression,  and  the 
ideational  ty^Q  of  the  individual.^  In  any  given  case,  there- 
fore, we  must  always  take  into  account  the  sort  of  impressions 


192  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

to  which  the  memory-image  owes  its  origin.  The  impressions 
which  are  to  be  retained  in  memory  may  have  originated 
from  several  or  from  only  one  sense-department;  and  the 
ideational  t^-pe  may  be  a  ''pure  "  one,  that  is,  it  may  be  exclu- 
sively auditory,  motor  or  visual.  Let  us  assume  that,  in  a 
particular  instance,  an  individual  is  called  upon  to  remember 
an  impression  received  through  but  a  single  sense-department^ 
— a  color,  let  us  say.  If  he  belongs  to  the  pure  visual  type, 
his  ideational  type  corresponds  to  the  sort  of  sensory  material 
with  which  he  is  to  deal;  and  he  will  ideate  it  by  the  corre- 
sponding or  "adequate"  means.  But  when  the  individual 
who  is  purely  auditory  is  called  upon  to  ideate  colors,  he  finds 
himself  unable  to  do  so  by  the  means  which  corresponds  to 
the  stimulus  in  question  because  he  possesses  no  visual  im- 
agery; he  must  therefore  have  recourse  to  a  non-adequate 
means  of  ideation.  He  may  employ  a  symbol  or  "surrogate" 
for  the  color  image;  and  he  may  have  recourse  either  to 
verbal  ideation,— the  verbal  image  of  the  name  of  the  color 
being  substituted  for  the  concrete  image  of  the  color  itself, — 
or  to  verbal  ideation  combined  with  an  act  of  judgment, — he 
may  remember  that  he  has  seen  something  which  is  called  red  or 
he  may  call  to  mind  the  circumstances  under  which  the  color 
was  seen  and  these  will  then  enable  him  to  recall  the  color. 

Representatives  of  all  of  the  pure  types  proceed  in  this 
latter  fashion  when  called  upon  to  ideate  sensory  material  of 
a  modahty  to  which  their  ideational  type  does  not  conform. 
Possessing  no  concrete  imagery  of  this  sort  of  sensory  material, 
they  substitute  an  appropriate  name  or  the  consciousness  that 
they  formerly  experienced  a  similar  impression. 

In  the  great  majority  of  our  every-day  experiences  we  are 
not  called  upon  to  learn  and  remember  material  from  but  a 
single  sense-department.  Most  objects  present  stimuli  which 
appeal  to  several  or  to  all  of  our  senses.    When  engaged  in 


Associative  Learning  193 

conversation  with  any  one,  I  have  a  visual  perception  of  his 
body  and  his  gestures,  I  hear  the  sound  of  his  voice,  I  may 
touch  his  clothing;  and  thus  I  perceive  him  through  the 
medium  of  three  of  my  senses.  In  all  such  cases,  the  repre- 
sentative of  a  pure  t}-pe  of  imagery  may  have  recourse  to 
those  images  which  correspond  to  his  own  type;  the  purely 
auditory  individual  would  remember  only  the  audible  speech, 
— clang- tint,  inflection,  tempo,  and  rhythm;  the  pure  visual- 
izer,  only  the  visual  picture  of  the  speaker  and  his  gestures. 
And  those  classes  of  impressions  which  correspond  to  the 
individual's  type  of  imagery  must  then  symbolize  all  of  the 
others;  and  they  must  constitute  for  each  individual  his  sole 
but  one-sided  remembrance  of  the  incident.  This  is  true  in 
the  case  of  Dodge,  for  instance,  who  is  wholly  lacking  in 
auditory  imagery.  Dodge's  visual  memory  of  the  appearance 
and  the  movements  of  his  fellow-men  serves  as  a  substitute 
for  a  remembrance  of  their  voices. 

Investigation  has  shown,  however,  that  the  great  majority 
of  people  belong  not  to  pure  but  to  mixed  or  balanced  idea- 
tional types.  '  In  these  cases,  we  have  a  compromise  between 
ideational  type  and  sense-modahty.'  When  they  endeavor 
to  remember  impressions  of  a  single  sense-department  which 
is  not  identical  with  their  ideational  type, — for  example, 
when  an  auditory  individual  whose  visual  imagery  is  weak 
is  called  upon  to  remember  colors, — we  observe  a  phenom- 
enon which  is  wholly  different  from  that  which  we  observed 
in  the  case  of  the  pure  types.  The  "mixed  type"  is  made  up 
of  individuals  in  whom  images  of  some  particular  sense- 
department  or  sense-departments  predominate;  they  work 
most  readily  with  this  sort  of  material,  and  these  images  are 
found  to  be  more  distinct  and  complete  than  any  of  their 
other  sorts  of  imagery.  But  they  can  also  make  use  of  the 
less  distinct  and  less  readily  reproducible  sorts  of  imagery. 


194  ^^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

The  representative  of  the  mixed  type  relies  chiefly  upon 
those  images  which  predominate  in  his  ideation ;  and  he  makes 
use  of  the  other  sorts  only  in  secondary  fashion.  Thus,  when 
the  stimuli  themselves  are  of  mixed  sorts,  he  selects  the 
sensory  elements  which  correspond  with  the  dominating 
elements  in  his  own  imagery.  The  representative  of  the  mixed 
type,  who,  for  instance,  possesses  distinct  visual  imagery  but 
indistinct  auditory  imagery,  remembers  his  fellow-men  chiefly 
in  terms  of  visual  images;  the  auditory  image  of  the  voice 
ordinarily  cooperates  to  some  extent,  but  only  in  an  indefinite 
and  uncertain  manner.  The  procedure  is  different,  however, 
when  the  stimulus  belongs  to  a  sense-department  which  is 
not  dominant  in  the  individual's  ideation,  and  also  when  he 
is  called  upon  to  remember  those  parts  of  a  composite  stim- 
ulus which  do  not  dominate  in  his  imagery.  For  instance, 
when  an  individual  of  the  auditory  type,  who  possesses  weak 
visual  but  strong  auditory  imagery,  remembers  colors  or 
forms,  his  remembrance  contains  visual  elements  but  they 
come  to  consciousness  indistinctly]and  indefinitely.  When  he 
has  to  recall  and  describe  the  visual  image  of  another  person 
his  ideation  adapts  itself  to  tliis  task  also;  the  visual  elements 
of  his  imagery  are  now  accentuated  by  his  attention,  and  in 
consequence  they  are  temporarily  raised  to  predominance 
but  still  they  remain  relatively  indefinite  and  indistinct. 
Then  the  attention  accentuates  these  more  indefinite  elements 
of  his  imagery,  and  drives  the  more  definite  material  tempo- 
rarily into  the  background. 

From  this  we  see  that  in  concrete  ideation  the  individual 
who  possesses  a  mixed  or  balanced  imagery  works,  as  a  rule, 
with  those  elements  which  are  normally  dominant  in  his 
ideation*  It  is  just  that  which  constitutes  the  type.  But 
because  the  possessor  of  mixed  imagery  has  vague  images 
from    several    sense-departments,    these    come    forward    as 


Associative  Learning  195 

the  dominant  elements  when  they  correspond  with  the  stimulus 
of  the  moment  or  with  the  problem  which  has  been  under- 
taken by  the  indi\ddual.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that^the  possessor  of  mixed  imagery  adopts  different  proce- 
dures for  immediate  and  for  permanent  retention. 

In  immediate  retention  he  is  confronted  by  the  definite 
task  of  remembering  a  particular  sort  of  sensory  material. 
Let  us  take  the  case  of  an  individual  who  has  read  a  list  of 
words,  or  to  whom  such  a  list  has  been  dictated,  with  a  view 
to  having  them  reproduced  immediately  in  vocal  form.  The 
mixed  type  is  always  able  to  adapt  itself  to  this  task.  Even 
the  visual  individual  operates  chiefly  with  his  weak  auditory 
images  when  he  attempts  an  immediate  recall  of  words  which 
he  has  heard ;  at  least,  I  have  always  found  this  to  be  true  of 
my  observers  whose  auditory  images  were  not  exceedingly 
weak.  Here,  however,  we  must  always  assume  the  presence 
of  an  intensive  immediate  after-effect  of  the  original  stimu- 
lation which  facilitates  this  adaptation  to  the  task  in  hand. 
In  recalling  auditory  words  immediately  after  hearing  them, 
the  visuaHzer  may  employ  auditory  images  chiefly,  but  may 
make  a  secondary  use  of  the  visual  imagery  into  which  he 
has  transformed  the  auditory  material;  but  in  recalling  a 
conversation  with  a  friend  after  a  long  interval, — that  is,  in 
a  case  of  genuine  ideation, — he  has  recourse  chiefly  to  visual 
images  of  expressions  employed  by  his  friend  during  the  con- 
versation. The  individual  who  belongs  to  a  pure  type,  on 
the  other  hand,  endeavors  in  immediate  retention  to  transform 
into  his  own  favored  imagery  the  sensory  impressions  which 
he  receives. 

It  is  essential  that  we  bear  in  mind  that  most  impressions 
from  the  external  world  come  to  us  through  the  visual  sense; 
and  experiments  have  shown  that  most  persons  belong  to  the 
mixed  t}^e  in  so  far  as  their  concrete  imagery  is  concerned. 


196  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

It  is  not  difficult  then  to  understand  why  visual  elements  should 
dominate  the  concrete  imagery  of  the  majority  of  persons  who 
possess  a  full  complement  of  sense-organs.  ^  Most  persons 
recall  their  past  experience  in  terms  chiefly  of  residua  of  former 
visual  impressions.  Sensations  of  pressure,  temperature, 
taste,  and  smell,  and  even  auditory  sensations  are  relatively 
secondary  throughout.  The  majority  of  mankind,  then, 
belong  to  the  visual  type  in  so  far  as  their  non-verbal  ideation 
is  concerned.  This  shows  us,  too,  why  the  type  usually  fails 
to  be  identical  in  concrete  and  in  verbal  thinking.  Most 
people  who  possess  a  full  complement  of  sense-organs  are 
found  to  be  auditory-motor  in  their  verbal  ideation;  in  the 
majority  of  individuals,  then,  we  find  a  combination  of  visual 
concrete  ideation  and  of  auditory-motor  verbal  ideation. 
Verbal  ideation  employs  both  auditory  and  auditory-motor 
imagery;  hence  the  representative  of  the  mixed  type  finds 
himself  well  equipped  for  verbal  ideation.  Within  these 
various  types  of  ideation  and  retention  we  find  that  individual 
endowment  may  vary  between  wide  limits.  Thus  it  is  found, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  ratio  of  the  dominant  to  the  second- 
ary sorts  of  imagery  in  a  consciousness  of  the  mixed  t^'pe  may 
vary  between  an  upper  limit  which  represents  an  almost 
complete  absence  of  secondary  sorts  of  imagery  and  a  lower 
Hmit  which  represents  little  more  than  an  equal  distribution 
of  dominant  and  secondary  sorts  of  imagery;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  we  find  equally  wide  variations  in  the  permanence  and 
fidelity  with  which  imagery  is  retained  in  memory.  Numer- 
ous individual  variations  may  therefore  be  observed  within 
the  chief  ideational  types;  and  we  find  individual  variations 
and  sub-classes  of  each  of  the  sub-types,  as  has  recently  been 
shown  by  G.  E.  Miiller.  ^    The  extreme  case  of  visual  endow- 

^  G.  E.  Miiller,  Ged'dchtnistatigkeit  und  Vorstellungsverlauf,  Leipzig, 
1911. 


Associative  Learning  197 

ment  is  frequently  observed  in  individuals  who  have  devoted 
themselves  to  the  plastic  and  the  graphic  arts.  Dr.  Wigan  tells 
of  a  painter  who  habitually  dismissed  his  model  after  half  an 
hour's  sitting,  and  then  painted,  from  memory,  as  though  the 
model  were  still  before  his  eyes.  He  recalled  to  consciousness 
a  picture  of  the  model  sitting  upon  the  chair,  varied  the  pos- 
ture, the  expression  and  the  coloring  at  will,  and  had  the 
visual  image  as  clearly  before  him  as  though  the  model  were 
present.  Similar  incidents  are  reported  of  Peter  von  Laar 
and  Henri  Regnault.  Anselm  Feurbach  relates  in  his  "Tes- 
tament" that  before  painting  certain  of  his  pictures  he  planned 
and  executed  them  mentally  "to  the  last  brush  stroke."  ^  The 
visual  memory  may,  again,  be  chiefly  and  one-sidedly  a  form 
memory  or  a  color  memory;  nor  does  it  always  exist  in  com- 
bination with  a  highly  developed  visual  perception.  In  con- 
trast with  those  individuals  who  possess  a  superior  endow- 
ment of  visual  imagery,  we  find  others  in  our  psychological 
laboratories  who  have  had  a  thorough  and  well-rounded  mental 
training  and  yet  are  scarcely  able  to  recall  a  single  color  or 
visual  form  accurately. 

We  can  do  no  more  than  offer  conjectures  as  to  the  origin 
of  these  cases  of  asymmetrical  individual  endowment,  and  of 
gradual  variability  in  the  dominance  of  a  particular  sort  of 
imagery.  Binet^  believes  that  the  development  of  "special 
memories"  is  due  essentially  to  the  prevailing  direction  of 
the  individual's  interests  and  training;  but  this  does  not 
accord  with  the  familiar  experience  that  one's  interests  are 

^  Interesting  statements  by  artists  concerning  these  phenomena  are 
compiled  in  H.  Popp's  Malcraesthetik,  Strassburg,  1902,  32o£f.  See 
also  Ballet,  Die  innerliche  Sprache  (trans.),  46ff. 

^  A.  Binet,  Psychologic  des  grands  calculateurs,  Paris,  1894.  This 
work  will  frequently  be  referred  to,  in  what  follows,  by  a  simple  men- 
tion of  the  author's  name. 


198  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

frequently  found  to  lie  in  a  field  for  which  one  has  no  special 
talent,  nor  with  the  fact  that  professional  psychologists  have 
frequently  striven  in  vain  to  overcome  a  one-sidedness  in 
their  ideational  type.  Connate  endowment  is  an  essential 
factor  here;  but  how  are  we  to  conceive  of  connate  endow- 
ment? Of  course,  it  is  easy  to  say  that  in  the  case  of  the 
visually  endowed  indi\adual,  certain  regions,  probably  in  the 
occipital  lobe,  come  into  question;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact 
Moebius  has  shown  that  mathematical  endowment  is  always 
attended  by  a  marked  development  of  the  temporal  region, 
from  which  he  is  led  to  locate  the  mathematical  center  in 
the  inferior  convolutions  of  the  anterior  region  of  the  frontal 
lobes.  But  a  mere  translation  of  psychological  facts  in- 
to physiological  and  anatomical  terms  contributes  nothing 
to  the  psychological  explanation  of  the  asymmetries  of 
memory. 

It  is  more  important  that  we  should  know  whether  idea- 
tional types  are  due  to  congenital  bent  and  disposition  {An- 
lage),  or  whether  they  are  acquired  by  habituation  and  train- 
ing. This  question  can  be  answered  with  some  degree  of 
certainty  from  the  facts  in  our  possession.  It  is  probable 
that  a  certain  degree  of  congenital  mental  defect  constitutes 
the  basis  of  every  pure  type.  For  this  reason,  I  always  regard 
purity  of  type  as  a  defect  in  ideation.  The  predominance  of 
one,  or  of  several  sorts  of  imagery  in  the  mixed  type,  however, 
frequently  appears  to  depend,  in  part,  upon  the  combined 
influence  of  endowment  and  education;  in  part,  upon  the 
sheer  influences  of  training  and  habituation.  Otherwise  we 
could  not  explain  how,  in  the  training  of  memory  by  means 
of  material  where  a  particular  sort  of  imagery  preponderates,  ^ 
the  ideational  type  adapts  itself  in  so  short  a  time  (often 
within  a  few  v/eeks)  to  this  sort  of  learning.  It  is  undoubtedly 
possible  also  that  there  may  be  such  a  thing  as  an  ideational 


Associative  Learning  199 

disposition  which  is  equally  well-adapted  for  all  sorts  of  sen- 
sory elements.  This  general,  all-round  endowment  must  suf- 
fer modification  in  consequence  of  one-sided  practice  with 
particular  sorts  of  sensory  material;  and  a  habituation  type 
would  then  come  into  existence.  — 

There  are  in  general  four  possibilities  as  to  the  mode  of 
origin  of  the  various  types  of  endowment:  i.  They  may  be 
due  to  congenital  bent  or  disposition,  which  would  then  be 
conceived  to  be  the  sole  determining  factor, — the  dispositions 
themselves  being  conceived  to  be  qualitatively  fixed  and 
unalterable.  Education  and  training  would  not  transform 
them,  but  only  develop  what  is  latent  and  pre-determined  in 
the  disposition.  In  the  case  of  the  ideational  type  we  must 
then  conceive  the  disposition  to  be  a  peculiar  individual  sus- 
ceptibility to  particular  sorts  of  sensory  impressions, — an 
individual  facihty  for  acquisition  and  an  individual  aptitude 
for  preservation, — -corresponding  to  the  memory  disposition. 
2.  The  types  may,  indeed,  appear  to  be  predisposed  by  one's 
congenital  bent;  the  bent,  however,  is  capable  of  being  trans- 
formed, but  education  and  training  are  less  effective  than  the 
disposition  itself,  j.  The  ideational  type  may  be  due  to 
disposition  and  education,  it  is  true,  but  the  forces  of  edu- 
cation have  a  greater  influence  than  the  disposition  itself. 
4.  The  disposition  may  be  of  no  significance ;  and  education, 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term,  is  the  sole  determining 
factor. 

I  regard  the  second  possibility  as  the  most  probable,  because 
in  ideational  types  we  frequently  see  the  influence  of  the 
disposition  asserting  itself  with  extraordinary  potency;  and 
yet  we  find  a  certain  influence  exerted  by  educative  forces. 
The  significance  of  the  disposition  is  indicated:  a.  By  the 
evident  influence  of  heredity  upon  ideational  type.  Not  infre- 
quently do  we  find  that  a  particular  type  of  ideation  recurs  in 


200  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

several  successive  generations  of  the  same  family,  a  fact 
which  can  be  explained  only  from  heredity.  Dodge  reports 
that  his  type  is  a  family  inheritance.  Lay  found  three  pairs 
of  brothers  who  belonged  to  the  auditory  type;  the  Viennese 
philologist  Nussbaumer  and  his  brother  possessed  "colored 
hearing"  (Pfeiffer).  The  predominance  of ,  particular  sense- 
memories  in  families  of  artists  and  musicians  is  well-known. 
Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  this  is  furnished  by  the  family 
of  Johann  Sebastian  Bach,  in  which  musical  memory  was 
present  in  conspicuous  degree  through  several  generations. 
h.  The  typical  differences  between  the  two  sexes  likewise 
point  to  a  congenital  disposition.  We  have  already  men- 
tioned that  women  are  usually  more  visual  than  men.  Ker- 
chensteiner  found  that  the  color-sense  of  girls  is  better  than 
that  of  boys,  and  that  the  former  are  more  talented  in  decora- 
tion while  the  latter  excel  in  the  arts  which  have  to  do  chiefly 
with  spatial  relations. 

In  addition  to  this  we  find,  as  has  already  been  stated,  that 
a  certain  variability  of  type  occurs.  We  shall  refer  to  this 
later  when  we  deal  with  the  question  of  the  possibility  of 
training  the  types.  More  striking,  however,  than  the  varia- 
tion of  t3^e  is  their  relative  stabiHty.  Pfeiffer  on  testing  the 
ideational  types  of  children  of  the  same  school-classes  for 
three  successive  years  found  a  very  marked  permanence  and 
constancy  of  type.  Their  variations  from  year  to  year  are  so 
slight  that  their  fixity  appears  to  be  the  more  important  phe- 
nomenon. From  the  tenth  to  the  eleventh  years,  the  "vis- 
uals" were  found  by  Pfeiffer  to  decrease  by  8.7  per  cent.;  the 
"auditories"  remained  approximately  constant;  the  "motors" 
increased43y  8.7  per  cent.  In  the  following  year  the  "visuals," 
among  the  same  children,  increased  by  2.4  per  cent.;  the 
"auditories"  decreased  by  1.5  per  cent.;  and  the  "motors" 
decreased  by  .9  per  cent. 


Associative  Learning  201 

Before  we  can  understand  the  nature  of  these  differences 
of  ideation  we  must  answer  another  question:  Are  the  differ- 
ences traceable  more  to  an  original  primary  strength  of  sense- 
memory,  or  to  a  congenital  primary  direction  of  attention 
toward  certain  sensory  contents? 

This  problem  cannot,  of  course,  be  solved  by  merely  point- 
ing out  the  "circular"  course  or  reciprocal  relationship  of 
these  processes, — by  showing  that  intensive  sensory  impres- 
sion arouses  greater  interest  and  this,  in  turn,  reacts  upon 
sense-impressions  and  intensifies  them.     The  whole  of  psy- 
chology is  permeated  by  this  view,  namely,  that  sense-impres- 
sion, sense-memory  and  direction  of  attention  are  capable  of 
reinforcing  and  intensifying  one  another.    But  this  does  not 
solve  the  problem  as  to  which  is  primary.    I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  a  typical  direction  of  the  attention  upon  particular 
classes  of  sensory  impressions  must  be  favorable  to  the  per- 
ception and  retention  of  these  impressions ;  ^  and  I  also  believe 
that  the  supra-normal  domination  of  any  modahty  of  sense- 
memory  may  also  result  in  a  favoring  of  that  modality  by 
attention,  and  the  more  so  the  more  one-sided  the  sense- 
memory  is.     But  in  our  mental  endowment,  dominant  atten- 
tion and  dominant  sense-memory  may  be  predisposed  inde- 
pendently of  each  other.    I  beheve,  moreover,  that  individual 
differences  in  the  sensory  content  of  imagery  are  due  primarily 
to  the  retention  and  reproduction  of  this  content  itself,  and 
that  they  are  reinforced  in  only  a  secondary  fashion  by  an 
individual  direction  of  attention.    Strictly  speaking,  therefore, 
ideational  types  must  be  called  association  types,  because: 
a.   Our  dominant  interest  in  certain  sensory  material  does  not 
always  coincide  with  our  dominant  sense-memory.    Indeed, 
it  not  infrequently  happens  that  one  is  deeply  interested  in  a 
sense-department  for  which  one's  memory  is  not  especially 
'  Cf.  our  discussion  of  Observational  Noting,  pp.  63ff. 


202  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

well  developed,  h.  The  investigation  of  observational  noting 
and  more  particularly  the  investigation  of  testimony  show 
that  the  prevaihng  direction  of  attention  is  determined  not 
by  sensory  contents  but  by  wholly  different  and  more  general 
causes,  namely,  by  our  practical  interests  of  life,  and  by  our 
theoretical  interest  in  knowing  and  understanding  the  exter- 
nal world.  It  is  possible,  then,  that  the  dominant  sense- 
memory  and  the  dominant  direction  of  attention  may  be 
discrete  and  unrelated  in  our  mental  constitution.  The  two 
may  go  hand-in-hand,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  go  hand- 
in-hand.  If  they  do  follow  parallel  paths  they  will  reinforce 
each  other;  and  even  if  their  paths  are  not  parallel  this  recip- 
rocal or  ''circular"  reinforcement  may  still  take  place.  But 
it  may  also  happen  that  the  prevailing  direction  of  attention 
is  of  advantage  to  the  sense-memory  toward  which  one  is 
least  strongly  disposed,  c.  No  matter  to  what  ideational 
type  an  individual  may  belong  his  attention  is  directed  to 
all  sorts  of  sense-impressions  in  his  acts  of  perception.  If 
notwithstanding  this  fact  the  extreme  representative  of  any 
ideational  type  is  unable  to  reproduce  certain  sorts  of  sensory- 
impressions,  it  is  clear  that  attention  is  only  a  secondary 
factor  in  determining  the  ideational  type.  Even  when  atten- 
tion is  attracted  as  intensively  as  possible  to  auditory  impres- 
sions, individuals  like  Dodge  are  still  unable  to  evoke  auditory 
imagery.  Such  designations  as  "sensory  types,"  "intuition 
types"  are  therefore  misleading.  These  t>9ical  differences 
are  not  due  to  differences  in  the  functioning  of  the  senses. 

It  should  also  be  pointed  out  here  that  all  of  the  traditional 
terms  which  have  been  employed  to  designate  these  ideational 
types  are  far  from  being  accurate.  Each  t>^e  should  be  desig- 
nated not  only  in  terms  of  the  sort  of  imagery  which  it  pos- 
sesses, but  also  in  terms  of  those  sorts  of  imagery  which  it 
lacks.    This  plan  would  provide  us  with  much  more  definite 


Associative  Learning  203 

names.  We  describe  color-blinds  in  terms  of  the  colors  which 
they  do  not  see;  for  instance,  we  speak  of  the  red-green  blind, 
and  in  so  doing  we  designate  him  positively  as  being  capable 
of  seeing  yellow  and  blue.  Similarly,  a  representative  of  the 
pure  auditory  ideational  type  is  a  non-visual-motor.  A  more 
accurate  characterization  is  especially  needed  in  the  case  of 
the  mixed  or  balanced  types.  Here  it  is  solely  a  question  of 
determining  and  designating  unequivocally  whether  a  sort  of 
sensory  element  is  lacking,  or  whether  it  is  present  in  weak 
and  indefinite  form.  Since  most  persons  belong  to  the  mixed 
types,  we  usually  designate  these  types  in  terms  of  their 
dominating  sensory  elements.  Hence,  if  we  ordinarily  em- 
ploy a  somewhat  inaccurate  terminology  and  call  a  man  of 
the  mixed  type  a  "visual,"  that  term  is  usually  employed  to 
signify  only  that  visual  imagery  predominates  in  his  con- 
sciousness. He  may  also  be  ec^uipped  with  the  other  sorts 
of  imagery,  but  may  employ  these  only  in  a  secondary  fashion 
and  with  greater  indefiniteness.  This  has  come  to  be  the 
usual  meaning  of  ''auditory,"  "visual,"  etc.,  because  the 
mixed  types  occur  so  frequently.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
general  psychology,  it  is  a  somewhat  arbitrary  delimitation 
to  designate  all  of  these  types  of  imagery  solely  in  terms  of 
diversity  of  material  content.  We  can  distinguish  them 
quite  as  well  from  the  formal  point  of  view  of  individual 
peculiarity  of  image-process,  or  of  prevailing  form  of  repro- 
duction. I  have  elsewhere '  briefly  attempted  to  broaden  the 
concept  of  ideational  type;  more  detailed  discussion  of  the 
matter  here  would  carry  us  too  far  afield. 

In  an  investigation  of  ideational  types  by  means  of  the 

method  of  reproduction  I  found  that  the  peculiar  type  to 

which  certain  individuals  belong  is  determined  by  the  fact 

that  although  they  can  readily  ideate  imagery  of  certain' 

'E.  Meumann,  IntcUigcnz  und  Willc,  Leipzig,  1908,  128. 


204  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

sense-departments,  each  by  itself,  they  are  unable  to  make 
use  of  these  different  sorts  of  imagery  in  combination  with 
one  another  in  their  ideation  and  learning.  For  instance,  it 
was  found  that  one  individual  possessed  definite  visual  images 
of  objects  and  auditory  images  of  words;  but  it  was  difficult 
for  him  to  employ  them  both  at  the  same  time  in  an  act  of 
learning.  He  relied  either  upon  the  retention  of  visual  con- 
crete imagery  or  of  auditory  verbal  imagery;  that  is,  he 
remembered  the  appearance  of  an  object  or  he  remembered 
the  sound  of  its  name,  but  never  both  together.  Another 
case  was  found  where  an  observer  possessed  a  good  auditory 
memory  of  melodies,  clangs,  timbres  of  voices  and  noises; 
he  also  had  a  good  memory  of  forms  and  a  fairly  good  mem- 
ory of  colors.  But  it  was  difficult  for  him  to  combine  these 
concrete  visual  and  auditory  images.  It  is  probable  then, 
that  we  can  distinguish  combination  types  of  ideation;  and 
here  the  non-combinability  of  certain  images  is  the  best  term 
for  the  designation  of  these  types.  Many  defects  of  endow- 
ment of  the  third  order  are  probably  due  to  these  phenom- 
ena, ^  because  defects  in  complex  functions,  such  as  are  con- 
cerned in  the  work  of  the  school-room,  must  owe  their  origin 
to  defects  of  combination.  For  instance,  defective  capacity 
to  learn  geography  may  be  due  either  to  sub-normal  ability 
to  deal  with  concrete  visual  imagery  (maps  and  the  like); 
or  when  normal  visual  imagery  and  normal  memory  of  names 
is  present,  it  may  be  due  to  an  inability  to  combine  concrete 
visual  images  with  the  auditory-motor  images  of  words. 
In  another  volume^  I  have  sought  to  make  a  complete 

'  Defects  of  endowment  may  be  of  three  orders:  first  order,  defects 
in  the  elementary  mental  processes;  second  order,  defects  of  complex 
mental  capacity;    third  order,  defects  of  complex  functions. 

^  E.  Meumann,  Vorlesungen  zur  Einfuhrung  in  die  experimentelle 
Padagogik,  Leipzig,  1907,  I.,  449. 


Associative  Leaniifig  205 

schematic  classification  of  the  ideational  types  from  the  point 
of  view  of  their  content.  The  schema  which  is  appended  here 
needs  no  additional  comment: 

1.  Types  of  Concrete  Ideation 

A.  Pure  Types: 

a.  Visual. 

b.  Auditory 

c.  Tactual-Motor — the  latter  perhaps  differing  according 

as  they  have  to  do  with  a  motor  ideation  of  move- 
ments or  of  forms.  Individuals  of  this  t^'pe  ideate 
in  terms  of  imitative,  empathetic  ^  or  copying  move- 
ments, with  or  without  an  actual  innervation  of 
the  muscles. 

In  addition  to  these  three,  there  are  perhaps 
types  which  make  use  of  elements  from  the  gusta- 
tory and  olfactory  senses,  and  of  organic  sensa- 
tions. 

d.  Gustatory 

e.  Olfactory 

f.  Emotional 

B.  Mixed  Types:     Instances  of  these  types  have  not  been 

proven,  beyond  a  doubt,  to  exist. 

2.  Types  of  Verbal  Ideation 
A.  Pure  Types: 

a.  Visual — perhaps  two  forms:    ideating  in  images  of 

^  Empathy  {Einfuhlung)  is  a  term  which  has  come  to  be  employed 
in  psychology  and  esthetics  to  designate  the  general  tendency  to 
project  oneself  into  situations  in  which  one  is  interested,  and  to  experi- 
ence such  sensations  as  would  result  from  one's  active  participation 
in  such  situations.  For  instance,  when  we  observe  or  even  imagine  a 
feat  of  strength,  our  bodies  become  set  and  our  muscles  become  tense; 
when  we  see  a  slender  column  which  supports  a  heavy  capitol,  we 
experience  an  empathetic  feeling  of  the  heavy  stress  which  is  borne  by 
the  column. 
15 


2o6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

written  or  printed  words;    and,  possibly,  ideating 
in  visual  images  of  writing-movements. 

h.  Auditory 

c.  Tactual-Motor — ideating   in   images   of   vocal  move- 
ments;  ideating  in  (kina^sthetic)  images  of  writing 
movements,  with  or  without  innervations  of  move- 
ments. 
B.   Mixed  Types:  not  yet  clearly  shown  to  exist. 

J.   Combinations   of  Concrete   and    Verbal   Ideational    Types 

A.  Visual  concrete  ideation  combined  with  auditory-motor  ver- 

bal ideation:    This  is  probably  the  most  common  type. 

B.  There  may  be  other  combinations  of  i  and  2  of  the  above 

schema:  but  they  are  rare, — indeed  the  existence  of 
such  cases  has  not  yet  been  demonstrated  beyond  a 
doubt. 

4.   Negative  Combination  Types  in  Concrete  and 
Verbal  Ideation 

A.  Auditory  Verbal  and  Visual  Concrete,  both  well  developed, 

but  the  two  incapable  of  being  combined. 

B.  Auditory  Concrete  and  Visual  Concrete,  both  well  developed, 

but  the  two  incapable  of  being  combined. 

Let  me  again  mention  that  in  the  concrete  auditory,  tac- 
tual, olfactory  and  gustatory  memories  a  similar  one-sidedness 
of  development  and  similar  differences  of  native  endowment 
seem  to  occur.  The  endowment  of  the  unmusical  individual, 
who  can  not  remember  a  tune  and  who  sings  only  a  few  notes 
correctly,  ^  and  the  endowment  of  a  Mozart,  who  reproduced 
the  Miserere  from  memory  after  hearing  it  but  twice,  vary 
between  quite  as  wide  limits  as  the  extreme  cases  of  visual 
endowment  which  we  have  described. 

Of  more  importance  to  pedagogy,  however,  are  the  typical 
^  Such  cases  have  been  cited  by  Stumpf  and  by  Dodge. 


Associative  Learning  207 

differences  which  are  found  to  occur  in  verbal  thinking;   and 
these   have   been   more   fully   investigated   by   psychology. 
Following  the  example  of  Charcot,  writers  have  usually  sub- 
divided them  into  three,  or  really  four,  types.    The  auditory 
individual  thinks  in  heard  words;  the  visual,  in  visual  images 
of  printed  or  written  words;   the  motor,  in  images  of  writing 
movements  or  in  images  of  former  vocal  movements  which 
themselves  are  frequently  accompanied  by  sHght  but  actual 
movements  of  the  lips  or  tongue.    Observations  bearing  upon 
this  topic  have  been  made  by  psychologists  these  many 
years.      Leibnitz    called    thinking    a    silent    speaking;     and 
Hartley  distinguished  the  other  types  in  a  work  which  ap- 
peared in  1749.     More  detailed  investigations  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  various  types  were  first  made  by  Charcot,  the 
director  of  the  Salpetriere  in  Paris,  and  his  pupils, — partic- 
ularly Ballet;  later  contributions  were  made  by  Gal  ton,  Taine, 
Ribot,  Binet,  Egger,  numerous  German  psychiatrists,  physi- 
cians and  psychologists  among  whom  were  Kussmaul,Wernicke, 
Storring,  Ziehen,  Pfeiffer,  Segal,  Kraepehn  and  his  students. ' 
To  Charcot  must  be  given  the  credit  of  having  first  pointed 
out  the  fact  that  the  verbal  images  in  which  most  people 
think  are  not  simple  mental  processes  but  that  they  are  com- 
posed of  at  least  four, — more  correctly,  five — different  ele- 
ments:   auditory  images,  visual  images,  motor  images  of 
movements  of  vocalization  or  of  writing,  and  ideas  of  meaning. 
Besides  the  three  "pure"  types  which  are  characterized  by 
an  exclusive  dominance  of  some  particular  sort  of  imagery  in 
the  subjectively  spoken  words,  Charcot  also  recognized  the 
"indifferent,  or  mixed"  type.    We  must  assume  that  in  the 
ideation  of  words  all  of  these  t>-pes  may  occur;  and  individual 
cases  of  approximately  pure  types  of  verbal  imagery  of  both 
the  auditory  and  the  visual  sorts  have  been  shown  to  exist. 
'  See  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


2o8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

We  must  also  assume  that  all  varieties  of  the  mixed  types  of 
verbal  ideation  are  possible.  The  existence  of  auditory- 
motor,  of  auditory-motor-visual,  and  of  visual-motor  types 
has  been  demonstrated  (NetschajefT).  In  most  persons,  how- 
ever, the  auditory-motor  ideation  of  words  predominates; 
and,  as  already  remarked,  this  is  probably  an  adaptation  of 
the  ideational  type  to  the  sort  of  impressions  which  most 
frequently  occur  in  the  noting  of  words  which  are  heard  in 
the  speech  of  ourselves  and  others. 

An  analysis  of  these  differences  is  extremely  instructive  for 
psychology  and  pedagogy.  Let  us  begin  with  the  pure  audi- 
tory type.  Individuals  who  ideate  solely  in  terms  of  audi- 
tory images  are  very  rare.  The  average  normal  person  can 
easily  observe  his  ideational  type;  and  among  numerous 
persons  whom  I  have  requested  to  make  such  observations, 
I  have  found  not  one  who  employs  heard  words  exclusively 
in  his  processes  of  thinking.  Yet  it  is  true  that  many  indi- 
viduals approximate  this  type,  in  that  mentally  heard  words 
predominate  in  their  thinking  and  are  accompanied  by  but 
faint  motor  images.  In  the  majority  of  persons  there  is,  in 
all  probability,  an  alternation  of  the  sensory  elements  which 
constitute  their  internal  words.  In  calm  reflection  and  in 
reading,  the  heard  and  the  mentally  spoken  word  predominate, 
the  appearance  of  the  printed  word  arousing  the  reproduc- 
tion of  the  mentally  spoken  word.  The  same  state  of  affairs 
is  found  in  writing;  here,  too,  the  image  of  internally  spoken 
and  externally  seen  words  play  a  part.  But  when  one  writes, 
the  internal  words  rush  along  in  advance  of  the  act  of  writing, 
dictating,  so  to  speak,  what  the  hand  shall  write.  Further- 
more, in  calm  emphatic  speaking,  the  internal  word  hastening 
on  in  advance  plays  the  part  of  a  prompter,  as  Ballet  remarks, 
telling  us  in  a  soft  and  oftentimes  imperfect  whisper  what  we 
are  to  say. 


Associative  Learni7ig  209 

What  determines  the  auditory  type?  We  are  not  to  sup- 
pose that  it  is  always  accompanied  by  musical  endowment. 
As  has  already  been  stated,  we  may  find  any  particular 
ideational  type  existing  in  combination  with  an  endowment 
.of  any  other  sort  of  imagery.  This  is  shown  by  such  facts 
as  the  following.  We  know,  on  the  one  hand,  that  idiots  and 
microcephalous  children,  who  belong  to  the  lowest  level  of 
intelligence,  who  can  never  learn  to  speak  a  word,  and  who 
do  not  understand  the  ordinary  conversation  of  persons  about 
them,  certainly  do  not  possess  any  internal  speech;  and  yet 
they  sometimes  have  a  keen  musical  apprehension  and  an 
excellent  memory  for  tones.  I  have  myself  observed  an  idiot 
who  led  little  more  than  an  animal  existence  and  who  never 
spoke  a  word;  yet  I  was  astonished  to  find  that  he  listened 
attentively  to  the  pla}dng  of  a  music-box  and  accompanied 
the  melody  with  rhythmic  movements.  When  the  pla}dng 
ceased,  he  hummed  the  melody  to  himself  with  a  fair  degree 
of  accuracy.  Nor  is  there,  in  the  development  of  the  normal 
child,  any  coincidence  between  the  development  of  the  tonal 
sense  and  the  acquisition  of  language.  Tracy  estabHshed 
the  fact  that  in  many  children  the  tonal  sense  begins  to  develop 
at  the  age  of  six  months;  one  of  Stumpf's  children  knew  the 
tonal  scale  at  the  age  of  fourteen  months;  a  son  of  the  com- 
poser Dvorak  sang  a  military  march  at  the  age  of  one  year, 
and  six  months  later  could  sing  all  of  his  father's  melodies 
when  the  latter  played  the  accompaniments  on  the  piano. 
We  find  a  corresponding  state  of  affairs  in  adults.  Ballet 
mentions  the  case  of  a  musician  who  possessed  a  remarkably 
good  memory  for  tones  but  who  ideated  words  more  readily 
in  visual  than  in  auditory  form.  On  the  other  hand,  many 
persons  who  have  a  distinctly  auditory  ideation  of  words 
possess  no  special  gift  for  music.  But,  of  course,  a  serious 
defect  of  the  tonal  sense  usually  gives  rise  to  a  non-auditory 


2IO  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ideation  of  words.  These  characteristic  combinations  of  idea- 
tional types,  in  verbal  thinking  and  in  non-verbal  thinking, 
indicate  that  our  ideation  of  words  is  of  two  wholly  different 
sorts,  in  so  far  as  its  relation  to  audition  is  concerned.  The 
auditory  ideation  of  words  is  either  a  product  chiefly  of  mere 
habituation, — in  which  case  it  can  be  overcome  by  training, — 
or  it  is  due  to  a  congenital  lack  in  capacity  to  recall  non- 
auditory  images, — in  which  case  a  modification  of  ideational 
type  is  possible  only  to  a  limited  degree. 

In  an  attempt  to  reach  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  audi- 
tory ideation  of  words  the  question  has  been  raised:  How 
does  the  auditory  individual  hear  his  internal  words?  Cer- 
tain investigators,  Egger  in  particular,  have  asserted  that  we 
normally  hear  the  inflection  and  the  rhythm  of  our  own  voices 
and  that,  if  this  is  lacking,  genuine  internal  speech  is  impos- 
sible. This  statement  Ballet  very  properly  disputes.  We 
really  hear  our  own  voices  only  when  we  reflect,  or  when  in 
thought  we  place  ourselves  in  situations  where  we  seem  to 
speak.  In  addition  to  this,  however,  all  of  our  remembrances 
of  other  voices  which  we  have  heard  also  come  to  conscious- 
ness when  we  think  of  another  person  as  speaking,  or  when 
we  think  of  ourselves  as  carrying  on  a  discussion  with  another 
person.  Scherer  reports  that  Diderot  was  an  enthusiastic 
debater  and  that  his  abstract  thinking  always  took  the  form 
of  an  imagined  debate  with  an  opponent;  and  Gal  ton  has 
introduced  the  term  "histrionic"  or  "dramatic"  to  describe 
the  ideation  of  this  type  of  individual.  It  can  scarcely  be 
assumed  that  one's  own  voice  alone  is  heard  in  such  a  case. 
One  would  expect  that  the  imagery  would  be  constituted 
exclusively  by  one's  own  voice  only  when  one's  type  is  vocal- 
motor,  rather  than  auditory  because,  in  that  case,  the  indi- 
vidual is  limited  to  the  functioning  of  his  own  vocal  muscles 
in  his  ideation  of  the  sounds  of  words.    And,  of  course,  he 


Associative  Learni^ig  21 1 

will  hear  only  the  sounds  which  arise  from  the  innervation 
of  his  own  vocal  organs.  Our  propensity  to  think  in  terms 
of  heard  or  spoken  words  may  be  intensified  under  certain 
pathological  conditions.  When  the  nervous  system  is  over- 
stimulated  we  frequently  find  ourselves  impelled  to  repeat 
phrases  in  an  automatic  fashion.  The  reader  may  remember 
the  humorous  sketch  in  which  Mark  Twain  describes  the 
contagious  effect  of  a  verse  which  was  used  in  remembering 
the  street  car  fares  in  an  American  city.  Everybody  who 
heard  the  verse  was  driven  to  distraction  by  it. 

What  is  the  relation  between  ideational  type  and  mental 
efficiency?  A  reference  to  the  foregoing  discussion  of  the 
auditory  type  will  indicate  the  state  of  affairs  which  one  may 
expect  to  find  in  the  case  of  the  other  tjpes.  Every  variety 
of  motor  indi\'idual  who  thinks  in  terms  of  vocal  images, — 
and  vocal  motor  images  are  frequently  accompanied  by  move- 
ment innervations, — is  intimately  related  to  the  auditory 
type.  We  have  in  the  literature  an  excellent  introspective 
analysis  of  two  such  motor  individuals  both  of  whom  were 
trained  psychologists.  iDodge,  a  pupil  of  Erdmann,  has 
given  a  detailed  description  of  his  own  thinking  which  is 
almost  exclusively  motor;  and  Strieker,  a  Viennese  physician, 
has  devoted  several  monographs  to  the  analysis  of  his  own 
internal  speech.  Dodge  has  established  the  fact  that  his 
thinking  may  assume  the  form  either  of  verbal  or  of  concrete 
images.  The  latter  form  of  ideation  occurs,  for  example, 
when  he  is  planning  the  construction  of  a  piece  of  apparatus; 
in  such  cases  he  is  altogether  \isual,  and  his  internal  speech 
retreats  completely  into  the  background,  excepting  when  his 
emotions  are  \-i\idly  aroused  and  when  he  is  about  to  utter 
an  exclamation.  When,  as  he  ordinarily  does,  he  thinks  in 
verbal  terms  he  pronounces  the  words  mentally  but  without 
hearing  them.    His  thinking  is  therefore  a  motor  speech  of 


212  •     The  Psychology  of  Learning 

which  he  has  no  auditory  image.  The  sensory  elements  which 
come  to  consciousness  during  the  process  are  images  of  tactual 
and  kinassthetic  sensations  from  the  muscles  of  the  lips, 
tongue,  mouth  and  throat,  and  probably  from  the  thoracic 
muscles  which  are  concerned  in  breathing.  Auditory  elements 
may  appear  but  only  when  the  ideation  is  very  definite;  and 
even  then  the  auditory  images  are  vague.  Dodge  has  no 
images  of  writing  movements,  nor  any  sort  of  visual  verbal 
imagery.  Even  in  voluntary  recall,  images  of  writing  move- 
ments can  be  evoked  only  with  difficulty.  This  shows  that 
Charcot  was  wrong  in  including  persons  who  think  in  terms  of 
writing  movements  and  persons  who  think  in  terms  of  vocal 
movements,  in  the  same  category;  it  shows,  too,  that  "motor 
type"  is  but  a  general  name  under  which  numerous  variants 
are  to  be  included.  In  Dodge's  processes  of  thinking,  verbal 
meanings  attach  to  words  which  are  ideated  in  motor  fash- 
ion with  weak  auditory  accompaniments. 

Dodge's  introspections  are  especially  valuable  because  his 
motor-verbal  imagery  may  be  traced  to  a  congenital  and 
hereditary  lack  of  auditory  imagery;  it  is,  therefore,  not 
merely  a  product  of  habituation.  His  auditory  remembrances 
are  ''exceedingly  scant  and  indefinite."  He  says:  "I  am 
wholly  incapable  of  recalling  the  successive  sounds  of  a 
musical  composition."  "I  am  able  to  sing  mentally  a  few 
simple  melodies,  but  this  singing  possesses  little  besides  motor 
content."  He  is  usually  unable  to  ideate  the  voices  of  his 
acquaintances;  the  voice  of  his  father  can  be  recalled  only  in 
certain  phrases,  such  as  "My  boy,"  etc.,  and  only  by  means 
of  the  visual  images  of  the  appropriate  situations.  An  opera 
which  has  but  recently  been  heard  can  be  rehearsed  mentally, 
but  "purely  as  a  pantomime."  "The  verbal  images  (of  the 
arias)  are  motor;  the  voices  of  the  singers  are  inaudible." 
This  one-sidedness  of  imagery  is  hereditary  in  the  Dodge 


Associative  Learning  213 

family.  "My  mother  and  my  brother  have  no  more  musical 
memory  than  I  have."  "None  of  us  sing."  In  this  case, 
then,  the  lack  of  internal  speech  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  lack 
of  auditory  memory  in  general.  Strieker  is  even  more  purely 
motor  than  Dodge;  and  Strieker  has  analyzed  his  ideational 
type  with  great  care  in  numerous  refined  observations.  He 
is  guilty,  however,  of  two  gross  errors.  In  the  first  place,  he 
regards  his  own  peculiar  type  as  being  characteristic  of  man- 
kind in  general;  and  he  is  of  the  opinion  that  nobody  pos- 
sesses definite  auditory  and  visual  memories  of  vocal  and 
writing  movements.  Secondly,  it  is  evident  from  his  own 
descriptions  that  he  thinks  in  terms  of  tactual  and  kines- 
thetic imagery;  yet  he  asserts  that  his  ideation  of  words 
contains  no  sensory  elements,  but  consists  exclusively  of  re- 
vived motor  impulses  (innervations  of  vocal  movements). 
He  summarizes  his  observations  as  follows:  "My  ideas  of 
singing  are  wholly  independent  of  any  remembrance  of  songs 
which  I  have  heard.  The  state  of  affairs  is  similar  in  the 
case  of  music  to  what  it  is  in  the  case  of  articulate  sounds. 
The  auditory  impressions  which  I  have  experienced  are  com- 
pletely forgotten;  but  still  something  remains  in  their  stead, 
something  which  I  did  not  obtain  from  the  external  world 
but  have  myself  created.  My  musical  ideas,  like  my  verbal 
ideas,  I  owe  to  my  innervations  of  movements." 

The  other  ideational  types  occur  less  frequently  in  verbal 
thinking.  Purely  visual  individuals,  an  illustration  of  whom 
will  be  cited  presently,  think  in  terms  of  verbal  images  wliich 
are  mentally  seen;  they  read  off  their  words  internally,  as 
Ballet  describes  it.  Every  person  who  has  learned  to  read 
may  have  such  images;  but  in  most  persons  they  play  no 
part  in  the  process  of  thinking.  They  make  their  appearance 
on  certain  occasions  in  the  mixed  types,  as  for  example,  when 
such  a  person  recalls  a  passage  in  a  book  or  a  manuscript. 


214  ^^^^  Psychology  of  Lear7iing 

Galton  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  establish  the  existence 
of  this  type.  Charcot,  in  deahng  with  a  dominantly  visual 
patient,  found  that  he  thought  solely  in  terms  of  the  visual 
images  of  printed  words.  Cases  of  persons  who  think  in 
distinctly  visual-verbal  terms  seem  to  be  found  most  fre- 
quently among  mathematicians  and  "mathematical  prodi- 
gies. 

The  nature  of  these  types  is  very  clearly  shown  by  an  accu- 
rate investigation  of  individuals  who  possess  a  decided  mental 
bent  in  some  particular  direction.  Fortunate  circumstances 
led  Binet  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  two  noted  "calculators " 
who  employed  processes  of  wholly  different  types  in  their 
mathematical  operations.  Binet  first  investigated  the  Itahan, 
Inaudi,  whose  calculations  were  made  without  any  partici- 
pation of  visual  imagery;  then  the  Greek,  Diamandi,  who 
accomplished  enormous  numerical  operations  almost  exclu- 
sively by  means  of  visual  imagery.  I  have  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  make  a  study,  of  several  hours'  duration,  of  these 
two  prodigies.  Inaudi  placed  himself  at  my  disposal  in  the 
Leipzig  laboratory;  and  Diamandi  visited  me  at  my  labora- 
tory in  Zurich.  The  results  of  my  tests  differ  somewhat  from 
Binet's  in  that  he,  probably  under  the  influence  of  Charcot, 
concluded  that  Inaudi  was  a  purely  auditory  calculator, — 
he  called  him  a  "model  auditory," — while  I  found  that  he 
employs  internal  speech  throughout,  both  speaking  and  hear- 
ing the  numbers.  And  Binet  regards  Diamandi  as  a  pure 
visual,  while  I  found  that  in  him,  too,  a  trace  of  internal 
speech  is  present.  But  my  results  agree  with  Binet's  in  their 
essential  features,  particularly  in  the  finding  that  Inaudi  is 
wholly  lacking  in  visual  images  and  that  Diamandi  works 
cliiefly  by  means  of  visual  images.  These  two  mathematical 
prodigies  are  excelled  by  Dr.  Ruckle,  who  has  been  investi- 
gated by  G.  E.  Miiller.     Ruckle  belongs  to  a  mixed  type, 


Associative  Learning  215 

with  predominant  visual  imagery;  according  to  his  own  state- 
ments made  to  me  during  a  brief  investigation,  Ruckle  makes 
extensive  use  of  mnemonic  aids  and  of  the  mathematical 
relations  of  numbers. 

The  nature  of  the  special  memories,  whose  investigation 
has  proved  to  be  difficult  for  modern  psychology,  cannot  be 
better  set  forth  than  by  a  description  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  memory  of  a  "rapid  calculator"  functions.  In  Inaudi's 
case  it  was  possible  to  determine  without  psychological  inves- 
tigation that  he  must  necessarily  do  his  calculations  in  a  non- 
visual  fashion.  He  was  reared  as  a  shepherd,  without  any 
schooling,  and  remained  ilhterate  until  the  age  of  fourteen. 
When  six  years  old  he  began  his  calculations,  after  an  elder 
brother  had  taught  him  to  count;  and  at  seven  he  was  able 
to  multiply  two  five-place  numbers  mentally.  He  never 
needed  to  have  his  numbers  or  his  numerical  operations 
written  or  presented  in  any  other  concrete  fashion.  After 
he  had  earned  a  HveHhood  for  a  time  by  travelHng  about  and 
giving  exliibitions  in  cafes  while  his  brother  played  a  hand- 
organ,  he  went  to  Paris  in  1880.  There  he  came  under  the 
observation  of  Broca,  Charcot  and  Binet;  even  at  that  time 
he  was  still  unable  to  read  or  to  write.  His  talents  and  his 
interests  were  then  of  a  wholly  one-sided  sort.  The  details 
of  Inaudi's  feats  cannot  interest  us  here  but  the  following 
seems  to  have  a  psychological  significance.  His  public  exhi- 
bition usually  consisted  in  multiplying  extremely  large  num- 
bers,— numbers  of  sixteen,  twenty  or  twenty-four  digits.  He 
calculated  mentally,  while  behind  him  his  manager  wrote  the 
result  on  a  large  blackboard.  Inaudi  did  not  see  the  numbers; 
the  problem  must  be  given  him  orally  because  the  sight  of  the 
figures  disturbed  him.  He  did  not  fear  any  distraction  or 
interruption  during  the  calculation;  indeed  lest  the  dem- 
onstration should  become  tedious  to  his  spectators  he  even 


2i6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

introduced  interruptions.  He  would  ask  one  of  the  audi- 
ence to  give  the  date  of  his  birth,  and  he  would  then  calculate 
the  day  of  the  week  upon  which  the  birthday  fell, — all  of  this 
while  he  was  still  apparently  engaged  upon  his  first  and  chief 
problem  of  multiplication.  I  am  convinced,  however,  that 
he  was  really  not  able  to  carry  on  two  calculations  simul- 
taneously. He  simply  interrupted  the  first  problem  at  a 
certain  point  and  subsequently  took  it  up  again  at  the  point 
where  he  had  left  ofT.  But  we  shall  see  that  this  independ- 
ence of  interruptions  and  distractions  is  a  characteristic  of 
the  auditory-motor  type. 

Inaudi's  extraordinary  memory  for  numbers  is  the  chief 
feature,  however,  in  which  he  surpasses  the  ordinary  calcu- 
lator. After  an  hour's  pubhc  performance,  during  which 
approximately  three  hundred  digits  were  employed,  he  was 
able  to  reproduce  all  of  the  mathematical  operations  from 
memory;  he  was  still  able  to  recall  them  on  the  following 
day,  even  when  he  had  not  been  forewarned  or  especially 
prepared  for  the  delayed  recall.  And  yet  his  memory  was 
poorly  developed  in  every  other  direction.  When  numbers 
were  presented  to  him  orally  and  he  was  asked  to  repeat 
them  immediately  afterwards,  he  was  able  to  recall  forty-two 
correctly, — the  limit  for  other  persons  does  not  exceed  thirteen; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  could  not  repeat  more  than  six  or 
seven  disconnected  letters  under  similar  conditions,  nor  more 
than  a  very  few  words  of  a  poem.  His  memory  for  musical 
compositions,  for  geometrical  forms,  and  for  colors  was 
below  the  average. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  Inaudi  does  not  retain  large 
groups  of  numbers  mechanically,  but  by  remembering  the 
problems  in  which  they  occur.  This  shows  that  even  in  this 
unusual  development  of  a  memory  for  numbers,  logical  reten- 
tion plays  a  leading  role.    If  we  regard  forty  digits  as  approx- 


Associative  Learning  217 

imately  the  maximum  which  he  is  able  to  retain  mechanic- 
ally and  reproduce  orally,  and  regard  as  his  extreme  Hmit  of 
logical  retention  the  results  obtained  in  a  sitting  at  the  Sor- 
bonne  where  he  recalled  four  hundred  digits,  we  find  that 
his  memory  when  reinforced  by  the  meaning  of  the  problem 
is  ten-fold  more  efficient  than  his  mechanical  memory.  Eb- 
binghaus  obtained  an  identical  relation  in  his  investigation 
of  the  memory  of  the  average  individual.  Binet's  experi- 
ments show  that  the  memories  of  these  two  prodigies  follow 
the  same  laws  as  the  memory  of  the  individual  of  average 
and  normal  endowment.  The  sole  difference  is  a  difference  of 
degree. 

Inaudi  remembers  numbers  by  combining  them  into  suc- 
cessive groups.  He  forms  series  of  successive  auditory-motor 
impressions  which  he  brings  into  association  with  one  another, 
constantly  vocalizing  throughout.  By  this  means  he  im- 
prints upon  his  memory  successive  groups  of  spoken  names 
of  numbers;  or,  psychologically  expressed,  he  forms  successive 
associations  of  the  auditory-verbal  images  and  the  vocal- 
motor  images  of  numbers.  And  in  recalling  his  mathematical 
operations  he  always  has  recourse  to  a  successive  re-pronounc- 
ing of  the  imprinted  groups.  Never  does  he  see  large  groups 
of  numbers  simultaneously  before  him.  Multiplication,  there- 
fore, constitutes  the  basis  of  all  of  his  calculations  because 
multiplication  is  a  genuinely  successive  operation. .  It  is 
probable  that  in  division,  when  he  deals  with  large  numbers, 
his  procedure  consists  in  hitting  upon  a  tentative  quotient 
from  his  wide  experience  and  then  in  rapidly  testing  its  cor- 
rectness by  a  process  of  multiplication. 

The  exact  process  of  his  retention  was  not  discovered, 
however,  until  an  experimental  investigation  had  been  made. 
Binet  asked  Inaudi  to  sing  a  tone  continuously  during  the 
act  of  calculating,  in  order,  by  this  device,  to  introduce  an 


2l8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

auditory-motor  distraction.  This  did  not  completely  destroy 
his  ability  to  calculate,  but  it  doubled  the  time  required  for 
the  operation.  I  arranged  the  following  experiment :  Inaudi 
was  first  asked  to  solve  a  great  number  of  problems  which 
were  as  nearly  as  possible  of  equal  difficulty.  Each  problem 
consisted  in  raising  a  two-place  number,  above  forty,  to  the 
third  power.  After  I  had  determined  from  a  number  of  these 
problems  what  was  the  average  time  required  for  their  solu- 
tion, I  introduced  auditory  and  motor  distractions  alternately, 
in  the  hope  of  determining  exactly  what  was  his  mental  type. 
I  also  set  several  metronomes  in  motion;  but  they  did  not 
disturb  him  at  all.  Then,  too,  he  was  asked  to  extend  his 
tongue  and  to  hold  it  between  his  teeth  during  the  act  of 
calculating, — an  expedient  which  eliminated  his  internal 
speech.  This  variation  increased  his  time  threefold;  and  it 
was  increased  still  more  when  the  tongue  was  extended  from 
the  mouth.  We  applied  a  registration  apparatus  to  his  tongue 
and  his  larynx  and  made  a  graphic  record  of  his  vocal  move- 
ments. This  showed  that  his  calculation  was  attended 
throughout  by  uniformly  present  but  faint  vocal  movements. 
I  was  not  surprised,  therefore,  to  hear  him  state  that  he  always 
found  it  impossibler  to  calculate  well  when  he  was  hoarse. 
Our  tests  show  that  he  undoubtedly  belongs  to  the  domi- 
nantly  motor  type.  Yet  from  his  own  statements  there  seems 
to  be  no  doubt  that  he  also  possesses  auditory  imagery  of 
spoken  numbers;  if  he  were  a  purely  auditory  calculator, 
however,  he  would  be  distracted  by  noises.  His  employment 
of  vocal  movements  enables  him  to  obviate  these  distrac- 
tions. 

Diamandi  was  born  in  1880  upon  the  Greek  island  of 
Pylaros.  He  is  descended  from  an  educated  and  well-to-do 
family,  and  he  himself  was  for  a  time  a  corn  merchant.  In 
describing  his  method  of  calculating  he  states  that  he  sees 


Associative  Learning  219 

the  numbers  "as  though  they  were  photographed"  upon  a 
sheet  of  paper  before  him,  and  he  reads  these  visual  images. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  his  calculating  is  done  in  a  wholly 
visual  fashion;  but  his  statement  that  the  process  is  of  a 
"photographic"  character  cannot  be  accepted  without  quali- 
fication. In  the  first  place,  I  was  able  to  discover  that  he, 
too,  was  disturbed  when  his  internal  speech  was  inhibited 
during  the  process  of  calculating.  The  disturbance  was 
slight,  however,  and  he  was  still  able  to  calculate  visually 
when  he  counted  the  strokes  of  a  metronome  while  engaged 
upon  the  solution  of  a  problem.  In  contrast  with  Inaudi, 
who  refuses  to  accept  any  but  oral  problems  and  who  never 
looks  at  the  blackboard,  Diamandi  demands  that  his  prob- 
lems be  presented  in  written  form.  Then  he  proceeds  with 
two  interesting  and  distinctly  separate  acts;  he  glances 
rapidly  over  the  written  problem,  closes  his  eyes  and  calls 
up  a  visual  image  of  the  numbers  which  he  saw.  Not  until 
this  visual  image  comes  to  consciousness  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly does  he  begin  his  calculation.  This  shows  that  the 
images  of  the  numbers  are  not  simply  photographed.  His 
procedure  consists,  rather,  in  first  transforming  the  objec- 
tively seen  picture  of  the  numbers  into  a  mental  image  in 
the  form  of  his  own  familiar  handwriting,  and  then  calcu- 
lating by  means  of  this  image.  It  would  be  directly  contra- 
dictory to  the  view  held  by  modern  psychology  regarding 
the  reproduction  of  our  sense-impressions  if  the  imaging  of 
the  digits  in  the  form  in  which  he  sees  them  were  a  purely 
objective  process  to  which  he  himself  contributes  no  part. 
Memory  never  works  in  a  fashion  which  consists  simply  in 
retaining  retinal  images  with  photographic  fidelity;  the  re- 
membering of  visual  impressions  is  possible  only  because 
apperceptive  processes  are  superadded  to  purely  sensory 
processes.    Those  data  of  experience  which  are  not  consciously 


220  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

received  and  brought  into  relation  with  our  previous  store 
of  ideas  by  acts  of  apperception  are  not  remembered.    Repro- 
duction must  always  come  about  under  the  moulding  and 
assimilating   influence   of   former   ideas.     A   complete   and 
perfect  mirroring  or  reproduction  of  a  complex  visual  experi- 
ence is  of  exceedingly  rare  occurrence;    and  we  can  accom- 
plish, or  even  approximate  this  feat,  only  after  numerous  acts 
of  apperception  have  supplemented  one  another  and  have 
tested  and  corrected  our  reproduction  by  comparing  it  with 
the  original  experience.    Even  Diamandi's  memory  for  num- 
bers, although  it  is  dominantly  visual  in  its  mode  of  oper- 
ation, does  not  "photograph"  the  digits  but  requires  a  series 
of  acts  of  apperception  if  it  is  to  succeed  in  retaining  and 
reproducing  accurate  visual  images  of  them.    Binet  arranged 
the  following  experiment.     Digits  were  written  in  inks  of 
different  colors,  and  Diamandi  was  asked  to  remember  both 
the  digits  and  their  colors.     Now  if  the  visuahzer's  process 
of  retention  were  a  "photographic"  process  he  must  imprint 
both  the  digits  and  the  colors  in  a  single  act.     But  this  he 
could   not   do;    two   operations   were  necessary.     He  first 
learned  the  figures;  and  then,  in  a  second  reading,  he  learned 
their  colors.     Hence  we  should  obtain  a  wholly  erroneous 
conception  of  the  process  employed  by  the  visualizer  in  cal- 
culating if  we  supposed  that  he  is  able  to  read  figures  from 
an  internal  photograph  as  one  may  read  them  from  a  sheet 
of  paper.    What  he  really  does  is  this:  In  a  series  of  succes- 
sive acts  of  apperception  he  transforms  the  objectively  seen 
figures  into  purely  subjective  visual  images;   and  if  it  is  not 
expressly  demanded  of  him  that  he  shall  remember  the  details 
of  color  and  of  form  in  the  written  figures,  he  will  remember 
only  their  meaning  and  value.     These  visual  images,  how- 
ever, enable  him  to  bring  to  consciousness  only  a  limited 
number  of  digits  at  a  time.    He  then  sets  about  performing 


Associative  Learning  221 

his  calculations  with  these  relatively  few  images  of  simul- 
taneously *'seen"  groups  of  digits. 

When  we  take  these  facts  into  consideration  we  under- 
stand the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of  the  different 
t^pes  of  memory.  Every  difference  in  efficiency  between 
the  two  calculators  must  not  be  referred  simply  to  differences 
in  their  ideational  types  because,  of  course,  the  mathematical 
talent  of  the  two  men  may  also  be  different.  But  if  a  com- 
parison of  their  efficiencies  should  reveal  constant  and  uni- 
form correlations  with  their  memory  types,  then  it  would  be 
highly  probable  that  the  efficiencies  are  to  be  regarded  as 
products  of  the  respective  memory  types. 

It  was  found,  first  of  all,  that  in  simple  calculations  Inaudi 
(auditory-motor  tj'pe)  worked  much  more  rapidly  than  Dia- 
mandi  (visual).  There  was  a  great  difference  even  in  the 
rapidity  with  which  they  grasped  the  problem.  The  problem 
was  presented  to  Inaudi  orally  and  he  set  to  work  immedi- 
ately after  hearing  it.  In  the  case  of  Diamandi,  however, 
a  noticeable  time  elapsed  before  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 
a  clear  visual  image  of  the  written  problem.  Secondly,  the 
calculations  themselves  are  much  more  rapidly  accomplished 
by  Inaudi  than  by  Diamandi;  in  view  of  the  latter's  superior 
mathematical  abihty  one  is  compelled  to  ascribe  this  differ- 
ence in  rapidity  to  the  difference  in  ideational  t}pe.  Series 
of  auditory-motor  names  whose  meanings  are  securely  asso- 
ciated can  be  pronounced  and  reproduced  more  rapidly  than 
their  visual  images  can  be  evoked.  In  short,  the  auditory 
motor  calculator  is  the  more  rapid;  the  visual  is  slower.  A 
single  series  of  twenty-five  digits  is  memorized  by  Diamandi 
in  three  minutes,  by  Inaudi  in  forty-five  seconds.  But  this 
disadvantage  has  its  compensation  because  the  visual  mem- 
ory is  much  superior  to  the  auditory-motor  in  other  regards. 
Even  in  calculating  we  are  not  always  concerned  with  abstract 

IG 


222  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

numbers.    It  frequently  happens  that  we  are  called  upon  to 
deal  numerically  with   concrete  magnitudes,   as  in   simple 
and  higher  geometry,  in  all  operations  with  equations,  in  all 
cases  where  one  deals  with  curves  and  in  numerous  applied 
computations.    So  soon  as  spatial  arrangement  comes  in  for 
consideration,  even  if  it  be  of  the  simplest  sort,  we  find  that 
the  relationship  of  rapidity  between  the  two  types  of  compu- 
tation is  reversed;    now  the  visual  calculates  much  more 
rapidly  than  the  auditory.    Binet  found  that  for  the  mem- 
orization  of    twenty-five   simple   numbers   Inaudi   required 
forty-five  seconds,  Diamandi  three  minutes.    When  asked  to 
reproduce  the  twenty-five  numbers  in  their  original  order, 
Inaudi  required  sixty  sec^onds,  Diamandi  thirty-five  seconds; 
for  reproduction  in  reverse  order  Inaudi  required  ninety-six 
seconds,  Diamandi  only  thirty-six  seconds.    In  other  tests  it 
was  found  that  numbers  presented  in  the  form  of  a  square 
or  of  a  spiral  were  readily  memorized  by  Diamandi,  who 
was  also  able  to  recall  them  in  any  order  because  he  imaged 
them  visually.    Inaudi  was  almost  wholly  unable  to  accom- 
pHsh  either  of  these  tasks;   and  when  he  did  succeed  he  did 
so  only  by  means  of  laborious  and  complex  auxihary  oper- 
ations.   From  this  again  it  is  evident  that  a  memory  which 
is  to  be  capable  of  meeting  all  of  the  demands  made  upon 
it  must  make  use  of  every  sort  of  imagery,  at  least  it  must 
make  use  of  auditory  and  visual  images,  that  is,  words  which 
are  both  mentally  seen  and  heard.     Here  again  Ruckle  far 
excelled  the  other  two  prodigies  because  he  made  use  of 
reflective   processes,    especially   in    compHcated    operations. 
For  instance,  after  twice  reading  forty-nine  numbers  arranged 
in  seven  equal  columns  Ruckle  was  able  to  recite  them  in 
any  desired  order, — a  feat  which  neither  of  the  other  prod- 
igies could  accomplish. 

For  the  sake  of  completeness  it  may  be  mentioned  here 


Associative  Learning  223 

that  pathological  observations  have  furnished  much  infor- 
mation regarding  ideational  types.  Investigations  of  aphasia 
(disorders  of  speech),  alexia  (disturbances  of  ability  to  read), 
and  agraphia  (disturbances  of  abihty  to  write)  come  in  espe- 
cially for  consideration  here.  It  is  significant  that  intellectual 
disturbances  of  these  sharply  demarcated  sorts  may  occur  in 
a  consciousness  which  is  otherwise  relatively  unimpaired. 
They  confirm  the  view  that  internally  spoken  words  are, 
like  audible  speech  and  ordinary  writing,  a  product  of  com- 
plex functions;  that  the  component  processes  of  which  they 
are  composed  may,  in  general,  be  correctly  specified  by  speci- 
f}-ing  the  ideational  t^-pes;  that  in  most  persons  the  auditory- 
verbal  image  and  the  vocal-verbal  image  play  the  leading 
role  in  verbal  thinking;  and  that  these  component  processes 
of  verbal  thinking  are  to  some  extent  mutually  dependent, 
although  they  are  to  some  extent  independent  of  one  another. 
The  one-sidedness  of  m.ental  endowment  which  we  have 
described  is  therefore  confirmed  by  the  results  of  patholog- 
ical investigation. 

Among  pathological  observations  there  is  a  noted  case 
which  led  Charcot  to  the  discovery  of  ideational  types.  The 
case  is  interesting  also  for  the  reason  that  it  furnishes  an 
illustration  of  substituted  or  surrogate  images.  This  patient, 
a  teacher,  had  formerly  possessed  a  very  highly  developed 
visual  imagery,  but  he  had  lost  it  almost  completely  as  the 
result  of  an  illness.  When  he  wished  to  recall  complex  visual 
impressions,  such  as  the  appearance  of  familiar  persons  or 
places,  he  found  it  necessary  to  have  recourse  chiefly  to  audi- 
tory imagery,  which  now  came  to  consciousness  as  a  substi- 
tute for  the  missing  visual  images.  This,  of  course,  as  one 
might  expect,  resulted  in  a  general  decrease  of  the  patient's 
efficiency  of  memory. 

These  cUnical  obser^^ations  do  not,  unfortunately,  give  us 


224  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

an  adequate  insight  into  the  extent  to  which  the  ideational 
type  is  changed  as  a  result  of  such  a  partial  loss  of  imagery. 
Such  an  insight  is  especially  desirable  because  it  would 
clear  up  the  question  of  the  modifiability  of  ideational 
type.  Still  pathological  observations  always  seem  to  show 
that  other  images  which  formerly  served  in  a  subsidiary 
capacity  may  take  the  place  of  the  missing  imagery.  Some- 
thing of  a  similar  nature  is  found  to  occur  in  the  normal  indi- 
vidual of  the  mixed  type  when,  in  order  to  adapt  himself  to 
a  particular  sort  of  presentation,  he  works  with  a  sort  of 
imagery  which  he  has  but  sHghtly  developed. 

During  the  past  few  years  the  pedagogical  significance  of 
individual  types  of  ideation  has  been  made  the  subject  of 
several  important  investigations.  Before  we  can  apply  the 
results  of  these  experiments  to  the  work  of  the  school-room 
we  must  first  determine:  i.  Whether  different  types  occur 
in  children  as  they  do  in  adults;  2.  Whether  typical  modes 
of  ideation  are  capable  of  being  modified  by  training;  and  3. 
What  significance  these  differences  of  t}^e  have  in  the  work 
of  memory.  4.  It  is  also  essential  that  we  should  have  reli- 
able and  convenient  methods  for  the  determination  of  the 
ideational  types  of  children. 

As  for  the  first  question,  the  investigations  of  Ziehen, 
Netschajeff,  Lobsien,  Pfeiffer,  Eckhardt,  Lay,  Pohlmann,  and 
others,  as  well  as  experiments  which  I  have  made  upon  school- 
children, show  that  the  concrete-objective  ideation  of  the 
child,  up  to  the  age  of  about  thirteen  or  fourteen  years,  is 
always  more  particular  and  visual  than  that  of  the  adult; 
that  is,  children  of  school-age  think  in  terms  of  concrete 
images  of  particular  objects,  persons  and  occasions  which  are 
frequently  locahzed  spatially  and  oftentimes  temporarily  also, 
while  adults  think  chiefly  in  terms  of  general  verbal  ideas. 
Girls  make  greater  use  of  visual  imagery  than  boys  of  the 


Associative  Learning  22^ 

same  age;  and  the  visual  memories  of  girls  are  more  diversi- 
fied and  definite.  This  characteristic  difference  between  the 
sexes  seems  also  to  persist  throughout  later  years,  for  Cohn's 
investigations  of  the  ideational  types  of  adults  show  that 
women  are  more  dominantly  visual  than  men.  And  Wresch- 
ner  also  shows  that  women's  testimony  regarding  their  visual 
experiences  is  more  abundant  and  more  accurate  than  that 
of  men.  ^  Now  this  seems  to  indicate  that  the  child's  mode 
of  ideating  is  usually  concrete- visual;  but  it  does  not  deter- 
mine whether  a  dominantly  and  distinctly  visual  type  of 
ideation  exists  in  childhood. 

We  cannot  infer  from  the  foregoing  that  verbal  thinking 
must  also  be  more  visual  in  children  than  in  adults.  The 
ideational  types  seem  rather  to  occur  with  about  the  same 
relative  frequency  in  adults  and  in  children. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  no  statistical  investigation  has  ever 
determined,  with  sufficient  comprehensiveness,  what  is  the 
relative  distribution  of  ideational  types  in  children  and  in 
adults.  In  the  work  of  Lay  and  Pfeiffer  a  beginning  has 
been  made;  and  in  my  own  laboratory  the  ideational  types 
of  about  forty  children  have  been  examined.  The  investi- 
gations of  this  problem  by  Pfeiffer  at  Wiirzburg  are  instruc- 
tive; but  they  deal  with  only  about  fifteen  girls,  whose  types 
were  very  .carefully  examined  in  each  of  three  successive  years. 
Pfeiffer's  averages  for  the  three  years  show  that  about  forty- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  group  were  visual,  twenty-five  per  cent, 
were  auditory  and  thirty  per  cent,  were  motor, — these  data 
referring  to  concrete  objective  ideation.  Here  again  the  visual 
type  predominates. 

As  to  the  second  question, — whether  the  ideational  type 
may  be  trained  or  transformed, — I  beheve  that  we  must 
answer  in  the  affirmative  for  we  found  that  in  our  experi- 
'  See  Bibliography  at  end  of  this  volume. 


226  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ments  the  type  is  frequently  changed  by  the  use  of  a  partic- 
ular method  of  learning  which  was  employed  for  only  a  few 
weeks.    This  particular  mode  of  learning,  which  consisted  in 
reading  Hsts  of  words  sotto  voce,  had  a  transforming  influence 
upon  the  type,  usually  in  the  direction  of  intensifying  either 
the  auditory  or  the  motor  elements  or  both.    Thus  all  of  the 
observations  which  affirm  the  variability  of  the  types  also 
testify  to  the  possibility  of  modifying  them  by  training.    A 
number  of  such  observations  were  reported  in  earher  investi- 
gations.    Ziehen  found  a  boy  who,  when  words  were  pre- 
sented orally,  always  made  use  of  visual  images  of  written 
words  because  he  had  been  taught  to  spell  by  the  visual 
method.    Pohlmann  even  found  that  every  sort  of  training 
develops  a  special  responsiveness  to  particular  modes  of  pre- 
senting material.     Such  a  specific  responsiveness  to  partic- 
ular sensory  impressions,  however,  presupposes  that  a  specific 
training  of  sense-memory  has  taken  place.    Queyrat  reports 
that  in  ideating  the  song  of  Lucrece  he  has  a  visual  image  of 
the  printed  verse;  when  he  recalls  the  Marseillaise  he  has  an 
auditory  image  of  its  words;  and  when  he  remembers  a  con- 
versation the  images  of  vocal  movements  predominate.    This 
shows  us  that  the  dominating  sense-elements  employed  in 
ideating  any  material  correspond  to  the  method  employed  in 
learning  the  material.     The  same  phenomenon  is  seen  in 
Baldwin's  statement  that  he  ideates  the  German  language  in 
vocal-motor  and  auditory  terms  because  he  learned  it  by 
conversation  in  Germany,  while  he  ideates  French  in  visual 
and  manual  motor  terms  because  he  learned  it  in  the  class- 
room.   Pfeiffer  found  that  the  influence  of  pur  everyday  life, 
especially  of  our  vocation,  also  moulds  our  ideational  type 
by  a  process  of  habituation  and  practice;    and  Lobsien  re- 
ported that  the  type  of  concrete  ideation  varies  with  age. 
All  of  this  shows  that  ideational  types  are  plastic  and  edu- 


Associative  Learning  227 

cable;  but  we  do  not  yet  know  what  are  the  limits  of  their 
educability.  Our  conception  of  the  modifiability  of  idea- 
tional types  must  conform  with  our  general  conception  of 
the  modifiability  of  natural  aptitudes.  Every  natural  apti- 
tude is  of  a  dispositional  character.  Dispositions  can,  in 
general,  be  intensified  by  training  in  proportion  to  their 
original  congenital  intensity,  strong  dispositions  being  more 
easily  strengthened  by  practice  than  weak  ones.  The  effect 
of  practice,  then,  is  limited  only  by  weakness  of  disposition, 
or  by  complete  absence  of  congenital  bent.  This  accords 
with  our  experience  that  the  mixed  types  are  more  variable 
than  the  pure  types,  because,  in  the  former,  dispositions 
towards  several  sense  memories  are  present.  Pfeiffer  found 
that  the  pure  t>pe  shows  a  greater  stability,  but  his  finding 
is  a  phenomenon  of  development  rather  than  of  training;  and 
I  cannot  grant  that  Pfeiffer's  alleged  pure  t^pes  are  really 
pure.  Moreover,  the  question  as  to  the  possibility  of  train- 
ing ideational  types  will  also  depend  upon  their  connate 
character.  The  view  which  we  have  here  presented  affirms -y 
that  they  may  be  trained.  Wells  ^  has  called  attention  to 
the  significant  phenomenon  that  all  such  questions  are  inti- 
mately related  to  the  individual  educability  and  "practice- 
ability"  of  the  particular  individual;  and  educability  and 
"practice-abiHty"  are  for  Wells,  as  they  are  for  Kraepehn, 
fundamental  differences  in  mankind. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  methods  which  have  been  employed 
for  the  determination  of  ideational  t}^es.  A  consideration 
of  these  methods  seems  Hkely  to  throw  still  more  light  upon 
the  nature  and  the  pedagogical  significance  of  the  types 
themselves.  We  have  not  yet  discovered  a  perfectly  satis- 
factory method  for  the  rapid  and  rehable  determination  of 

^  F.  L.  Wells,  The  Relation  of  Practice  to  Individual  Differences,' 
Amer.  Jour.  Psychol.,  XXIII.,  191 2,  75-88. 


228  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ideational  types.  The  methods  which  have  been  in  current 
use  are  ingenious  devices  rather  than  accurate  and  systematic 
methods.  The  method  of  distractions  and  aids  combined 
with  the  reaction-time  method  gives  the  most  rapid  and  the 
most  rehable  results.  In  this  procedure  the  observer  is  given 
a  number  of  definite  memory  tasks  of  equal  difficulty  and  the 
time  required  to  accompHsh  each  task  is  measured.  By  this 
means  we  are  able  to  determine  the  amount  of  memorial 
work  accomplished  and  the  time  required  for  its  accomphsh- 
ment.  Then  aids  and  distractions  are  introduced  with  a  view 
to  helping  and  hindering  the  work  of  memory;  and  these 
are  so  chosen  that  the  means  which  are  employed  in  the  special 
memories  and  which  constitute  the  observer's  type  may  be 
aided  or  hindered.  In  this  way  we  determine  whether  the 
time  required  to  accompHsh  a  given  amount  of  memory  work 
is  decreased  or  increased,  and  what  is  the  relative  amount 
of  decrease  or  increase  in  different  individuals.  For  instance, 
an  observer  is  asked  to  memorize  groups  of  numbers  or  letters 
or  to  recite  them  immediately  after  he  has  read  them.  By 
this  means  we  are  able  to  discover  the  maximum  of  numbers 
or  letters  which  he  just  succeeds  in  memorizing,  and  to  measure 
the  time  which  he  required  for  their  memorization. 

Now  we  assume  that  the  auditory  individual  is  distracted 
more  by  the  presence  of  auditory  stimuli,  the  visual  by  visual 
stimuli,  and  the  motor  by  the  inhibition  of  his  internal  speech. 
One  would  then  expect  that  the  possession  of  a  dominantly 
visual  type  of  ideation  would  be  revealed  by  the  fact  that 
memorial  efficiency  is  not  essentially  impaired  by  an  inhibition 
of  internal  speech;  and  that  the  presence  of  a  motor  type  would 
be  disclosed  by  the  fact  that  an  inhibition  of  vocal  movements 
almost  wholly  destroys  the  capacity  to  memorize.  As  Segal 
has  pointed  out,  this  method  can  yield  unequivocal  results 
only  when  it  is  supplemented  by  variations  in  the  mode  of 


Associative  Leanmig  229 

presenting  the  material,  and  when  we  take  into  consideration 
whether  the  material  is  mentally  reproducible  in  single  or 
manifold  fashion.  Just  as,  by  this  method,  we  introduce 
distractions,  so  we  may  also  introduce  aids  or  helps  to  memo- 
rization. For  instance,  the  visualizer  may  be  identified  from 
the  fact  that  his  retention  is  materially  aided  and  strengthened 
by  a  distinct  spatial  arrangement  of  the  material  which  he 
is  to  reproduce;  and  this  aid  is  non-effective  or  even  nega- 
tive in. the  case  of  the  auditory  individual  because  the  latter 
must  now  form  successive  groups  of  impressions,  and  a  definite 
spatial  arrangement  of  the  items  to  be  remembered  may 
hinder  his  procedure  in  memorization.  The  following  phe- 
nomena furnish  additional  means  of  determining  the  t}^e  to 
which  a  given  indi\ddual  belongs.  The  visualizer  can  readily 
reproduce  visual  impressions  in  transposed  order;  the  indi- 
vidual who  is  dominantly  auditory-motor  finds  that  such  a 
transposition  is  a  difficult  feat.  The  visualizer  confuses  let- 
ters and  words  which  look  alike,  although  they  may  have 
wholly  different  sounds;  the  audi^  ry-motor  individual  con- 
fuses letters  and  words  which  sound  alike  although  they  may 
not  look  alike.  The  Frenchman  who  wrote  ''droit"  where  he 
intended  to  write  ''trois"  clearly  belongs  to  the  auditory  type. 
In  learning  lists  of  words  the  visualizer  is  more  likely  to  note 
the  consonants,  the  auditor}^  individual  the  vowels.  The 
visualizer  remembers  positions  upon  the  pages  of  books,  the 
auditory-motor  does  not.  The  visualizer  spells  long  words 
backwards  almost  as  readily  as  forwards;  the  auditory  and  the 
motor  individuals  find  this  to  be  a  much  more  diflSicult  task. 
For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  these  methods  I  must  refer 
the  reader  to  the  special  literature  of  the  topic.  ^ 

The  foregoing  discussions  indicate  that  the  memory  t>T3e 

"^  Sec  E.  Meumann,  Vorlesungen  zur  Einjuhrung  in  die  experimen- 
ielle  P'ddagogik,  II, 


230  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  the  pupil  should  be  taken  into  account  by  the  teacher. 
I  once  observed  a  boy  of  thirteen  who  was  trying  to  draw  an 
outline  map  of  Greece.  Although  he  had  made  an  accurate 
study  of  the  map,  his  drawing  did  not  show  the  characteristic 
outline  but  only  a  shapeless  form  which  bore  no  resemblance 
to  the  map  of  Greece.  I  surmised  at  once  that  he  belonged 
to  the  motor  type  and  had  him  trace  the  coast-line  with  his 
finger,  at  first  in  sections  and  then  as  a  whole.  He  was  then 
able  to  make  the  drawing  accurately  and  without  any  difficulty. 
A  study  of  his  ideational  type  would  have  been  beneficial  both 
to  him  and  to  his  teacher.  Binet  also  has  determined  that 
certain  persons  must  trace  a  drawing  with  the  finger  if  they 
are  to  remember  it.  And  a  certain  French  painter  employs 
this  method  in  teaching  his  art.  *'In  order  to  accustom  his 
pupils  to  drawing  from  memory,  he  had  them  follow  the  out- 
line of  the  figure  with  a  lead  pencil  held  at  some  distance 
from  the  eye;  and  he  thus  obUged  his  pupils  to  fuse  the 
motor  remembrance  with  the  visual  remembrance"  (Ballet). 
While  a  student  in  the  high  school  I  studied  Hebrew;  but 
since  it  was  my  custom  to  remember  vocabularies  by  means 
of  auditory  images  I  had  great  difficulty  with  Hebrew  verbs 
because  they  are  all  so  similar  in  sound  (a  long  a  in  the  first 
syllable  and  a  short  a  in  the  second).  It  occurred  to  me  to 
attend  only  to  the  visual  images  of  the  consonants  and  my 
difficulty  disappeared. 

These  are  only  indications  of  the  pedagogical  applications 
which  may  be  made  of  the  doctrine  of  memory  types.  We  shall 
learn  more  of  them  in  our  discussion  of  methods  of  learning. ' 

I  Concerning  the  significance  of  ideational  types  in  the  general  work 
of  teaching,  see  L,  Pfeiffer,  Op.  ciL,  i2off.;  for  their  significance  in 
mathematics,  see  R.  Eckhardt,  Visuelle  Erinnerungsbilder  beim  Rech- 
nen,  Zeitschrijt  J.  cxp.  Padagogik,\.,  1907,  pp.  1-22;  for  their  signifi- 
cance in  language  instruction,  see  L,  Pfeiffer,  Ueber  qualitative  Arbeits- 
typcti,  Leipzig,  1908.     Pohlmann  and  Lobsien  may  also  be  consulted. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ASSOCIATIVE  LEARNING  {Continued) 

J.  Economical  Learning 

Economical  learning  is  that  sort  of  learning  which  attains 
its  end  in  the  most  appropriate  and  advantageous  fashion. 
The  end  usually  consists  in  an  ability  to  recite  from  memory 
and  to  retain  permanently  in  memory;  and  the  most  advan- 
tageous method  is  the  method  which  employs  the  least  time, 
and  which  employs  the  simplest  and  most  appropriate  pro- 
cedure.   The  aim  of  learning,  however,  is  not  always  the  same, 
as  we  have  already  seen.    In  school-work  the  act  of  learning 
aims  to  secure  an  ability  to  recite  the  material  once  from 
memory,  and  then  to  retain  the  "substance"  of  the  acquired 
material  either  temporarily  or  permanently.    In  certain  cases 
we  endeavor  to  memorize  word-for-word;  in  other  cases  our 
sole  purpose  is  to  learn  the  essential  content  of  a  coherent 
context  or  a  mass  of  concrete  material  without  regard  to  the 
author's  wording.     The  concerns  of  practical  Kfe  and  the 
affairs  of  the  school-room  frequently  impel  us  to  learn  material 
with  a  view  to  remembering  it  for  only  a  short  time.    When  a 
professor  prepares  for  a  lecture,  a  public  speaker  for  an  ad- 
dress, a  preacher  for  a  sermon,  or  an  actor  for  a  performance, 
permanent  retention  is  a  matter  of  but  shght  importance. 
Hence  it  is  preferable  to  extend  the  significance  of  the  term 
"economical  learning"  to  include  every  sort  of  learning  which 
reaches  its  goal  with  a  least  expenditure  of  time  and  of  energy 
and  by  means  of  associations  whose  formation  conforms  with 
sound  psychological  principles. 

In  practical  life  and  in  the  school-room,  significance  attaches 

231 


232   "  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

chiefly  to  three  of  the  numerous  conditions  of  learning:  the 
expenditure  of  time,  the  expenditure  of  energy,  and  the 
method  of  forming  the  associations  which  are  to  be  effective 
in  subsequent  reproduction.  The  amount  of  time  which  is 
expended  in  learning  can  be  measured  without  difficulty. 
In  measuring  expenditure  of  energy  we  first  of  all  determine 
how  many  repetitions  are  necessary  to  secure  a  first  errorless 
recitation;  then  we  determine  the  intensity  of  concentra- 
tion, and  finally  the  degree  of  fatigue  which  is  produced  by 
the  act  of  learning.  The  effect  of  the  act  of  learning  may  be 
measured  in  various  ways;  we  may  determine  it  from  the 
first  errorless  recitation,  or  from  subsequent  recitations  made 
after  the  lapse  of  variable  intervals  of  time  or,  when  repro- 
duction is  no  longer  possible,  we  may  measure  how  much 
time  or  how  many  repetitions  are  saved  when  the  same 
material  is  re-learned  after  various  intervals  of  time.  When 
the  method  of  relearning  is  employed  we  may  supplement  it 
by  other  methods  of  measurement,  such  as  the  method  of 
paired  associates  which  has  already  been  described.  Ebbing- 
haus  developed  a  method  of  prompting,  in  which  the  learner 
signals  that  he  is  in  need  of  aid  and  is  then  supplied  with  the 
name  of  the  missing  word  or  syllable;  the  number  of  prompt- 
ings is  taken  as  a  measure  of  retention.  But  this  method  is 
not  to  be  recommended. 

If  we  are  to  obtain  an  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  methods 
of  learning  it  is  indispensable  tliat  we  should  mnke  nn  iade- 
pendent  investigation  of  every  factor  or  condition  which  has 
to  do  with  the  work  of  memory.  And  for  this  reason  the 
saving  of  time,  the  saving  of  energy,  and  other  phases  of  the 
problem  of  learning  has  each  been  made  the  topic  of  a  special 
investigation.  ^ 

^  For  a  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  economy  in  learning  see  Appen- 
dix II. 


Associative  Learning  233 

It  will  be  less  difficult  to  give  a  clear  description  of  the 
methods  of  learning  and  of  the  means  which  have  been  em- 
ployed in  investigating  them  if  we  first  present  the  successive 
stages  through  which  the  development  of  memory  experi- 
mentation has  passed.  Then  we  shall  add  a  summary  state- 
ment concerning  the  significance  wliich  these  experimental 
results  possess  for  the  teacher. 

Let  us  observe  a  pupil  and  note  how  he  proceeds  when  he 
is  assigned  the  task  of  memorizing  a  poem,  or  of  learning 
words  of  a  foreign  language.  Notwithstanding  certain  differ- 
ences in  individual  methods  of  learning,  it  will  be  found  that 
most  pupils  commonly  adopt  the  same  procedure  to  the 
extent,  at  least,  that  they  break  up  the  prescribed  material 
into  smaller  sections,  especially  if  it  be  a  long  task;  then 
they  learn  each  of  the  sections  by  itself,  by  a  process  of  repeat- 
ing it  over  and  over  again;  and  finally  they  connect  it  all 
together  by  reading  the  whole  material  through  from  begin- 
ning to  end.  For  instance,  the  pupil  divides  a  stanza  of 
poetry  into  two  or  three  parts  which  vary  in  length  with  the 
content,  the  sentence  construction,  and  the  length  of  the 
stanza;  and  each  part  is  memorized  independently.  Most 
pupils  memorize  foreign  vocabularies  by  a  process  in  which 
each  word  with  its  equivalent  in  the  mother  tongue  is  learned 
by  a  series  of  repetitions  of  the  single  pair  of  words.  Seldom 
do  we  find  a  pupil  who  proceeds  in  any  other  fashion,  for 
instance  who  reads  the  whole  poem  or  the  whole  list  of  words 
through  from  beginning  to  end  and  by  always  reading  in  this 
fashion  attempts  to  memorize  it  as  a  whole.  And  yet  general 
psychological  considerations  as  well  as  experimental  findings 
show  that  the  latter  method  is  the  only  one  which  is  psycho- 
logically justifiable  and  that  it  is  by  far  the  more  economical. 
That  is,  the  "whole"  method  requires  fewer  repetitions  and 
usually  less  time  than  the  "part"  method  to  produce  a  first 


234  ^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

errorless  recitation;  and,  what  is  still  more  important,  the 
"whole"  method  secures  a  more  accurate  reproduction  and 
a  more  lasting  retention.  From  this  it  would  seem  to  follow 
that  pupils  should  be  induced  to  learn  material  as  a  whole 
and  never  in  parts.  It  is  especially  true  of  the  pupil  whose 
memory  is  weak  and  whose  reproduction  is  uncertain  and  hes- 
itant that  a  much  more  faithful  reproduction  and  a  more 
enduring  remembrance  is  attained  by  the  "whole"  method. 
Since  not  only  in  school-children  but  also  in  most  adults 
the  "part"  method  is  the  one  most  frequently  employed, 
we  must  devote  a  more  detailed  discussion  to  the  surprising 
experimental  result  which  has  just  been  described.  ^ 

In  order  that  the  methods  of  learning  may  be  designated 
as  accurately  as  possible,  we  shall  introduce  the  following 
terms:  The  ordinary  procedure  in  which  the  learner  divides 
his  material  into  sections  and  learns  each  section  by  itself 
and  then  proceeds  to  learn  the  whole  as  a  whole,  we  shall 
call  the  part-procedure.  But  when  he  reads  the  material 
through  from  beginning  to  end  during  the  whole  process  of 
learning,  we  shall  speak  of  his  method  as  continuous  learning 
or  the  whole-procedure. 

Even  in  the  earliest  systematic  investigations  of  memory 
Ebbinghaus  found  an  indication  of  the  difference  between 
these  two  methods  of  learning;  but  Ebbinghaus  reported 
only  that  with  material  whose  parts  are  of  very  unequal 
degrees  of  difficulty  the  whole-procedure  probably  requires 

^  From  questioning  my  acquaintances  I  have  found  that  in  certain 
individual  instances  children  and  adults  have  instinctively  hit  upon 
the  use  of  the  ''whole"  method  in  their  learning  of  all  sorts  of  material; 
one  of  my  colleagues  reports  that  he  has  employed  this  method  since 
childhood.  In  his  monograph  on  retention  and  forgetting,  Radossawl- 
jewitsch  reports  that  the  national  singers  of  Servia  learn  all  of  their 
songs  and  poems  by  the  ''whole"  method  {Op.  cit.,  p.  93);  and  I  have 
heard  that  certain  primitive  peoples  know  no  other  methgd  of  learning. 


Associative  Learning  235 

somewhat  more  time  than  the  part-procedure.  ^  We  shall  see 
that  this  is  sometimes  true  of  materials  whose  parts  are 
exceedingly  non-uniform  in  their  degree  of  difficulty;  but 
this  does  not  prove  the  falsity  of  our  principle  that  in  general 
the  whole-procedure  is  more  economical  than  the  part  pro- 
cedure. It  was  G.  E.  Miiller  who  by  his  experiments  upon 
the  learning  of  nonsense  syllables  first  instigated  the  more 
accurate  investigation  of  this  problem;  and  it  was  Lottie 
Steffens,  a  pupil  of  Miiller's,  who  although  her  investigation 
was  not  wholly  complete  first  showed  that  under  certain 
circumstances  it  is  more  advantageous  to  learn  an  extensive 
material  as  a  whole.  The  differences  between  different 
methods  of  learning  and  especially  their  effects  upon  perma- 
nent retention  have  been  investigated,  in  normal  individuals, 
by  Pentschew,  Ebert  and  Meumann,  Ephrussi,  Neumann, 
G.  E.  Miiller,  Witasek  and  others,  and  in  the  insane,  by  H. 
Miiller.^  Miss  Steffens  worked  almost  exclusively  with 
adults,  although  a  nine  year  old  boy  and  a  ten  year  old  girl 
were  included  among  her  observers  for  purposes  of  compari- 
son. In  all  of  the  investigations  in  my  own  laboratory  we 
experimented  with  both  children  and  adults,  and  we  adopted 
a  strictly  comparative  procedure. 

Miss  Steffens  first  determined  what  procedure  adults  nat- 
urally and  normally  adopt  in  learning  a  poem  of  nine  lines. 
In  order  to  discover  how  they  distributed  their  repetitions 
over  the  material,  she  introduced  a  most  ingenious  device. 
Stanzas  of  poetry  were  read  half-aloud  and  memorized  by 
seven  adults;  during  the  progress  of  the  learning  the  experi- 
menter indicated  upon  a  duplicate  sheet  what  sub-divisions 
the  reader  made  in  the  stanzas  during  his  process  of  learning. 
If,  for  example,  the  first  four  lines  were  read  through  five 

^  H.  Ebbinghaus.     Ueber  das  Gedachtnis,  Leipzig,  1885,  69. 
'  See  Bibliography. 


236  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

times  at  the  outset,  this  fact  was  recorded  by  drawing  five 
vertical  strokes  in  the  margin  beside  these  four  lines.  Hence 
"the  length  of  the  strokes  indicated  the  section  of  the  poem 
which  was  included  in  each  repetition,  and  the  order  of  the 
strokes  indicated  the  order  of  the  repetitions."  Similar 
records  were  also  made  for  the  boy  and  the  girl.  The  follow- 
ing characteristic  features  of  procedure  in  learning  were  dis- 
covered: a.  In  the  process  of  memorizing  poetry  every 
learner  divided  the  stanza  into  parts,  h.  In  memorizing  sub- 
sequent parts  they  all  went  back  occasionally  over  the  parts 
which  had  already  been  learned  and  re-read  these  once  more, 
partly  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  the  onset  of  forgetting, 
and  partly  for  the  purpose  of  linking  up  the  several  sections 
which  had  been  learned  independently  of  one  another. 
c.  Every  learner  repeated  the  earlier  lines  more  frequently 
than  the  later  ones;  children  wasted  many  more  repetitions  of 
the  earher  Hnes  than  adults,  d.  The  more  difficult  passages 
and  words  were  memorized  by  special  repetitions,  e.  The  end 
of  a  section  which  had  been  learned  by  itself,  and  the  begin- 
nings of  the  succeeding  section  were  linked  together  by  extra 
repetitions.  /.  Adults  showed  a  general  tendency  to  learn 
by  attempting  to  recite  what  had  been  half  memorized,  mean- 
while looking  back  occasionally  at  the  original  for  purposes  of 
control;  children  learned  solely  by  means  of  reading,  g.  The 
act  of  reading  was  slow  in  proportion  as  the  material  was 
difficult. 

Miss  Steffens  paid  particular  attention  to  individual  pecu- 
liarities in  learning.  Different  individuals  seem  to  have  wholly 
different  habits  in  their  mode  of  distributing  their  repe- 
titions over  the  material.  Some  read  the  whole  stanza 
through  at  the  outset  and  do  not  divide  it  into  sections  until 
this  has  been  done;  others  attempt  at  the  very  outset  to 
learn  a  part  by  itself,  etc.    The    chief  dift'erence  between  the 


Associative  Learni^ig  237 

child's  method  of  learning  and  the  adult's  consists  in  the  fact 
that  the  child  distributes  his  repetitions  in  an  exceedingly 
unpractical  and  uneconomical  manner.  The  child  wastes  a 
great  many  repetitions  upon  the  first  few  Hnes  of  the  stanza, 
and  learns  the  latter  part  of  the  stanza  in  a  very  imperfect 
fashion.  Such  a  method  of  memorization  must,  of  course, 
result  in  a  wholly  non-uniform  learning  of  the  material.  This 
uneconomical  distribution  of  repetitions  and  certain  other 
consequences  of  the  part-procedure  give  rise  to  a  hesitating 
recitation  and  to  a  non-uniform  retention. 

What  causes  have  given  rise  to  the  customary  methods  of 
learning?  Why  do  most  people  learn  in  a  manner  which  is 
psychologically  incorrect  and  uneconomical?  The  chief  cause 
is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  various  parts  of 
materials  to  be  learned  are  not  all  equally  difhcult.  We  first 
of  all  attempt  to  learn  the  more  diihcult  parts  separately;  and 
in  so  doing  we  break  the  whole  into  sections.  An  additional 
reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  we  are  naturally  indolent; 
we  see  the  progress  of  our  learning  more  readily  when  we  learn 
smaller  parts  by  themselves  than  when  we  attempt  to  mem- 
orize the  whole  at  once.  Then,  too,  certain  individuals 
dehberately  refuse  to  learn  the  whole  material  at  once;  they 
do  not  feel  that  they  are  equal  to  such  a  task.  We  found 
interesting  illustrations  of  this  natural  repugnance,  some  of 
our  adults  declaring  that  the  whole-procedure  is  nonsensical, 
but  they  later  discovered  to  their  astonishment  how  success- 
ful it  is.  There  are  other  secondary  causes  which  have  given 
rise  to  our  customary  methods  of  learning;  for  instance.  Miss 
Steffens  expresses  the  opinion  that  our  learning  is  not  always 
dominated  by  economical  motives  but  also  by  aesthetic  and 
other  motives  which  are  at  variance  with  economical  consid- 
erations.   Experimental  investigation  shows  us,  however,  that 

the  customary  methods  of  learning  are  psychologically  wrong 

17 


238  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

and  unpractical;  that  the  whole-procedure  secures  a  more 
advantageous  formation  of  associations;  that  it  leads  to  mem- 
orization more  rapidly  and  with  fewer  repetitions;  and  that 
it  guarantees  a  more  uniform  and  lasting  retention. 

As  we  have  already  remarked,  Miss  Steffens  proved  only 
that  the  whole-procedure  leads  more  rapidly  to  its  goal.  This 
was  first  investigated  by  means  of  stanzas  of  poetry  of  as 
nearly  equal  difficulty  as  possible.  Selected  stanzas  were 
learned  by  several  persons,  first  by  the  part-procedure  and 
then  by  the  whole-procedure.  The  differences  in  time  although 
not  always  large  were  in  favor  of  the  latter  method. 

Her  averages  show  that  the  learning  of  a  verse  by  the  whole- 
procedure  required  167  seconds,  by  the  part-procedure  183 
seconds.  A  similar  investigation  of  the  purely  mechanical 
learning  of  nonsense  syllables  was  also  made.  Here,  too,  there 
was  a  sUght  difference  in  favor  of  the  whole-procedure.  The 
children's  results  were,  on  the  whole,  the  same  as  those  of  the 
adults.  Miss  Steffens  also  attempted  to  determine  whether 
the  whole-procedure  is  also  more  advantageous  when  the 
memory  material  is  of  large  amount.  Her  results  furnish  an 
affirmative  answer  to  this  question;  even  when  long  lists  of 
nonsense  syllables, — up  to  twenty  syllables  in  a  series, — 
were  learned  by  the  two  methods,  the  whole-procedure  usually 
led  to  errorless  recitation  in  less  time  than  the  part-procedure. 

Miss  Steffens  then  raised  the  question:  Upon  what  does 
the  advantage  of  the  whole-procedure  really  depend?  A 
group  of  special  experiments,  which  dealt  with  this  problem, 
showed  that  the  whole-procedure  possesses  the  following 
advantages:  a.  When  poetry  or  prose  is  learned  in  sections, 
a  special  act  of  learning  must  be  devoted  to  the  transitions 
from  one  section  to  another.  The  special  repetitions  expended 
in  this  fashion  are  extra ;  they  are  not  needed  when  we  learn 
by  the  whole-procedure,     h.   When  we  learn  by  the  part- 


Associative  Learning  239 

procedure  we  establish  numerous  associations  which  must 
have  an  injurious  effect  in  our  subsequent  recitation;  in  turn- 
ing back  from  the  end  of  any  section  to  its  beginning  we 
estabhsh  an  association  between  the  end  and  the  beginning  of 
the  same  section  instead  of  associating  the  former  with  the 
beginning  of  the  following  section.    These  associations  are  an 
impediment  to  reproduction;  and  we  must  suppress  them  arti- 
ficially by  a  special  learning  of  the  transitions  themselves. 
c.   When  a  material  has  been  learned,  not  only  are  associa- 
tions established  between  parts  which  immediately  succeed 
one  another  but  parts  which  are  widely  removed  from  one 
another  are  also  linked  together  by  mediate  associations;  and 
in  learning  the  individual  parts  of  our  material  we  also  note 
the  positions  which  they  occupy  in  the  whole.     These  two 
aids  to  memory, — mediate  association  and  "absolute  posi- 
tion,"— are  reinforced  by  every  complete  reading  during  our 
process  of  learning  the  material  as  a  single  whole.    But  when 
we  adopt  a  discontinuous  and  disjointed  method  of  learning, 
these  two  advantages  are  decreased  or  wholly  eliminated 
because  the  first  few  Unes  are  now  wholly  disconnected  from 
the  succeeding  Hnes,  since  each  is  learned  independently,  and 
the  position  of  the  parts  is  continuously  altered  and  shifted. 
For  instance,  at  the  outset  the  first  few  lines  of  each  section 
occupy  the  initial  position;  but  so  soon  as  the  parts  are  Hnked 
up  in  a  whole  they  assume  a  new  position,    d.   When  we  learn 
by  the  whole-procedure,  our  learning  is  uniformly  distributed 
over  all  parts  of  the  material;   and  if  the  parts  of  the  poem 
are  approximately  equally  difficult,  the  whole  poem  is  learned 
more  uniformly.    Hence  the  method  itself  guards  against  our 
devoting  too  many  repetitions  to  certain  parts,  and  paying 
too  little  heed  to  other  parts. 

Miss  Steffens'  investigation  was  not  sufficiently  complete 
to   furnish   a  final  verdict  regarding  methods  of  learning. 


240  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

Beginning  with  the  summer  of  1901  we  undertook  an  exten- 
sive series  of  experiments  in  the  psychological  laboratory  at 
Zurich.  These  experiments  dealt  with  the  technique  and 
economy  of  learning,  their  chief  purpose  being  to  discover 
the  exact  meaning  of  economical  learning  as  discussed  at  the 
opening  of  this  chapter.  Accordingly  our  investigations 
dealt  with  three  main  problems:  i.  Which  method  of  learn- 
ing leads  to  faultless  recitation  from  memory  in  the  shortest 
time  and  with  the  least  number  of  repetitions?  2.  Which 
method  of  learning  secures  the  best  distribution  of  attention 
over  the  material,  and  the  best  formation  of  association  be- 
tween its  parts?  j.  Which  method  gives  the  most  accurate 
reproduction  and  the  most  lasting  retention?  Our  investi- 
gation throughout  included  a  comparative  study  of  children 
and  adults.  In  the  experiments  which  were  devoted  to  the 
above  three  questions  we  employed  five  school-children, — 
two  boys  and  three  girls,  eight,  ten,  eleven,  twelve  and  four- 
teen years  of  age.  The  later  experiments,  particularly  those 
of  Meumann  and  Ephrussi,  were  concerned  especially  with 
the  significance  of  the  different  methods  of  learning  for  dif- 
ferent sorts  of  memory  material. 

We  first  took  up  the  ordinary  part-procedure  and  asked 
ourselves  the  question:  Is  it  more  expedient  and  more  eco- 
nomical, in  the  sense  described  above,  to  divide  the  material 
into  few  or  into  many  parts?  For  instance,  when  four 
stanzas  of  poetry  are  to  be  memorized,  the  question  arises  as 
to  whether  it  is  more  advantageous  to  learn  each  of  the  four 
stanzas  by  itself  or  to  sub-divide  the  poem  into  still  smaller 
parts.  Our  experiments  showed  that  learning  by  parts 
becomes  more  and  more  disadvantageous  the  more  we  sub- 
divide the  material.  And  conversely,  the  more  closely  part- 
learning  approximates  to  whole-learning,  the  more  rapidly 
and  certainly  is  the  task  accomphshed.     Furthermore,  we 


Associative  Learning  241 

inquired  whether  the  superior  advantage  of  the  whole- 
procedure  increases  with  increase  in  the  amount  of  material 
to  be  learned.  Our  experiments  showed  that  in  the  case  of 
adults  the  advantage  of  this  method  becomes  more  evident 
with  increasing  amounts  of  material.  For  instance,  if  groups 
of  12,  16,  20  and  24  syllables  are  learned  by  each  of  the 
methods  the  sa\ing  in  time  and  in  repetitions,  and  the  in- 
creased retention  resulting  from  the  employment  of  the 
whole-procedure  are  great  in  proportion  as  the  group  is 
large. 

If,  now,  the  learning  which  is  usually  done  in  memorizing 
nonsense  syllables  is  regarded  as  a  purely  mechanical  memo- 
rization which  derives  no  aid  from  the  meaning  of  the  material, 
and  if  the  memorization  of  poetry  is  regarded  as  significant 
learning,  we  find  ourselves  confronted  by  the  question:  Is 
the  whole-procedure  more  advantageous  in  mechanical  learn- 
ing or  in  significant  learning?  We  discovered  that  the  greater 
advantage  is  derived  in  the  case  of  significant  learning.  The 
differences  between  the  two  methods  of  learning  are  present 
in  unmistakable  degree  only  in  cases  where  we  learn  signifi- 
cant material,  but  they  are  here  very  considerable.  For 
instance,  one  of  our  observers,  Kl.,  learned  two  stanzas  from 
Schiller's  "Dido"  on  each  of  ten  consecutive  days;  on  alter- 
nate days, — first,  third,  etc., — she  employed  the  part-proce- 
dure, and  on  intervening  days  the  whole-procedure, — each 
stanza  constituting  a  "part"  in  the  former  case.  It  was 
found  that  the  whole-procedure  showed  an  average  saving 
of  14.5  minutes  per  stanza  over  the  part-procedure.  Thus 
even  with  such  a  relatively  small  amount  of  memory 
material  as  two  stanzas  of  this  poem  there  was  a  very  consid- 
erable saving  of  time.  Subsequent  reproduction  showed  that 
the  stanzas  which  had  been  learned  as  wholes  were  retained 
in  memory  with  greater  tenacity  and  were  recited  from  mem- 


242  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ory  with  greater  certainty.  The  number  of  repetitions  em- 
ployed in  the  two  cases  reveals  a  similar  state  of  -affairs.  The 
part-procedure  required  thirty-three  repetitions  for  the  mem- 
orization of  each  pair  of  stanzas,  while  the  whole-procedure 
required  only  fourteen  repetitions, — less  than  half  the  num- 
ber of  repetitions  for  the  learning  of  the  same  amount  of 
material.  Moreover,  the  usual  hesitancy  in  recitation  did 
not  occur  at  the  beginnings  of  sections  or  of  stanzas  when 
the  whole-procedure  had  been  employed.  The  superior  advan- 
tage of  this  method  appeared  again  when  free  reproduction 
was  no  longer  possible;  the  partially  forgotten  stanza  was 
re-learned  more  rapidly  in  those  cases  where  it  had  originally 
been  learned  as  a  whole. 

Still  another  illustration  of  the  difference  between  the  two 
methods  of  learning  material  of  moderate  length  may  be 
cited.    One  of  our  observers,  Kel.,  memorized  five  eight-line 
stanzas  of  poetry  each  day  for  several  days, — employing  the 
part-procedure   and    the   whole-procedure    alternately.      He 
required  thirty-two  minutes,  and  forty-five  repetitions  for  the 
memorization  of  each  stanza  when  the  part-procedure  was 
employed;   he  required  only  twelve  repetitions,  but  approxi- 
mately the  same  amount  of  time  when  he  learned  the  stanzas 
as  wholes.     This  case  is  particularly  instructive  because  it 
shows  that  the  advantage  derived  from  the  use  of  the  whole- 
method  consists  not  so  much  in  a  saving  of  time  as  Miss  Stef- 
fens  believes,  but  chiefly  in  a  saving  of  repetitions,  in  a  more 
correct  formation  of  associations,  and  in  a  more  permanent 
retention.    It  frequently  happens  that  notwithstanding  a  con- 
siderably lesser  number  of  repetitions,  the  gain  in  time  from 
the  use  of  the  whole-procedure  is  not  great,  because  most 
persons  involuntarily  read  more  slowly  and  more  emphati- 
cally when  they  employ  the  whole-method.     The  difficult 
passages  are  read  with  especial  slowness  in  order  that  they 


Associative  Learning  243 

may  be  imprinted  upon  memory  with  maximum  concentra- 
tion during  every  reading. 

The  essential  advantage  of  learning  by  means  of  the  whole- 
procedure  does  not  come  to  light,  however,  until  we  examine 
the  mental  factors  which  come  into  play  in  the  two  methods, — 
especially  the  behavior  of  attention  and  the  formation  of 
associations.    If  all  the  parts  of  the  material  are  of  approxi- 
mately equal  difficulty,  then  the  circumstances  which  Miss 
Steffens  found  to  contribute  to  economical  learning  must  be 
taken  into  consideration:    i.   The  associations  between  the 
various  parts  of  the  material  must  be  of  a  more  uniform  degree 
of  stability  because  the  whole-procedure  provides  that  the 
repetitions  shall  be  uniformly  distributed  over  the  whole 
material.     2.   The   associations   established   by   the   whole- 
procedure  are  formed  in  the  direction  and  only  in  the  direc- 
tion in  which  they  are  subsequently  to  operate  in  reproduc- 
tion;   while  the  part-procedure  establishes  backward  asso- 
ciations between  the  end  and  the  beginning  of  the  same  sec- 
tion.   In  the  former  case,  reproduction  progresses  smoothly 
and  ■without  hesitation  at  the  points  of  junction  between  the 
several  sections.    3.   The  association  of  each  section  with  its 
position  in  the  whole  body  of  material  is  formed  correctly 
from  the  outset  and  is  reinforced  by  each  successive  reading. 
As  a  result  of  this  the  remembrance  of  position  becomes  a  most 
effective  aid  in  reproduction.     4.   In  the  learning  of  signifi- 
cant material  our  apprehension  of  the  meaning  and  of  the 
logical  coherence  of  the  material  is  much  more  effective  in 
the  formation  of  associations  when  the  whole-procedure  is 
employed.    It  is  clear  that  the  meaning  of  the  whole  is  much 
more  readily  comprehensible  and  is  much  more  permanently 
present  in  consciousness  when  we  read  the  material  through 
from  beginning  to  end  than  when  we  read  each  part  sepa- 
rately.   Even  the  separate  parts  are  themselves  more  readily 


244  '^^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

understood  when  they  are  always  interpreted  from  the  whole. 
The  advantage  which  learning  derives  from  an  understanding 
of  the  meaning  of  the  material  is  so  great  that  the  efl&ciency 
of  significant  learning  is  found,  under  certain  circumstances, 
to  be  ten  times  as  great  as  the  efficiency  of  mechanical  memo- 
rization.    When  we  have  recourse  to    the   part-procedure, 
therefore,  we  eHminate  the  most  potent  factor  which  can 
contribute  to  learning.     5.   The  clearer  apprehension  of  the 
coherence  of  material  learned  by  the  whole-procedure  gives 
rise  to  a  much  more  efficient  behavior  of  attention.     Since 
the  attention  is  continuously  attracted  by  the  meaning  of 
the  material  its  tension  does  not  relax  so  readily  and  a  uniform 
degree  of  concentration  is  preserved.    In  consequence  of  this, 
automatic  and  purposeless  recitations  are  not  so  likely  to 
occur;  they  are,  of  course,  almost  wholly  ineffective  for  memo- 
rization.    This   chiefly  explains  why  fewer  repetitions   are 
necessary   when    the   whole-procedure   is   employed;     every 
repetition  is  fully  utilized  because  the  concentration  of  atten- 
tion has  been  maintained  throughout. 

It  was  the  special  aim  of  our  investigation  to  determine 
whether  these  differences  between  the  two  methods  of  learn- 
ing, which  we  found  to  occur  in  the  adult,  are  present  also 
in  the  child.  We  discovered,  to  our  surprise,  that  the  differ- 
ences are  not  duplicated  in  all  of  their  details.  If  we  are  to 
understand  this  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  memory  of 
children  of  school-age,  up  to  fourteen  years,  is  a  much  less 
efficient  instrument  than  that  of  the  studious  adult  who 
constantly  exercises  his  memorial  functions.  This  is  partic- 
ularly true  of  the  mechanical  memory  of  children.  The  view 
is  universally  held  by  students  of  pedagogy  and  psychology 
that  the  mechanical  memory  of  children  is  superior  to  that  of 
adults,  except  perhaps  in  the  case  of  very  young  children. 
Our  experiments  have  convinced  us  that  this  view  is  erroneous. 


Associative  Learning  245 

In  comparing  the  memory  of  the  child  with  that  of  the  adult 
we  must  distinguish  between  two  different  capacities:  the 
capacity  to  learn  and  the  capacity  to  remember.  The  child's 
capacity  to  learn  is  inferior  to  that  of  the  adult;  but  what 
has  once  been  learned  is  retained  better  by  children.  Yet  we 
have  evidence  which  proves  that  even  in  young  children,  under 
the  age  of  five  or  six  years,  retention  is  less  permanent  than 
in  adults.  This  is  to  be  inferred  from  observations  that  chil- 
dren who  become  deaf  before  the  age  of  about  six  years  also 
lose  the  power  of  speech  and  must  thereafter  be  educated  as 
deaf  mutes;  it  is  also  found  that  children  forget  their  mother- 
tongue  when  they  emigrate  to  a  foreign  country  while  adults 
never  forget  their  native  language. 

We  do  not  yet  know  at  what  age  the  child's  retention 
becomes  superior  to  that  of  the  adult.  Experiments  have 
shown,  however,  that  material  which  has  been  learned  either 
mechanically  or  significantly  is  retained  better  by  school- 
children than  by  adults,  and  that  adults  memorize  much 
more  rapidly  than  school-children.^  Adults  who  constantly 
exercise  their  mental  functions  are  able  to  learn  much  more 
rapidly  than  children.  The  inferiority  of  the  child's  memory^ 
especially  its  inferiority  in  verbal  memorization,  always  aston- 
ished us  anew  when  we  compared  the  efficiency  of  students 
and  instructors  with  that  of  school-children.  This  inferiority 
was  indicated  in  the  results  of  Bolton's  investigation  of  the 
development  of  memory  in  children.  Bolton  pointed  out 
that  the  development  of  memory  depends  much  more  upon 
the  age  than  upon  the  intelligence  of  the  child.  This  means 
that  his  physiological  age  prescribes  a  definite  limit  wliich 
the  memorial  efficiency  of  even  the  inteUigent  child  cannot 
transcend,  and  that  older  children  excel  younger  children 
simply  because  they  are  older. 

'  Radossawljewitsch  {Op.  cii.)  has  amply  demonstrated  this  fact. 


246  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  adult, — in  our  investiga- 
tions, the  adults  varied  between  twenty  and  forty-six  years 
of  age, — must  possess  a  capacity  to  learn  which  is  superior 
to  that  of  the  child  of  fourteen  years  or  less.  But  is  this  not 
contradicted  by  the  familiar  experience  that  capacity  of 
verbal  retention  decreases  with  age,  and  that  children  learn 
mechanically  more  readily  than  adults?  Before  I  became  an 
experimental  psychologist  I  once  observed  that  a  long  geo- 
metrical demonstration  was  committed  to  memory  by  a  child 
because  he  failed  to  understand  it.  I  then  made  an  attempt 
to  memorize  the  same  demonstration  word-for-word  and  suc- 
ceeded only  with  the  greatest  difficulty.  Similar  observations 
could  be  cited  by  every  teacher;  but  they  do  not  prove  what 
they  are  alleged  to  prove.  All  of  our  mental  functions  owe 
their  efficiency  to  continuous  training.  The  adult  has  hab- 
ituated himself  to  learn  by  meaning  alone,  and  to  retain  the 
content  alone.  This  habitual  procedure  forces  his  mechanical 
learning  into  the  background;  but  it  does  not  entail  a  loss 
of  his  capacity  to  retain  in  a  mechanical  fashion.  Hence, 
until  he  reaches  a  very  advanced  age  the  adult  can,  by  a 
brief  training,  so  restore  his  neglected  mechanical  memory  as 
to  become  able  to  learn  more  than  three  or  four  times  as 
rapidly  as  the  average  child  of  even  the  higher  school  grades. 
Ebbinghaus  found  that  his  own  capacity  to  learn  had  not 
declined  at  the  age  of  fifty-two  years.  This,  however,  refers 
only  to  learning,  not  to  retention.  By  simply  re-training 
himself  in  learning  the  adult  becomes  capable  of  learning 
every  sort  of  material  in  less  time,  with  fewer  repetitions  and 
with  less  fatigue;  but  he  does  not  retain  it  so  faithfully  as 
the  child. 

The  experimental  psychologist  has  a  confirmation  of  both 
of  these  phenomena  in  the  quantitative  comparative  investi- 
gations of  the  memories  of  adults  and  children.    The  memori- 


Associative  Learning  247 

zation  of  a  series  of  sixteen  to  twenty-four  nonsense-syllables 
is  perhaps  the  best  example  of  mechanical  learning  which 
can  be  conceived;  in  the  accomplishment  of  such  a  task 
adult  learners  above  the  age  of  twenty  years  are,  after  a 
brief  practice,  considerably  superior  to  children  up  to  the  age 
of  fourteen  years.  Lists  of  twelve  syllables  fatigue  the  younger 
child;  eight-year-old  children  are  usually  unable  to  learn  a 
series  of  sixteen  syllables  at  a  single  sitting,  even  though  they 
continue  their  efforts  until  they  are  exhausted.  The  prac- 
tised adult,  on  the  other  hand,  learns  series  of  twenty-four 
and  more  syllables  at  a  single  sitting  without  serious  fatigue. 
Then,  too,  it  is  not  only  lack  of  practice  in  learning  by  rote 
which  usually  impairs  the  mechanical  memory  of  the  adult, 
but  rather  the  direction  of  his  interest  which  goes  out  to  the 
meaning  of  what  he  learns  and  endeavors  to  seize  upon  only 
the  particularly  important  items  or  upon  the  aesthetically 
pleasing  features  of  the  material.  When,  therefore,  an  adult 
is  asked  to  commit  to  memory  a  passage  of  prose,  we  invari- 
ably find  that  it  is  more  difficult  for  him  to  abandon  the 
accustomed  direction  of  attention  upon  the  content  and  to 
turn  his  attention  to  every  individual  word  of  the  material. 
The  fact  that  with  practice  the  adult  very  soon  becomes 
more  efficient  than  the  equally  practised  child  is  doubtless 
due  to  several  causes.  In  the  first  place,  all  secondary  con- 
ditions of  learning,  especially  the  concentration,  the  intensity 
and  the  uniformity  of  attention,  are  less  highly  developed  in 
the  child;  then,  too,  the  adult  tires  less  readily,— he  has  more 
endurance,  energy  and  self-control.  And  finally,  when  sig- 
nificant material  is  presented  the  adult's  more  rapid  compre- 
hension of  its  meaning  aids  him,  together  with  a  wealth  of 
secondary  associations  which  he  is  able  to  attach  to  the 
words. 
The  fact  that  children  excel  adults  in  the  retention  of  sim- 


248  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ilar  material,  learned  under  similar  conditions,  comes  to  light 
in  experimental  investigations,  especially  in  the  finding  that, 
in  re-learning,  the  saving  in  repetitions  is  relatively  greater 
than  in  the  case  of  adults.  And  this  difference  in  efficiency 
increases  with  increase  of  time  intervening  between  learning 
and  re-learning;  it  is  also  greater  for  children  of  seven  years 
than  for  children  of  thirteen  or  fourteen  years.  Thus  we  find 
the  same  difference  within  childhood  itself;  the  younger  the 
child  (it  has  been  proved  up  to  seven  years)  the  less  easily 
does  he  learn  by  rote  but  the  more  accurately  does  he  retain 
what  he  has  learned. 

This  lesser  efficiency  of  the  child's  memory  so  far  as  the 
act  of  learning  is  concerned  explains  the  difference  in  the 
results  obtained  by  different  methods  of  learning.  We  found, 
namely,  that  in  the  child's  mechanical  learning,  the  part- 
procedure  at  first  leads  more  rapidly  to  the  goal  than  the 
whole-procedure.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  child  finds 
the  whole-procedure  displeasing  and  discouraging  at  first 
because  he  feels  that  he  is  making  no  progress.  It  is  charac- 
teristic of  the  mental  operations  of  children,  however,  that, 
especially  in  younger  children,  their  emotions  and  their  moods 
are  of  prime  importance  in  determining  the  success  or  failure 
of  their  work.  Disinclination  and  faint-heartedness,  fear  of 
having  been  assigned  a  task  which  is  beyond  their  powers, — 
these  are  usually  not  overcome  in  the  case  of  the  child,  as  they 
are  in  the  case  of  the  adult,  by  an  increased  effort.  The  child 
is  at  the  mercy  of  these  debilitating  moods;  again  and  again 
we  found  in  our  experiments  that  nothing  is  so  important  for 
the  mental  work  of  children  as  the  consciousness  that  they  are 
able  to  accomplish  the  task  assigned.  When  the  child  learns 
his  material  in  parts  he  is  aware  of  his  progress  from  the 
outset;  applying  himself  to  small  sections  he  soon  masters 
them,  one  after  another,  and  feels  that  he  will  soon  be  master 


Associative  Learning  249 

of  the  whole  situation.^  This  changes,  however,  as  soon  as 
he  becomes  aware  of  the  advantages  of  learning  the  material 
as  a  single  section.  With  increasing  practice  even  the  child 
learns  more  rapidly,  with  fewer  repetitions  and  with  more 
accurate  retention  when  he  employs  the  whole-procedure. 
When  significant  material  is  learned,  the  whole-procedure 
proves  to  be  almost  as  advantageous  for  children  as  for  adults, 
as  is  shown  by  the  following  data:  Employing  the  part- 
procedure,  an  eight-year-old  boy  learned  a  verse  of  Goethe's 
Erlkonig  in  seventeen  repetitions;  in  eleven  repetitions  when 
he  employed  the  whole-procedure.  He  learned  another  verse 
of  the  same  poem  in  fifteen  repetitions  when  it  was  divided 
into  two  sections;  and  immediately  afterwards  he  learned 
the  next  verse  as  one  section  in  ten  repetitions.  Approxi- 
mately this  same  state  of  affairs  was  found  with  all  school- 
children. Subsequent  re-learning  was  easier  when  the  stanzas 
had  originally  been  learned  by  the  whole-procedure.  This  is 
true  also  for  larger  amounts  of  material  so  long  as  they  do 
not  fatigue  the  child.  We  may  therefore  regard  the  following 
general  result  as  estabhshed:  For  adults  and  children  it  is 
more  advantageous  and  it  is  psychologically  and  pedagog- 
ically  more  appropriate  to  learn  every  sort  of  material  as  a 
whole  than  to  break  it  up  into  parts. 

But  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  learning  of  material  which 
does  not  constitute  a  coherent  whole,  such  as  names,  dates, 
the  words  of  a  foreign  language,  etc.?  Experiments  which 
have  been  conducted  in  my  laboratory  show  that  with  this 
sort  of  material  also  it  is  more  advantageous  to  employ  the 
whole-procedure  than  to  learn  it  in  parts.  Words  of  a  foreign 
language, — Italian,  Russian,  Latin,  Bulgarian, — to  the  num- 

'  For  a  discussion  of  these  and  other  inhibitions  of  the  will  of  the 
child,  see  Meumann's  Vorlcsungen  zur  Einjiihrung  in  die  experimen- 
t'i'.c  Padagogik,  I.,  297fl. 


250  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

ber  of  fifty,  were  read  aloud  to  observers;  in  one  case,  the 
words  were  learned  in  the  usual  manner,  each  pair  being  mem- 
orized separately;  while  in  another  series  of  experiments  the 
whole  series  was  read  through  from  beginning  to  end.  The 
latter  procedure  gave  the  better  results  and  was  in  every 
way  more  economical. 

The  reason  for  this  advantage  is  probably  to  be  found 
chiefly  in  the  fact  that  in  learning  the  series  as  a  whole  the 
observer  is  impelled  to  distribute  his  repetitions  uniformly 
and  abundantly,  and  to  concentrate  his  attention  equably 
throughout.  Something  which  is  relatively  new  is  presented 
to  the  attention  at  every  step;  by  this  means,  a  non-signifi- 
cant and  purely  mechanical  recitation  is  avoided,  and  not  a 
single  repetition  fails  to  be  productive  in  the  acquisition  of 
the  material.  On  the  other  hand,  of  course,  there  is  here  no 
reinforcement  of  learning  by  means  of  a  coherence  of  the  whole 
body  of  material. 

According  to  investigations  made  by  Neumann,  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Martins,  upon  high  school  pupils  from  nine  and  a 
half  to  ten  and  a  half  years  of  age,  there  are  certain  other 
points  of  view  which  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
deciding  the  relative  merits  of  the  different  methods  of  learn- 
ing. This  investigator  also  found  that  the  whole-procedure  is 
much  more  economical  than  the  part-procedure.  But  the 
advantage  of  the  whole-method  is  immediately  apparent  only 
in  the  case  of  bright  pupils  and  rapid  learners;  with  dull 
pupils  the  advantage  appears  gradually,  and  only  after  long 
practice.  It  turns  out,  too,  that  increase  of  practice  benefits 
the  whole-procedure  more  than  the  part-procedure.  Other 
results  of  Neumann's  experiments  will  be  discussed  later;  let 
us  here  mention  only  that  he  found  the  superiority  of  the 
whole-procedure  to  be  evident  also  in  cases  where  the  material 
is  to  be  reproduced  not  in  its  original  but  in  a  changed  order. 


Associative  Learning  251  - 

Do  these  two  methods  of  learning  always  remain  equally 
advantageous  and  disadvantageous  with  every  sort  of  ma- 
terial? This  question  was  investigated  by  Ephrussi  in  an 
extensive  series  of  experiments  in  G.  E.  Miiller's  laboratory 
at  Gottingen.  Groups  of  nonsense-syllables,  pairs  of  Russian- 
German  words,  combinations  of  words  and  numbers,  and 
stanzas  of  poetry  were  learned  by  each  of  the  methods. 
Ephrussi  found  the  surprising  result  that  the  part-procedure  ^ 
gives  better  results  with  nonsense-syllables,  while  the  whole- 
procedure  is  more  advantageous  with  significant  material. 
This  she  explains  from  the  fact  that  in  dealing  with  nonsense- 
syllables  we  are  obHged  to  devote  a  certain  amount  of  effort 
to  the  task  of  becoming  acquainted  with  the  material  itself, 
that  is,  we  must  become  famihar  with  the  nonsense-syllables 
whereas  we  are  already  familiar  with  the  significant  words. 
And,  she  adds,  the  part-procedure  familiarizes  us  with  the 
syllables  more  rapidly  than  the  whole-procedure  because 
indi\idual  repetitions  in  immediate  succession  can  always 
make  use  of  the  after-effect  of  the  previous  reading  of  the 
syllables.  (Ephrussi  refers  to  this  after-effect  as  a  Persever- 
ation.) This  finding  has  no  essential  pedagogical  significance 
because,  in  the  first  place,  children  are  not  required  to  learn 
nonsense  material,  and  hence  the  whole-procedure  is  better 
for  all  material  learned  at  school.  And  secondly,  Ephrussi 
did  not  investigate  the  general  effect  upon  memory,  in  par- 
ticular, she  omitted  to  investigate  permanent  retention;  she 
determined  only  the  Trefcr,  that  is,  the  reproduction  of  a 
syllable  from  the  clue  furnished  when  the  experimenter  pre- 
sented the  syllable  which  had  been  learned  with  it  in  a  single 
unit  of  time  or  rhythm.    From  this  datum  alone  it  is  impossible 

'  Ephrussi  calls  the  part-procedure  the  method  of  learning  by  accu- 
mulated repetitions.  This  is  not  an  appropriate  term  because  the 
whole-procedure  is  also  a  learning  by  accumulated  repetitions. 


252  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

to  draw  any  reliable  conclusion  regarding  the  economy  of  a 
method  of  learning. 

However  advantageous  the  whole-procedure  may  be,  it 
must  be  adapted  and  modified  before  it  can  be  employed  in 
the  work  of  the  school-room  because  a  condition  which  we 
have  assumed  throughout  the  foregoing  discussion  is  seldom 
fulfilled  in  the  work  of  the  school-room, — namely,  one  rarely 
finds  that  the  material  to  be  learned  is  equally  difficult  in  all 
of  its  parts.  If  a  poem  or  a  list  of  words  contains  parts  which 
are  very  much  more  difficult  than  any  of  the  other  parts,  the 
method  which  learns  it  as  a  whole  compels  the  learner  to 
continue  reading  the  easier  parts  which  have  already  been 
mastered,  for  the  sake  of  the  more  difficult  parts  which  have 
not  yet  been  mastered.  This  is  of  course  a  disadvantage; 
and  the  method  has  yet  another  objection. 

It  may  be  shown  experimentally  that  when  a  large  body  of 
material  is  learned  in  one  piece, — for  instance,  a  poem  of 
eight  stanzas  or  a  series  of  sixteen  syllables, — the  concentra- 
tion of  attention  is  not  so  uniform  throughout  as  one  might 
suppose.  The  attention  rather  follows  a  typical  curve  of 
varying  degrees  of  concentration  showing  a  maximum  inten- 
sity at  the  beginning  and  towards  the  close  but  relaxing  at, 
or  slightly  beyond,  the  middle  region.  In  consequence  of 
this,  the  middle  portion  of  the  material  is  always  learned 
most  slowly  when  the  whole-procedure  is  employed;  and  if 
the  learning  has  not  been  thorough  the  middle  portion  of  the 
material  is  soon  forgotten.  This  typical  behavior  of  attention 
can  readily  be  observed  in  the  learning  of  nonsense-syllables. 
Ask  an  observer  to  learn  a  series  of  syllables  by  the  whole- 
procedure;  interrupt  him  as  soon  as  he  has  read  the  list 
through  twice  and  find  out  what  he  has  already  learned. 
Then  have  him  read  the  whole  series  twice  more  and  again 
determine  how  many  and  which  syllables  have  been  learned. 


4- 


Associative  Learning  253 

If  this  experiment  is  continued  until  the  whole  series  is  com- 
mitted to  memory  the  records  obtained  at  the  various  stages 
during  the  progress  of  learning  will  show  the  order  in  which 
the  various  members  of  the  series  are  mastered.  It  will 
almost  invariably  be  found  that  the  first  syllables  and  the  last 
syllables  are  memorized  first,  that  the  intermediate  syllables 
are  acquired  more  slowly,  and  that  at  a  certain  point  in  the 
series, — about  the  ninth  or  tenth  syllable, — there  lies  a  min- 
imum degree  of  concentration,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
these  syllables  are  almost  invariably  the  last  to  be  learned. 
If  the  series  is  very  long,  two  minima  of  concentration  usually 
appear.  In  learning  by  the  part-procedure  these  minimal 
degrees  of  concentration  do  not  make  their  appearance 
because  with  the  beginning  of  each  section  of  the  material 
the  attention  re\'ives  with  renewed  energy  and  with  a  maxi- 
mum of  concentration. 

We  have  attempted  to  overcome  these  two  objections  by 
introducing  procedures  which  have  been  called  the  mediating 
procedures.  These  methods  occupy  a  position  intermediate 
between  the  whole  and  the  part-procedures;  and  they  com- 
bine the  advantages  of  both  without  possessing  the  disad- 
vantages of  either.  One  of  these  mediating  procedures  stands 
the  test  with  all  sorts  of  memory  material.  In  this  procedure, 
the  whole  body  of  material  is  diWdcd  into  parts,  the  basis  of 
division  being  the  degree  of  difficulty  of  content;  and  the 
parts  are  marked  off  by  a  stroke,  or,  if  convenient,  by  a  blank 
space.  In  reading  the  series  the  learner  pauses  for  a  short 
time  at  the  end  of  each  section  but  he  does  not  then  return 
to  the  beginning  of  the  section;  instead  he  continues  to  read 
through  to  the  end  as  in  the  case  of  the  whole-procedure. 
I.  Hence  as  in  the  whole-procedure  associations  are  formed 
only  in  the  direction  in  which  they  are  to  operate  in  subse- 
quent reproduction ;  and  retrogressive  associations  at  the  end 
18 


254  ^^'^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  the  various  sections  are  avoided.  2.  The  pauses  at  the 
end  of  each  section  enable  the  attention  to  return  to  its  task 
with  fresh  vigor  and  with  a  maximum  degree  of  concentra- 
tion. This  procedure  can  best  be  ilhistrated  from  its  applica- 
tion to  nonsense-syllables;  and  the  principle  may  then  be 
carried  over  without  change  to  any  other  sort  of  material.  A 
series  of  twelve  syllables  is  written  in  two  sections  of  six 
syllables  each,  and  between  the  two  sections  is  a  blank  space. 
In  reading  the  series  the  observer  always  pauses  at  this 
point  but  thence  continues  to  the  end,  never  returning  to  the 
first  syllable  from  the  sixth. 

A  second  mediating  procedure  can  best  be  employed  with 
non-coherent  material,  such  as  the  vocabulary  of  a  foreign 
language.  In  this  method  the  reading  of  the  series  of  words 
progresses  continuously  until  the  learner  observes  that  certain 
members  of  the  series  prove  to  be  especially  difficult.  These 
he  indicates  by  a  written  mark;  he  devotes  a  special  effort 
to  learning  them  and  then  returns  to  the  reading  of  the  whole 
series, — continuing  until  the  whole  is  uniformly  memorized. 
This  variation  of  procedure  enables  us  readily  to  adapt  the 
whole-procedure  to  material  which  is  not  uniformly  difficult 
throughout  its  length.  Numerous  experiments  have  dem- 
onstrated the  superiority  of  these  methods  over  the  ordinary 
whole-procedure. 

Our  experiments  have  shown  that  the  mediating  methods 
are  capable  of  very  wide  application,  and  that  they  are  exceed- 
ingly advantageous  and  economical.  It  must  be  noted  in 
this  connection,  however,  that  these  two  are  not  the  only 
possible  modifications  and  adaptations  of  the  whole-procedure 
to  the  nature  of  the  material. 

Neumann  obtained  a  somewhat  different  result  in  his  inves- 
tigation of  the  learning  of  a  French  vocabulary,  where  the 
whole-method  again  proved  to  be  the  more  advantageous. 


Associative  Learning  255 

In  these  experiments  Neumann  made  a  special  investigation  to 
determine  which  method  of  learning  a  German-foreign  vocab- 
ulary ensured  the  most  accurate  reproduction, — the  learner 
being  asked  to  reproduce  the  pairs  of  words  in  an  order  which 
differed  from  that  in  which  they  had  stood  upon  his  printed 
list.  Here  again  the  whole-method  gave  better  results,  but 
that  was  probably  due  to  the  form  in  which  the  mediating 
method  was  employed.  Neumann  himself  advances  the 
hypothesis  that  there  are  various  possible  reasons  for  this 
phenomenon;  and  he  is  of  the  opinion  "that  the  form  and 
the  content  of  the  material  to  be  learned,  and  the  individuality 
of  the  learner  must  determine  which  method  is  best  in  any 
given  instance." 

Now  it  must  be  observed  that  all  of  the  investigations  of 
learning  which  we  have  described  were  concerned  exclusively 
with  learning  by  rote,  and  with  the  proper  formation  of  such 
associations  as  are  necessary  for  verbal  memorization.  In 
the  next  section  we  shall  deal  with  special  conditions  not 
only  of  mechanical  memorization  but  also  of  the  learning  of 
significant  and  intelligible  material.  It  is  upon  an  under- 
standing of  these  conditions  that  a  real  technique  of  learning 
must  be  based. 

4.   The  Conditions  and  the  Technique  of  Mechanical  Learning 

Every  act  of  learning  is,  in  part,  mechanical, — even  that 
learning  in  wliich  we  derive  aid  from  an  understanding  of 
the  material,  or  from  an  apprehension  of  its  logical,  ethical  and 
aesthetic  meanings.  This  mechanical  aspect  of  learning  con- 
sists in  a  repeated  imprinting,  during  which  the  will  and  the 
attention  are  not  directed  toward  an  understanding  of  the 
material,  as  such,  but  toward  an  acquisition  and  imprinting 
itself  which  become  the  object  of  our  activity  while  the  under- 
standing of  the  material  is  subordinated  as  a  means  to  this  end. 


256  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

The  more  complete  the  mastery  and  the  more  perfect  the 
command  which  we  wish  to  obtain  over  any  memory  material, 
or  the  more  easily,  certainly  and  permanently,  and  the  more 
accurately  and  completely  we  wish  to  be  able  to  reproduce  it, 
the  more  must  we  bring  into  operation  this  activity  of  sheer 
imprinting  and  its  chief  means, — the  attentive  repetition  of 
the  material. 

Attentive  repetition  tends  more  and  more  to  become  our 
sole  means  of  learning  in  proportion  as  the  material  offers 
few  opportunities  for  a  formation  of  associations,  for  an  incor- 
poration of  the  material  into  larger  groups  of  mental  content 
and  for  a  logical  and  intellectual  elaboration  of  its  meaning. 
Attentive  repetition  becomes  a  less  and  less  important  factor 
in  proportion  as  the  material  affords  more  of  the  above  oppor- 
tunities; but  it  never  wholly  loses  its  significance.  In  learn- 
ing significant  material  the  adult  is  often  disposed  to  under- 
estimate the  importance  of  this  mechanical  factor  of  attentive 
repetition  in  which  the  imprinting  becomes  an  end  in  itself, 
because  in  the  course  of  his  development  he  has  always  set 
out  to  apprehend  the  concrete  ideational  content  or  the 
abstract  thought-content  of  all  memory  material  in  order  to 
utilize  these  as  means  to  retention.  In  so  doing  he  abandons 
the  habitual  use  of  mechanical  learning;  but  in  all  cases 
where  he  must  recall  any  material  in  accurate  verbal  form, 
he  finds  it  impossible  to  dispense  with  the  use  of  the  mechanical 
factor  of  learning.  Hence  with  advance  in  mental  develop- 
ment we  tend  more  and  more  to  abandon  the  fac  simile 
mirroring  of  our  experiences;  and  in  place  of  verbatim  repro- 
duction is  substituted  an  independently  elaborated  and  indi- 
vidualized copy  of  our  experience.  In  making  this  substitu- 
tion, however,  we  no  longer  reproduce  the  original  experience 
but  only  make  an  approximate  copy  of  it. 

Wessely  reports  that  this   phenomenon  appeared  in  the 


Associative  Learning  257 

different  classes  of  a  high  school  in  Berlin.  He  wished  to 
determine  whether  memory  material  which  had  been  learned 
in  the  various  departments  of  the  school  was  still  retained  in 
memory  after  long  intervals  of  time,  and  whether  it  promised 
to  become  a  permanent  possesesion  of  the  pupil.  Pupils  from 
ten  to  fifteen  years  of  age  were  asked  to  write  from  memory 
a  poem  which  they  had  learned  about  a  year  before;  and  from 
the  data  thus  collected  Wessely  determined  the  amount  re- 
membered. ^ 

In  a  second  experiment,  boys  of  nine  to  fifteen  years  of 
age  were  asked  to  learn  lists  containing  eight  Latin  words 
with  their  German  equivalents.  The  memorial  effect  of  the 
learning  was  tested  immediately  afterwards,  and  also  after 
intervals  of  one  day,  eight  days,  and  four  weeks.  The  pro- 
cedure employed  in  testing  their  reproduction  consisted  in 
presenting  the  German  words  in  a  changed  order,  and  having 
the  pupils  recall  the  corresponding  Latin  word. 

These  investigations  showed  that  retentive  capacity  in- 
creases, in  the  first  type  of  experiment,  up  to  twelve  years  of 
age,  in  the  Latin  vocabulary  test,  up  to  eleven  years,  inclusive ; 
and  from  there  onward  retention  and  certainty  of  reproduc- 
tion decrease.  These  experiments  with  high  school  pupils 
confirm  the  main  results  of  the  investigations  of  retention 
which  have  already  been  reported;  after  the  pupil  reaches  a 
certain  age,  however,  it  is  found  that  accuracy  of  retention 
decreases  with  increase  of  age.  The  only  divergence  from  our 
results  is  Wessely's  finding  that  retention  increases  up  to  about 
the  age  of  twelve  years.  Wessely  himself  is  not  willing  to 
ascribe  this  increase  to  an  increase  of  formal  training  in  learn- 

^  R.  Wessely,  Zur  Methode  des  Auswendiglcrnens,  Neue  Jahrhuchcr 
fur  das  Mass.  Alierium,  1905,  297ff;373ff.  Certain  of  Wessely's  con- 
clusions with  which  the  present  author  does  not  agree  are  discussed 
in  the  latter's  Vorlesungcn  zur  Einfuhning  in  die  exp.  P'ddagogik. 


258  The  Psychology  of  Lear7iing 

ing,  but  refers  it  to  the  natural  growth  and  development  of 
mental  capacity.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  two  different  phenom- 
ena make  their  appearance  in  these  experiments.  The  mem- 
ory of  some  pupils  continues  to  develop  for  a  time;  and 
children  pass  over  more  and  more  to  the  memory  type  of 
adults,  that  is,  they  begin  to  rely  more  and  more  upon  appre- 
hending and  reproducing  by  content  alone,  and  abandon  the 
accurate,  and  especially  the  verbal,  memorization  of  material. 
The  mechanical  factor  of  memorization  comes  into  oper- 
ation in  more  pure  form  the  more  meaningless  is  the  material 
to  be  learned;  and  hence  dates  and  pairs  of  synon3ans  are 
learned  more  mechanically,  that  is,  more  through  the  influence 
of  mere  attentive  repetition,  than  are  grammatical  rules. 
We  find  the  purest  illustration  of  the  type  of  mechanical 
memorization  in  the  learning  of  meaningless  material;  in 
psychological  experiments  it  is  illustrated  in  the  memoriza- 
tion of  nonsense  syllables.  Hence  the  significance  of  experi- 
ments in  learning  with  nonsense  syllables  consists  in  the  fact 
that  they  show  us  in  purest  form  the  conditions  of  the  mechan- 
ical factor  in  learning.  The  existence  of  these  conditions  is 
here  shown  either  by  mere  observation  of  the  learner's 
procedure,  or  in  much  more  exact  form,  by  systematic  varia- 
tion of  particular  factors  of  learning.  When  one  of  these 
factors  is  varied  independently  while  all  of  the  other  factors 
remain  unchanged,  we  are  in  general  justified  in  ascribing 
any  variation  in  result  to  the  influence  of  this  one  changed 
factor;  and  then  we  can  draw  inferences  as  to  the  significance 
of  this  factor  itself.  For  example,  in  one  case  we  vary  only 
the  tempo  of  learning,  in  another  case  the  rhythm,  in  a  third 
the  distribution  of  repetitions;  and  we  determine  how  each 
of  these  changes  affects  the  result  of  the  learning.  The  infer- 
ence that  this  variation  in  result  is  to  be  ascribed  solely  to  the 
changed  condition  is  not  at  once  permissable ;  and  it  frequently 


Associative  Learning  259 

requires  numerous  variations  of  the  original  experiment  to 
dear  up  the  matter  and  to  bring  out  the  casual  relation 
distinctly. 

Investigations  of  this  sort,  where  the  particular  conditions 
of  learning  have  been  varied  systematically,  have  given  us 
our  chief  insight  into  most  of  the  conditions  of  mechanical 
learning.  I  shall  present  a  survey  of  these  conditions  as  they 
have  been  revealed  by  the  results  of  experiments  heretofore 
undertaken  in  this  field. 

The  conditions  under  which  we  learn  a  material  are  partly 
determined  by  external,  objective  factors,  such  as  the  material 
itself,  its  amount  and  its  character;  they  depend,  in  part, 
upon  the  subjective  factors  which  together  constitute  the  ** 
learner's  procedure.  We  may  accordingly  subdivide  the  con- 
ditions of  learning  into  external  or  objective,  and  internal  or 
subjective.  The  subjective  conditions  again  are  concerned 
partly  with  the  general  behavior  of  the  learner,  his  internal 
condition,  his  attention  and  the  like;  partly  with  the  forma- 
tion of  associations.  In  all  of  our  subsequent  discussions 
we  shall  take  the  experimental  learning  of  nonsense  syllables 
as  the  typical  case  of  mechanical  learning. 

Among  the  external  conditions  of  learning  we  may  men-  t 
tion,  first  of  all,  the  tempo  of  learning,  or  of  speaking  or  read- 
ing during  the  process  of  learning.  This  carries  us  over  into 
the  most  universal  and  fundamental  condition  of  memorial 
work^  because  the  tempo  of  learning  determines  the  time 
during  which  not  only  the  single  syllable  remains  in  conscious- 
ness and  is  imprinted  upon  consciousness,  but  also  the  rapidity 
with  which  the  associations  between  the  several  syllables  are 
formed.  Experiments  have  shown  that  the  tempo  of  speech 
during  the  process  of  learning  exerts  a  st-rong  influence  upon 
the  rapidity  with  which  we  succeed  in  memorizing.    Ebbing- 

^  See  pp.  i5f. 


26o  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

haus  ^  asserts  that  according  to  his  own  observations  the  most 
rapid  learning  is  the  most  advantageous,  at  least  in  so  far  as 
ratio  of  amount  learned  to  time  expended  is  concerned. 
Ogden,  however,  did  not  find  a  confirmation  of  this  statement; 
his  experiments  show  only  that  rapid  reading  secures  a  better 
survey  over  the  series  of  syllables.  According  to  Ogden's 
results,  the  number  of  repetitions  increases  so  rapidly  with 
increased  rapidity  of  learning  that  rapid  learning  may  become 
disadvantageous.  ^  I  have  found  that  neither  rapid  nor  slow 
learning  is  in  itself  advantageous;  but  that  the  matter 
depends  chiefly  upon  adapting  the  rate  of  learning  or  of 
reading  or  speaking  to  the  degree  of  familiarity  of  the  material, 
to  the  progress  of  memorizing  and  to  the  individuahty  of  the 
learner.  When  we  set  to  work  upon  an  unfamihar  material 
it  is,  of  course,  disadvantageous  to  sweep  over  it  with  the 
eyes  and  with  the  attention  in  an  effort  to  learn  it  with 
extreme  rapidity;  this  procedure  decreases  the  memorial 
effect  of  the  first  repetitions  because  in  such  cases  we  do  not 
become  famihar  with  the  material  until  the  third  or  fourth 
repetition.  We  waste  repetitions  in  our  attempt  to  obtain 
a  correct  apprehension  of  the  visual-auditory  impressions  and 
to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  material.  This  is  true  even 
in  the  case  of  meaningless  material.  In  the  learning  of  a 
meaningful  text  a  too  rapid  rate  of  reading  prevents  our  com- 
prehending the  meaning,  as  was  shown  from  observations 
which  I  made  in  Kraemer's^  experiments.  In  the  case  of  a 
significant  text  it  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  economical 
learning  that  the  rate  of  reading  should  be  adapted  to  the 

^  H.  Ebbinghaus,  Psychologie,  Leipzig,  1902,  (Dritte  Aufl.),  I.,  672. 

2  Cf.  the  observation  by  Ephrussi,  p.  262  of  this  volume. 

^  N.  Kraemer,  Experimentelle  Untersuchungen  ziir  Erkenntnis  des 
Lernprozesses,  Leipzig,  191 2.  See  also  Diirr,  in  Ebbinghaus'  Psychol- 
ogie, Dritte  Aufl.,  I.,  674. 


Associative  Learning  261 

understanding  of  the  content  of  the  text.  When  on  the 
other  hand,  we  make  our  first  reading  as  slowly  and  as  atten- 
tively as  possible,  and  then  gradually  increase  the  rate  of 
reading  and  of  learning  we  obtain  the  best  results.  I  per- 
formed the  following  experiment  in  the  investigation  of  this 
problem:  The  revolving  drum  which  carried  bands  of  non- 
sense syllables  was  provided  with  a  crank  so  that  it  could  be 
rotated  by  the  learner  himself  at  whatever  rate  he  chose. 
The  rapidity  with  which  he  rotated  it  was  recorded  accu- 
rately, to  one-hundredths  of  a  second,  by  a  graphic  method. 
The  sole  instructions  given  to  the  learner  were  that  he  should 
rotate  the  drum  in  such  manner  that  he  might  learn  most 
conveniently  and  might  feel  that  he  was  making  the  most 
satisfactory  progress.  Our  results  show  that  the  drum  was 
rotated  very  slowly  at  first,  much  more  slowly  than  in  the 
ordinary  experiments  with  syllables;  then  the  rate  increased 
with  periodic  accelerations  and  retardations  until,  toward  the 
close  of  the  period  of  learning,  the  learner  chose  an  exceed- 
ingly rapid  rate  of  reading  which  permitted  only  a  fugitive 
and  superficial  glance.  This  experiment  shows  that  the  ra- 
pidity of  learning  must  be  adapted  to  the  degree  of  memorizing 
which  has  already  been  acquired, — the  appropriate  technique 
of  learning  requiring  a  slow  learning  at  first,  followed  by  a 
more  and  more  rapid  rate.  Hence  we  miss  the  mark  if  we 
constantly  force  the  learner  to  memorize  slowly;  as  we  also 
do  if  we  urge  him  constantly  to  hasten  as  Ebbinghaus  believed 
that  we  should  do.  After  memorization  has  made  a  certain 
amount  of  progress,  a  slow  rate  of  reading  becomes  more  and 
more  disadvantageous.  Not  being  sufiiciently  employed,  the 
attention  digresses;  sensations  of  strain,  impatience  and 
aversion  make  their  appearance,  and  all  of  these  have  an 
unfavorable  influence  upon  learning. 

These  experiments  were  subsequently  varied  in  such  fashion 


262  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

as  to  allow  the  learner  to  choose  his  own  tempo;  and  here  it 
was  found  that  different  learners  proceed  differently  under 
these  conditions.  Some,  apparently  those  of  especially  impul- 
sive nature,  begin  with  an  exceedingly  rapid  tempo;  then 
they  slacken  their  speed  and  again  accelerate  it  toward  the 
close  of  the  period  of  learning. 

Rapid  learning  is  not  advantageous  for  permanent  reten- 
tion.   In  general  it  seems  to  be  true  that  the  more  rapidly 
we  learn  the  less  permanently  do  we  retain.    This  appears  to 
be  confirmed  by  all  the  later  experiments  of  G.  E.  Muller's 
pupils.    Thus  Ephrussi  found  the  "paradoxical"  result  that 
a  tempo  of  reading  and  learning  proves  to  be  economical  or 
non-economical  of  time  according  as  the  retention  is  tested 
by  the  method  of  re-learning  or  by  the  method  of  paired 
associates. '    That  is,  although  we  save  time  by  learning  rap- 
idly we  make  fewer  "hits,"  or  fewer  correct  reproductions  of 
the  immediately  following  syllable  when  any  given  syllable 
is  named  by  the  experimenter.    This  can  be  explained  only  on 
the  assumption  that  an  acceleration  of  the  rate  of  learning 
may  be  of  advantage  in  securing  a  first  correct  memorization, 
but  it  is  not  advantageous  for  permanent  retention.     This 
result  of  Ephrussi's'  was  tested  by  Jacobs  whose  method 
consisted  in  an  auditory  presentation  of  nonsense  syllables.  ^ 
The  experimenter  read  the  syllables  aloud  in  trochaic  rhythm, 
from  a  revolving  drum,   while   the  observer  listened  with 
closed   eyes.     Here  again,   learning  was  more  rapid  when 
presentation  was  more  rapid,  that  is,  the  total  time  required 
for  the  memorization  of  the  series  was  shortened.     Unfor- 

^cy.  p.  167. 

=»?.  Ephrussi,  Op.  cit.,  p.  192.  Concerning  alleged  "economy  of 
energy"  see  Appendix  II. 

3W.  Jacobs,  Ueber  das  Lernen  mit  ausserer  Lokalization,  Zeits- 
chriftf.  Psychologic,  XLV.,  1907,  43-77;   161-187. 


Associative  Learning  263 

tunately,  Ephrussi  and  Jacobs  did  not  determine  the  effect 
of  change  in  rate  of  learning  upon  permanence  of  retention. 
A  survey  of  all  of  these  experiments  gives  us  the  following 
view  concerning  the  significance  of  the  tempo  of  learning. 
A  certain  optimal  rate  of  learning  leads  most  rapidly  to  . 
initial  memorization;  where  this  is  the  only  aim  of  learning,  ' 
therefore,  the  rapid  rate  is  economical.  But  the  rapidity  of 
the  single  readings  must  not  be  too  great;  because  if  it  is, 
the  gain  in  time  is  more  than  compensated  by  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  repetitions  required  and  by  a  corresponding 
increase  of  fatigue.  The  more  rapidly  the  material  is  learned, 
the  less  permanently  is  it  retained;  and  where  permanent 
retention  is  desired,  rapid  learning  is  uneconomical.  Real 
economy  of  procedure  always  consists  in  adapting  the  tempo 
of  learning  to  the  individuality  of  the  learner  and  to  the 
stage  which  he  has  momentarily  reached  in  his  act  of 
learning. 

Another  very  important  external  condition  of  learning  has  • 
to  do  with  the  rhythm  which  the  learner  employs.  AU  experi- 
menters testify  that  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  disadvanta- 
geous to  learn  without  rhythm.  Experiments  by  Miiller  and 
Schumann,  and  by  M.  K.  Smith  yielded  the  result  that  a 
suppression  of  rhythmic  vocalization  makes  it  almost  impos- 
sible for  certain  individuals  to  learn.  In  continually  repeating 
a  material,  we  involuntarily  fall  into  a  rhythmic  speech,  and 
the  intentional  continuation  of  this  rhythm  is  advantageous 
in  learning.  Of  special  importance  here  is  a  definite  grouping 
of  our  impressions,  that  is,  a  combining  of  syllables  into  visual 
and  auditory  groups;  and  experiments  have  shown  that  the 
members  of  such  a  rhythmic  group  enter  into  a  particularly 
secure  association  with  one  another.  Now  the  question  arises: 
Which  rhythm  or  which  poetic  meter  proves  to  be  most  favor- 
able for  learning?    We  found  that,  in  general,  the  dissyllabic  ' 


264  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

verse-foot  is  the  most  favorable.  It  is,  moreover,  advan- 
tageous to  combine  the  single  feet  into  groups  so  that,  for 
example,  a  series  of  twelve  syllables  is  apprehended  as  two 
groups  of  six  syllables  each.  Some  find  it  more  convenient  to 
combine  a  series  of  twelve  syllables  into  three  groups  of  four 
syllables  each.  G.  E.  Miiller  believes  that  for  Germans  the 
trochee  is,  in  general,  the  optimal  rhythm;  but  we  have  not 
found  this  to  be  confirmed  in  our  laboratory.  In  two  investi- 
gations, where  the  observers  included  natives  of  fourteen 
different  countries,  we  determined  which  rhythm  was  pre- 
ferred by  each  observer.  We  found  that  rhythms  are  distrib- 
uted over  the  different  nationahties  in  the  most  irregular 
fashion;  indeed,  the  preferred  rhythm  in  many  countries 
differs  for  different  provinces.  North  Germans  tend  to  accen- 
tuate the  ultimate  syllable,  South  Germans  the  initial  syllable; 
and  each  of  these  habits  has  an  influence  upon  learning. 
Nagel  found  that  the  North  Germans  and  the  Scandinavians 
learn  with  a  rising  inflection,  the  South  Germans  with  a 
falhng  inflection.  G.  E.  Muller  has  recently  emphasized  the 
value  of  investigating  the  formation  of  rhythmic  complexes 
and  their  influence  upon  learning.  From  observations  made 
by  Nagel  and  Meumann  the  formation  of  complexes  appears 
to  be  largely  an  individual  matter,  that  is,  the  mode  of  com- 
bining the  elements  of  a  nonsense  series  in  learning  seems  to 
vary  from  individual  to  individual.  The  significance  of  these 
complexes  for  the  economy  of  learning  seems  to  me  to  consist 
in  the  fact  that  their  existence  indicates  that  the  individual 
learner  has  discovered  the  particular  rhythmic  grouping  which 
is  most  appropriate  for  him.  Moreover,  differences  in  the 
learner's  procedure  and  in  the  effect  of  learning  come  into 
consideration  in  this  manifold  variety  of  possible  groupings; 
and  while  these  differences  may  be  of  interest  in  a  highly 
specialized  psychology  of  memory  they  have  no  direct  bearing 


Associative  Learning  265 

upon  our  present  discussion  whose  purpose  is  of  a  dominantly 
practical  sort.'  The  further  question  may  be  raised:  Is  it 
easier  to  learn  by  reading  aloud^  in  an  undertone,  or  silently? 
We  found  that  sotto  voce  learning  gives  in  general  the  best 
result.  An  exception  to  this,  however,  is  furnished  by  young 
children,  where  one  finds,  remarkably  enough^__that_silerit 
reading  is  most  favorable  to  learning.  BuTthis  again  prob- 
ably varies  with  the  ideational  type  of  the  individual;  the 
more  the  learner  employs  motor  imagery,  the  more  advan- 
tageous is  his  motor  speech.  Sotto  voce  speech  seems  to  be 
most  advantageous  for  the  auditory-motor  type;  reading 
aloud  distracts  their  attention  too  much. 

Another  group  of  external  conditions  of  learning  includes 
the  manner  in  which  we  imprint  the  material  by  repetitions. 
In  connection  with  the  repeated  reading  of  materials  a  first 
question  to  arise  is:  Is  it  advantageous  to  learn  the  whole 
material  at  a  single  sitting?  Or  do  we  gain  anything  by  inter- 
rupting the  readings  and  distributing  them  over  a  number  of 
sittings?  Ebbinghaus  found  that  the  distribution  of  repe- 
titions in  learning  is  an  especially  important  condition  for  the 
economy  of  energy.  He  discovered,  namely,  that  in  series  of 
syllables  where  we  do  not  accumulate  the  repetitions  but 
distribute  them  over  a  long  period  of  time  with  intermediate 
pauses  we  find  that  a  great  saving  of  repetitions  results.  For 
example,  when  the  repetitions  were  distributed  over  three 
days,  each  series  required  thirty-eight  repetitions,  while  sixty- 
eight  repetitions  were  necessary  when  they  were  all  accumu- 
lated at  a  single  sitting.  This  problem  was  investigated  more 
accurately  by  Jost;^    we  shall  select  one  of  his  experiments 

'The  reader  is  referred  to  my  criticism  of  G.E.Miiller  in  Appendix  II. 

^  A.  Jost,  Die  Associationsfestigkeit  in  ihrer  Abhangigkcit  von  der 
Vertcilung  der  Wicderhoiungen,  Zeitschr.  f.  Psychologic,  XIV.,  1S97, 
436-472. 


7^ 


266  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

to  illustrate  his  plan  and  method.  In  one  case,  he  devoted 
thirty  repetitions  without  pause  to  the  learning  of  a  series 
of  syllables;  in  another  case,  he  employed  ten  repetitions  on 
each  of  three  successive  days.  In  both  cases  he  tested  ac- 
curacy of  retention  twenty-four  hours  after  the  repetitions  had 
been  completed.  He  found  that  the  syllables  which  had  been 
learned  with  distributed  repetitions  were  retained  better  than 
those  which  had  been  learned  with  the  same  number  of  accu- 
mulated repetitions.  Jost  also  attempted  to  determine  how 
far  the  distribution  of  repetitions  may  be  carried  without 
giving  rise  to  a  deleterious  result.  He  found  that  when  the 
material  to  be  learned  is  of  large  mass  the  most  extensive 
distribution  is  the  most  advantageous,  both  as  to  rapidity  of 
learning  and  permanence  of  retention.  Even  when  the  dis- 
tribution is  spread  out  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  but  a 
single  repetition  per  day,  the  result  is  better  than  when  the 
repetitions  are  accumulated  into  a  single  sitting,  provided,  of 
course,  that  other  circumstances  do  not  make  such  an  exten- 
sive distribution  disadvantageous.  Jost  attempts  to  explain 
this  striking  phenomenon  from  his  "law  of  the  age  of  asso- 
ciations." "Older"  series  of  associations,  i.e.,  those  series  of 
associations  which  were  acquired  some  time  previously,  are, 
according  to  this  law,  more  readily  refreshed  and  reinforced 
than  "younger"  or  more  recently  acquired  associations,  or  as 
Jost  expresses  it:  "Of  two  associations  which  are  of  equal 
strength  but  of  different  ages,  the  older  receives  the  greater 
intensification  from  a  new  repetition."  Now  when  the  rep- 
etitions employed  in  learning  a  material  are  spread  out  over 
a  longer  period  of  time,  it  comes  about  that  we  deal  more  and 
more  with  relatively  old  associations,  while  when  the  repeti- 
tions are  accumulated  we  are  forced  to  work  with  relatively 
young  associations.  Jost's  law  does  not  seem  to  be  vaKd 
for  smaller  and  easier  materials,  where  we  find  that  uninter- 


Associative  Learning  267 

rupted  learning  until  memorization  is  reached  proves  to  be 
more  advantageous.  We  need  scarcely  do  more  than  indicate 
the  pedagogical  significance  of  Jost's  law.  Whenever  the 
child  is  obliged  to  master  a  voluminous  memorial  material  he 
should  be  given  instruction  and  opportunity  to  learn  it  in 
easy  stages;  the  memorization  should  not  be  forced  but  the 
repetitions  should  be  distributed  as  widely  as  the  prescribed 
course  of  teaching  permits. 

We  have  repeated  Jost's  experiments,  and  on  the  whole 
we  have  confirmed  his  findings.  One  of  our  observers  was 
exceptional,  however,  in  that  the  distribution  which  prescribed 
one  repetition  per  day  proved  to  be  disadvantageous  on 
account  of  his  forgetting  between  sittings. 
pThis  problem  is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  another 
of  kindred  nature.  Apart  from  the  question  of  temporal 
distribution  we  may  ask  what  significance  the  number  of 
repetitions  has  for  learning,  and  especially  for  retention. 
Or  what  is  the  effect  of  an  accumulation  of  repetitions  of  any  * 
given  material?  Let  us  assume  that  a  material  which,  so 
far  as  its  amount  is  concerned,  can  be  learned  perfectly  well 
at  a  single  sitting  is  learned  until  it  can  be  repeated  once  from 
memory.  What  now  is  the  effect  of  additional  repetitions? 
Of  course  one  would  expect  that  the  material  would  become 
more  firmly  fixed  in  memory  and  would  be  better  retained. 
But  the  question  arises:  i.  Is  this  expectation  fulfilled? 
2,  Is  this  increased  retention  relatively  easily  attained,  or 
only  by  a  great  number  of  extra  repetitions?  According  to 
the  experiments  of  Ebbinghaus  the  extra  repetitions  grad- 
ually become  less  and  less  effective  so  that,  for  instance,  a 
disproportionately  large  number  of  repetitions  must  be  em- 
ployed in  order  not  only  to  attain  the  first  recitation  from 
memory,  but  to  imprint  the  material  so  indehbly  upon  mem- 
ory that  it  can  be  repeated  without  error  at  the  end  of  twenty- 


268  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

four  hours,  or  can  be  retained  permanently.  This  observation 
was,  in  general,  confirmed  by  Weber  and  by  Knors ;  but  these 
investigators  also  show  that  a  process  of  learning  which  has 
been  continued  only  to  the  point  where  a  first  recitation  from 
memory  is  just  barely  possible  does  not  by  any  means  guar- 
antee a  complete  mastery  or  a  permanent  retention.  Many 
additional  repetitions  are  still  necessary  before  a  lasting  reten- 
tion is  attained.  It  is  clearly  evident  that  immediate  repro- 
duction is  a  potent  factor  even  in  this  process  of  ''first  correct 
recitation."^ 

Certain  important  rules  for  the  practice  of  teaching  may 
be  derived  from  the  foregoing.  /.  The  mere  act  of  learning 
a  material  until  it  can  barely  be  reproduced  never  secures  a 
permanent  retention  in  the  case  of  nonsense  material  of  con- 
siderable bulk,  even  up  to  ten  or  twelve  syllables;  in  the  case 
of  significant  material  it  very  seldom  secures  a  permanent 
retention.  From  this  it  follows:  2.  that  for  everything  which 
is  to  be  retained  permanently,  a  subsequent  "freshening"  by 
means  of  additional  repetitions  is  indispensable.  It  follows, 
too,  3.  that  we  should  not  be  content  to  regard  the  ability 
barely  to  recite  it  from  memory  as  an  indication  that  a  material 
has  been  memorized.  Really  permanent  retention  or  complete 
mastery  demands  many  more  repetitions  for  its  achievement. 
We  see  here  how  important  the  factor  of  mechanical  learning 
is  for  genuine  memorial  function.  That  which  is  to  become 
an  imperishable  possession  of  memory, — not  as  a  part  of  one's 
systematized  body  of  knowledge,  but  only  as  a  datum  of 
concrete  cognition, — can  be  acquired  only  at  the  cost  of  many 
repetitions.     4.   If  we  wish,  at  a  single  sitting,  to  learn  a 

^  J.  Weber,  Untersuchungen  zur  Psychologie  des  Gedachtnisses, 
Zeitschrift  f.  d.  exper.  P'ddagogik,  VIII.,  1908.  C.  Knors,  Experimen- 
telle  Untersuchungen  iiber  den  Lernprozess,  Archiv.  /.  d.  gesamie  Psy- 
chologie, XVII.,  1910,  297-361. 


Associative  Learning  269 

material  so  perfectly  that  it  will  be  retained  permanently  we 
must  devote  an  excessive  number  of  repetitions  to  it;  and 
even  then  the  result,  so  far  as  permanent  retention  is  con- 
cerned, will  remain  in  doubt. 

Among  the  external  conditions  of  memory  must  also  be 
mentioned  the  mode  of  presenting  the  material.  It  is  a  matter 
of  importance  whether  the  learner  himself  reads  the  material 
or  whether  he  hears  it  read.  Thus  we  distinguish  between 
learning  by  means  of  visual  and  by  means  of  auditory  presen- 
tation. It  is  of  especial  interest  to  pedagogy  to  determine 
whether  either  of  these  is  a  more  profitable  procedure  than 
the  other. 

We  have  investigated  this  problem  experimentally,  and  we 
found  that  learning  by  means  of  the  visual  method  is  easier, 
both  for  children  and  adults,  than  by  the  auditory  method- 
This  is  true  both  for  meaningless  and  meaningful  materials. 
This  law  is  limited  in  its  application,  however,  on  account  of 
the  dependence  of  learning  upon  the  individual  equipment 
of  the  learner,  and  particularly  upon  the  ideational  type  to 
which  he  belongs.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  a  person  whose 
imagery  is  essentially  visual  will  learn  better  from  visual 
presentation,  while  the  representative  of  the  auditory  type 
will  learn  more  readily  that  which  he  hears.  But  still  we  have 
found  that  even  the  auditory  individual  sometimes  learns 
better  from  \dsual  than  from  auditory  presentation.  This  I 
find  to  be  true  of  myself.  It  is  due  in  part  to  habituation, 
and  in  part  to  the  fact  that  more  associated  elements  come 
into  play  in  visual  presentation.  Our  observations  must  be 
supplemented,  first  of  all,  by  the  results  obtained  by  Pohl- 
mann,  who  reports  that  nonsense  material  is  learned  better 
from  visual  presentation,  while  significant  material  is  learned 
better  when  heard.  But  this  conclusion  is  unfortunately  inval- 
idated by  the  fact  that  Pohlmann  did  not  take  the  ideational 
19 


270  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

types  of  his  observers  sufficiently  into  account.  Then,  too, 
it  seems  natural  to  suppose  that  the  advantages  possessed  by 
visual  presentation,  in  the  case  of  nonsense  syllables,  may  be 
due  merely  to  the  fact  that  visual  stimuli  are  apprehended 
more  readily  than  auditory  stimuK.  If  this  is  true,  the  phe- 
nomenon does  not  belong  to  the  domain  of  memory  or  learn- 
ing at  all  and  would  not  occur  with  materials  which  are  more 
easily  perceived  and  apprehended. 

This  phenomenon,  however,  has  no  direct  bearing  upon 
the  work  of  the  teacher.  One  may  not  infer  directly  from 
this  that  in  the  school-room  it  would  be  more  advantageous 
to  have  the  pupils  employ  visual  learning  exclusively  because 
there  are  many  secondary  circumstances  which  would  inval- 
idate the  rule.  Among  these  is  the  circumstance  that  audi- 
tory learning,  or  the  act  of  learning  from  the  oral  instruction 
of  the  teacher  possesses  more  of  the  character  of  common 
and  equal  work  by  every  member  of  the  class,  while  in  visual 
reading  each  pupil  is  left  more  to  himself.  The  former  is 
always  a  more  favorable  condition  for  the  work  of  children.  ^ 
Moreover,  auditory  learning  provides  an  incentive  to  the 
attention  of  children;  and  in  using  this  method  of  presenta- 
*tion  the  teacher  can  more  readily  influence  the  will  and  secure 
the  active  co-operation  of  his  pupils.  These  secondary  effects 
of  teaching  are  probably  more  significant  in  auditory  than  in 
visual  learning.  If  some  investigator  would  clear  up  this 
matter  by  experimentation  he  would  render  a  distinct  service 
to  psychology. 

It  may  be  assumed  to  be  very  probable  that  certain  factors 

^  C/.  Pohlmann,  0/».  Ci7.,  pp.  i68ff.;  also  Pentschew,  Ueber  Oekon- 
omie  und  Technik  des  Lernens,  Arch.f.  d.  gesamte  Psychologie,  I.,  1903, 
514.  For  a  discussion  of  the  influence  of  the  class  upon  the  work 
of  the  individual  pupil,  see  the  papers  by  A.  Meyer,  F.  Schmidt,  and 
W.  Baade. 


Associative  Learning  271 

which  appear  to  be  subordinate  still  serve  as  aids  to  memory 
in  the  act  of  learning.    To  this  group  belongs  the  locq.lization*- 
of  the  items  in  the  material  which  is  learned.    We  know  that 
certain  indi\iduals  tend  to  note  the  position  upon  a  page 
where  a  passage  stands.     When  the  child  learns  words  or 
dates  he  may  imprint  a  visual  picture  of  the  page  or  column 
where  they  occur.    I  know  a  man  who  memorizes  his  lectures  , 
so  perfectly  from  his  manuscript  that  in  lecturing  he  is  able 
to  follow  the  original,  page  for  page,  in  a  purely  mental 
fashion.     This  factor  of  locahzation  is  an  important  aid  to 
memory.    Its  significance  for  the  learner  is  intimately  related 
with  his  memory  type.    The  visuahzer  employs  spatial  locah-  # 
zation  much  more  than  do  individuals  who  belong  to  the 
auditory  and  the  auditory-motor  types;  he  estabhshes  definite 
associations  between  certain  items  of  the  memorized  material 
and  their  position  upon  the  page,  and  he  also  associates  them 
with  other  visual  criteria  especially  those  of  a  spatial  sort. 
Mtiller  and  Schumann  found  that  in  learning  nonsense  sylla- 
bles we  note  the  "absolute  position"  of  particular  syllables, 
and  that  this  process  is  an  aid  to  retention.    Miiller  and  Pil- 
zecker  discovered  still  other  sorts  of  localization  which  prob- 
ably have  greater  significance  for  the  auditory-motor  learner. 
The  position  of  an  item  in  a  memorized  group  of  syllables  or 
words  may  be  remembered  in  three  different  ways :  i.   Locali- 
zation in  visual  space.    This  consists  in  associating  the  syl- 
lable, word,  or  group  of  words  with  the  position  where  it  was 
seen.     2.   Locahzation  by  means  of  verbal  labelling.     The 
syllables  are  counted  during  the  process  of  reading,  and  the 
number  or  numerical  position  of  particular  syllables  in  the 
series  is  noted  and  remembered,    j.   Localization  by  means  of 
modulation  of  speech.     The  observer  remembers  the  varia- 
tion of  inflection  or  of  melody  of  speech  with  which  the  material 
was  heard  during  the  process  of  learning.    This  third  sort  of 


272  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

localization  is  successfully  employed  only  by  individuals  of 
the  auditory  type. 

Walther  Jacobs  made  a  detailed  investigation  of  the  influ- 
ence of  external  and  internal  localizations.     Syllables  were 
learned  by  auditory  presentation,  the  observer  having  before 
him  cards  upon  which  were  printed  as  many  circles  as  there 
were  syllables  in  each  series.    In  a  first  group  of  experiments, 
the  observer  looked  at  these  circles  while  the  syllables  were 
being  read  to  him,  and  imagined  each  syllable  to  be  localized 
in  one  of  the  circles.    In  a  second  group  of  experiments,  the 
observer  listened  with  closed  eyes  and  attempted  to  localize 
•  the  syllables  in  a  purely  subjective  fashion.    Jacob's  results 
showed  that  observers  differ  very  greatly  in  procedure  accord- 
ing to  their  ideational  type.    VisuaHzers  transform  the  audi- 
tory syllables  into  visual  images,  sometimes  so  definitely  and 
clearly  that  they  are  able  to  describe  even  the  handwriting 
into  which  they  have  transformed  them;    they  also  localize 
and  "mark"  the  position  of  syllables  in  a  perfectly  definite 
manner.     The  presence  of  the  schema  of  circles  facilitated 
localization  for  all  learners;  but  visual  learners  localize  more 
definitely  when  their  eyes  are  closed  than  when  they  see  the 
circles.    Auditory  and  auditory-motor  learners  localize  much 
less  definitely;    and  with  closed  eyes  their  locahzations  are 
exceedingly   imperfect.     A   characteristic   feature    of   these 
results  consisted  in  the  fact  that  an  increase  in  the  rapidity  of 
reading  forces  the  learner  to  make  more  and  more  use  of  his 
auditory  imagery;  and  this  is  true  even  of  the  visual  type  of 
learner.     This  finding  confirms  my  own  view  that  visual 
ideating  is  always  a  slower  process  than  auditory-motor  ideat- 
ing.    On  the  whole,  the  introspections  of  observers  indicate 
that  a  rapid  tempo  of  presentation  increases  the  rapidity  of 
auditory-motor  learning;    and  in  the  case  of  the  auditory- 
motor  type,  the  more  rapid  tempos  are  advantageous  for  this 


Associative  Learni^ig  273 

form  of  learning.  A  slow  tempo  possesses  corresponding 
advantages  for  visual  learning.  ^ 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  visualizer  probably  makes 
greater  use  than  do  the  other  types  not  only  of  visual  criteria 
but  also  of  criteria  derived  from  spatial  localization  in  general. 

Among  the  external  circumstances  which  have  a  direct 
bearing  upon  learning  must  be  mentioned  yet  another  differ- 
ence in  the  learner's  mode  of  procedure;  and  this  may  be 
designated  briefly  by  the  phrases  "learning  by  means  of  purely 
visual  reading"  and  "learning  by  hearing  oneself  read." 
Whenever  an  adult  learns  any  material  by  reading  it  over  and 
over  again,  it  may  always  be  observed  that  only  during  the 
first  few  readings  is  his  attitude  and  behavior  similar  to  that 
of  an  ordinary  reader;  so  soon  as  he  begins  to  become  familiar 
with  the  material  he  takes  up  the  attitude  of  an  auditor  and 
listens  to  his  own  reading.  He  attempts  to  recite  the  material 
from  memory,  and  he  glances  back  to  the  text  again  only  when 
his  recitation  hesitates  or  halts.  Witasek  showed  by  a  special 
investigation  that  these  two  modes  of  procedure  have  wholly 
different  effects  upon  learning.^  Recitation  is  considerably 
more  effective  in  securing  a  first  perfect  memorization  than 
is  simple  reading, — perhaps  as  a  result  of  the  greater  amount 
of  energy  expended, — and  the  effect  is  greater  when  a  certain 
amount  of  memorization  has  already  taken  place  in  conse- 
quence of  previous  reading  before  recitation  is  attempted. 
Katzaroff  also  found,  on  repeating  WItasek's  experiments, 
that  when  recitation  is  combined  with  reading  in  the  act  of 

'  CJ.  INIiiller  and  Pilzecker,  Op.  cit.,  p.  221;  R.  M.  Ogden,  Archiv  f. 
d.  gesamte  Psychologie,  II.,  1903,  120;  A.  Pohlmann,  Op.  cit.,  29;  W. 
Jacobs,  Zeitschrijt  f.  Psychologie,  XLV.,  1097,  especially  44. 

^  S.  Witasek,  Ueber  Lesen  und  Rezitieren  in  ihrcn  Beziehungen 
zum  Gedachtnis.  Zeitschrijt  f.  Psychologie,  XLIV,  1907,  i6iff.;  D. 
Katzaroflf,  Le  role  de  la  recitation  commc  facteur  de  la  memorisation. 
Archives  de  psychologie,  VII.,  1908,  225-258. 


274  ^^^^  Psychology  oj  Learning 

learning  a  more  permanent  retention  results.  It  is  expedient, 
therefore,  to  employ  a  combined  procedure, — combining  a 
number  of  readings  of  the  material  with  a  number  of  at- 
tempted recitations,  and  prompting  the  learner  meanwhile 
whenever  he  hesitates,  Witasek  experimented  with  twelve 
combinations  of  the  two  factors  which  may  be  presented  in 
tabular  form, — the  number  of  readings  being  indicated  by 
Roman  numerals,  and  the  number  of  recitations  by  Arabic: 

VI... o  VI... 5  VI... lo       j_VI...i5 

XI. ..o  XI. ..5  XI. ..10          XI. ..15 

XVI... o  XVI...  5  XVI...  10 

XXI... o 

Of  these  twelve  possibilities  Witasek  found  that  a  combina- 
tion of  six  readings  with  fifteen  recitations  is  the  most  eco- 
nomical method  so  far  as  saving  of  time  is  concerned. 

It  is  indispensable  that  these  experiments  be  repeated  and 
that  their  results  be  confirmed  before  they  are  appUed  in 
pedagogy  because  the  learning  of  children  is  distinguished 
from  that  of  adults  by  the  very  fact  that  the  former  learn 
almost  exclusively  by  a  process  of  reading.  Is  recitation  as 
effective  in  the  case  of  children  as  it  is  in  adults?  Does  the 
same  combination  of  readings  and  recitations  give  optimal 
results  in  the  two  cases? 

"^  A  final  external  condition  of  learning  is  a  product  of  the 
quantity  and  the  quality  of  the  material  which  is  to  be  learned. 
As  regards  its  quality,  much  depends  upon  whether  it  is 
meaningless  or  significant  material;  and  in  case  it  is  signifi- 
cant material,  upon  whether  it  is  prose  or  poetry,  concrete  or 
abstract,  narration  or  description,  and  the  hke.  Since  we 
are  considering  mechanical  learning  separately,  we  shall  now 
discuss  the  influence  of  amount  of  material  in  the  learning  of 
nonsense  syllables.    It  may  be  remarked  here  that  the  rela- 


Associative  Learning  275 

tionship  between  amount  of  material  and  act  of  learning  is 
similar  in  the  case  of  meaningless  and  significant  materials. 

The  fundamental  question  here  is :  Does  difficulty  of  learn- 
ing increase  proportionately  with  increase  in  amount  of  mate- 
rial? Or  does  some  other  relation  obtain  between  these  two 
variables?  Ebbinghaus  formulated  the  law  that  difficulty  of 
memorization  does  not  increase  in  direct  proportion  with 
increase  in  amount  of  material,  but  that  larger  groups  or 
greater  masses  of  material  require  a  disproportionately  greater 
number  of  repetitions, 

I  have  repeatedly  tested  the  validity  of  this  law,  and  I  find 
that  it  does  not  hold.  More  recent  experiments  conducted 
by  Weber  and  Knors  in  my  laboratory  at  Miinster  revealed 
the  reason  for  the  discrepancy  between  my  earlier  results  and 
those  of  Ebbinghaus.  Weber  discovered  that  the  law  of 
Ebbinghaus  is  valid  only  for  unpractised  learners.  The 
more  training  one  has  in  memorization,  the  more  does  the 
number  of  repetitions  show  the  very  opposite  relation;  that 
is,  the  learning  of  large  masses  of  material  demands  relatively 
fewer  repetitions  than  the  learning  of  smaller  masses  of  mate- 
rial. This  may  be  illustrated  by  citations  from  our  data. 
Ebbinghaus  found  that  for  the  learning  of  groups  containing 
7,  12,  16,  24  and  36  syllables  he  required  the  following  num- 
ber of  repetitions  respectively:  i,  16.6,  30,  44,  65.  Thus  the 
number  of  repetitions  increases  much  more  rapidly  than  the 
number  of  syllables.  I  have  never  obtained  such  results 
from  practised  observers;  and  only  with  observers  who  were 
wholly  unpractised  in  the  memorizing  of  nonsense  syllables 
did  Weber  and  Knors  obtain  such  a  progressive  increase  in 
number  of  repetitions.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  law  of 
Ebbinghaus  does  not  possess  universal  validity.  Our  pupils 
are  on  the  whole  relatively  practised  learners;  and  with 
practised  learners  we  always  found  a  confirmation  of  the  law 


276  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

which  I  formulated,  and  which  may  be  illustrated  by  the 
following  data: 

8  syllables  were  learned  with    5.2  repetitions 


12 

10.4 

16 

17 

18 

21.5 

24 

30 

36 

32.5 

In  the  data  reported  by  Ebbinghaus  the  leap  from  7  to  12 
syllables  (i  to  16.6  repetitions)  is  the  only  one  which  is 
(approximately)  valid.  This  may  be  explained  from  the  fact 
that  at  this  point  occurs  the  transition  from  immediate  reten- 
tion to  actual  learning.  And  this  relation  conforms  with  our 
observations  of  mental  work  in  general,  and  with  all  of  the 
findings  which  have  been  reported  during  many  years  of 
experimental  investigation  of  memory.  It  would  indeed  be 
remarkable  if  an  increase  in  the  amount  of  material  to  which 
we  apply  our  mental  energies  did  not  derive  some  advantage 
from  the  general  expenditure  of  energy  and  the  general  ad- 
justment of  activity  which  we  must  devote  to  the  material 
when  the  increment  is  not  present.  In  the  affairs  of  every- 
day life  a  slight  amount  added  to  a  task  does  not  seem  to 
demand  so  great  an  expenditure  of  energy  for  its  accomplish- 
ment as  it  would  if  the  increment  constituted  our  sole  task. 
So  too  in  the  process  of  learning,  our  adaptation  of  attention, 
our  adjustment  to  the  activity  and  to  the  material,  our 
mastery  of  initial  disinclination,  our  steady  increase  of  con- 
centration, our  reciprocal  reinforcement  of  associations,  and 
the  whole  group  of  constellation  factors  contribute  to  the 
benefit  of  the  material  to  be  learned,  if  we  only  bring  them 
into  action  in  the  right  manner.  Or  in  other  words,  the 
amount  of  material   to  be  learned  is  not   so    effective  in 


Associative  Lcanmig  277 

determining  how  many  repe-titions  must  be  employed  as  is 
the  coming  into  play  of  all  of  those  formal  conditions  of 
learning. 

At  the  same  time,  the  slow  increase  in  number  of  repetitions 
with  increase  in  amount  of  material  reveals  the  presence  of  a 
fact  of  will,  and  also  perhaps  of  an  attitude  or  adjustment, 
which  may  be  described  by  the  statement  that  the  expendi- 
ture of  energy  is  regulated  automatically  to  conform  with  the 
magnitude  of  the  achievement  which  is  demanded  of  the 
learner.  It  is  a  matter  of  every-day  observation  that  our 
task  progresses  more  readily  when  we  make  it  a  part  of  a 
larger  task  than  when  we  set  about  it  independently.  Our 
awareness  of  the  fact  that  the  task  is  larger  leads  us  uncon- 
sciously and  involuntarily  to  a  keener  and  more  efTective 
concentration  of  our  energies.  I  have  found  this  phenomenon 
to  occur  in  learning,  in  the  work-curve,  and  even  in  ergo- 
graphic  experiments,  so  that  I  am  led  to  suppose  that  it  may 
be  a  universal  law  of  will.  ^ 

Fortunately  mind  is  not  organized  so  uneconomically  that, 
as  one  might  infer  from  the  law  of  Ebbinghaus,  our  mental 
work  increases  more  rapidly  than  the  results  which  it  accom- 
plishes; but,  on  the  contrary,  we  find  a  relative  decrease  in 
expenditure  of  energy  with  increase  of  mental  achievement. 
This  principle  holds  of  course  only  within  the  limits  of  the 
individual's  working-power  or  his  available  psychophysical 
energy.  In  an  investigation  of  the  learning  of  20,  24  and  30 
syllables,- — with  myself  as  observer  and  Radossawljewitsch 
and  Dannenbaum  as  controls, — dullness  and  weariness  occa- 
sionally made  themselves  felt  in  the  longest  series,  and  I  was 
then  obliged  to  report  that  I  could  no  longer  succeed  in  learn- 
ing; but  until  one  approaches  the  limit  beyond  which  addi- 
tional repetitions  make  no  additional  contribution  to  memorial 
'  Cf.  E.  Meumann.    Hausarbeit  tmd  Schularheit,  Leipzig,  1904. 


278  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

effect,  the  number  of  repetitions  wholly  fails  to  increase  in 
accordance  with  the  Ebbinghaus  law  of  progression. 

These  facts  have  of  course  an  important  bearing  upon 
pedagogy.  They  show  us  that  it  is  not  desirable  to  reduce  to 
a  minimum  the  amount  which  is  to  be  learned  at  a  single 
sitting,  as  one  must  infer  from  the  law  of  Ebbinghaus,  but 
that  the  task  assigned  for  a  single  period  must  be  as  great  as 
the  capacity  of  the  learner  permits. 

A  natural  transition  to  the  internal  conditions  of  learning 
may  be  made  through  a  consideration  of  the  question:  What 
relation  obtains  between  number  of  repetitions  and  concen- 
tration of  attention?  Most  psychologists  support  the  view 
that  these  two  factors  are  interchangeable  with  each  other. 
They  believe  that  when  the  learner  concentrates  his  attention 
more  intensively  and  more  uniformly,  he  learns  with  a  lesser 
number  of  repetitions;  and  when  the  learner's  concentration 
is  neither  intensive  nor  uniform  he  must  make  good  this  defect 
by  an  increase  in  the  number  of  his  repetitions  if  he  is  to 
obtain  an  equal  result  from  his  learning.  This  law  is  valid  in 
a  certain  sense;  but  its  range  of  vaUd^ty  is  limited  by  the  fact 
that  both  attention  and  repetition  have  their  own  peculiar 
effects  upon  memory.  Increased  concentration  of  attention 
secures  one  result  more  rapidly, — namely,  a  first  errorless 
recitation;  but  while  a  saving  in  repetitions  is  thus  effected, 
retention  is  less  permanent.  Increase  in  number  of  repetitions 
on  the  other  hand,  has  an  especially  favorable  effect  upon 
lasting  retention.  This  conclusion  is  supported  by  various 
experiments  upon  memory.  We  shall  return  to  it  in  our  dis- 
cussion of  attention  and  forgetting.  Let  us  now  turti  to  the 
internal  or  subjective  conditions  of  learning. 

It  is,  of  course,  very  important  to  know  and  to  control  these 
subjective  conditions, — the  whole  mental  disposition  which 
the  learner  finds  to  be  present  during  his  process  of  learning. 


Associative  Learning  2'j() 

And  it  would  be  an  ideal  state  of  affairs  if  throughout  our 
experiments  and  throughout  the  work  of  the  school-room  we 
could  keep  these  subjective  conditions  as  constant  and  as 
uniform  from  day  to  day  as  we  are  able  to  do  in  the  case  of 
the  objective  conditions  of  our  experiments.  But  this  is  an 
exceedingly  difficult  task.  It  usually  lies  within  the  power  of 
the  experimenter  and  of  the  teacher  to  choose  approximately 
uniform  external  conditions  under  which  a  child  shall  learn; 
but  we  are  seldom  able  to  secure  complete  control  of  the 
learner's  internal  condition. 

A  first  point  which  concerns  us  in  learning  is  the  regulation 
of  the  attention.  The  attributes  of  attention  which  have 
chiefly  to  do  with  learning  and  retention  are  intensity  and 
uniformity  of  concentration  throughout  the  whole  act  of 
learning,  and  particularly  persistence  of  attention  throughout. 
Every-day  experience  teaches  us  that  these  three  attributes 
have  an  intimate  bearing  upon  the  act  of  learning.  The  more 
intensively  a  person  concentrates  his  attention  upon  his  act 
of  learning,  the  sooner  will  he  succeed,  as  a  rule,  in  memorizing. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  attribute  of  uniformity  of  attention 
is  concerned  chiefly  in  the  learning  of  a  large  body  of  material, 
and  in  associating  its  various  parts  with  a  uniform  degree  of 
stability.  We  may  distinguish  between  an  individual  and  a 
general  unevenness  or  lack  of  uniformity  of  attention.  Gen- 
eral lack  of  uniformity  is  due  to  the  nature  of  the  attentive 
process  itself,  to  the  material  upon  which  attention  is  con- 
centrated, and  in  part,  to  the  method  of  learning.  We  know 
from  general  observation  that  the  duration  or  persistence  of 
attentive  concentration  varies  from  individual  to  individual. 
There  are  individuals  whose  attention  functions  in  a  t^-pically 
regular  and  uniform  fashion;  others  however  possess  a  typi- 
cally fluctuating  attention  which  alternates  between  states  of 
concentration  and  relaxation. 


28o  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

General  concentration  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the 
attentive  process.  The  nature  of  attention  is  such  that  it 
cannot  function  uniformly,  and  psychology  recognizes  the 
existence  of  normal  fluctuations  of  attention.  These  fluctua- 
tions, whose  alternations  may  be  of  long  or  of  short  duration, 
make  themselves  felt,  of  course,  in  our  learning.^ 

Then  too  an  irregularity  in  the  distribution  of  attention  is 
due  to  the  nature  of  the  material.  When  material  interests  us 
or  when  it  has  meaning  for  us  it  claims  the  attention  in  greater 
or  lesser  degree.  Irregularity  of  attention  is  even  more  inti- 
mately related  to  the  method  of  learning  which  we  adopt. 
It  may  be  said  that  each  method  has  its  own  typical  distribu- 
tion of  attention,  or  more  accurately,  its  typical  irregularity 
of  distribution  of  attention.  We  have  already  seen  that 
when  we  learn  by  means  of  the  whole-procedure  we  find  a 
typical  irregularity  of  attention  to  manifest  itself  in  the  fact 
that  the  middle  region  of  the  series  of  syllables  is  invariably 
learned  with  a  lesser  intensity  of  concentration.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  series  attention  enters  upon  its  task  with  a 
relatively  high  degree  of  intensity,  and  toward  the  close  a 
second  impulsion  of  attention  makes  itself  felt;  but  at  the 
middle  region  a  lesser  degree  of  concentration  occurs.  When 
the  part-procedure  is  employed  a  different  distribution  of 
attention  takes  place.  Here  it  strikes  out  anew  with  each 
new  section  of  the  material;  but  it  also  dies  down  more 
rapidly  because  when  this  method  is  employed  the  same  short 
section  is  repeated  over  and  over  again  in  immediate  succes- 
sion. This  is  the  reason  why  the  mediating  methods  are 
much  more  effective  for  learning.  The  latter  methods  pro- 
vide for  the  associations  being  established  in  proper  serial 

^  The  physiological  causes  of  fluctuation  of  attention  are  discussed 
by  Zoneff  and  Meumann,  Ueber  den  Ausdruck  der  Gemiitsbewegungen 
in  Atem  und  Puis,  Philos.  Stiidien,  XVIII.,  1901,  44ff. 


Associative  Leami^iz  281 


6 


order;  and  they  also  make  it  possible  for  attention  to  recover 
for  a  moment  at  the  stopping-places  within  the  group  of 
material,  and  then  to  proceed  with  renewed  energy  at  the 
beginning  of  the  next  section  without  being  dulled  or  blunted 
as  it  advances  through  the  series. 

The  endurance  or  persistence  of  attention  must  be  regarded 
as  another  subjective  condition  of  learning.  The  opposite 
condition  shows  itself  in  the  exhaustion  of  attention,  Kraepelin 
was  the  first  to  point  out  that  individuals  differ  widely  in  this 
regard,  some  possessing  an  attention  which  is  readily  fatigued 
while  the  attention  of  others  is  characterized  by  endurance. 
One  need  scarcely  remark  that  it  is  a  matter  of  great  impor- 
tance for  the  teacher  to  be  able  to  determine  whether  a  child 
possesses  an  enduring  or  an  easily  exhausted  attention.  This 
factor  must  be  taken  into  account  not  only  in  the  manage- 
ment but  also  in  the  evaluation  of  pupils. 

Adaptation  is  another  subjective  condition  of  learning 
which  may  be  explained  from  the  attributes  of  attention. 
By  adaptation  we  understand  the  accommodation  of  atten- 
tion to  the  activity  of  the  moment.  We  have  already  seen 
that  individuals  differ  widely  in  their  rapidity  of  adaptation. 
Certain  persons  are  typically  rapid,  and  others  are  typically 
slow  to  adapt;  and  to  this  variation  is  chiefly  due  the  differ- 
ence between  the  rapid  and  the  slow  learner. 

Another  subjective  condition  of  learning,  and  one  which 
has  been  too  little  heeded,  is  the  affective  state  which  is 
present  during  the  act  of  learning.  The  emotional  condition 
in  which  we  find  ourselves  during  the  performance  of  a  mental 
task  is  of  profound  importance  for  the  accomplishment  of 
the  task.  In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  an  emotion  of  pleas- 
antness facilitates  the  function  of  memory,  and  that  unpleas- 
antness has  a  very  detrimental  effect  upon  memory.  We  are 
all  familiar  with  the  experience  that  when  during  a  state  of 


282  The  Psychology  oj  Learning 

extreme  unpleasantness  we  have  to  learn  something,  it  usu- 
ally requires  a  great  effort  to  overcome  the  unpleasantness; 
while  a  moderate  cheerfulness  or  a  calm  but  pleasurable 
mood  is  favorable  to  efficiency  in  all  mental  work.  This  rule 
however,  is  not  universally  valid.  All  emotions  exert  an 
influence  upon  the  work  of  memory;  and  all  impair  it  if  they 
exceed  a  moderate  degree.  Experiments  have  shown  that  a 
certain  equable  mood  is  especially  advantageous  for  learning. 
What  this  statement  means  can  best  be  described  by  com- 
paring an  unpractised  with  a  thoroughly  practised  learner. 
The  unpractised  learner  is  usually  subject,  at  the  outset,  to 
well-marked  fluctuations  of  emotion.  He  may  feel  a  certain 
pleasure  in  the  experiment,  perhaps  however  an  uneasiness 
due  to  the  unfamillarity  of  the  material  and  to  other  external 
circumstances.  This  fluctuation  of  emotion  is  particularly 
deleterious  to  the  act  of  learning.  With  progressive  practice 
the  learner  gradually  discovers  the  mood  which  is  propitious 
to  the  work  in  hand;  and  it  seems  probable  that  this  is  in- 
timately related  to  the  relative  degree  of  intensity  with  which 
the  desire  to  learn  must  be  present.  If  this  relative  degree  of 
desire  is  present,  the  most  favorable  condition  for  learning, 
or  otherwise  expressed,  the  state  of  equable  emotion  or  of 
emotional  equilibrium  is  attained. 

Another  group  of  subjective  conditions  of  learning  may  be 
designated  by  the  word  "tension."  The  advent  of  tensions 
in  the  muscular  system  is  a  concomitant  of  concentrated 
attention.  Almost  everybody  who  strains  his  attention  to 
keen  concentration  may  note  that  he  also  contracts  muscles 
at  different  parts  of  his  body;  and  these  contractions  come  to 
consciousness  as  sensations  of  strain.  The  distribution  of 
muscular  contractions  and  sensations  of  tension  is  wholly 
different  in  different  individuals,  and  is  to  a  certain  extent  a 
matter  of  habit.     Certain  persons  observe  them  in  the  mus- 


Associative  Learning  283 

cular  apparatus  of  the  sense-organs,  especially  in  the  eyes  and 
the  visual  muscles;  others  in  the  toes  or  in  the  muscles  of  the 
legs;  in  certain  instances,  the  muscles  of  the  neck  are  con- 
tracted, the  teeth  are  set  and  the  fists  are  clenched  during 
keen  concentration.  Now  these  tensions  always  make  their 
appearance  when  we  are  engaged  in  learning,  and  they  accom- 
pany our  every  act  of  learning.  How  important  they  are  may 
be  seen  when  we  compare  the  unpractised  and  the  practised 
observer  in  a  memory  experiment.  The  untrained  learner 
ordinarily  employs  too  much  motor  strain  at  first.  Such  an 
excessive  expenditure  of  tension  impairs  the  function  of  mem- 
ory; and,  in  consequence,  the  beginner  is  obliged  to  expend 
many  more  repetitions  in  learning  a  material  than  the  trained 
observer.  During  the  course  of  the  experiment,  however,  a 
feeling  of  the  proper  amount  of  tension  is  usually  acquired 
by  the  learner;  and  then  ensues  that  equable  condition  which 
is  most  favorable  for  memorial  efficiency. 

It  seems  probable  that  the  phenomenon  of  impulse  of  will, 
which  Kraepelin  investigated,  is  related  with  these  tensions. 
We  spur  and  impel  the  will  from  within  whenever  during  the 
course  of  a  long  act  of  learning  we  detect  that  the  attention 
is  flagging  or  that  the  desired  memorial  result  is  not  being 
attained.  These  impulsions  probably  have  both  an  intel- 
lectual and  a  motor  aspect.  The  intellectual  aspect  consists 
in  the  accomplishment  of  our  task  and  the  realization  of  the 
voluntary  resolve  by  whose  aid  we  hold  ourselves  to  the  task. 
The  motor  aspect  consists  in  the  arousing  of  tensions  from 
the  groups  of  voluntary  muscles;  and  this  dual  phenomenon 
brings  it  about  that  transient  relaxations  of  attention  are 
eliminated. 

A  further  feature  which  belongs  to  the  subjective  conditions 
of  learning  has  to  do  with  the  disposition  of  the  learner.  This 
simply  means  our  general  physical  and  mental  condition. 


284  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

When  the  disposition  is  favorable,  the  work  of  memory  pro- 
gresses more  efficiently  than  when  an  unfavorable  disposition 
is  present.  A  general  rule  of  method  may  be  derived  from 
this  because,  since  investigation  shows  us  that  the  learner's 
psychophysical  disposition  exerts  a  very  strong  influence  upon 
the  process  of  learning,  the  teacher  must  take  this  fact  into 
consideration.  It  is  impossible  to  obtain  as  satisfactory  results 
from  an  ill-disposed  child  as  from  the  same  child  when  in  a 
normal  condition.  Moreover,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  certain 
children  have  abnormally  great  fluctuations  of  disposition; 
these  demand  a  different  treatment  in  a  case  of  long-continued 
memory  work  than  children  who  are  perfectly  sound  and 
normal.  ^ 

Yet  another  group  of  internal  conditions  is  designated  by 
the  term  practice.  This  term  has  a  two-fold  meaning  in  the 
German  language.  We  use  it  to  designate  the  process  of 
training,  and  also  to  designate  the  result  of  training.  It  would 
be  better  to  substitute  for  the  latter  some  other  term,  such  as 
skill.  The  amount  of  practice  or  skill  which  an  observer 
possesses  exerts  an  exceedingly  great  influence  upon  the  result 
which  is  attained  in  his  memory  experiments  and  in  his  learn- 
ing in  general.  For  this  reason  the  experimenter  arranges  that 
a  so-called  maximum  degree  of  practice  shall  be  attained  by 
his  learners  in  the  preliminary  stage  of  his  investigation. 
Maximum  practice  represents  the  point  beyond  which  further 
progress  is  not,  or  is  scarcely,  attainable.  The  practised 
learner  proceeds  more  economically  under  all  conditions  of 
learning  than  the  unpractised  observer.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  the  former  employs  no  superfluous  tensions;  he  has  a 
more  equable  mood,  more  intensive  and  more  regular  concen- 
tration, requires  fewer  repetitions,  etc.     Now  experimental 

^  A.  Fuchs,  Dispositionsschwankungen  bei  normalen  und  schwach- 
sinnigen  Kinder n,  Gutersloh,  1904. 


Associative  Learning  285 

investigations  have  yielded  the  exceedingly  important  result 
that  learning  is  to  an  extraordinary  degree  subject  to  training. 
This  phenomenon  however  is  so  significant  that  we  shall 
devote  a  special  discussion  to  it.  ^ 

Habituation,  as  a  condition  of  learning,  is  intimately  related 
to  practice.  Habituation  also  consists  of  a  group  of  subjective 
conditions  which  must  be  taken  into  account  in  the  investi- 
gation of  memory.  Every  observer  passes  through  a  stage 
in  which  he  is  not  habituated  to  memory  experiments,  not 
only  as  regards  the  objective  conditions  under  which  they 
are  conducted  but  also  with  respect  to  subjective  procedure, 
to  material  to  be  learned,  and  to  the  pecuHar  demands  which 
are  made  upon  him  during  the  experiment.  So  long  as  this 
period  of  strangeness  and  unfamiliarity  continues,  experiments 
cannot  be  conducted  properly;  hence  it  is  customary  to  intro- 
duce a  number  of  preliminary  experiments.  The  emotional 
state  and  the  tensions  which  we  have  already  mentioned 
belong  among  the  factors  of  habituation;  but  neither  of  them 
is  wholly  dependent  upon  habituation. 

Another  group  of  subjective  conditions  may  be  referred  to 
as  the  influence  exerted  by  the  ideational  type  upon  the  act 
of  learning.  The  ideational  type  to  which  an  individual 
belongs  exerts  an  influence  upon  the  result  of  his  mental 
work.  Thus,  for  instance,  in  the  experiments  which  we  ordi- 
narily regard  as  fundamental  to  the  whole  psychology  of  mem- 
ory,— in  the  learning  of  nonsense  syllables, — auditory-motor 
ideation  is,  on  the  whole,  the  most  advantageous  endowment; 
and,  indeed,  an  especially  favorable  condition  is  found  to  be 
present  when  the  auditory-motor  type  is  to  some  extent  com- 
bined with  the  visual  type.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
nonsense  syllables  may  be  memorized  by  reading  and  pronounc- 
ing them  solto  voce.    Here  we  have,  on  the  one  hand,  a  func- 

'  See  the  concluding  section  of  this  book. 
20 


286  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

tioning  of  the  motor  processes  of  speech  with  the  concomitant 
sensations  of  movement,  as  well  as  a  functioning  of  the  audi- 
tory and  the  visual  images  of  the  syllables.    On  the  other  hand, 
the  purely  visual  type  is  at  a  disadvantage  in  this  sort  of 
learning  because  the  syllables  are  seen  for  but  an  instant,  and 
moreover  the  visuaUzer  possesses  no  vocalization  or  auditory 
imagery  to  reinforce  his  memory.    One  finds  a  similar  state  of 
affairs  in  a  great  part  of  the  work  of  the  school-room.    Chil- 
dren are  required  to  remember  a  great  many  things  which 
they  learn  through  hearing  alone ;  and  here  again  the  auditory- 
motor  type  excels.    Hence  the  ideational  type  must  be  taken 
into  account,  above  all  else,  in  deciding  upon  the  method  of 
presenting  material  which  is  to  be  learned  because  when  the 
mode  of  presentation  conforms  with  the  learner's  type  he 
learns  more  readily.     Jacobs  found  that  when  material  is 
presented  in  auditory  fashion  the  visual  observer  transforms  it 
into  visual  images  wherever  the  experimental  conditions  give 
occasion  for  his  doing  so;    and  this  visual  transformation  is 
done  with  such  definiteness  by  certain  observers  that  they  see 
the  letters  before  them  in  a  particular  form  of  handwriting. 
Jacobs^  also  reports, — and  this  is  confirmed  by  every-day 
observation, — that   the   visualizer   receives   more   aid    from 
spatial  localizations;    he  notes  the  "absolute  position"  of 
syllables  in  the  series,  of  words  in  the  list,  of  sentences  upon 
the  page,  etc.    The  auditory-motor  individual,  on  the  other 
hand,  notes  the  position  of  particular  items  by  labelling  them 
with  their  consecutive  numbers,  by  observing  their  position 
in  the  "speech  melody,"  and  in  the  vocal  rhythms.     Most 
learners  seem  then  to  localize  the  various  parts  of  their  mem- 
ory material  but  they  do  so  by  wholly  different  means  accord- 
ing to  the  ideational  type  to  which  they  belong.    Consequently 
Miiller  and  Pilzecker  distinguish  three  sorts  of  localizations: 

'  W.  Jacobs.    Op.  cit.,  soff. 


Associative  Learning  287 

Localizations  in  visual  space;  auditory-motor  enumerations; 
and  vocal  modulations.^ 

A  final  subjective  condition  has  to  do  with  the  influence  of 
the  task  or  of  the  will  upon  the  act  of  learning.  Whenever 
we  set  to  work  upon  memory  material,  a  definite  task  or 
problem  hovers  before  our  minds;  for  instance,  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  we  are  to  learn  a  certain  number  of 
syllables  or  verses  of  poetry  as  rapidly  as  possible,  in  such 
fashion  as  to  be  able  to  recite  them  from  memory  and  to  remem- 
ber them  as  long  as  possible.  The  manner  in  which  we  ideate 
the  problem  or  task  is  a  matter  of  great  importance  in  learn- 
ing. It  may  even  be  shown  that  the  efficiency  of  the  learning 
is  determined  by  the  sort  of  problem  which  we  set  up  before 
ourselves.  For  example,  in  experiments  upon  memory  it  is 
necessary  that  the  observer  should  know  during  the  act  of 
learning  whether  he  is  subsequently  to  be  tested  by  the 
method  of  re-learning  or  by  the  method  of  paired  associates; 
and  if  our  experimental  procedure  includes  both  methods,  we 
very  soon  find  that  the  observer  inquires :  Which  method  are 
you  going  to  employ  in  testing  this  memorization?  When 
this  question  is  answered  he  regulates  his  whole  procedure  in 
accordance  with  the  form  of  test  which  is  subsequently  to  be 
applied.  If  he  knows  that  the  method  of  paired  associates  is 
going  to  be  employed,  he  involuntarily  adopts  a  procedure 
which  makes  the  association  between  each  pair  of  syllables  as 
closely  knit  as  possible,  and  prepares  himself  relatively  little 
for  a  free  recitation  of  the  whole  series  of  syllables.  When, 
however,  he  knows  in  advance  that  he  is  going  to  be  tested 
by  the  saving  method  he  pays  almost  no  heed  at  all  to  the 
individual  associations  but  devotes  himself  to  learning  to 
recite  the  whole  Hst.  Yet  another  illustration:  When  the 
observer  knows  that  the  only  thing  which  is  to  be  determined 
'  Cf.  the  discussion  in  the  foregoing  pages. 


288  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

is  the  rapidity  with  which  he  can  learn  to  recite  the  whole 
list  once  from  memory,  he  adopts  a  wholly  different  procedure 
from  that  which  he  follows  when  he  knows  that  his  permanent   • 
retention  also  will  be  tested.    In  the  former  case,  he  learns 
only  for  the  momentary  effect;  in  the  latter  case,  he  aims  to 
have  his  learning  result  in  a  lasting  retention.   And  if  we  should 
deliberately  assign  the  task  of  learning  only  for  a  single  reci- 
tation from  memory  but  should  subsequently  test  his  perma- 
nent retention,  we  would  find  that  he  actually  retains  the 
material  much  less  permanently.    In  general,  then,  we  may 
formulate  the  rule  that  the  consciousness  of  the  task  should 
^  correspond  as  closely  as  possible  with  the  nature  of  the  achieve- 
ment which  we  shall  subsequently  demand;   if  the  assigned 
problem  does  not  conform  to  the  achievement  which  we  test, 
the  ef&ciency  of  the  learning  will  invariably  be  impaired. 

Everything  which  we  have  discussed  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  conditions  of  mechanical  learning  may  also  be  regarded 
as  having  to  do  with  the  general  conditions  of  all  learning 
because  all  learning  has  a  mechanical  aspect.  When  signifi- 
cant material  is  learned,  however,  a  number  of  additional 
factors  come  into  operation.  The  importance  of  the  mechan- 
ical factor  of  repetition  is  somewhat  lessened  in  logical  mem- 
orization; but  none  of  the  conditions  of  learning  which  have 
been  mentioned  lose  their  importance  even  in  the  learning  of 
significant  material.  In  discussing  these  conditions,  therefore, 
we  have  discussed  universal  conditions  of  all  learning. 

At  this  point  we  may  present  a  summarized  statement  con- 
cerning technically  correct  and  economical  learning.  We 
learn  most  economically,  so  far  as  time  and  energy  are  con- 
cerned, when  we  are  familiar  with  all  of  the  foregoing 
subjective  and  objective  conditions  of  learning;  when  we 
control  these  conditions  in  ourselves,  and  when,  if  it  is  possible 
to  vary  the  conditions,  we  adapt  them  to  the  purpose  for  which 


Associative  Learning  289 

the  act  of  learning  has  been  undertaken.  That  individual 
possesses  a  technique  of  learning  who  understands  these  con- 
ditions, controls  them  in  his  own  learning,  and  is  able  to 
adapt  them  to  the  purpose  for  which  he  learns. 

We  shall  now  complete  our  description  of  the  conditions  of 
learning  by  adding  a  discussion  of  the  learning  of  significant 
material;  here  the  mechanical  factor  of  attentively  repeating 
the  words  recedes  into  the  back-ground,  and  the  factor  of 
content  or  meaning  comes  into  prominence. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ASSOCIATIVE  LEARNING  (Continued) 

5.    The  Learning  of  Significant  Materials 
It  is  universally  recognized  that  the  learning  of  significant 
material  progresses  more  easily,  leads  sooner  to  memorization, 
and  results  in  a  more  permanent  retention  than  the  mechan- 
ical learning  of  unrelated  data,  such  as  isolated  letters,  num- 
bers or  names,  nonsense-syllables,  and  the  like.     Quite  as 
wide-spread,  however,  as  this  belief  are  certain  fundamental 
errors  concerning  the  relation  of  meaningful  or  "rational" 
memorization  to  mechanical  memorization.    Investigations  in 
this  field  of  psychological  pedagogy  have  paid  but  little  heed 
as  yet  to  that  type  of  memorization  which  is  assisted  or  rein- 
forced by  meaning.    This  dearth  of  experimentation  is  easily 
explained  if  we  but  bear  in  mind  the  extraordinary  variety  of 
possibiUties  which  must  be  taken  into  account  by  the  inves- 
tigator in  this  field  of  research;  the  work  of  Ebert  and  Meu- 
mann  and  the  more  recent  work  of  Kraemer,  however,  have 
thrown  a  certain  amount  of  light  upon  the  learning  of  logically 
coherent  material.    In  the  domain  of  significant  learning  we 
find  that  not  only  do  all  of  the  conditions  of  mechanical 
memorization  co-operate   but  that  the  act  of  learning  is  now 
further  compKcated  by  the  manifold  variety  of  possibilities 
which  arise  as  a  result  of  the  nature  of  the  material  to  be 
learned,  and  of  its  action  upon  the  learner  himself.     In  signifi- 
cant learning,  the  quality  and  the  quantity  of  the  material 
must  again  be  taken  into  account.    As  regards  quantity,  the 
rules  which  we  have  laid  down  in  connection  with  nonsense- 
syllables  are  also  valid  here,  that  is,  the  practised  learner  also 

290 


Associative  Learning  291 

learns  significant  material  with  relatively  few  repetitions 
even  when  the  material  is  of  large  bulk,  and  the  unpractised 
learner  requires  an  excessive  number  of  repetitions  for  the 
learning  of  significant  as  well  as  of  non-significant  material. 

If  we  next  consider  the  influence  exerted  by  the  quality  of 
the  significant  material,  we  again  find  that  it  is  a  matter  of 
importance  whether  the  material  is  made  up  of  relatively 
incoherent  elements  as  synonyms,  or  dates,  or  whether  it 
forms  a  significantly  coherent  whole.  In  the  latter  case,  again, 
conditions  differ  according  as  we  deal  with  prose,  or  with 
poetry  where  rhythm  and  rhyme  have  a  facilitating  effect. 
In  relation  not  only  to  the  age  but  also  to  the  individuali-ty 
of  the  learner,  much  depends  upon  whether  the  material  is  of 
relatively  abstract  character, — here  the  apprehension  of  log- 
ical coherence  plays  a  leading  role, — whether  it  is  concrete 
and  descriptive  or  whether  it  is  historical  and  narrative. 

The  nature  of  the  material  exerts  an  influence  upon  learning 
in  the  following  manner:  It  is  very  much  easier  to  remember 
a  coherent  body  of  material  than  to  remember  a  group  of 
incoherent  data.  For  the  latter  sort  of  material  the  limit  of 
retention  in  our  most  highly  practised  learners  was  found  to 
be  not  more  than  thirteen  letters,  thirteen  numbers,  seven  to 
nine  nonsense-syllables,  ten  isolated  words,  twenty  words  of  a 
poem,  twenty-four  words  of  (philosophical)  prose.  ^  This 
brings  to  fight  the  important  fact  that  learning  is  not  a  mere 
matter  of  the  number  of  elements  but  of  the  number  of  inde- 
pendent memorial  units.  For  example,  our  ten  words  con- 
tained about  fifty  or  sixty  letters;  they  were  not  remembered 
as  so  many  letters,  however,  but  only  in  virtue  of  their 
memory  value  as  word-units.  Here  is  expressed  the  universal 
nature  of  memory:   The  only  tilings  which  we  remember  are 

^  Ebcrt  und  Meumann,  U ebiingsph'dnomene  im  Berciche  dcs  Ged'dcht- 
nisscs. 


292  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

wholes;  and  particular  things  are  remembered  only  as  parts 
of  unitary  wholes.  An  observer  once  reported  that  he  remem- 
bered a  series  of  syllables  by  making  them  into  an  auditory 
whole,  "a  sort  of  melody."  Memory  is  a  synthetising  activity 
which  combines  elements  to  form  wholes;  and  data  are  "asso- 
ciated" when  they  become  parts  of  a  whole  for  consciousness. 

The  nature  of  the  content  which  is  to  be  learned  must  also 
be  taken  into  consideration.  The  content  may  be  relatively 
concrete  or  relatively  abstract  in  character;  and  in  the  former 
case  it  may  deal  with  a  concrete  description,  or  with  a  narra- 
tive in  which  temporal  relations  are  concerned.  For  these 
reasons  it  may  make  its  appeal  more  strongly  to  the  concrete 
ideation  or  to  the  logical  function  of  the  learner.  Again,  it 
may  derive  its  data  from  different  domains  of  sensation;  and 
in  its  logical  aspect  it  may  be  more  or  less  abstract  in  charac- 
ter. Its  logical  coherence  may  be  clear  and  readily  compre- 
hensible, or  it  may  be  obscure  and  complicated.  The  gram- 
matical structure  and  the  length  of  the  sentences  may  be 
favorable  or  unfavorable  for  learning.  And  there  comes  in  a 
wholly  new  factor, — the  relation  between  the  content  and  the 
form  of  expression;  indeed  the  words  themselves  sometimes 
obtain  a  special  sensory  significance  in  virtue  of  their  relation 
to  the  content, — the  sound  of  the  words  may  be  more  or  less 
appropriate  to  the  objects  designated.  Alliteration,  asso- 
nance, rhyme,  rhythm  and  meter,  the  variety  and  richness 
of  the  diction,  all  of  these  play  a  part  in  memory. 

This  enormous  variety  of  factors  which  contribute  to  the 
learning  of  coherent  material  raises  a  host  of  interesting  prob- 
lems. Only  a  few  of  these  problems  have  as  yet  received 
attention  from  the  investigator;  but  the  following  phenomena 
have  been  observed.  First  of  all,  the  existence  of  thorough- 
going differences  between  indi\idual  learners  has  come  to 
light.    These  may  be  called  types  of  rational  memorization. 


Associative  Learning  293 

The  materials  employed  by  Ebert  and  Meumann  were 
stanzas  from  Schiller's  Zerstdnmg  von  Orleans  and  selected 
passages  from  a  German  translation  of  Locke's  Essay  con- 
cerning Human  Understanding.  Kraemer  employed  materials 
of  various  sorts:  selections  from  Locke,  and  from  Hume's 
Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding,  passages  from 
Kleist's  Michael  Kohlhaas  (narrative  prose);  from  Man's 
Pompei,  Schmeil's  Lehrhuch  der  Zoologie  and  Hertwig's 
Pliysiology  (descriptive  prose).  The  learners  were  asked  to 
describe  their  mode  of  procedure;  and  these  introspective 
reports  were  supplemented  by  objective  determinations. 

Ebert  and  Meumann's  investigation  revealed  the  following 
typical  differences  in  method  of  learning:  one  observer  {Mn.)  , 
learned  exclusively  from  the  meaning  and  the  logical  coherence 
of  the  material.  He  remembered  the  words  of  the  poem  and 
the  prose  selections  only  in  so  far  as  they  expressed  the  mean- 
ing and  the  coherence  of  the  content.  The  learning  of  the 
prose,  which  was  chiefly  of  an  abstract  character,  was  char- 
acterized by  the  fact  that  attention  was  directed  more 
exclusively  to  the  meaning  and  the  grammatical  connection 
of  the  sentences  than  in  the  learning  of  the  poetry;  while  in 
the  poem  the  most  concrete  en\isagement  possible  of  the 
events,  actions,  persons,  and  places  served  the  memory  as  a 
starting-point  for  the  work  of  imprinting  the  words.  The 
retention  of  the  words  was  facilitated  more  by  their  concrete 
content  than  by  their  abstract  relations.  At  times,  Schiller's 
poetic  diction  led  the  learner  to  attend  to  the  sounds  of  the 
words,  to  the  rhythm,  and  to  the  lengths  of  measures,  words 
and  sentences.  Still  these  sensory  elements  always  served 
merely  as  secondary  aids  to  memory. 

The  procedure  of  some  of  the  other  observers  was  wholly 
different.  Ln  their  cases,  the  verbal  and  grammatical  elementsv 
of  the  text  played  the  leading  role  in  imprinting  even  in  the 


294  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

act  of  significant  learning.  They  attended  chiefly  to  the 
visual  elements, — the  length  of  the  words,  sentences  and  parts 
of  sentences,  to  their  position  in  the  hne,  in  the  stanza  or  in 
the  paragraph,  and  to  the  sentence  construction;  or  to  the 
auditory  elements, — the  sounds  of  the  words,  the  inflection 
and  the  rhythm  of  their  own  voices,  especially  to  the  relative 
strength  of  accentuation,  to  rhythm  and  rhyme,  to  the  recur- 
rence of  the  same  letters  or  sounds  at  the  beginning  of  words, 
to  unusual  words  which  are  not  current  in  common  diction, 
and  the  like;  or  to  sounds  which  are  difficult  to  pronounce, 
and  to  the  succession  of  vocal  innervations.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  these  observers  the  sense  and  significance  of  what 
they  learned  played  only  the  role  of  an  auxiliary  to  the  sense- 
memory.  This  shows  us  that  even  in  learning  significant 
material,  one  person  remembers  chiefly  by  means  of  sensory 
elements,  another  chiefly  by  the  meaning  of  the  content.  In 
the  latter  case  the  sensory  elements,  whether  auditory-motor 
or  visual,  are  only  occasionally  summoned  as  aids  when  the 
learner  finds  that  a  certain  word  will  not  take  hold  and  cling; 
or  the  sensory  elements  may  occasionally  force  themselves 
into  the  focus  of  consciousness  in  virtue  of  their  unusual  or 
striking  character. 

A  second  difference  between  individuals  results  from  the 
fact  that  the  meaning  of  what  is  learned  is  envisaged  chiefly 
in  concrete  images  by  some  observers,  while  by  others  the 
imprinting  is  accomplished  in  terms  either  of  the  logical 
coherence  or  the  grammatical  structure  of  the  sentences,  or, 
in  certain  cases,  in  terms  of  temporal  coherence.  A  third 
typical  difference  consists  here  again  in  the  fact  that  certain 
observers  set  out  to  learn  the  total  body  of  material  as  a 
whole,  imprinting  the  single  sentences  or  lines  of  verse  as 
parts  of  the  stanza,  and  the  stanzas  as  parts  of  the  whole 
connected  poem;   the  attention  of  these  observers  is  directed 


Associative  Learning  295 

to  the  total  context.  In  opposition  to  this  procedure,  other 
learners  link  together,  piece  by  piece,  the  various  lines,  sen- 
tences and  stanzas,  and  the  parts  are  thus  connected  up  into 
a  whole.  The  attention  of  the  former  type  of  observer  is  a 
total  attention;  that  of  the  latter  functions  in  a  series  of 
discrete  acts,  each  directed  to  a  single  detail.  The  one  atten- 
tion is  analytic;  it  proceeds  to  analyze  what  has  first  been 
grasped  as  a  whole.  The  other  is  synthetic;  it  constructs  a 
whole  from  a  number  of  parts.  ^ 

We  find  here  a  recurrence  of  the  fixating  and  the  fluctuating 
types  of  attention.  The  observer  who  possesses  a  fluctuating  * 
attention  reaches  out  in  advance  of  his  reading,  and  reaches 
back  as  well,  not  only  with  his  internal  but  also  with  his 
external  regard ;  the  fixating  type  reads  and  learns,  in  a  strictly 
successive  fashion,  whatever  appears  before  his  progressively 
advancing  regard.  One  is  tempted  to  speak  of  yet  a  fourth 
typical  difference;  but  it  seems  doubtful  to  me  whether  this 
type  is  to  be  placed  upon  a  level  of  fundamental  significance 
with  the  foregoing.  In  all  psychological  experiments,  includ- 
ing, of  course,  memory  experiments,  it  is  observed  that  cer- 
tain learners  tend  to  employ  all  possible  secondary  associa- 
tions of  their  own  devising,  while  others  wholly  refrain  from 
using  these  devices  and  confine  themselves  to  what  is  given 
them.  In  some  cases,  the  former  devise  mnemonic  aids  which 
connect  the  parts  of  the  material  with  one  another;  in  other 
cases,  they  make  reinforcing  movements  or  they  construct  pe- 
culiar spatial  schemata  into  which  they  arrange  what  is  to  be 
remembered,  and  the  like.  The  most  of  these  secondary  aids 
disappear,  however,  during  the  course  of  progressive  experimen- 
tation, and  the  learning  is  confined  more  and  more  to  the  text 
which  is  furnished.  These  auxiliary  means  appear,  therefore, 
to  be  a  matter  of  habituation;  they  do  not  seem  to  imply  the 
existence  of  essential  differences  in  the  organization  of  memory. 


^96  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

Kraemer  was  able  to  establish  these  typical  differences  in 
learning  more  securely  because  he  prescribed  a  variety  of 
conditions  under  which  the  act  of  learning  was  to  be  per- 
formed. In  one  case  the  learners  were  instructed  to  attend 
only  to  the  meaning;  in  another  case  their  attention  was 
directed,  so  far  as  possible,  to  the  verbal  and  sensory  elements 
of  the  material;  and  in  a  third  case  they  were  to  attend  to 
both  form  and  meaning.  Kraemer  also  employed  the  method 
of  interrupted  reading;  here  the  act  of  learning  was  broken 
in  upon  after  a  certain  number  of  readings  and  the  amount 
which  had  been  learned  up  to  that  point  was  determined. 
His  results  show  that  the  direction  of  attention  to  meaning 
proved  to  be  the  most  advantageous  procedure  throughout. 
For  adults,  then,  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  content 
and  particularly  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  logical  connec- 
tion of  the  sentences  constitute  not  only  the  most  important 
but  the  indispensable  factor  of  all  learning  and  remembering. 
When  the  learner  relies  upon  the  sensory  details  of  forms  of 
expression  his  learning  is,  in  most  instances,  attained  only 
after  a  great  many  readings  of  the  text;  and  even  then  he 
does  not  usually  understand  its  meaning.  And  even  those 
individuals,  whose  act  of  learning  seems  to  be  based  chiefly 
upon  the  words  of  the  text,  employ  the  words  only  as  a  sec- 
ondary aid  for  the  attainment  of  logical  memorization.  All 
three  investigators,— Ebert,  Meumann  and  Kraemer,— have 
made  the  important  observation  that  the  act  of  learning  a 
material  of  any  considerable  extent  starts  out  from  certain 
"corner-stones"  of  retention;  and  the  procedure  consists  in 
first  laying  these  "corner-stones"  securely  and  then  support- 
ing the  rest  of  the  learned  material  upon  them.  These  may 
also  be  regarded  as  crystalHzation-points  around  which  the 
whole  chain  of  associations  is  formed.  In  the  case  of  the  type 
which  learns  exclusively  from  meaning,  these  supports  are  the 


Associative  Learning  2()'j 

centers  upon  which  the  whole  logical  context  hinges;  for  the 
other  type  of  learner,  striking  words  or  phrases,  verbal  antith- 
eses or  repetitions  also  constitute  starting-points  of  retention. 

Apart  from  these  individual  variations,  however,  our  inves- 
tigations of  significant  learning  have  yielded  a  number  of 
results  which  are  pedagogically  important. 

J.  In  the  case  of  coherent  and  meaningful  materials  the 
chief  memorial  support  consists  in  the  apprehension  of  the 
meaning  and  the  logical  context;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
process  of  learning  takes  its  start  from  the  dominant  thoughts 
of  the  text.  These  are  learned  first  of  all;  and  the  rest  of 
the  content,  which  the  learner  himself  regards  as  subsidiary, 
is  wholly  ignored  at  the  outset.  The  natural  pedagogical 
inference  is  that  the  memorial  acquisition  of  all  meaningful 
material  can  best  be  facilitated  by  clearly  explaining  to  the 
pupil  the  context  and  coherence  of  thought  of  the  whole 
material. 

2.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  it  is  necessary  a.  that  the 
learner  should  grasp  the  leading  thoughts,  and  b.  that  he 
should  pay  particular  attention  to  those  parts  of  the  text 
upon  which  the  essential  progress  of  the  thought  or  the  devel- 
opment of  the  argument  is  based.  The  subsidiary  parts  of 
the  text  may  then  be  learned  with  relative  ease  because  they 
enter  into  union  with  the  dominant  thoughts. 

J.  Besides  these  points  which  are  (objectively)  significant 
for  the  progress  of  the  thought,  it  is  chiefly  those  parts  of 
the  text,  which  are  (subjectively)  most  readily  understood 
by  the  learner,  whose  mastery  constitutes  the  starting-point 
of  the  act  of  learning.  It  is  important,  therefore,  that  in 
teaching,  these  parts  should  be  discovered  and  that  attention 
should  first  be  concentrated  upon  them. 

4.  In  the  act  of  learning,  a  special  significance  attaches  to 
the  assocjatipiis  which  are  already  present  in  the  mind  of  the 


298  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

learner, — his  habitual  combinations  of  words,  his  habitual 
trains  of  thought,  and  his  habitual  modes  of  expressing  his 
thoughts.  These  are  grasped  first  of  all;  and  these  are  most 
correctly  reproduced.  It  is  natural,  then,  for  the  teacher  to 
infer  that  the  new  elements  in  the  material  to  be  learned  will 
attach  themselves  with  relative  facility  to  what  is  already 
known,  and  that  the  weak  learner  should  begin  with  the  famil- 
iar parts  of  the  material. 

Those  trains  of  thought  and  contexts  of  words,  which  al- 
though in  themselves  unfamiliar  are  yet  similar  to  trains  and 
contexts  which  are  familiar,  act  in  much  the  same  way  as 
familiar  and  customary  associations.  From  this  it  may  be 
inferred  that  if  a  new  material  contains  memorial  supports 
which  are  similar  to  former  contexts  of  thought,  they  consti- 
tute the  best  starting-point  for  the  act  of  learning;  and  the 
novel  and-  unfamiliar  parts  of  the  content  should  be  brought 
into  relation  with  them. 

5.  The  factors  which  we  have  briefly  designated  the  chief 
supports  of  the  process  of  learning  are  of  three  sorts: 

a.  When  the  memory  material  is  a  description  of  tangible 
objects  or  of  concrete  situations,  or  the  like,  the  chief  support 
of  learning  consists  in  the  learner's  act  of  envisaging  their 
parts  or  properties  as  concretely  .as  he  can.  In  doing  so,  how- 
ever, he  must  guard  against  superfluity  of  concrete  envisage- 
ment;  he  must  confine  himself  strictly  to  the  content  which  is 
expressed  in  the  text  because  the  superfluous  portrayal  of 
objects  by  an  act  of  imagination  inhibits  the  function  of 
memory.  Concrete  aids  may  contribute  in  a  secondary  fash- 
ion if  they  are  employed  to  embody  the  abstract  parts  of  the 
content;  but  this  is  an  advantage  only  in  cases  where  the 
individual  endowment  of  the  learner  lacks  auxiliary  imagery  of 
a  concrete  sort  for  the  direct  apprehension  of  the  abstract 
thoughts. 


Associative  Learning        ^  299 

b.  When  the  memory  material  is  narrative  in  character,  its 
temporal  relations  constitute  its  most  effective  memorial  fac- 
tor; and  these  temporal  relations  must  be  definitely  and 
accurately  presented  to  the  consciousness  of  the  learner.  Sev- 
eral sorts  of  temporal  relations  come  into  consideration  here : 
the  simultaneity  or  the  succession  of  events;  their  duration; 
their  recurrence;  their  rhythmic  succession,  when  periodically 
recurring  events  are  dealt  with. 

c.  To  these  must  be  added  the  logical  elements,  among 
which  the  thought  of  cause  plays  an  especially  prominent 
part  when  the  content  is  of  the  nature  of  a  proof  or  an  explan- 
ation. 

Besides  these  chief  supports  of  memory  a  great  many 
secondary  supports  contribute  to  the  process  of  learning. 
The  following  may  be  mentioned  as  secondary  aids  which 
owe  their  origin  to  the  meaning  of  the  text: 

I.  The  most  important  of  these  secondary  supports  is  the 
structure  of  the  sentences.  Its  effect  consists  in  the  fact  that: 
a.  Simplicity  of  grammatical  structure  facihtates,  while 
complexity  of  grammatical  structure  hinders  the  act  of  learn- 
ing, b.  Uniformity  of  sentence  structure  is  an  exceedingly 
valuable  aid  to  memory,  irregularity  of  sentence  structure 
gives  rise  to  an  intensely  inhibitory  effect,  c.  Subordinate 
clauses  are  relatively  well  remembered  when  they  are  not  too 
numerous  or  too  difficult  to  understand;  subordinate  clauses 
which  contain  digressions  or  additions  that  seem  to  be  super- 
fluous or  subsidiary  interfere  with  the  act  of  learning,  d.  The 
recurrence  of  identical  introductory  words  or  phrases, — in 
part — in  part,  now — now,  and  the  like, — proves  to  be  advan- 
tageous to  learning,  e.  The  length  of  the  sentences  is  an 
important  factor.  Sentences  of  moderate  length  which  can 
be  apprehended  at  a  single  reading  are  most  readily  remem- 
bered; successions  of  short  sentences  are  difficult  to  remember 


300  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

as  are  also  very  long  sentences.  /.  The  rhythm  of  prose 
facilitates  learning.  The  more  smooth  the  rhythmic  flow  of 
the  sentence,  the  more  easily  can  its  content  be  remembered, 
and  vice  versa.  The  effect  of  rhythm  is  greater,  the  more  we 
attend  to  the  wording  of  the  text.  g.  Particularly  striking 
words  attract  the  attention  and  are  for  that  reason  remem- 
bered better.  Such  words  may  sometimes  have  an  inhibiting 
effect  at  first;  they  attract  the  attention,  and  in  the  subse- 
quent course  of  the  process  of  learning  they  aid  retention.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  similar  but  not  identical  words  recur  fre- 
quently in  the  text,  they  interfere  with  the  act  of  learning. 
h.  Certain  visual  elements  such  as  unusual  handwriting, 
unusual  syllabification,  and  the  Hke,  are  of  advantage  only 
to  the  visual  type  of  learner,  i.  All  characteristics  and  pecul- 
iarities of  the  text  which  occasion  external  or  internal  locali- 
zation, such  as  the  noting  of  a  striking  passage  in  the  line 
or  on  the  page,  constitute  secondary  supports  of  the  act  of 
learning. 

2.  We  may  also  mention  certain  chief  factors  which  con- 
stitute hindrances,  and  which  are  a  product  of  the  meaningful 
and  grammatical  elements  of  the  text.  Like  the  chief  supports 
they  are  partly  objective,  partly  subjective  in  their  nature; 
that  is,  they  are  due  in  part  to  the  nature  of  the  material,  and 
in  part  to  the  mental  constitution  of  the  learner. 

Among  the  hindrances  may  be  mentioned  the  following: 
a.  Frequent  recurrence  of  similar  or  synonymous  expressions; 
this,  however,  does  not  prove  to  be  equally  disadvantageous  for 
all  learners  because  certain  individuals  are  disturbed  in  an 
extraordinary  degree  by  the  frequent  recurrence  of  synon- 
ymous words,  while  this  factor  is  much  less  disturbing  to  other 
learners,  b.  Successions  of  many  short  sentences  which  are 
not  grammatically  connected  with  one  another,  c.  The  other 
extreme,  immoderate  length  of  sentences,  is  also  disadvan- 


Associative  Learning  301 

tageous.  d.  Interpolated  words,  especially  adverbs  referring 
to  place  and  to  time,  have  a  disadvantageous  effect;  indeed, 
they  may  furnish  a  very  great  obstacle  if  they  interfere  with 
the  learner's  obtaining  a  distinct  perception  of  the  connec- 
tions between  the  parts  of  the  text.  All  additions  which  appear 
to  be  secondary  or  superfluous  as  compared  with  the  leading 
thoughts  also  tend  to  hinder  the  process  of  learning,  e.  The 
form  of  expression  and  the  customary  combination  of  words 
and  phrases  have  a  disadvantageous  effect  when  a  familiar 
thought  is  expressed  in  an  unusual  fashion  in  the  text.  The 
ordinary  form  of  expression  persists  stubbornly  in  forcing 
itself  upon  the  learner  and  can  only  be  suppressed  with  diffi- 
culty by  dint  of  learning  the  form  of  expression  which  appears 
in  the  text.  This  phenomenon  is  more  prominent  in  qases 
where  the  material  is  learned  by  concentrating  one's  attention 
upon  the  meaning.  /.  There  are  certain  other  factors  which 
may  have  an  exceedingly  disadvantageous  effect,  such  as 
fatigue,  unpleasantness,  repugnance  and  the  like. 

These  aids  and  hindrances  of  the  act  of  learning  take  their 
origin  chiefly  from  the  meaning  of  the  material  which  is 
learned;  but  there  are  also  specific  disturbances  and  obstacles 
which  are  due  to  the  wording  of  the  material.  These  are  par- 
ticularly effective  when  the  attention  of  the  learner  is  directed 
to  the  wording  or  to  spoken  material.  Yet  it  is,  in  general, 
true  that  but  few  universal  rules  can  be  formulated  for  acts  of 
learning  which  consist  in  verbal  acquisition;  certain  general 
phenomena  may  be  established,  however,  which  relate  to  this 
sort  of  verbal  learning.  Their  formulation  will  enable  the 
reader  to  recognize  the  general  nature  of  this  type  of  learning 
which  has  recourse  to  the  forms  of  expression  contained  in 
the  text. 

I.  The  memorization  of  the  wording  of  a  text  is  invariably 

the  most  disadvantageous  procedure  for  the  adult.     It  can 
21 


302  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

be  relatively  advantageous  only  when  the  learner  possesses  a 
distinctly  verbal  type  of  memory  and  when,  therefore,  his 
learning  does  not  differ  materially  from  meaningful  learning. 
But  even  in  individuals  of  dominantly  verbal  memory,  an  act 
of  learning  which  proceeds  by  merely  noting  the  words  is 
always  somewhat  more  disadvantageous  than  a  learning  which 
relies  upon  meaning. 

2.  When  the  wording  of  the  text  is  learned  apart  from  its 
meaning,  the  former  may  be  completely  memorized  without 
the  latter  being  apprehended  in  its  context.  And  since  this  is 
true  even  of  adults,  how  much  more  must  it  be  true  of  children? 
The  following  important  pedagogical  inference  may  be  drawn: 
Even  a  complete  and  perfect  memorization  of  the  wording  of 
a  text  does  not  constitute  a  guarantee  that  the  meaning  has 
been  grasped.  Indeed,  it  happens  even  in  the  case  of  adults 
that  the  wording  of  the  material  may  have  been  learned  by 
rote,  and  yet  the  learner  may  have  no  knowledge  whatever  of 
the  meaning  of  what  he  has  learned. 

J.  The  verbal  memorization  of  a  material  which  has  thus 
been  learned  from  the  wording  of  the  original  enables  one  more 
readily  to  apprehend  the  meaning  of  the  material  when  one's 
attention  is  subsequently  directed  to  the  latter.  From  this 
we  may  derive  the  pedagogical  inference, — although  it  is  not 
wholly  innocuous, — that  in  certain  instances  where  we  have 
to  do  with  pupils  who  possess  a  normal  verbal  memory  but  a 
sub-normal  understanding,  we  may  first  have  them  learn  the 
text  by  rote  in  a  verbal  fashion,  and  then  have  them  proceed 
to  acquire  an  understanding  of  its  meaning,  because  the 
memorial  mastery  of  the  text  facihtates  the  apprehension  of 
its  meaning.  But  we  must  bear  in  mind  here  that  a  special 
work  still  remains  to  be  done  wliich  should  never  be  omitted, 
namely,  the  acquisition  of  the  meaning  of  the  text  which  has 
already  been  learned  by  rote.    This  pedagogical  rule  is  the 


Associative  Learning  303 

more  worthy  of  note  because  in  our  experiments  we  observe 
that  even  the  adult  sometimes  resorts  instinctively  to  this  de- 
vice, learning  by  rote  certain  passages  of  the  text  which  are 
especially  difficult  to  understand  and  then  emplo}dng  his 
memorial  mastery  of  the  words  as  a  means  of  acquiring  the 
meaning  of  the  context. 

4.  The  meaningless  learning  of  words  always  results  in  the 
remembering  of  parts  but  not  the  whole  of  the  text. 

5.  The  most  important  aids  for  the  learning  of  spoken 
material  and  verbal  expressions  as  such  are  attention  to 
rhythm,  attention  to  the  sounds  of  the  words,  and  the  whole 
group  of  factors  which  have  to  do  with  the  grammatical 
structure  of  sentences.  The  most  important  obstacles  to 
verbal  learning  result  from  the  fact  that  customary  associa- 
tions of  words  and  customary  forms  of  expression  force  them- 
selves in  upon  the  learner  and  prevent  the  unusual  forms  of 
expression  which  are  employed  in  the  novel  text  from  coming 
into  action.  The  other  hindrances  result  from  the  foregoing 
group  of  obstructions  which  depend  upon  the  structure  of 
the  sentence. 

One  of  the  most  important  results  of  our  recent  investiga- 
tions of  the  process  of  learning  is  the  discovery  of  the  extra- 
ordinary influence  which  the  different  intentions  or  attitudes 
{EinstcUiingen)  of  the  learner  exert  upon  his  whole  memorial 
process  and  upon  his  memorial  result.  It  may  be  shown  that 
there  is  a  highly  differentiated  attitude  of  learning,  and  that 
memorial  results  are  determined  in  a  highly  differentiated 
fashion  by  the  attitudes  or  intentions  of  learners. 

In  the  learning  of  significant  texts  three  attitudes  are  pos- 
sible: I.  An  adjustment  to  the  meaning  as  such;  2.  to  the 
words  as  suc"h;  and  j.  to  the  meaning  and  the  words  together. 
Most  individuals  usually  learn  in  a  more  or  less  random 
fashion  in  so  far  as  this  three-fold  possibihty  is  concerned; 


304  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

their  attitude  assumes  now  one,  now  another  of  these  three 
forms.  Kraemer's  results  show,  however,  that  the  adjust- 
ment is  very  significant  for  the  effect  of  learning,  and  that 
with  rare  exceptions  adjustment  to  meaning  is  most  appropri- 
ate, being  even  more  advantageous  than  adjustment  to  mean- 
ing and  words  together.  Adjustment  to  words  alone  is  least 
advantageous,  that  is,  most  adults  can  best  learn  a  significant 
material  from  its  meaning,  i.e.,  by  basing  their  process  of 
learning  upon  an  apprehension  of  the  context  of  thought. 
But,  remarkably  enough,  even  adults  differ  widely  in  this 
regard,  for  we  sometimes  find  students  who  learn  a  text 
almost  as  readily  from  its  wording  as  from  its  meaning,  and 
in  some  cases  even  more  readily.  During  the  act  of  learning, 
these  individuals  attend  almost  exclusively  to  the  wording  as 
such.  But  here  again  one  finds  indi\ddual  variations,  because 
in  certain  learners  it  proves  to  be  a  matter  of  prime  importance 
whether  they  attend  to  meaning  alone  or  to  wording  and 
meaning  together,  while  in  other  learners  this  variation  in 
adjustment  of  attention  makes  no  difference.  There  are 
individuals,  then,  who  learn  most  effectively  when  their  atten- 
tion is  wholly  one-sided  and  particular, — when  they  set  out 
to  acquire  meaning  alone,  or  wording  alone,  but  not  to  acquire 
both  together;  and  there  are  other  individuals  in  whom  it 
appears  to  make  but  Httle  difference  whether  these  different 
intentions  are  pursued  separately  or  not,  although,  of  course, 
this  is  not  a  matter  of  complete  indifference  in  any  individual. 
From  these  experiments  we  deduce  the  following  general 
rules  of  memory:  j.  It  is  always  disadvantageous  to  dis- 
tribute the  attention  over  both  form  and  content  in  the  learn- 
ing of  meaningful  material.  2.  The  distribution  of  attention 
gives  rise  to  an  extravagant  expenditure  of  energy  and  to  a 
purposeless  act  of  learning  because  the  learner  attends  to 
now  one,  now  another  phase  of  the  material;    and  in  most 


Associative  Learning  305 

individuals  an  increasing  mood  of  unpleasantness  results  from 
this  increased  work  of  memory.  3.  The  mode  of  distributing 
the  attention  depends  upon  the  memory  type  of  the  learner. 
If  he  is  more  verbal  he  may  almost  wholly  dispense  with 
meaning,  while  the  more  concrete  or  logical  type  must  neces- 
sarily attend  chiefly  to  meaning  as  such. 

The  memorial  effect,  the  amount  remembered  and  repro- 
duced, depends  upon  the  adjustment  or  attitude  of  the  learner. 
The  more  his  intention  is  directed  upon  the  meaning,  the  more 
is  a  correct  reproduction  of  the  meaning  attained;  the  more 
he  intends  to  learn  the  wording  as  such,  the  more  are  the 
words  alone  mastered.  And  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  the 
words  are  more  correctly  reproduced, — and  probably  more 
permanently  remembered  as  well, — if  they  are  learned  not  by 
means  of  a  divided  attention  but  by  means  of  either  one  of 
these  two  adjustments  of  attention  alone;  that  is,  this  superior 
memorial  result  is  attained  not  only  in  the  case  where  the 
learner  attends  to  the  wording  as  such,  but  also  in  the  case 
where  he  learns  the  wording  from  its  meaning  and  imprints 
the  words  as  bearers  of  meaning  or  as  the  vehicles  of  a  partic- 
ular train  of  thought. 

Similar  observations  have  been  made  in  investigations 
where  nonsense  syllables  were  employed  as  material  for  mem- 
ory. In  these  experiments,  retention  may  be  tested  either 
by  the  method  of  free  reproduction  or  by  the  method  of  paired 
associates.  Now  it  has  been  observed  that  when  the  learner 
undertakes  his  task  with  the  intention  of  learning  for  the 
paired-associates  test  he  can  sometimes  succeed  in  recalHng 
all  of  the  associates  for  which  he  is  asked  while  he  is  wholly 
unable  to  recite  the  complete  series.  And  conversely  when  it 
was  his  intention  to  learn  the  series  for  the  recitation  test, 
he  may  be  unable  to  recall  each  syllable  when  he  hears  its 
predecessor  in  the  series  although  his  recitation  of  the  series 


3o6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

is  fluent  and  free  from  error.  This  phenomenon  shows  that 
a  specific  intention  in  the  act  of  learning  has  a  specific  effect 
upon  the  result. 

It  is  pedagogically  important  that  the  pupil  should  know 
of  the  influence  which  his  intentions  exert  upon  the  results  of 
his  acts  of  learning,  because  misdirection  of  his  attention 
could  be  avoided  and  the  formation  of  improper  habits  in 
learning  could  be  obviated.  It  frequently  happens  that  in 
the  learning  of  a  vocabulary  the  pupil  directs  his  intention 
Upon  the  spatial  localization  of  particular  words,  and  he 
learns  their  positions  in  order  that  he  may,  by  this  means, 
remember  them  better.  This  association  may,  in  certain 
instances,  be  an  invaluable  aid  to  memory;  but  in  this  case 
it  proves  to  be  an  obstacle  to  the  ready  employment  of  the 
words  in  his  subsequent  study  of  the  language  because  they 
have  been  learned  not  as  words  but  as  groups  which  stand 
at  a  particular  place  upon  the  page. 

Every  distribution  of  the  learner's  intention  and  every  im- 
proper adjustment  of  his  attention  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  un- 
desirable by-product  which  tends  to  diminish  or  to  impair 
the  chief  product  of  the  act  of  learning. 

But  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  these  types  of  learn- 
ing there  are  certain  characteristics  which  are  common  to  all 
learners.  It  is  always  found,  for  instance,  that  the  learning 
of  meaningful  material  is  far  superior  to  the  mechanical  learn- 
ing of  discrete  items.  There  is,  however,  a  lack  of  agreement 
in  the  statements  of  the  various  authors  who  have  endeavored 
to  make  a  quantitative  comparison  of  the  effects  of  these  two 
sorts  of  learning.  The  learning  of  meaningful  material  varies 
with  the  degree  of  difficulty  of  its  content;  and  it  is  therefore 
impossible  to  compare  logical  with  mechanical  learning  except- 
ing in  an  inaccurate  and  merely  approximate  fashion.  Eb- 
binghaus  found  that  stanzas  from  Don  Juan  could  be  repro- 


Associative  Learning  307 

duced  without  error  on  the  fourth  day  after  learning,  while 
approximately  the  same  amount  of  meaningless  material  had 
been  so  far  forgotten  that  thirty-one  repetitions  were  required 
in  the  act  of  re-learning  them  on  the  sixth  day.  From  other 
experiments  of  Ebbinghaus  and  of  Binet,  the  learning  of  a 
meaningful  text  of  moderate  length  seems  to  demand  only 
one-tenth  of  the  time  required  for  mechanical  learning.  In 
Binet  and  Henri's '  investigation  of  the  retention  of  words  and 
sentences  by  school  children,  it  was  found  that  an  average  of 
twenty-five  times  as  many  words  were  retained  when  signifi- 
cant sentences  were  presented  as  when  disconnected  words 
were  employed. 

As  regards  methods  of  learning,  our  experiments  showed 
that  for  significant  material  the  whole-procedure  (C/.  p.  233) 
or  one  of  the  mediating  methods  (C/.  p.  253)  is  by  far  the  best. 
Indeed  the  whole-procedure  does  not  manifest  its  complete 
superiority  over  the  part-procedure  in  all  of  its  forms  until 
we  come  to  deal  with  significant  material.  The  distribution 
of  attention,  the  uniform  regularity  of  concentration  is  most 
advantageous  when  the  whole-method  and  the  mediating 
methods  are  applied  to  significant  material. 

A  question  which  is  of  especial  importance  in  the  pedagog- 
ical application  of  investigations  of  significant  learning  is  this: 
How  do  significant  and  mechanical  learning  act  in  combina- 
tion with  each  other?  Modern  school-practice  very  properly 
insists  that  all  memorization  and  retention  should  be  pre- 
ceded by  as  thorough  an  interpretation  of  the  material  as  is 
possible,  and  that  a  complete  understanding  of  the  meaning 
of  the  content  should  constitute  the  basis  of  all  memorizing. 
"Rational  learning"  is  therefore  to  be  preferred  over  every 
sort  of  "mechanical  learning."    From  this,  however,  the  con- 

'  A.  Binet  et  V.  Henri,  La  mcmorie  des  mots  et  la  memoire  des 
phrases,  Annee  psychol.  I.,  1895. 


3o8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

viction  seems  to  have  arisen  in  many  quarters  that  there 
exists  a  purely  logical  memorization  from  which  every  mechan- 
ical element  of  mere  repetition  is  lacking,  and  that  this  purely 
rational  memorization  is  the  ideal  type  of  learning  for  which 
to  strive  in  school-children.  If  tliis  view  of  learning  were 
taken  seriously,  a  complete  confusion  of  memory  and  a  uni- 
versal fragmentariness  of  retention  would  necessarily  result. 
Psychological  investigation  shows  us  that  in  all  memory 
material  which  is  to  be  reproduced  with  accuracy,  and  which 
is  to  become  the  permanent  possession  of  mind,  a  mere  initial 
apprehension  of  the  content  does  not  suffice;  but  that  in  all 
learning  which  is  to  leave  lasting  traces  upon  consciousness 
the  mechanical  element  of  sheer  repetition  must  play  a  part. 
Indeed  it  is  found  that  mere  repetition  has  exactly  the  same 
importance  for  significant  as  for  mechanical  memorizing  even 
though  the  number  of  repetitions  is  less  in  the  former  case. 
Repetition,  repeated  imprinting,  reading,  speaking,  reciting, 
all  of  these  play  a  characteristic  and  independent  role  besides 
that  played  by  the  energy  of  attention  and  by  an  apprehen- 
sion of  the  meaning.  In  investigations  of  permanent  reten- 
tion we  discovered  that  when  a  learner  found  himself  unable 
to  concentrate  upon  his  re-learning  on  account  of  unfavorable 
psychophysical  disposition,  and  therefore  worked  with  dimin- 
ished attention,  he  sometimes  endeavored  to  compensate 
the  unfavorable  bodily  or  mental  condition  by  an  excessive 
accumulation  of  repetitions.  It  invariably  happened,  in  such 
cases,  that  more  enduring  traces  remained  in  consciousness 
and  that  the  material  was  remembered  longer. 

We  found  a  somewhat  similar  phenomenon  in  a  compara- 
tive investigation  of  the  influence  of  rhythm  upon  learning. 
It  turned  out  that  a  poetic  meter  had  a  particularly  inciting 
effect  upon  the  observer;  he  learned  with  heightened 
attention  and  in  more  pleasant  mood,  and  by  these  means 


Associative  Learning  309 

effected  a  sa\'ing  of  repetitions.  But  when  permanent  reten- 
tion was  tested,  we  found  that  the  series  were  not  retained 
so  well  as  series  with  unfavorable  rhythm  which  had  been 
learned  with  apparently  the  same  degree  of  thoroughness,  but 
by  dint  of  a  greater  number  of  repetitions.  Experiments 
dealing  with  immediate  retention  show  even  more  clearly  the 
necessity  of  mechanical  memorization.  In  the  determination 
of  the  Hmit  of  immediate  retention  of  significant  passages,  the 
retention  of  the  last  sentence  which  can  just  be  reproduced 
without  error  is  in  no  particular  different  from  the  retention 
of  a  group  of  meaningless  elements.  A  very  few  minutes 
after  he  has  written  it  down  he  finds  himself  unable  to  repro- 
duce it  completely  and  correctly.  Everything  which  is  to  be 
remembered,  permanently  must  be  acquired  and  secured  by 
means  of  repeated  memorizations.  And  if  a  text  is  to  be 
memorized  word-for-word,  the  repeated  memorization  must 
contain  a  purely  mechanical  element, — namely,  the  sheer 
association  of  the  visual-auditory-motor  elements  of  the  heard 
and  spoken  words.  No  one  is  able  to  acquire  a  verbatim  remem- 
brance of  a  poem  of  six  stanzas  by  simply  obtaining  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  ideas  and  thoughts  contained  in  it,  or 
by  simply  imprinting  these  ideas  and  thoughts  in  their  con- 
secutive order  because,  in  the  first  place,  there  is  no  unequiv- 
ocal relationship  of  association  between  any  chain  of  ideas  and 
any  series  of  verbal  expressions,  in  consequence  of  which  the 
words  might  be  discovered  from  ones  knowing  the  ideas;  and, 
in  the  second  place,  all  of  the  ideas  of  the  poem  are  themselves 
conditioned  by  the  choice  of  words.  Our  memory  must  there- 
fore devote  a  certain  amount  of  energy  to  the  mechanical- 
imprinting  of  the  verbal  material  itself  if  verbal  memoriza- 
tion and  retention  are  to  ensue.  This  mechanical  element 
may  recede  far  into  the  back-ground  of  consciousness,  as  it  ' 
really  does  in  the  case  of  that  learning-t}'pe  which  directs  its 


3IO  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

attention  to  the  meaning  and  makes  use  of  the  non-signifi- 
cant elements  of  the  word  in  a  more  secondary  fashion; 
nevertheless  the  mechanical  element  is  invariably  present.  A 
more  important  condition  which  forces  us  to  memorize  in  a 
mechanical  fashion  has  been  found  in  the  fact  that  we  are 
obliged  to  make  our  reproduction  in  vocal  form,  and  that  we 
learn  by  means  of  a  process  of  speaking.  From  this  has  been 
drawn  the  erroneous  inference  that  the  motor  associations  of 
the  act  of  speaking  constitute  a  group  of  mechanical  associa- 
tions which  are  fundamental  and  indispensable  to  the  act  of 
learning.  But  this  can  be  true  of  only  the  motor  t>'pe  of 
learner.  In  the  visual  and  auditory  types,  the  visual  and 
auditory  elements  of  words  may  become  so  securely  associated 
that  vocal  movements  are  automatically  reinstated  in  the 
act  of  reproduction  in  virtue  of  the  perfectly  facile  association- 
paths  of  the  visual-verbal  and  auditory-verbal  centres  in  the 
cortex. 

If  then  the  factor  of  repetition  and  at  the  same  time  the 
mechanical  association  of  concrete  verbal  images  play  a  part 
in  all  verbal  memorization,  then  learning  by  means  of  repe- 
tition must  not  be  under-estimated  or  neglected  by  the  teacher. 
A  lasting  permanence  and  an  accurate  verbal  reproduction  of 
what  has  been  learned  is  acquired  by  the  child  only  through 
the  agency  of  genuine  memorization. 

These  statements  must,  however,  not  be  misunderstood. 
They  do  not  mean  that  a  clear  grasping  of  the  meaning  and  a 
constant  attention  to  the  logical  connection  of  what  is  learned 
are  merely  secondary  matters;  nor  do  they  mean  that  the 
sensory  and  mechanical  elements  constitute  the  essence  of 
learning.  If  this  were  true  how  would  it  be  possible  to  explain 
the  extraordinary  superiority  of  significant  learning  over 
mechanical  learning?  On  the  contrary,  the  mechanical  ac- 
quisition of  sensory  and  motor  elements  in  verbal  learning, 


Associative  Learning  311 

and  the  manifold  repetition  of  the  material  must  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  apprehension  of  meaning  whenever  possible. 
But  on  the  one  hand,  mechanical  learning  must  undertake  the 
task  of  securing  and  making  fast  the  material  which  is  atten- 
tively grasped  and  understood,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
alone  can  give  fluency  to  the  reproduction  of  the  verbal 
material. 

Now,  since  it  is  so  much  easier  to  learn  significant  material 
than  to  learn  incoherent  items,  the  question  arises:  Does  this 
fact  not  justify  the  systems  of  mnemonics  which  are  in  current 
use?     These,  as  is  well  known,  endeavor  to  faciHtate  the 
remembering  of  numbers,   names,   and  other  disconnected 
data  by  introjecting  an  artificial  coherence.     For  instance, 
letters  are  substituted  for  the  dates  of  accession  of  the  German 
emperors.    As  a  rule,  only  consonants  are  employed  primarily 
but  vowels  are  interpolated  in  order  to  build  up  significant 
words  from  the  consonants.    A  sentence  is  formed  from  several 
words  of  this  sort;  the  sentence  is  relatively  easy  to  remem- 
ber, nor  is  it  difficult  to  re-construct  the  dates  from  the  words 
in  the  sentence.    By  means  of  this  and  similar  devices  which 
always  depend  upon  the  introduction  of  artificial  ideas  of  an 
intermediary  and  auxihary  sort,  mnemonics  teaches  one  to 
remember    every    conceivable    sort    of    material,— numbers, 
names,  foreign  vocabularies,  grammatical  rules,  and  the  like. 
The  mnemonic  principle  in  itself  is  not  inconsistent  with  ^ 
psychology.    If  one  finds  it  easier  to  remember  discrete  and 
disconnected  data  by  bringing  them  into  artificial  association 
with  one  another,  no  psychological  blunder  is  made  so  long 
as  the  principle  is  not  abused.    But  all  of  the  directions  which 
have  been  published  for  the  construction  of  mnemonic  aids 
employ  a  jumbled  medley  of  the  most  heterogeneous  aids  to 
memory  which  cannot  fail  to  confuse  one  by  their  unsystem- 
atic arrangement.    At  one  time,  they  rely  upon  similarities 


312  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

of  sound;  at  another,  upon  logical  relations, — which  are 
usually  falsely  stated;  at  another,  they  have  recourse  to 
memory  of  locality;  at  another,  they  bring  in  a  complicated 
substitution  of  other  letters  or  numbers,  and  the  like. 

"7*  Apart  from  this,  however,  the  whole  mnemonic  principle  is 
as  uneconomical  as  it  possibly  could  be.  It  is  at  variance 
with  the  natural  tendency  of  memory  to  retain  only  what  is 

,  absolutely  necessary;^  and  at  the  same  time,  it  burdens  the 
learner  with  a  cumbrous  mass  of  auxiUary  ideas  all  of  which 
must  gradually  be  weeded  out  again  if  a  fluent  and  reliable 
reproduction  of  an  experience  is  ever  to  take  place.  Those, 
therefore,  who  at  first  make  enthusiastic  use  of  mnemonic 
devices  usually  abandon  the  system  ultimately  because  no  one 
will  permanently  bear  this  burden  of  purely  auxiliary  ideas. 
This  criticism  may  be  expressed  in  quantitative  terms.  Any- 
one who  masters  a  foreign  language  must  learn  a  vocabulary 
of  approximately  four  thousand  words.  If  now  he  introduces 
three  auxiliary  ideas,  on  the  average,  between  the  word  of 
his  mother  tongue  and  the  word  of  the  foreign  language  his 
memory  must  carry  an  extra  burden  of  twelve  thousand 
words.  But  there  are  other  psychological  principles,  such  as 
the  effect  of  mediate  and  immediate  associations,  which 
reveal  the  disadvantages  of  systems  of  mnemonics.  The  con- 
tinuous use  of  mnemonics  in  teaching  must  be  distinguished 
from  an  occasional  employment  of  particular  mnemonic  de- 
vices by  means  of  which  one  can  sometimes  make  it  easier 
for  pupils  to  remember  a  date,  the  meaning  of  a  word,  or  the 
like.  There  is,  of  course,  no  objection,  psychological  or  prac- 
tical, which  can  be  urged  against  such  an  occasional  use  of 
memorial  aids.  And  if,  as  is  supposed  by  certain  psychol- 
ogists, it  should  turn  out  that  there  is  a  special  mnemonic 
type  of  memory,  we  should,  of  course,  place  no  obstacle  in  the 

^  See  pages  3isff. 


Associative  Learning  313 

path  of  pupils  who  endeavor  to  remember  everything  by  means 
of  secondary  associations,  because  that  may  be  their  normal 
and  typical  mode  of  remembering.  But  to  base  the  whole 
formal  education  of  memory  upon  a  mnemonic  foundation 
would  be  decidedly  objectionable  for  reasons  already  cited. 
The  technique  and  economy  of  learning  by  logical  apprehen- 
sion or  learning  by  means  of  understanding  or  the  rational 
combination  of  ideas  has  not  yet  been  included  in  our  discus- 
sion. The  psychological  investigation  of  this  sort  of  memory 
work,  however,  is  still  in  such  a  backward  condition  that  wc 
must  be  content  with  the  references  which  have  already  been 
made  to  it.  ^ 

6.  Experimental  Investigation  of  the  Effect  of  Learning.  Stages 
of  Learning;  Retention  and  Forgetting. 

The  effect  of  learning  is  usually  conceived  to  consist  in  a 
"retention"  of  what  has  been  learned;  but  since  the  existence 
of  retention  can  be  revealed  only  by  an  act  of  reproduction, 
we  may  estimate  the  effect  of  learning  in  terms  of  reproduc- 
tion. As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  first  effect  of  learning 
comes  to  hght  in  the  act  of  learning  itself,  in  that  previous 
repetitions  affect  subsequent  repetitions  in  a  definite  fashion, 
and  the  process  of  imprinting  passes  through  several  clearly 
distinguishable  stages. 

Before  we  consider  these  stages,  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
the  investigation  of  memory  we  ordinarily  employ  the  effects 
of  learning'  as  a  means  of  designating  the  attributes  of  mem- 
ory. We  make  a  distinction  between  memories  which  acquire 
their  material  with  ease  or  with  difficulty,  and  between  mem- 
ories which  reproduce  their  content  with  ease  or  with  difficulty. 
Wc  speak  of  a  faithful  memory,  designating  by  this  term  the 
accuracy  with  which  the  original  impressions  are  retained  and 

^  See  pages  agoff. 


314  The  Psychology  oj  Learning 

reproduced;  of  an  extensive  memory,  referring  to  the  num- 
ber and  variety  of  items  which  are  retained;  of  a  tenacious 
memory,  referring  to  the  length  of  time  during  which  impres- 
sions can  still  be  reproduced  with  a  certain  degree  of  vivacity 
and  completeness. 

Let  us  first  of  all  consider  the  effect  of  learning  in  the  act  of 
learning  itself.    We  know  that  learning  passes  through  several 
stages.    The  first  stage  may  be  called  that  of  the  adaptation 
and  orientation  of  the  learner.     The  first  few  readings  of  a 
material, — or  it  may  be  the  very  first  reading, — serve  to 
adapt  the  learner  to  the  activity  of  learning  and  to  the  material 
in  hand;  by  this  means  he  becomes  oriented  to  the  material 
which  is  presented  to  him.    When  nonsense  syllables  are  pre- 
sented, he  usually  discovers  at  this  early  stage  which  rhythm 
of  learning  is  most  suitable,  and  he  becomes  familiar  with 
the  auditory  and  visual  impressions  of  the  syllables.  ^    This  is 
-  followed   by   a   second   stage, — that   of  passively  receptive 
learning.     The  learner  now  imprints  the  essential  material 
upon  his  mind  by  reading,  hearing  or  speaking,  meanwhile 
assuming  an  essentially  receptive  attitude.    This  is  followed 
by  a  third  stage  where  the  material  is  tentatively  recited, 
checked,  and  controlled  by  the  learner.    As  a  rule  the  observer 
reveals  the  advent  of  this  stage  by  his  external  behavior; 
he  looks  away  from  the  text  and  anticipates  the  forthcoming 
parts  of  the  material.    This  stage  is  usually  manifested,  in  the 
case  of  nonsense  syllables,  by  an  involuntary  acceleration  of 
the  tempo  of  speech.    The  fourth  stage  is  characterized  by  a 
^  Cf.  the  introspections  of  observers  in  the  papers  of  Ebert  and 
Meumann,  Pentschew  and  Radossawljewitsch;  see  also  M.  K.  Smith, 
Rythmus  und  Arbeit,  Philos.  Studien,  XVI.,  1900.,  6iff.    G.  E.  Miiller, 
Gedachtnist'dtigkeit  und  Vorstellungsverlauf,  Leipzig,  191 1;    and  espe- 
cially Franz  Nagel,  Experimentelle  Untersuchungen  iiber  Grundfragen 
der  Assoziationslehre,  Archiv  J.  d.  gesamte  Psychologic,  XXIII.,  191 2, 

156-253- 


Associative  Learning  315 

final  fixing  and  strengthening  of  the  uncertain  parts  whose 
difficulty  the  learner  discovered  in  his  tentative  recitation, 
and  by  a  genuine  associating  or  synthetizing  in  consequence 
of  which  the  learner  now  begins  to  feel  that  he  is  able  to  repro- 
duce the  material  from  memory.  ^  /  The  emotional  state  of  the 
learner  also  experiences  marked  changes  during  these  four 
stages  of  learning.  The  first  stage  is  usually  attended  by 
unpleasantness  and  tension  or  by  alternating  emotional  states 
and,  in  proportion  as  the  subsequent  stages  arouse  a  conscious- 
ness of  progress  and  success,  a  pleasant  mood  ensues. 

The  act  of  learning  also  has  its  definite  effect  in  retention 
and  forgetting.  Before  we  can  make  this  clear  we  must  bear 
in  mind  that  the  purpose  of  learning  is  not  always  the  same. 
In  one  case,  we  may  endeavor  to  obtain  a  permanent  imprint- 
ing, in  another  case,  only  a  single  reproduction.  Now,  it  is 
most  desirable  that  memory  should  not  retain  everything 
which  it  receives;  and  it  is  no  less  desirable  that  everything 
which  is  to  be  remembered  permanently  and  accurately 
should  be  memorized  in  the  real  sense  of  the  term.  Non- 
psychologists  have  frequently  been  heard  to  complain  that 
memory  oftentimes  fails  us,  and  that  we  frequently  find  our- 
selves unable  to  give  an  account  of  our  everyday  surroundings 
when  we  endeavor  to  remember  them.  I  have  frequently 
convinced  myself  that  this  is  true.  I  made  systematic  en- 
quiries of  a  number  of  students  as  to  whether  they  could 
describe  the  wall-paper  of  the  rooms  in  which  they  studied ; 
whether  they  could  describe  the  dishes  which  they  used  every 
day  at  table;  how  many  steps  they  ascended  daily  in  the 
university  stairways;  whether  they  could  name  the  buildings 

^  Special  experiments  devoted  to  this  topic  indicate  that  this  syn- 
thesis is  not  a  purely  associative  act;  but  this  is  a  psychological 
question  whose  discussion  would  carry  us  too  far  from  our  present 
subject. 


3i6  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

which  they  passed  every  day;  whether  they  could  describe  or 
sketch  the  most  striking  church  spires  of  the  city;   whether 
they  could  sketch  the  outline  of  mountain-peaks  which  they 
have  seen  often  and  attentively;  whether  the  four  upon  their 
watch  dials  is  indicated  by  four  I's  or  by  a  IV,  and  the  hke. 
To  all  questions  of  this  sort  one  obtains  exceedingly  uncertain 
or   even   erroneous   answers.      Remembrances   of   everyday 
experiences  are   frequently   so   uncertain   that   the  student 
becomes  vexed  and  wishes  to  discontinue  the  experiment. 
These  and  similar  observations  prove  that  memory  fails  to 
retain  many  impressions  that  come  to  us  countless  times 
during  our  lives.    They  prove  further  that  it  is  not  the  mere 
repetition  of  impressions  as  such  which  constitutes  imprint- 
ing, and  makes  it  possible  for  us  to  reproduce,  especially  to 
reproduce  freely;  on  the  contrary  we  find  that,  as  a  rule,  we 
remember  only  what  we  have  apprehended  attentively  and 
with  the  intention  of  remembering  it.     However  necessary 
then  the  factor  of  repetition  may  be  for  retention,  it  seems  to 
render  a  subsequent  free  reproduction  possible  only  when  it 
constituted  an  intentional  acquisition  by  consciousness.    We 
must  not  reproach  memory  because  everything  which  it  did 
not  acquire  by  intentional  and  repeated  acts  has  been  allowed  to 
lapse  or  is  not  freely  reproducible.    Consciousness  would  indeed 
have  an  exceedingly  heavy  burden  to  carry  if  the  countless 
triviahties  which  we  daily  experience  were  all   so  deeply 
imprinted  that  they  were  "retained"  and  acquired  a  tendency 
to  be  reproduced.     The  limited  compass  of  consciousness 
forbids  our  being  occupied  with  many  ideas  at  any  one  time. 
The  struggle  of  ideas  for  possession  of  the  narrow  field  of 
consciousness  would  be  immeasureably  increased  if  memory 
were  not  limited  to  the  relatively  narrow  domain  of  those 
impressions  which  were  intentionally  noted.     There  is  yet 
another  characteristic  of  memory  which  sustains  us  in  the 


Associative  Learning  317 

presence  of  this  alleged  defect  of  practical  life.  This  is  the 
familiar  phenomenon  that  it  is  easier  to  recognize  than  to, 
reproduce.  Countless  things  are  recognized  when  we  perceive 
them  again  although  we  could  not  have  called  up  a  free 
memory-image  of  them  in  the  meantime.  For  practical  pur- 
poses it  is  sufficient  that  we  should  recognize  the  things  which 
we  know;  it  is  by  no  means  always  essential  that  we  should 
be  able  to  reproduce  a  free  idea  of  them. 

In  the  interests  of  psychology  and  of  pedagogy,  the  accu- 
rate investigation  of  retention  and  forgetting  has  frequently 
been  attempted.  It  is  particularly  important  that  we  should 
know  how  rapidly  impressions,  which  have  once  been  received, 
disappear  from  consciousness  again;  in  what  manner  forget- 
ting is  dependent  upon  sort  of  impression,  upon  our  apprehen- 
sion and  imprinting  of  it,  upon  the  individual  characteristics 
of  the  learner,  upon  an  occasional  renewal  or  refreshing,  etc. 
These  latter  determinations  would  furnish  us  with  reliable 
data  which,  in  turn,  would  constitute  a  basis  for  the  system- 
atic introduction  of  repetition  into  the  courses  of  study  in 
the  school-room. 

When  we  approach  this  question  experimentally  we  must 
bear  in  mind  the  different  functions  of  retention  which  have 
been  described  in  the  foregoing  discussions.  Memory  is  char- 
acterized by  two  wholly  different  sorts  of  retention, — imme- 
diate and  lasting  retention.  We  may  also  designate  them  as 
primary  memor}%  and  secondary  or  mediate  or  genuine  mem- 
ory. ^  It  is  instructive  to  compare  the  effects  of  retention  and 
forgetting  in  each  of  these  memory  functions.  Such  a  com- 
parison discloses  the  extraordinary  superiority  of  permanent 
retention  over  immediate  retention.  Immediate  retention  dies 
down  in  consciousness  very  rapidly,  and  the  more  so,  the  more 
nearly  the  number  of  impressions  to  be  retained  approximates 
22  '  Cf-  pp.  4off. 


3 1 8  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

the  limit  of  our  power  of  retention.  For  instance,  if  we  read 
.  aloud  to  an  observer  as  many  letters  as  he  is  just  able  to  repro- 
duce immediately  thereafter,  his  power  to  reproduce  them 
will  frequently  be  found  to  have  disappeared  entirely  within 
a  few  seconds,  provided  no  new  imprinting  of  the  material 
has  taken  place  in  the  meantime. 

Immediate  retention  is  easily  improved  by  formal  training.  | 
Unpractised  adults  are  ordinarily  incapable  of  immediately 
reproducing  more  than  eight  or  ten  letters  at  the  most,  but 
practised  observers  can  reproduce  twelve  or  fourteen.  Signifi- 
cant texts  are  correctly  reproduced,  immediately  after  pre- 
sentation, to  a  much  larger  extent.  The  effect  of  practice  in 
immediate  retention  is  not  very  great;  but  it  must  be  noted 
that  the  addition  of  only  a  few  items  may  make  the  task  much 
more  difficult.  The  Hmit  of  achievement  of  immediate  reten- 
tion may  here  be  illustrated  by  citations  from  our  numerical 
results;  but  of  course  it  depends  upon  the  observer's  practice, 
upon  the  sort  of  material  chosen,  and  upon  other  conditions 
as  well.  When  letters  or  digits  were  employed,  one  of  our 
observers  succeeded  in  reproducing  thirteen  to  fourteen  cor- 
rectly; with  nonsense  syllables,  eight  to  nine;  words,  twelve; 
stanzas  of  poetry,  twenty-four  words;  prose  selections,  thirty- 
six  words.  The  child's  limit  in  this  function  of  memory  is 
considerably  less  than  the  average  limit  for  adults.  This  is 
apparent  from  the  experiments  which  dealt  with  the  numeri- 
cal determinations  of  the  compass  of  immediate  attention. 

The  limit  of  immediate  retention  in  school-children  has 
been  determined  by  several  investigators ;  and  similar  methods 
have  been  employed  in  all  of  these  experiments.^     Bolton 

'T.  L.  Bolton,  The  Growth  of  Memory  in  School-children,  Amer. 
Jour.  Psychol.,  IV.,  1892,  362-380;  B.  Bourdon,  Influence  de  I'age  sur 
la  memoire  immediate,  Revue  philos.,  XXXVII.,  1894,  148-167;  A. 
Binct  et  V.  Henri,  La  memoire  des  mots,  Annee  psychoL,  I.,  1895, 


Associative  Learnirig  319 

and  Jacobs  employed  auditory  presentation;  they  read  short 
lists  of  monosyllabic  numbers  which  were  written  by  the 
children  immediately  after  hearing  each  list.  Binet  and 
Henri  read  seven  series,  each  containing  seven  disconnected 
words,  and  had  the  children  write  down  what  they  remem- 
bered. They  tested  three  hundred  and  eighty  children,  from 
eight  to  thirteen  years  of  age.  Then  they  read  significant 
sentences,  which  likewise  were  written  down  immediately 
from  memory  by  the  children.  The  same  general  method  was 
also  employed  by  the  later  investigators.  I  have  improved 
upon  it  in  the  following  manner:  In  my  systematic  investiga- 
tion of  the  compass  of  immediate  retention  the  children  were 
first  given  three,  then  four,  then  live  words,  continuing  up  to 
eight;  the  words  were  read  aloud  to  the  children  who  were 
required  to  write  all  that  they  could  remember  immediately 
afterwards.  This  modification  adapts  the  experimental  pro- 
cedure to  the  age  of  the  child.  Binet  and  Henri  used  a  Hst  of 
seven  words  for  eight-year-old  children.    This  number  is  too 


1-23;  La  memoire  des  phrases,  Ibid.,  24-59;  J-  Jacobs,  Experiments 
on  Prehension,  Mind,  O.S.XII.,  1887,75-79;  E.Meumann,  Vorlcsungcn 
zur  Eiufiihrung  in  die  experimentelle  Padagogik,  Leipzig,  1907.  I.  Schuy- 
ten's  experiments  are  reported  in  the  Bulletins  de  I'Acadcmie  Royale  de 
Belgiqiie,  1905,  and  in  the  Paedologisch  Jaarboek  from  1900  on.  See 
also  M.  Lobsien,  Das  Gedachtnis  fiir  bildlich  dargestcllte  Dinge,  usw. 
Bcitrage  zur  Psychologie  der  Aussage,  II.,  1905;  Bernstein  und  Bog- 
danoflf,  Experimente  iiber  das  Verhalten  der  Merkfahigkeit  bei  Schul- 
kindern,  Ibid.,  II.,  1905,  nsff.;  Ebert  und  Mcumann,  Grundjragen  der 
Psychologie  der  Uebungsph'dnomcne  im  Bereiche  des  Ged'dchtnisscs, 
Leipzig,  1904;  Decroly  et  Degand,  Experiences  de  memoire  visuelle 
verbale,  etc.,  Annee  psychoL,  XIII.,  1907;  W.  H.  Winch,  Immediate 
Memory  in  School  Children,  British  Jour,  of  Psychol.  I.,  II.,  1904-6; 
Louise  Ellison,  The  Acquisition  of  Technical  Skill,  Pedagogical  Semi- 
nary, XVI.,  1909.  See  also  the  Reports  of  the  Board  of  Education 
of  the  Chicago  Public  Schools,  containing  reports  of  experiments  by 
Smedley,  Coolcy,  Macmillan  and  others,  Chicago,  i899ff. 


320  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

great;  it  readily  confuses  the  child.  Schuyten  dictated  lists 
each  containing  eight  two-place  numbers;  and  here  again 
written  records  were  made  by  the  children. 

These  experiments  show,  first  of  all,^  that  immediate  reten- 
tion throughout  all  of  the  classes  of  the  pubHc  school  is  less 
efficient  than  in  adults.  Furthermore,  immediate  retention 
develops  very  slowly,  and  has  not  reached  its  maximum 
capacity  at  the  age  of  thirteen  or  fourteen  years,  the  age  at 
which  the  child  leaves  the  public  school.  The  pupil  of  the 
high  school  is  better  off  in  this  particular.  The  most  important 
part  of  his  mental  training  comes  during  those  years  when 
memory  has  approximately  reached  its  greatest  efiiciency. 
Comparative  data  for  children  and  adults,  which  I  have  ob- 
tained from  observers  up  to  the  age  of  forty-six  years,  show 
that  up  to  the  age  of  thirteen  years  the  development  of 
immediate  retention  is  very  slow;  from  thirteen  to  about 
sixteen  there  is  a  more  rapid  development.  At  the  age  of 
twenty-two  to  twenty-five  the  adult  student  reaches  the  Hmit 
of  his  capacity  of  immediate  retention;  from  there  onward 
the  capacity  remains  stationary  in  most  persons.  Bourdon 
found  a  sHght  growth  of  immediate  retention  between  the 
ages  of  fourteen  and  twenty  years,  when  tested  with  mean- 
ingless or  relatively  discrete  material. 

Bolton  reports  that  the  development  of  immediate  reten- 
tion does  not  run  parallel  with  the  development  of  intelh- 
gence  but  with  increase  of  age;  that  is,  older  children  have,  on 
the  average,  a  better  memory  than  younger  children,  and 
increase  of  age  is  the  chief  factor  in  the  development  of  mem- 
ory. My  investigations  show  that  in  the  majority  of  cases 
intelligent  children  are  also  equipped  with  better  memories; 
this  does  not,  however,  constitute  a  parallelism  in  the  develop- 
mental progress  of  the  two  functions  in  question.  The  inves- 
tigations of  the  Socicte  de  psychologic  de  V enfant  in  Paris  also 


Associative  Learning  321 

show  that  intelligent  children  have  on  the  average  a  more 
efficient  immediate  memory. ' 

The  children  investigated  by  Binet  and  Henri  retained,  on 
the  average,  4.7  and  the  adults  5.7,  of  the  seven  words  dic- 
tated to  them.  This  result  is  clearly  too  low  for  adults. 
Children  of  eight  to  nine  years  retained  an  average  of  4.6 
words;  ten  to  eleven  years,  4.9;  eleven  to  twelve  years,  4.8; 
twelve  to  thirteen  years,  4.9.  According  to  my  experiments, 
the  memory  capacity  of  eight-year-old  children  is  less  than 
these  data  indicate;  they  retained  an  average  of  four  words, 
while  children  of  thirteen  to  fourteen  years  retained  an  aver- 
age of  5.6  words.  A  comparison  of  some  of  the  extreme 
findings  is  more  instructive.  Among  the  seven-year-old  chil- 
dren I  found  a  great  many  who  never  succeeded  in  retaining 
more  than  three  words  and  two  nonsense  syllables,  while  a 
great  many  of  the  fourteen-year-old  children  reproduced 
eight  words  correctly.  The  best  observers  among  my  prac- 
tised adults  retained  as  many  as  twelve  words,  and  in  correlate 
experiments  sometimes  succeeded  in  retaining  fourteen  dis- 
crete letters. 

Decroly  and  Degand  extended  the  investigation  of  imme- 
diate reproduction  to  children,  five  to  ten  years  old,  in  a 
kindergarten  school  in  Brussels.  The  results  of  these  experi- 
ments show  that  simpler  impressions  are  by  no  means  better 
retained  but  that  facility  and  fidelity  of  immediate  reproduc- 
tion increase  in  proportion  as  the  material  is  more  familiar 
to  the  child;  they  also  show  that  in  children,  as  in  adults, 
sentences  which  express  unitary  concrete  thoughts  are  more 
readily  attended  to  and  remembered  than  isolated  words, 
and  much  more  readily  than  syllables  and  letters.  Small 
cards  upon  which  letters,  words  or  sentences  were  written  in 
red  ink  were  shown  to  the  children  who  were  allowed  to  look 
'  See  the  bulletins  of  this  Society,  published  by  Alcan,  Paris. 


322  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

at  them  for  thirty  seconds.  The  sentences  were  remembered 
better  than  the  words  or  the  letters.  In  a  second  series  of 
experiments  nine  letters  were  shown  to  normal  and  abnormal 
children  who  were  then  asked  to  select  these  letters  from  a 
group  of  twenty-six;  similar  experiments  were  made  with 
geometrical  figures  and  pictures.  In  these  recognition-tests  of 
immediate  memory,  pictures  were  remembered  better  than 
letters  or  geometrical  figures;  and  it  was  also  found  that  words 
contained  in  sentences  are  remembered  better  than  isolated 
words. 

In  an  investigation  of  the  immediate  retention  of  visual 
and  auditory  words,  Winch  undertook  to  solve  the  following 
problems:  Can  "pure  memory,"  — or  memory  of  data  which 
are  associated  only  in  time  and  space, — be  improved  by 
practice?  Does  "pure"  memory  improve  with  increase  of 
age  and  of  mental  proficiency?  In  a  first  series  of  experi- 
ments, twelve  consonants  written  in  three  columns  were 
presented  for  a  period  of  thirty-five  seconds  to  children  from 
eight  to  fourteen  and  a  half  years  of  age.  In  one  case,  written 
reproductions  were  made  immediately,  in  another  case,  after 
an  interval  of  twenty-five  seconds.  Although  the  temporal 
interval  was  brief  it  is  remarkable  that  Winch  found  no  dif- 
ference between  the  results  of  immediate  and  delayed  repro- 
duction. Repeated  tests  showed  that  this  fundamental  func- 
tion of  memory  manifests  a  distinct  and  regular  improvement 
as  the  result  of  practice.  Winch  also  found  that  memory  im- 
proves with  increase  of  age  and  general  proficiency,  and  that 
a  definite  relation  obtains  between  memorial  excellence  and 
intellectual  proficiency.  In  a  second  series  of  experiments, 
Winch  tested  the  immediate  auditory  memory  of  thirty-six 
girls.  These  girls  represented  the  average  ages  and  the  aver- 
age degrees  of  intelligence  of  the  second  to  the  seventh  classes, 
inclusive.    Twelve  consonants  were  read  aloud  to  these  pupils, 


Associative  Learfiing  323 

with  pauses  after  the  fourth  and  the  eighth  consonants;  each 
consonant  was  read  twice,  twenty-five  seconds  being  devoted 
to  the  two  readings.  The  consonants  were  then  reproduced 
in  writing,  and  after  one  minute  and  thirty-five  seconds  the 
next  experiment  began.  Notwithstanding  every  precaution, 
the  pupils  sometimes  formed  significant  words  from  the  con- 
sonants, for  instance,  sir  from  sr,  and  Ted  from  id,  but  only 
by  six  of  the  thirty-six  pupils.  All  ten  of  the  tests  were  made 
on  the  same  day  of  the  week  and  at  the  same  hour  of  the  fore- 
noon. Winch  reports  that  immediate  retention  shows  a 
distinct  and  fairly  uniform  improvement  as  the  result  of  prac- 
tice; that  school  proficiency  and  efficiency  of  "pure"  mem- 
ory usually  go  hand  in  hand;  and  that  when  the  comparison 
is  Umited  to  children  of  the  same  age  and  school-class,  the 
same  correlation  holds  although  it  is  less  conspicuously  present. 
The  experiments  of  Smedley  and  Cooley  dealt  only  with 
the  immediate  reproduction  of  numbers,  but  they  attempted 
to  analyse  retention  into  its  component  processes  and  to  trace 
the  development  of  auditory,  visual,  vocal-motor  and  manual- 
motor  memories  of  numbers,  independently;  the  visual  and 
auditory  acuity  of  the  pupils  was  also  tested.  Smedley  pre- 
sented ten  series  of  four  to  eight  numbers  to  pupils  between 
the  ages  of  seven  and  sixteen  years.  Four  modes  of  presen- 
tation were  employed, — the  numbers  being  seen;  seen  and 
heard;  seen,  heard  and  pronounced;  seen,  heard  and  written 
by  the  pupil.  Two  objections  may  be  raised  against  this 
procedure.  The  sort  of  memorial  function  employed  by  the 
pupil  is  not  necessarily  identical  with  the  sort  of  stimulus 
presented  by  the  teacher;  and  the  author  himself  states  that 
some  of  the  pupils  found  it  impossible  to  repress  their  vocal 
innervations  during  the  auditory  tests.  Moreover  the  idea- 
tional type  plays  such  a  prominent  part  in  immediate  reten- 
tion that  no  matter  what  may  be  the  mode  of  presentation  of 


324  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

a  verbal  material  which  is  reproducible  in  more  than  one 
modality,  many  individuals  transform  the  presented  material 
into  their  own  typical  modality;  for  instance,  the  auditory 
individual  attempts  to  remember  by  means  of  auditory  images 
when  verbal  material  is  presented  to  him  visually.  For  this 
reason  such  experiments  do  not  warrant  any  inference  as  to 
the  development  of  the  several  memories  unless  each  sense- 
memory  is  compelled  to  function  independently,  and  unless 
the  observers  are  classified  into  ideational  t>^es  by  means  of 
a  special  investigation.  The  former  condition  can  be  only 
approximately  fulfilled  and  the  latter  can  not  be  fulfilled  in 
the  class-experiment.  As  to  the  practical  application  of  the 
results  of  these  experiments  it  must  also  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  most  favorable  condition  for  retention  is  not  provided 
when  the  mode  of  presentation  is  made  as  many-sided  as 
possible  (auditory- visual- vocal-mo  tor),  but  only  when  the 
mode  of  apprehension  is  relatively  circumscribed  and  when  it 
conforms  to  the  ideational  type  of  the  learner.  This  comes 
to  light  in  the  Chicago  experiments  where  numbers  which 
were  seen  and  heard  by  the  pupil  were  sometimes  remembered 
better  than  numbers  which  were  seen,  heard  and  written. 
My  own  observations  show  that  this  phenomenon  is  due  to 
the  fact  that,  in  the  absence  of  special  practice,  it  is  more 
economical  to  employ  our  customary  modes  of  learning;  and 
that  these  modes  are  a  product  in  part  of  congenital  type  and 
in  part  of  habit.  So  soon  as  a  memorial  means  which  does  not 
correspond  to  the  congenital  or  the  acquired  factor  comes  into 
play,  a  part  of  the  energy  which  should  be  devoted  to  attentive 
apprehension  is  expended  in  the  act  of  learning  the  unaccus- 
tomed material  which  does  not  conform  to  the  learner's  typical 
modality.  And  that  is  just  what  happens  in  the  case  of  most 
pupils  when  they  are  asked  to  write  their  memorial  material, 
because  they  are  not  accustomed  to  learn  words  by  writing 


Associative  Learning  325 

them  since  the  manual-motor  type  of  memory  is  rarely 
found. 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed  then  that  the  results  of  these 
experiments  nullify  the  law  which  was  empirically  established 
by  Muensterberg  and  Bigham, — namely,  that  we  remember 
well  in  proportion  as  we  have  recourse  to  many  associative 
aids, — because  this  law,  of  course,  presupposes  that  the  several 
associative  aids  are  equally  facile  and  familiar  to  us.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  impelled  by  general  psychological  consider- 
ations to  assume  that  practice  in  the  use  of  the  several 
memorial  aids  must  demonstrate  that  the  law  is  valid 
throughout  the  whole  range  of  memorial  functioning. 

If  we  assume  that  those  modes  of  presentation  where  Smed- 
ley  employed  no  unaccustomed  memorial  means  are  to  be 
regarded  as  constituting  normal  cases  of  immediate  retention, 
then  it  follows  from  his  experiments. that  the  average  capacity 
of  immediate  retention  increases  by  a  considerable  amount 
and  in  fairly  constant  progression  up  to  the  fourteenth  year. 
In  agreement  with  the  findings  of  other  investigators,  its 
capacity  almost  doubles  between  the  seventh  and  the  four- 
teenth year,  thence  it  improves  more  slowly  but  continues  to 
improve  up  to  the  nineteenth  year.  Here  again  we  see  that 
development  still  continues  after  the  last  year  in  the  public 
school, — a  phenomenon  which  we  see  duplicated  in  all  of  the 
other  higher  mental  functions. 

Lobsien  has  recently  investigated  the  development  of  audi- 
tory memory  by  testing  the  immediate  reproduction  of  ten 
meaningless  combinations  of  syllables.  His  material,  however, 
was  much  too  difficult;  and  material  should  not  be  presented 
solely  in  groups  of  ten  elements  if  accurate  results  are  to  be 
obtained.  Moreover,  his  investigation  dealt  with  an  inter- 
mediate function  between  immediate  retention  and  genuine 
learning  because  the  series  were  each  presented  five  times. 


326  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

He  tested  2,788  boys  and  girls  between  the  ages  of  seven  and 
fifteen.  He  found  that  the  average  number  of  syllables  re- 
tained was  2.33,  about  a  quarter  of  the  maximum  capacity 
that  was  possible.  The  capacity  of  immediate  retention  of 
this  meaningless  verbal  material  increases  progressively;  but 
the  unreliability  of  phonetically  accurate  reproduction  also 
shows  a  considerable  increase  with  increase  of  age.  The 
improvement  is  not  regular,  but  fluctuates  periodically  both 
as  regards  amount  and  fidelity  of  retention;  and  the  perio- 
dicity differs  in  the  two  sexes.  A  striking  lapse  in  efficiency 
is  found  at  about  the  tenth  year. 

Now  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  capacity  of  immedi- 
ate retention,  which  proves  to  be  so  ill-developed,  must  be 
made  use  of  at  every  moment  by  the  child  at  school.  When- 
ever the  teacher  asks  him  a  question  the  child  must  "imme- 
diately retain"  a  sentence.  Here,  then,  we  have  a  psycholog- 
ical basis  for  the  famihar  rule  that  questions  must  be  put  to 
children  in  brief  form.  In  all  auditory  instruction  and  oral 
response,  in  dictation,  in  mental  arithmetic,  and  particularly 
in  drawing,  immediate  retention  plays  an  important  role.  In 
the  act  of  drawing,  the  child  must  glance  at  the  original  or 
the  model,  and  when  he  glances  back  to  his  drawing-board 
the  immediate  retention  of  what  he  has  just  seen  comes  into 
play. 

In  psychological  experiments  we  endeavor  to  determine 
not  only  the  compass  of  immediate  retention,  but  also  to  dis- 
cover what  methods  are  employed  by  different  individuals  in 
their  acts  of  immediate  retention.  Here  again  are  revealed 
certain  typical  differences  in  procedure,  which  come  to  Hght 
not  only  in  the  behavior  of  attention  but  also  in  the  means 
by  which  the  primary  impressions  are  remembered.  The 
chief  differences  in  types  of  immediate  retention  may  be  made 
clear  by  a  description  of  two  of  my  observers,  whom  I  shall 


Associative  Learning  327 

call  D.  and  F.  The  diversity  in  the  procedure  of  these  two 
observers  was  revealed  in  the  sort  of  errors  which  they  made 
in  the  immediate  reproduction  of  letters  and  numbers,  i^.'s 
errors  were  usually  misplacements, — he  transposed  letters  or 
digits  from  their  original  order;  while  D.'s  were  usually 
phonetic  errors, — he  substituted  letters  of  somewhat  similar 
sound  for  the  letters  dictated  to  him.  In  visual  presentation, 
D.  was  aided  by  the  letters  being  printed  closely  together,  but 
this  feature  had  no  significance  for  F.  In  a  series  of  experi- 
ments where  the  tongue  was  held  securely  between  the  upper 
and  lower  teeth  F.  made  more  errors  than  D., — the  former 
being  conscious  of  a  strong  impulse  to  withdraw  the  tongue 
while  D.  was  not  aware  of  any  such  tendency. 

These  facts  show  us  that  D.  remembers  chiefly  in  terms  of 
auditory  images  of  words,  F.  by  means  of  vocal  movements, 
ideated  or  executed.  That,  however,  does  not,  by  any  means, 
constitute  the  essential  difference  between  their  modes  of  pro- 
cedure; this  consists  rather  in  the  different  behavior  of  their 
attention.  Z).  himself  gave  the  following  description:  "While 
the  experimenter  is  dictating  I  do  not  direct  my  attention  to 
the  individual  letters,  nor  do  I  fixate  my  internal  regard  at 
all  upon  the  series  of  words  which  I  hear;  but  I  turn  my 
attention  aside  in  order  to  receive  the  whole  uniformly  into 
the  neutral  and  unconcentrated  field  of  consciousness.  Imme- 
diately after  the  dictation  is  finished,  I  have  a  very  faint 
auditory  image  of  the  whole  series.  This  soon  clears  up,  and 
I  write  the  whole  series  as  rapidly  as  possible  as  though  it  were 
'all  in  one  piece.'  "  F.  describes  the  behavior  of  his  attention 
as  being  directly  opposed  to  this:  "  I  attend  to  each  individual 
letter;  and  during  the  later  process  of  writing  them  down  I 
arrange  the  single  items  of  the  series  one  to  another,  assign- 
ing each  to  its  place." 

If  now  we  express  these  introspections  in  more  general 


328  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

terms,  we  find  that  the  two  observers  have  wholly  different 
behaviors  of  attention.  F.'s  attention  functions  in  a  discrete 
fashion;  it  turns  to  the  particular  letters,  words,  etc.,  in  a 
series  of  successive  acts,  and  the  observer  himself  must  com- 
bine these  individual  impressions  into  a  series.  The  group  or 
the  whole  is  here  built  up  from  the  individual  items.  On  the 
other  hand,  D.'z  attention  is  directed  toward  the  whole;  his 
is  a  sort  of  total  attention.  Consequently  what  his  memory 
retains  is  the  series;  and  the  single  items  are  remembered 
solely  by  means  of  the  series  and  as  parts  of  it.  For  this 
reason  D.  turns  aside  his  attention  or  the  focus  of  his  con- 
sciousness while  he  is  Hstening  to  the  dictation  of  the  series 
in  order  that  he  may  not  heed  the  several  elements  discretely 
and  in  isolation  from  one  another,  but  may  rather  obtain  a 
general  impression  of  them  as  a  series.  The  full  work  of  atten- 
tion does  not  begin  until,  with  the  completion  of  the  dictation, 
the  whole  is  before  him.  Now  it  is  especially  important  that 
a  definite  and  intimate  internal  relation  should  be  found 
between  the  means  employed  by  the  memories  of  these  two 
individuals  and  the  modes  of  behavior  of  their  attention.  Or 
shall  we  regard  it  as  an  accidental  circumstance  that  F.,  who 
is  more  motor,  should  be  the  one  who  manifests  the  discrete 
type  of  attention?  It  is  probably  his  motor  method  of  re- 
taining, that  is,  the  necessity  of  accompanying  every  single 
letter  with  a  special  vocal  innervation,  which  directs  his 
attention  to  the  items  of  the  series;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  more  advantageous  for  D.,  who  belongs  to  the  auditory 
type,  first  to  permit  the  individual  items  of  his  series  of  audi- 
tory images  to  fuse  into  a  whole  in  order  that  he  may  then  be 
able  to  reproduce  the  latter. 

Now  it  may  be  shown  that  this  difference  in  attitude  and 
behavior  of  attention  makes  its  appearance  not  only  in  learn- 
ing but  also  in  other  and  wholly  diverse  sorts  of  mental  activ- 


Associative  Learning  329 

ity.  In  the  experimental  analysis  of  the  act  of  reading,  for 
example,  we  find  that  a  wholly  analogous  difference  comes  to 
light  in  the  reading  processes  of  different  individuals;  some 
readers  sharply  fLxate  the  particular  parts  of  the  word,  while 
others  invariably  direct  their  attention  to  as  large  a  group  of 
words  as  possible, — to  a  "reading-field."  In  reading,  then, 
the  attention  of  one  individual  proceeds  in  a  fixating  fashion, 
that  of  another  proceeds  in  a  fluctuating  fashion.  I  have  no 
hesitation  in  asserting  that  this  variation  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a  fundamental  difference  in  the  attention  of  different  indi- 
viduals, and  that  it  is  to  be  set  on  a  par  with  those  differences 
in  concentration  and  distribution  of  attention  which  have 
been  accepted  by  modern  psychology.  ^ 

The  foregoing  results  are,  to  some  extent,  supplemented  by 
Binet  and  Henri's  investigation  of  the  retention  of  sentences 
by  school-children.  A  comparison  of  these  with  our  Zurich 
investigations  of  immediate  retention  in  adults  furnishes  the 
pedagogically  important  result  that,  in  this  regard  also,  the 
memory  of  the  child  of  school-age  is  considerably  less  efficient 
than  that  of  the  adult. 

A  summary  of  the  investigations  of  immediate  retention 
yields  the  following  conclusions  which  are  of  interest  to 
pedagogy:  i.  The  behavior  of  attention  and  the  means 
employed  in  retention  show  typical  variations  from  individual 
to  individual, — hence  the  conditions  which  are  most  favorable 
to  retention  must  also  be  subject  to  individual  variation. 
The  auditory  type  finds  auditory  presentation  to  be  most 
advantageous;  the  visualizer  finds  visual  presentation  to  be 
most  favorable.  For  the  auditory  type,  the  directing  of  the 
attention  to  the  whole  body  of  material  and  a  certain  divert- 

'  I  have  repeatedly  observed  this  difference  in  children  and  adults; 
Mrs.  Dlirr  has  found  it  in  children,  and  Albien  in  pupils  from  nine 
to  eighteen  years  of  age. 


330  The  Psychology  of  Learning  \ 

ing  of  attention  is  a  profitable  procedure;  the  motor  learner 
finds  it  best  to  fix  his  attention  sharply  upon  particular 
details.  2.  Errors  made  in  immediate  reproduction  can  be 
understood  only  in  relation  to  type  of  ideation  and  of  atten- 
tion. 3.  The  memory  of  the  child  is  much  less  efficient  in 
immediate  retention  than  that  of  the  adult.  4.  Individual 
differences  in  aptitude  for  immediate  retention  are  very  great 
both  in  children  and  in  adults.  Bright  children  retain  twice 
as  much  as  dull  children  of  the  same  age.  \ 

All  of  these  relations  which  we  have  determined  for  imme- 
diate reproduction  have  also  been  established  for  permanent 
retention.  It  is  found,  however,  that  so  soon  as  we  come  to 
deal  with  permanent  retention  we  are  confronted  by  wholly 
new  problems,  such  as:  What  influence  does  re-learning 
exert  upon  the  process  of  forgetting?  And  this  is  an  important 
question  for  pedagogy. 

Ebbinghaus  again  is  the  experimenter  to  whom  we  owe  the 
first  accurate  investigation  of  permanent  retention  and  re- 
learning.  He  memorized  many  series  of  nonsense  syllables, — • 
each  series  containing  thirteen  syllables,  and  as  a  rule  eight 
of  these  series  were  learned  in  succession.  Each  series  was 
learned  until  he  could  just  recite  it  from  memory  without 
error.  After  definite  intervals  of  time,— twenty  minutes,  one 
hour,  nine  hours,  one  day,  two  days,  six  days,  and  thirty-one 
days, — each  series  was  re-learned.  The  results  of  such  a 
procedure  must  show  the  progressive  course  of  the  process  of 
forgetting,  first  during  succeeding  hours  of  the  day  upon 
which  the  syllables  were  learned,  and  then  through  the  ensuing 
days  and  weeks.  It  is  unfortunate  that  Ebbinghaus  usually 
recorded  simply  the  time  expended  or  the  time  saved  in  re- 
learning  after  the  lapse  of  the  interval,  and  employed  these 
determinations  as  the  measure  of  the  amount  of  forgetting 
which  had  taken  place  up  to  that  point.    It  would  have  been 


Associative  Learning  331 

more  correct  to  determine  not  only  the  time  but  also  the 
number  of  repetitions,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  the  accuracy  of 
reproduction.  The  chief  results  of  these  experiments  were  as 
follows:  Forgetting  proceeds  rapidly  at  first,  then  gradually 
more  and  more  slowly.  Even  within  an  hour  after  the  cessa- 
tion of  the  learning  "more  than  a  half  of  the  work  done  at  the 
beginning  must  be  done  over  again,"  before  the  series  can 
again  be  reproduced  correctly.  At  the  end  of  about  nine 
hours  the  loss  amounted  to  approximately  two-thirds  of  the 
work  done  at  the  outset.  From  this  point  onward,  forgetting 
proceeds  more  slowly.  After  twenty-four  hours  about  one- 
third  of  what  was  learned  is  still  present  in  memory;  after 
six  days,  one  quarter;  and  after  one  month,  fully  one-fifth 
is  still  present.  This  gradually  retarding  progress  indicates 
that  complete  forgetting  would,  theoretically,  not  ensue  until 
after  an  infinity  of  time  had  elapsed.  From  this  behavior  of 
memory  Ebbinghaus  derives  the  following  general  principle: 
Forgetting  progresses  not  in  direct  proportion  to  the  time 
elapsed  but  in  proportion  to  the  logarithm  of  the  time. 

Ebbinghaus's  determination  of  the  curve  of  forgetting  has 
not  been  confirmed  in  the  numerous  investigations  which 
have  been  carried  on  in  my  laboratory.  A  considerable  devi- 
ation from  the  finding  of  Ebbinghaus  was  invariably  found  in 
the  experiments  of  M.  K.  Smith,  MagnefT,  Pentschew,  and, 
in  particular  of  Radossawljewitsch,  who  repeated  the  experi- 
ments of  Ebbinghaus  with  twenty-seven  observers.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  certain  that  the  results  of  Ebbinghaus  show 
forgetting  to  proceed  much  too  rapidly  at  the  outset.  When 
the  act  of  learning  has  been  continued  to  the  point  where  one 
finds  it  possible  to  recite  the  material  once  or  twice  from 
memory,  the  amount  of  forgetting  which  occurs  for  a  time 
thereafter  is  almost  directly  proportional  to  the  length  of  the 
elapsed  interval.    Not  until  some  little  time  afterwards  does 


332  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

a  more  rapid  progress  of  forgetting  appear;  and  this  again  is 
always  followed  by  a  rate  of  progress  which  gradually  becomes 
slower  and  slower.  Another  striking  divergence  comes  to 
light  in  connection  with  Ebbinghaus's  finding  that  more  has 
been  forgotten  after  an  interval  of  twenty-four  hours  than 
after  eight  hours,  for  instance,  when  the  syllables  were  learned 
in  the  morning  and  the  re-learning  took  place  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day,  eight  hours  later.  We  found  that  all 
observers  remember  more  after  twenty-four  hours  than  they 
do  after  eight  hours.  It  is  probable  that  two  factors  contrib- 
ute to  bring  about  this  state  of  affairs:  A  general  mental 
fatigue  makes  its  appearance  during  the  day,  rendering  reten- 
tion more  difficult;  and  associations  continue  to  gain  in 
strength  throughout  the  first  twenty-four  hours.  This  is  the 
phenomenon  of  latent  after-practice  which  may  be  shown  by 
other  means  to  exist.  The  progressive  advance  of  forgetting 
as  found  by  Radossawljewitsch  is  compared  with  that  found 
by  Ebbinghaus  in  the  table  ^  on  opposite  page. 

The  results  reported  by  Ebbinghaus  seem  improbable  in 
the  light  of  every-day  experience.  What  an  unreHable  instru- 
ment memory  would  be  if  it  forgot  as  rapidly  as  Ebbinghaus 
believes!  If  to-day  we  are  to  succeed  in  reciting  a  body  of 
material  which  we  learned  yesterday,  we  must  do  over  again 
more  than  half  of  the  work  which  we  devoted  to  its  initial 
memorization ! 

It  seems  desirable  to  bring  forward  additional  evidence 
bearing  upon  this  first  point  concerning  retention  and  for- 
getting. We  can  obtain  a  direct  measurement  of  the  process 
of  forgetting  by  determining  the  effect  of  re-learning  upon 
retention  and  forgetting.  And  this  determination  may  be 
made  by  discovering  how  the  number  of  repetitions  required 
for  re-learning  any  material  are  distributed  over  successive 
'  Radossawljewitsch,  Op.  cit.,  p.  83. 


Associative  Learning 


333 


Number  of 
Experiments 
Performed  by 

Length  of  Interval 

Between  Learning 

and  Re-iearnitig 

Per  Cent. 

Forgotten 

Difference 
in  Favor 

Rados- 

sau'Ijew- 

ilsch 

Ebbhia- 
haiis 

Radossau'l- 
jewitsch 

Ebbinghaus 

of  Rados- 
sawljeu'itsck 

I 

24 

5  minutes 

2-5 

2 

24 

12 

20     "     (Ebbing- 
haus,    19) 

I  1.4 

41.8 

-30-4 

3 
4 

24 
24 

16 
12 

60     "     (Ebbing- 

haus,  63) 

4S0     "     (Ebbing- 

haus,  525) 

29-3 
52.6 

55-8 
64.2 

-26.5 

-II.6 

5 

47 

26 

I  day. 

32.2 

66.3 

-34.1 

6 

26 

26 

2  clays 

39-1 

72.2 

-33-1 

7 

20 

26 

6     " 

50-7 

74.6 

-13-9 

8 
Q 

13 
8 

14     " 
21     " 

59-0 
62.0 



lO 

18 

45 

30     " 

79.8 

78.9 

•9 

II 

12 

120     " 

97.2 

Total 

240 

163 

days, — the  material  being  learned  or  re-learned  in  each  case 
until  we  know  it  by  heart.  This  method  was  first  employed 
by  Ebbinghaus,  who  found  that  the  number  of  repetitions 
required  for  learning  the  same  material  on  consecutive  days 
decreases  in  logarithmic  progression.  Thus,  for  instance,  if 
21.5  repetitions  are  necessary  for  the  memorization  of  24 
nonsense  syllables  on  the  first  day,  the  numbers  of  repetitions 
required  on  the  following  days  are  10,  5,  3,  and  i.  The 
existence  of  such  a  state  of  affairs,  however,  seems  to  be 
very  problematic  because  the  first  re-learning,  on  the  second 
day,  is  much  more  effective  than  Ebbinghaus  reports  it  to 
be.  Our  own  determinations  for  consecutive  days  were  (for 
24  syllables)  21.6,  4,  i  and  .7.    From  this  it  follows  that  the 

23 


334  ^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

first  repetition  is  the  prime  factor  in  retention,  and  that 
subsequent  repetitions  serve  only  to  intensify  its  effect. 
Pedagogical  rules  for  the  technique  of  learning  may  be  de- 
rived from  all  of  these  facts;  but  particular  heed  should  be 
paid  to  the  stages  of  learning.  The  pupil  who  is  made  familiar  . 
with  these  stages  will  be  more  likely  to  guard  against  immature 
and  imperfect  learning,  and  hence  will  be  spared  a  great  deal 
of  relatively  useless  work.  In  the  class-room,  material  should 
always  be  thoroughly  re-learned  as  soon  as  possible  after  its  • 
initial  acquisition  because  this  procedure  will  be  found  to  aid 
retention  in  a  most  effective  manner. 

Ebbinghaus  reports  other  findings  which  are  of  value  to 
pedagogy.  At  each  sitting  he  memorized  six  stanzas  of 
Byron's  Don  Juan,  and  a  series  containing  twelve,  twenty-four 
or  thirty-six  nonsense  syllables;  and  on  the  following  day,  at 
the  same  hour,  he  re-learned  the  same  materials.  In  these 
experiments  the  difference  between  the  number  of  repetitions 
required  for  learning  and  for  re-learning,  that  is,  the  ''saving" 
in  repetitions,  was  taken  as  a  measure  of  the  amount  retained. 
The  results  were  as  follows:  i.  As  to  the  influence  of  length 
of  series,  it  was  found  that  the  longer  series  were  more  indel- 
ibly imprinted, — that  is,  they  were  retained  better;  indeed, 
the  groups  of  thirty-six  syllables  were  imprinted  almost  twice 
as  thoroughly  as  the  groups  of  twelve  syllables.  Significant 
material  was  remembered  very  much  better  than  meaningless 
material.  The  stanzas  of  poetry  were  re-learned  on  the  second 
day  with  less  than  half  as  many  repetitions  as  the  shortest 
series  of  nonsense  syllables  required;  and  notwithstanding 
this,  the  memorial  stability  of  the  former  was  so  great  that 
no  more  repetitions  were  required  for  their  refreshing  on  the 
next  day  than  for  the  series  of  twenty-four  syllables,  i.e., 
about  one-half  of  the  original  number  of  repetitions.  2.  As 
to  the  influence  of  re-learning,  the  results  revealed  the  remark- 


Associative  Learning  335 

able  fact  that  the  number  of  repetitions  which  the  longest 
series  of  syllables  required  on  re-learning  decreased  more 
rapidly  than  tlie  corresponding  number  of  repetitions  for  the 
shortest  series;  so  that  ultimately,  upon  a  certain  day,  the 
longest  and  the  shortest  series  were  re-learned  with  the  same 
number  of  repetitions. 

Ebbinghaus  employed  but  a  single  method  of  learning;  and 
he  wholly  failed  to  determine  which  procedure  in  learning 
gives  the  most  accurate  and  permanent  retention.    We  have 
already  mentioned  the  influence  of  procedure  upon  retention 
and  forgetting.     We  need  only  repeat  that  material  which 
has  been,  learned   in   parts  is   more   readily  forgotten,  and 
what  has  been  learned  as  a  single  whole  is  remembered  much 
longer.     If,  for  example,  an  observer  remembers  thirty  per 
cent,  of  a  poem  which  he  learned  three  months  ago  by  the 
whole-procedure,  he  would  be  found  to  have  forgotten  almost 
the  whole  of  it  during  the  same  interval  if  he  had  learned  it 
by  the  part-procedure.    Indeed,  it  sometimes  happened,  it  is 
true,  that  stanzas  which  had  been  learned  by  the  whole-pro- 
cedure required  more  repetitions  on  re-learning  than  stanzas 
learned  by  the  part-procedure;   but,  even  in  those  cases,  the 
former  stanzas  were  remembered  essentially  better  than  the 
latter.     Hence  the  whole-method  again  proves  to  be  more 
advantageous  in  so  far  as  retention  for  longer  periods  of 
time  is  concerned.        ^ . 

i;  7.  The  Education  of  Memory  in  the  Schools 
The  foregoing  descriptions  have  disclosed  a  picture  of  mem- 
ory function  which  is  wholly  different  from  that  which  psy- 
chology was  accustomed  to  sketch  in  its  non-experimental 
days.  According  to  the  older  psychology,  all  remembering 
and  reproducing  depend  simply  upon  laws  of  associajtion ;  and 
no  clear  distinction  was  made  between  laws  of  association  and 


336  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

laws  of  reproduction.  Instead  of  these  laws  of  association 
we  now  have  an  analysis  of  the  particular  and  the  general 
conditions  of  memorization  and  reproduction  in  their  extra- 
ordinary fullness  and  complexity.  We  have  obtained  an 
insight  into  the  fundamental  differences  of  learning-types,  and 
into  certain  of  the  more  essential  of  the  general  conditions  of 
learning.  The  question  will  now  arise :  To  what  degree,  and 
in  what  manner  are  the  learning  types  capable  of  being  sys- 
tematically turned  to  account  in  learning,  of  being  improved 
and  developed,  or  of  being  levelled  down  and  made  identical 
with  one  another?  We  must  also  inquire  to  what  extent  and 
by  what  means  memory,  in  general,  is  capable  of  being 
trained  and  improved.  And  finally  it  may  be  mentioned  once 
more  that  the  profound  importance  of  formal  memory  train- 
ing has  been  estabhshed  in  every  memorial  investigation  where 
the  training  of  memory  as  such  was  attempted.  May  it  not 
be  demanded,  then,  that  the  schools  shall  incorporate  the 
formal  training  of  memory  into  their  curriculum? 

A  first  demand  which  our  psychological  investigations  lead 
us  to  make  upon  the  schools  is  of  a  general  sort:  Memoriza- 
tion should  not  be  a  matter  of  accidental  success  as  it  has  been 
in  the  past;  nor  should  it  be  given  over  to  the  blundering  efforts 
and  the  unsystematic  groping  of  the  child.  It  should  not 
entail  the  waste  of  time  and  of  energy  which  necessarily 
results  from  a  desultory  and  fortuitous  procedure..  The  teacher 
must  raise  it  to  a  higher  plane;  and  this  he  can  do  by  directing 
his  pupils  in  their  process  of  learning  and  by  adapting  thfeir 
activity  to  conform  with  the  results  obtained  from  investi- 
gations of  the  conditions  of  economical  learning. 

How  can  this  be  brought  about?    It  may  be  accomplished 

I  in  the  followin^g  ways.    Children  should  be  instructed  by  the 

I    teacher  in  the  proper  use  of  their  means  of  remembering  and 

modes  of  reproducing,  the  instruction  of  course  being  made 


I 

Associative  Learning'  337 

more  and  more  complete  and  thorough  as  the  children  become 
older.     They  should  be  systematically  trained  by  practical! 
memory  exercises.     The  material  employed  in  this  training 
should  be  related  as  closely  as  possible  with  the  material 
ordinarily  learned  in  the  school-room;    its  quahty  and  its 
quantity  should  be  graded  to  adapt  it  to  the  age  and  the 
capacity  of  the  pupils.    The  formal  purpose,— the  training  and  • 
development  of  memory  itself, — and  the  material  purpose, — 
the  mental  acquisition  of  the  subject-matter, — should  receive  ^ 
equal  emphasis  throughout. 

As  regards  the  theoretical  instruction  of  the  child  in  the  . 
use  of  his  memory,  this  may  include  the  following  points:/ 
I.  Pupils  may  have  their  attention  called  to  the  various) 
means  of  memorizing  through  whose  use  the  highest  efficiency/ 
of  memory  is  attained;  and  again  the  instruction  may  include 
either  the  particular  means  of  memorizing,  which  are  peculiar 
to  particular  persons,  or  the  general  means  which  are  common 
to  all  individuals.  This  demand,  of  course,  presupposes  that 
the  teacher  himself  has  a  mastery  of  the  methods  by  means  of 
which  the  memory- type  of  the  child  may  be  determined.  A 
few  minutes  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  school-period  should 
suffice  for  an  examination  of  the  memory  types  of  certain 
children  in  the  class;  the  tests  could  be  made  in  the  presence 
of  other  children,  who  would  thus  come  to  an  understanding 
of  the  experiments  which  are  to  be  made  upon  them  later. 
In  this  manner  a  large  class  can  be  investigated  within  a  few 
weeks.  Where  it  is  not  feasible  to  make  individual  tests,  the 
whole  class  may  be  investigated  at  once  by  means  of  one  of 
the  mass-methods,  although  mass-methods  are  always  less 
reliable  than  individual  tests.  For  instance,  the  pupils  may 
be  asked  to  record  all  of  the  visual,  auditory,  and  motor  ideas 
which  occur  to  them  in  a  given  period  of  time,  say  five  minutes ; 
or  the  teacher  may  determine  which  children  remember  data 


338  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

best  from  auditory  presentation,  and  which  find  visual  pres- 
entation the  most  favorable;  or  the  pupils  may  be  asked  to 
report  the  first  idea  which  occurs  to  them  when  a  word  is 
pronounced  in  their  presence.  In  the  latter  case,  one  may 
gradually  confine  their  choice  of  reproduced  words  within 
narrower  and  narrower  hmits;  by  this  means,  and  by  an 
appropriate  selection  of  stimulus-words,  the  child's  dominating 
imagery  may  readily  be  determined.  The  time  required  for 
the  learning  of  a  given  material  may  be  measured,  and  notice- 
able fluctuations  of  attention  may  be  recorded.  It  is  a  simple 
matter  to  determine  the  compass  of  immediate  retention  for 
all  the  members  of  the  class. 

When  we  have  determined  the  ideational  type  to  which  a 
child  belongs,  and  have  also  determined  his  type  of  attention, 
it  is  then  desirable  to  bring  the  essential  features  of  his  method 
of  learning  to  the  notice  of  the  child  himself,  and  to  show 
him  the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of  his  procedure. 
My  own  observations  show  that  these  determinations  and 
demonstrations  are  interesting  both  to  the  teacher  and  to  the 
pupil.  Through  acquiring  an  insight  into  the  mechanism  of 
memory,  children  are  led  to  take  pleasure  in  the  formal  act 
of  learning;  while  the  teacher  is  enabled  to  ascertain  the 
causes  of  success  and  failure  in  the  memory  work  of  his  pupils, 
to  acquire  skill  in  diagnosing  memorial  weakness  and  memorial 
strength  in  particular  pupils,  and  to  develop  an  ability  to 
direct  his  pupils  to  a  proper  and  effective  employment  of 
means  which  may  be  made  to  contribute  to  memory.  He 
sees  that  the  attention  of  one  pupil  adapts  itself  with  difficulty 
to  the  material  and  to  the  act  of  learning,  while  that  of  another 
adapts  itself  readily  and  securely;  that  one  child  is  incHned 
to  remember  chiefly  in  terms  of  sensory  elements  while  an- 
other tends  to  employ  non-sensory  elements;  and  that  the 
former  child's  procedure  consists  chiefly  in  calling  up  material 


Associative  Learning  339 

concretely  before  his  mind,  while  the  latter  relies  upon  his 
power  to  apprehend  the  logical  coherence  of  the  material. 
He  sees,  too,  that  the  attention  of  one  is  attracted  by  the 
whole, — the  parts  being  remembered  by  means  of  the  whole, — 
while  that  of  another  is  directed  to  particular  details;  that 
in  the  latter  case,  the  act  of  learning  consists  in  apprehending 
the  details  as  isolated  items  and  then  combining  them  into  a 
whole;  that  the  attention  of  one  is  characterized  by  its  inten- 
sity of  concentration  and  by  the  fact  that  it  progresses  by 
means  of  a  series  of  acts  of  fixating,  while  that  of  another  is 
diffuse  and  fluctuating,  and  vacillates  between  forward  and 
backward  movements  during  the  process  of  estabhshing  its 
associations;  that  in  one  pupil  the  emphasis  in  the  mechan- 
ical aspect  of  learning  is  upon  the  auditory  word  elements,  in 
another  pupil  upon  the  visual  or  the  motor,  or  any  combina- 
tion of  the  three;  that  certain  pupils  make  extensive  use  of 
secondary  clues  such  as  memorial  locahzations.  Speaking 
generally,  the  teacher  who  proceeds  in  this  investigative  fash- 
ion ascertains  that  the  whole  acti\-ity  of  learning  is  constituted 
differently  according  to  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the 
individual's  memory,  and  that  every  individual  must  first 
learn  how  best  to  make  use  of  his  own  pecuHar  means  to 
remembering. 

Here  is  a  problem  in  memory  training  regarding  whose 
solution  psychologists  are  far  from  being  in  agreement.  In 
consequence  of  general  psychological  considerations  and  of 
the  results  of  certain  experiments,  psychologists  have  held 
that  pupils  should  be  instructed  to  employ  as  many  memorial 
factors  as  possible,  or,  in  other  words,  to  learn  by  means  of 
all  of  the  senses  and  by  means  of  the  content  or  meaning  of 
the  material  as  well.  Other  authors  are  of  the  opinion  that 
it  is  better  for  each  individual  to  work  with  the  factors  which 
conform  with  his  own  endowment  or  type, — the  auditory 


340  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

learner  with  auditory  images,  etc.  An  investigation  by 
Bigham^  seems  to  support  the  former  view.  Bigham  deter- 
mined whether  an  observer  makes  more  errors  in  the  imme- 
diate reproduction  of  numbers  and  colors  when  he  retains  the 
impressions  by  auditory  imagery  alone,  by  visual  imagery 
alone,  or  by  both  of  these  means  in  combination.  Numbers 
and  colors  were  learned  by  simply  seeing  them  in  one  case,  by 
simply  hearing  their  names  in  another  case,  and  in  a  third 
case  by  the  two  modes  of  presentation  together.  His  results 
show  that  visual  memory  acting  alone  retains  better  than 
auditory  memory  alone;  and  that  when  the  two  memories 
co-operate,  the  number  of  errors  is  considerably  less  than 
when  either  memory  operates  alone.  Thus  when  the  names  of 
ten  colors  were  presented,  an  average  of  7.6  were  remembered; 
when  the  colors  themselves  were  seen  8.2  were  remembered; 
when  they  were  seen  and  their  names  were  heard  at  the  same 
time  9.5  were  remembered.  This  result  also  seems  to  be 
supported  by  theoretical  considerations.  Indeed,  one  may 
say  that  the  more  associative  connections  a  content  of  con- 
sciousness enters  into,  the  more  aids  are  present  for  its  reten- 
tion and  reproduction. 

But  Bigham's  experiment  is  too  crude  to  furnish  any  proof; 
and  against  the  general  consideration  it  may  be  urged  that 
the  number  of  associative  connections  is  by  no  means  the  sole 
determinant  of  retention.  Retention  is  rather  a  matter  of 
stabiHty  and  strength  of  associative  bonds.  In  investigations 
of  immediate  and  permanent  retention  I  have  found  that 
unpractised  observers  retain  better  when  they  employ  only 
the  sort  or  sorts  of  imagery  which  correspond  to  their  idea- 
tional t3^e  than  when  they  are  asked  to  make  use  of  all  pos- 
sible sorts  of  imagery.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  unprac- 
tised auditory  individual  the  request  that  he  shall  attend  also 
^  J.  Bigham,  Memory,  Psychol.  Rev.,  I.,  1S94,  453-461. 


Associative  Learning  ,  341 

to  the  visual  images  of  the  letters,  numbers,  syllables  and 
words  may  produce  such  a  decrease  of  memorial  efficiency 
that  he  retains  very  much  fewer  data  than  when  he  directs 
his  attention  only  to  the  auditory  imagery  with  which  he  is 
conversant.  The  explanation  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  unusual  direction  of  his  attention  to  the  visual 
images  weakens  the  association  of  the  auditory  images  with- 
out furnishing  any  compensatory  strengthening  of  association 
by  means  of  visual  images.  This  is  in  accord  with  our  experi- 
ence that  a  beginner  sometimes  requires  a  ridiculously  great 
number  of  repetitions  (sixty,  seventy  or  more)  for  the  learn- 
ing of  a  series  of  twelve  meaningless  syllables,  while  on  the 
following  day  he  may  succeed  in  learning  an  equally  long  list 
of  new  syllables  with  one-half  or  one-third  as  many  repeti- 
tions. In  such  cases,  it  is  always  possible  to  show  that  the 
beginner  must  first  discover  his  learning  type,  and  that  in 
his  first  few  sittings  he  vacillates  between  different  modes  of 
learning.  None  but  practised  observers  can  learn  to  make 
use  of  means  of  memorizing  with  which  they  are  not  naturally 
conversant. 

From  this  it  seems  to  follow  that  memory  exercises  for 
children  must  at  first  be  adapted  to  their  peculiar  mental 
types,  and  that  children  should  first  acquire  an.  ability  to 
make  exclusive  use  of  their  connate  memorial  endowment. 
Not  until  they  have  attained  an  increased  degree  of  memorial 
efficiency  will  it  be  possible  for  them  to  make  a  transition  to 
the  gradual  process  of  rounding  out  their  one-sided  memorial 
endowTnent. 

A  second  important  point  in  instructing  children  in  their 
process  of  learning  would  consist  in  teaching  them  that  in 
learning  significant  material  an  understanding  of  the  subject- 
matter  must  be  made  to  co-operate  with  the  indispensable 
mechanical  aspect  of  all  memorization,  and  also  in  directing 


342  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

them  as  to  how  this  co-operation  is  to  be  brought  about.  A 
complete  understanding  of  the  content  should  constitute  the 
starting-point  of  all  learning,  ^  because  otherwise  it  is  impos- 
sible to  avoid  the  danger  that  a  tedious  mechanical  memoriza- 
tion of  an  uncomprehended  text  may  be  substituted  for  a 
rational  acquisition  of  it,  and, — what  is  psychologically  more 
important, — in  that  case  the  valuable  memorial  aids  which 
inhere  in  the  understanding  of  the  content  are  not  employed 
to  the  best  advantage  in  the  act  of  learning.  In  addition  to 
this,  however,  the  attention  of  the  child  must  be  especially 
directed  to  the  sensory  vehicle  by  means  of  which  the  subject- 
matter  is  conveyed  to  his  consciousness.  As  early  as  possible 
the  child  should  be  given  instruction  in  rhythm  and  rhyme, 
correct  pronounciation,  the  length  of  words  and  sentences, 
and  whatever  other  features  correspond  to  his  ideational  type. 
In  so  doing  we  may  show,  at  least  to  the  more  intelligent 
child,  that  the  choice  of  words  is  not  an  arbitrary  or  accidental 
matter  in  so  far  as  their  purely  sensory  character  is  concerned. 
This  marks  the  first  step  toward  guiding  the  mechanical  fac- 
tor of  memorizing  in  the  proper  direction.  The  second  step 
in  the  same  direction  consists  in  showing  him  the  necessity  of 
vigorous  repetition  with  constant  concentration  of  attention 
upon  the  subject-matter  and  upon  the  mechanical  and  sensory 
elements. 

Meanwhile  it  is  exceedingly  important  that  the  child  should 
receive  a  hint  as  to  the  difference  between  aimless,  ineffective 
repetition  and  that  sort  of  repetition  in  which  attention  and 
memory  receive  the  full  benefit  of  every  single  reading.  This 
can  be  done  by  showing  him  the  differences  between  the 
various  methods  of  learning.  I  have  discovered  that  the  whole- 
procedure  is  advantageous  not  only  in  the  laboratory,  for 
teachers  of  my  acquaintance  have  also  submitted  it  to  a 

^  See  pages  297fif. 


Associative  Learning  343 

thorough  test  in  their  schools.  Let  the  children  see  how  wholly 
different  is  their  concentration  of  attention  when  they  learn 
by  means  of  the  whole-method  or  by  one  of  the  mediating 
methods,  and  when,  in  employing  the  part-method  as  they 
ordinarily  do,  they  waste  an  extravagant  number  of  repeti- 
tions on  the  first  few  lines  of  a  stanza  of  poetry  and  neglect 
the  other  Unes.  My  own  experience  shows  me  the  necessity 
of  using  the  child  himself  as  an  illustration  in  demonstrating 
how  the  various  methods  differ  in  their  effects  upon  retention 
and  reproduction;  it  encourages  the  child  to  adopt  a  partic- 
ular method  in  his  learning,  and  it  also  contributes  to  his 
enjoyment  of  the  act  of  learning.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
add  that  all  of  these  instructions  may  be  given  without 
burdening  the  child  with  psychological  terminology. 

The  fundamental  characteristics  of  his  attention  may  also 
be  pointed  out  to  the  child.  If  he  is  led  to  see  that  his  atten- 
tion is  slow  to  adapt  itself  to  its  task,  this  may  spur  him  on  to 
overcome  his  defect.  And  the  practical  precepts  which  follow 
from  Kraemer's  investigation  may  also  be  included  here,  espe- 
cially those  which  concern  the  adjustment  and  direction  of  at- 
tention upon  the  results  to  be  attained  in  the  act  of  learning.  ^ 

Practical  exercises  in  appropriate  memorial  work  may  go 
hand  in  hand  with  theoretical  instruction.  Let  the  child  first 
be  taught  that  all  memory  work  should  begin  with  a  correct 
apprehension  of  the  content  which  is  to  be  remembered,  and 
that  the  accuracy  and  care  of  this  initial  apprehension,  the 
sensory  perception  and  the  motor  reproduction  of  the  verbal 
material  as  well  as  the  concrete-logical  understanding  of  the 
material  to  be  remembered  arc  fundamental  conditions  of 
memorial  acquisition. 

The  precautions  which  are  to  be  observed  in  order  to  secure 
a  compliance  with  this  rule  are  different  in  the  mechanical 

^  See  pages  293(1. 


344  T^^^^  Psychology  of  Learning 

learning  of  unrelated  data  and  in  significant  learning.  In 
mechanical  learning, — for  instance,  in  learning  words  of  a 
foreign  language, — the  auditory,  motor,  and  visual  elements 
of  the  words  must  be  apprehended  as  accurately  as  possible 
in  purely  sensory  fashion  before  the  learning  begins;  and 
during  the  first  few  readings  the  rapidity  of  speaking  and  of 
learning  is  slackened  to  such  a  degree  that  an  accurate  sensory 
apprehension  may  become  possible.  In  the  learning  of  sig- 
nificant material,  the  complete  penetration  or  "soaking  in" 
of  the  content,  in  its  concrete  and  logical  relations,  constitutes 
the  analogous  pre-condition  of  memorial  work.  The  accuracy, 
rapidity  and  range  of  the  apprehending  attention  can  be  im- 
proved by  practice;  and  this  improvement  contributes  indi- 
rectly to  the  work  of  imprinting  upon  memory.  To  what 
degree  one's  rapidity  in  apprehending  visual  words  can  be 
improved  by  practice  may  be  seen  from  experiments  in  tachis- 
toscopic  reading.  The  tachistoscope  is  essentially  a  falling 
screen  which  may  be  made  to  drop  with  variable  rapidity,  and 
to  expose  a  word  for  an  instant  at  some  point  in  its  course. 
By  means  of  this  instrument,  one  may  determine  the  shortest 
exposure-time  during  which  words  may  still  be  read.  If  a 
great  many  persons  are  trained  in  the  rapid  apprehension  of 
words,  it  may  sometimes  be  determined  that  their  reading- 
time  is  generally  reduced  by  seven-fold  to  eight-fold,  so  that 
most  observers  ultimately  read  a  word  with  an  exposure- 
time  of  three  to  four  one-thousandths  of  a  second.  The 
rapidity  of  apprehension  of  content  can  likewise  be  increased 
by  practice.  But  the  more  rapidly  and  accurately  the  visual- 
auditory  impressions  and  the  content  or  meaning  of  the 
material  are  grasped,  the  more  rapidly  does  the  single  reading 
become  effective  for  memory ;  while  the  individual  who  appre- 
hends inaccurately  and  slowly  devotes  more  readings  to  the 
mere  process  of  completing  his  apprehension. 


Associative  Learning  345 

Still  more  important  is  it  to  give  practical  instruction  in 
the  concentration  of  attention  for  the  act  of  learning  itself. 
A  certain  education  of  attention  for  the  act  of  learning  is 
necessary  if  memorization  is  to  attain  its  highest  efficiency. 
Investigation  shows  that  this  end  can  be  accomplished  by 
regulating  the  rapidity  of  reading  and  in  general  by  following 
the  precept:  Learn  slowly  and  accurately  at  first,  then  grad- 
ually increase  the  rapidity  of  reading  and  learning.  Psycho- 
logical investigations  have  furnished  us  with  valuable  obser- 
vations regarding  the  best  means  of  attaining  a  uniform  and 
intensive  degree  of  concentration  of  attention.  We  frequently 
make  perception  and  reading  more  difficult  by  artificial  means 
in  order  to  obtain  a  higher  degree  of  concentration.  Thus, 
when  nonsense-syllables  are  being  read  from  a  revolving 
drum,^  the  rotation  is  sometimes  increased  to  a  very  rapid 
rate,  and  the  observer  is  obHged  to  read  with  a  maximum 
concentration  of  attention  or  the  syllables  will  disappear  from 
view  before  he  has  apprehended  them.  The  attention  of  the 
child  may  be  trained  in  similar  fashion,  by  obHging  him  to 
read  through  a  slit  which  moves  at  a  definite  rate  of  speed 
across  the  list  of  words  or  other  non-coherent  memory  mate- 
rial. We  find,  too,  that  when  distractions  of  attention,  such 
as  noises,  are  introduced  into  the  experiment,  these  oftentimes 
give  rise  to  no  distracting  effect  but  to  an  increase  in  the 
efficiency  of  attention  and  memory.  In  these  cases  the  dis- 
traction is  more  than  compensated  by  an  increased  concen- 
tration of  attention.  The  presence  of  his  class-mates  in  the 
school-room  constitutes  a  natural  "distraction"  which  in- 
creases the  efficiency  of  the  child's  attention;  class-learning 
may,  then,  be  one  of  the  most  effective  means  of  attaining  a 
higher  degree  of  attentive  concentration  upon  the  part  of  the 
pupil.     Investigations  have  recently  been  undertaken  which 

'  CJ.  p.  164. 


346  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

aimed  to  compare  the  class-work  with  the  isolated,  indi\ddual 
work  of  the  child;  and  in  almost  every  instance,  the  class- 
work  was  found  to  be  superior.  These  investigations  also 
show  that  the  energy  expended  in  protecting  attention  from 
distracting  stimuli  is  greater  in  class-work  than  in  solo  work.  ^ 
The  sort  of  directions  which  the  teacher  gives  to  pupils  exerts 
an  influence  upon  the  intensity  of  attention.  The  same  task 
is  attacked  by  the  pupil  in  wholly  different  fashion  according 
as  the  teacher  instructs  him  to  do  it  slowly  and  well,  to  do  it 
rapidly  and  well,  or  to  do  it  as  rapidly  as  he  can.  We  have 
already  discussed  the  form  in  which  instructions  for  memory 
work  must  be  expressed.  From  the  nature  of  these  practical 
instructions  for  memorial  exercises  it  also  follows  that  the 
exercises  must  be  done  under  the  control  of  the  teacher,  and 
for  the  same  reason  they  must  be  done  as  class-work.  A 
comparative  study  of  work  which  is  done  individually  and  as 
class-work  shows  in  general  that  the  more  the  pupil  studies  in 
class,  the  more  efficient  does  he  become  in  concentrating  upon 
his  learning;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  home-work  is  done 
under  distracting  influences  it  frequently  has  a  deleterious 
effect  upon  the  concentration  of  pupils  who  are  prone  to  dis- 
traction. 

As  to  the  arranging  of  memory  exercises,  the  results  of 
school  experiments  show  that  the  nrst  hour  of  the  day  should 
be  chosen  for  those  exercises  in  which  the  formal  purpose  of 
memory  development  is  most  emphasized,  because  in  the 
first  place,  school-children  possess  the  greatest  amount  of 
psycho-physical  energy  during  the  first  and  second  hours, 
and  they  are  then  still  free  from  the  influence  of  fatigue; 
and  in  the  second  place,  their  memorial  efficiency  fluctuates 
between  wide  limits  at  different  hours  of  the  day. 

'^  Cf.  the  references  to  A.  Mayer,  F.  Schmidt,  and  K.  Roller,  in  the 
Bibliography. 


/ 


Associative  Learning  2>^'j 

Immediate  retention,  no  less  than  permanent  retention, 
should  receive  systematic  training  in  school.  If  the  adult  can 
almost  double  his  immediate  retention  by  practice,  we  may 
expect  an  even  greater  improvement  of  this  capacity  in  the 
child.  Dictation  and  every  other  form  of  school  activity 
which  appeals  to  immediate  retention  may  be  used  as  a  means 
for  the  systematic  training  of  this  function.  For  example, 
lists  of  words  may  be  read  aloud  by  the  teacher  up  to  the  limit 
of  immediate  retention,  before  the  real  memorization  of  the 
list  begins. 


8.  The  Actual  Memorial  Efficiency  of  ScJwol  Children  Com- 
pared with  the  Results  of  Experimental  Investigations 
We  have  offered  certain  suggestions  for  the  systematic 
development  of  memory  in  the  school-room.  If  now  we  con- 
sider the  memorial  efficiency  of  the  child  as  it  actually  exists, 
we  find  that  the  investigations  of  school-children  of  different 
ages  reveal  an  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs.  It  has  already 
been  mentioned  that  Miss  Steffens,  working  at  the  instigation 
of  G.  E.  Miiller,  was  the  first  to  make  a  detailed  investigation 
of  the  natural  methods  of  learning  employed  by  school- 
children. She  found  that  children  learn  in  a  much  more  uneco- 
nomical way  than  adults,  and  particularly  that  they  learn 
with  an  exceedingly  injuaicious  distribution  of  repetitions. 
Her  ex-periments  also  showed  that  the  amount  remembered 
and  the  compass  of  immediate  retention,  as  well  as  the  fidelity 
and  accuracy  of  remembrance  are  much  greater  in  adults  than 
in  school-children  of  any  age,  even  when  purely  mechanical 
learning  is  concerned.  In  Pentschew's  investigation  in  the 
Zurich  laboratory  it  was  found  that  school-children  at  the  age 
of  nine  years  never  succeeded  in  remembering  more  than  four- 
teen nonsense-s}-llables  which  had  been  learned  in  a  purely 
mechanical  fashion  and  as  a  whole  series;    it  was  observed, 


348  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

too,  that  they  soon  become  very  much  fatigued.  Adults, 
however,  learned  Hsts  which  were  at  least  twice  as  long,  with- 
out fatigue,  although  the  material  did  not  conform  to  their 
usual  mode  of  memorizing;  and  practised  adults  were  able 
to  memorize  twenty-four,  thirty-six  or  even  more  syllables  at 
a  single  sitting.  In  class-experiments  conducted  by  A.  Mayer 
in  Wurzburg,  certain  pupils  required  from  eighty  to  one  hun- 
dred repetitions  for  the  memorization  of  ten  syllables;  two 
of  my  most  highly  practised  observers  learned  this  number  of 
syllables  with  an  average  of  three  to  four  repetitions. 

A  somewhat  similar  state  of  affairs  is  found  in  immediate 
retention.  As  already  described,'  my  own  experiments  in 
immediate  reproduction  showed  that  children  of  ten  to  twelve 
years  retain  an  average  of  about  four  letters,  and  that  children 
of  thirteen  to  fourteen  years  retain  an  average  of  five  to  six 
letters  and  not  quite  so  many  syllables,  while  our  practised 
adults  retain  as  many  as  thirteen  to  fourteen  letters  and 
approximately  the  same  number  of  words.  This  clearly 
shows  that  the  memory  of  school-children  is  much  less  efficient 
than  is  to  be  expected.  Experiments*  by  German,  American 
and  French  teachers  have  shown  that  the  improvement  in 
memory  with  increase  of  age  is  slight.  The  memory  of  chil- 
dren seems  to  improve  but  little  after  they  have  reached  the 
mean  school-age.  This  fact  has  been  confirmed  by  nearly  all 
investigators,  but  the  differences  were  not  always  so  slight  as 
Binet  and  Henri  found  them  to  be.  Indeed,  Bourdon  found 
even  a  worse  state  of  affairs,  so  far  as  increase  of  memory  in 
children  is  concerned,  than  appears  from  the  data  which  we 
have  quoted.  Bourdon  tested  the  memories  of  one  hundred 
pupils  between  the  ages  of  eight  and  twenty  in  the  high  schools 
of  Paris.  According  to  his  results,  memory  improves  slowly 
from  eight  to  fourteen  years;   from  fourteen  to  twenty  years 

^C/.  p.  321. 


Associative  Learning  349 

it  remains  wholly  unchanged  or  improves  in  scarcely  percep- 
tible degree. 

How  is  it  possible  that  the  child's  memory  develops  so  little 
during  all  his  years  at  school,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
it  is  exercised  and  trained  every  day  and  every  hour?  General 
psychological  considerations  and  experimental  investigations 
lead  one  to  suppose  that  the  child's  memory  is  much  more 
plastic  and  impressionable  than  the  over-burdened  memory  of 
the  adult.  The  fact  that,  notwithstanding  its  possibilities  of 
development,  memorial  efficiency  improves  so  little  during 
school-age  forces  one  to  form  an  exceeding^  unfavorable 
opinion  of  school  methods  of  memorization,  in  so  far  as  their 
value  as  formal  training  is  concerned.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  child's  learning  does  not  improve  his  ri^emory;  there 
seems  to  be  but  a  single  factor  which  contribute  to  a  develop- 
ment of  his  memory  and  that  is  his  own  increasing  age.  And 
this  slight  improvement  in  memorial  function  he  does  not 
owe  to  the  school.  His  learning  at  school  is  organized  and 
conducted  from  a  purely  material  or  non-formal  point  of  view; 
and  in  consequence  of  this,  his  memory  is  demoralized  and 
becomes  a  mere  matter  of  accident.  Yet  in  spite  of  this,  it 
improves  somewhat  as  a  result  of  his  natural  development. 

The  serious  complaints  against  the  current  learning  of  the 
schools,  which  is  regulated  in  accordance  with  no  psychological 
laws,  are  based  chiefly  upon  the  fact  that  school-children  who 
have  been  subjected  to  formal  memory  training  in  our  labor- 
atories have  frequently  shown  a  ten-fold  increase  of  memorial 
efficiency;  the  fidelity  of  their  retention,  although  not  increas- 
ing by  nearly  so  much,  is  likewise  essentially  improved;  and 
their  accuracy  of  reproduction  also  increases.  The  empirical 
determination  of  the  child's  lesser  capacity  to  learn  must  not, 
however,  be  employed  simply  as  a  justification  for  heaping 

reproaches  upon  the  schools.     The  chief  weakness  of  these 
24 


350  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

charges  lies  in  their  assumption  that  the  child  has,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  a  much  more  plastic  and  impressionable  memory 
than  the  adult.  This  assumption,  couched  in  this  general 
form,  is  too  indefinite;  and  although  a  psychologist  has 
recently  asserted  that,  strictly  speaking,  the  memory  of  the 
child  decreases  steadily  in  impressionabiHty  with  advancing 
age,  and  that  the  child's  whole  gain  is  a  gain  in  concentration 
of  attention,  one  can  readily  cite  experimental  evidence  to 
show  that  the  pupil's  capacity  to  learn  increases  steadily  with 
his  years.  ^  Yet  the  fact  remains  that  notwithstanding  all  his 
learning  at  school  he  shows  but  little  improvement;  and  the 
question  arises  as  to  what  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from  this 
circumstance. 

f  My  inference  is,  first  of  all,  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  introduce  into  the  schools  a  formal  training  of  memory 
such  as  we  have  suggested.  According  to  our  experimental 
investigations,  it  must  be  possible  to  increase  the  memorial 

I  efficiency  of  school-children  by  three  or  four-fold,  by  giving 
them  systematic  instruction  based  upon  sound  psychological 
principles,  and  by  training  them  in  retention  as  such.  Are 
we,  then,  to  resort  to  purely  formal  memory  exercises?  And 
are  we  to  drill  pupils  in  the  most  efficient  methods  of  learning 
by  means  of  material  which  is  itself  valueless?  This  question 
I  should  answer  in  the  negative;  or  at  least  I  should  say  that 
purely  formal  exercises  are  to  be  employed  only  occasionally 
and  secondarily,  as  for  instance,  when  it  becomes  necessary 
to  train  an  especially  inattentive  learner  by  private  treatment 
outside  school-hours.  Meaningless  material  with  accurately 
controlled  methods  of  learning  would  serve  well  for  this  pur- 
pose. But  there  are  two  important  reasons  for  not  introduc- 
ing purely  formal  memory  exercises,  a  practical  and  a  psy- 

'  J.  J.  van  Biervliet,   Esquisse  d'une  education  de  la  memoire. 
Revue  de  philos.  III.,  1903. 


Associative  Learning  351 

chological  reason.  The  practical  reason  is  this :  Specific  formal 
mental  training  cannot  be  added  to  the  over-loaded  curriculum 
of  the  public  school.  There  simply  is  not  time  for  it,  because 
what  may  justly  be  demanded  for  memory  may  with  equal 
justice  be  demanded  for  other  mental  capacities;  and  if  we 
introduce  formal  mental  training  why  not  also  exercises  in 
apprehension,  judgment,  speaking,  etc.?  In  short,  we  would 
return  to  the  atrocious  speech-drill  of  Pestalozzi,  or  to  the 
monstrous  words  of  the  orthographical  training  of  the  Phil- 
anthropinists. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Biervliet  has  recently  arrived  at  this  L 
conclusion,  apparently  without  a  knowledge  of  the  failure  of 
the  older  pedagogy  in  this  direction.'  But  there  are  also 
psychological  objections.  Purely  formal  memory  exercises 
with  meaningless  material  must  necessarily  train  the  child's 
mechanico-meaningless  method  of  learning;  and  he  would 
never  discover  the  correct  use  of  the  most  important  factor 
of  memory, — the  proper  reinforcement  by  the  meaning  of  the 
material.  This  latter  procedure  can  be  learned  only  by  means 
of  material  which  has  meaning  and  value  for  consciousness. 
This,  however,  is  not  tantamount  to  saying  that  valuable 
formal  training  of  memory  and  a  systematic  improvement  of 
methods  of  learning  cannot  be  combined  with  the  material 
already  contained  in  the  school  curriculum.  Only  to  this 
extent  would  I  be  in  favor  of  a  formal  mental  training.  The 
materials  which  are  already  prescribed  by  the  curricula  of  the 
schools  must  be  learned  in  such  fashion  as  will  contribute  as 
much  as  possible  to  a  formal  training  of  memory ;  and  the  act 
of  learning  must  be  performed  in  a  manner  which  is  psycho- 
logically sound.  I  have  already  endeavored  to  offer  sugges-  ' 
tions  as  to  how  this  may  be  done;   children  must,  above  all 

^  Thus  Biervliet  recommends  exercises  in  the  pronunciation  of  such 
words  as  lololilalulilo  and  lalabarakalamana.     Op-  cH,  p.  506. 


352  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

else,  be  instructed  in  the  proper  use  of  their  memorial  equip- 
ment and  in  the  acquisition  of  a  technique  and  an  economy 
of  learning  which  is  psychologically  and  practically  justified. 
A  complete  organization  of  such  exercises  can  be  attained 
only  by  a  systematic  co-operation  of  psychological  observa- 
tion and  pedagogical  practice. 

Another  psychological  objection  to  the  demand  for  formal 
mental  exercises  in  the  schools  has  recently  been  advanced; 
but  it  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  vahd.  In  an  interesting  study 
of  memorization  Netschajeff  ^  has  urged  the  following  consid- 
eration against  this  demand.    "Experimental  psychology  has 

shown that  different  sorts  of  memory  are 

to  be  distinguished  from  one  another.  Is  it  possible  for  train- 
ing to  exert  a  beneficent  influence  upon  all  of  the  memorial 
functions  of  a  given  person?  For  instance,  can  a  composer 
who  endeavors  to  strengthen  his  auditory  memory  by  rehears- 
ing various  melodies  hope  that  his  visual  memory  will  also  be 
improved  by  this  means?  Experimental  investigations  do  not 
justify  us  in  answering  this  question  in  the  afiirmative.  We 
know  only  that  practice  in  remembering  certain  impressions 
strengthens  our  capacity  to  remember  this  one  sort  of  impres- 
sion alone."  Then  the  author  adds  that  it  might  sometimes 
appear  ''as  though  the  training  of  a  particular  sort  of  memory 
also  strengthens  other  forms  of  memory;"  it  is  probable, 
however,  that  this  is  not  due  to  a  training  of  the  general 
memorial  function  but  to  the  fact  that  the  practised  learner 
has  acquired  certain  "schematic  devices,"  clues,  knacks,  and 
a  more  advantageous  general  behavior  in  consequence  of  which 
his  general  learning  is  now  improved.  In  short,  Netschajeff 
claims  that  there  is  no  general  memorial  function,  but  only  a 
group  of  special  memories;  that  for  this  reason  no  general 
formal  training  of  memory  is  possible,  but  that  we  can  train 
'  A.  Netschajeff,  Ueher  Memorieren,  Berlin,  1902,  20. 


Associative  Learni7ig  353 

only  a  certain  special  memory, — memory  for  tones,  or  colors, 
or  names,  or  numbers,  etc.  From  this  he  infers  that  the  devel- 
opment of  memory  at  school  can  proceed  only  in  such  fashion 
that  the  child  acquires  "certain  rational  schematic  methods" 
of  memorizing. 

In  the  foregoing,  we  have  demanded  two  things  instead  of 
one,  namely:  The  introduction  into  our  schools  not  only  of 
general  memory  exercises,  but  also  of  methods  of  learning 
which  are  psychologically  sound.  In  the  first  place,  Netscha- 
jeff  appears  to  overlook  the  fact  that  even  if  a  general  improve- 
ment of  memory  is  due  solely  to  the  learner's  acquisition  of  a 
more  advantageous  procedure  in  learning,  still  the  school  may 
derive  profit  from  memory  exercises  because  it  is  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  the  teacher  whether  the  general  concomitant 
training  of  other  sorts  of  memory  is  due  to  one  cause  or  to 
another, — to  the  presence  of  a  general  memorial  function 
which  is  improved  and  strengthened  by  practice,  or  to  an 
improvement  in  certain  general  factors  of  another  sort  such 
as  attention,  interest  in  learning,  or  the  practical  procedure  or 
behavior  of  the  learner.  Even  in  the  formal  discipline  of  a 
special  memory  these  more  general  factors  which  are  indi- 
rectly advantageous  to  retention  are  improved.  The  student 
of  pedagogy  is  interested  only  in  determining  whether,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  general  training  of  memory  is  possible;  the 
psychological  basis  upon  which  it  rests  concerns  him  only 
indirectly  as  a  practical  man. 

Ebert  and  Meumann  have  made  an  experimental  investi- 
gation of  just  this  very  question,  as  to  whether  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  general  memory  training;  and  their  experimental 
findings  were  unequivocal  and  positive.  The  following  exper- 
iment was  carried  through  with  six  observers.  First,  in  a  series 
of  preliminary  experiments  the  existing  state  of  the  observer's 
memory   was    determined,    i.e.,    a    cross-section   was   made 


354  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

through  all  of  his  special  memories.  They  first  of  all  tested 
immediate  retention  by  determining  the  compass  of  retention 
of  numbers,  letters,  words,  nonsense  syllables,  stanzas  of 
poetry,  and  selections  of  prose.  Then  they  tested  permanent 
retention  in  the  genuine  learning  of  nonsense  syllables,  poetry 
and  prose;  and  finally  a  special  investigation  of  visual  mem- 
ory was  made.  After  the  chief  sorts  of  memory  in  unprac- 
tised individuals  had  thus  been  determined  quantitatively, 
the  drill  experiments  began.  Only  a  single  type  of  memory  was 
trained, — the  mechanical  memorization  of  nonsense  syllables, 
— and  the  training  was  continued  through  thirty-six  consec- 
utive days.  At  the  end  of  this  period,  they  again  made  a 
cross-section  through  all  of  the  varieties  of  memory  present 
in  the  individual  in  order  to  discover  whether  these  other 
memories  had  profited  from  the  training.  Then  they  again 
trained  certain  of  the  observers  for  eighteen,  others  for  thirty- 
six  days,  in  the  mechanical  retention  of  nonsense  syllables; 
and  then  once  more  a  quantitative  determination  of  the  special 
memories  was  made. 

Now  these  experiments  show  that  all  of  the  sorts  of  memories 
were  considerably  improved  by  mere  drill  in  the  learning  of 
nonsense  syllables.  Even  a  function  which  is  so  different 
from  genuine  memorization  as  the  immediate  retention  of 
non-significant  impressions  had  been  considerably  strength- 
ened. Purely  visual  memory  had  been  improved  by  the  learn- 
ing of  nonsense  syllables,  as  had  also  the  learning  of  abstract 
prose  selections,— a  function  which  is  utterly  different  from 
the  practised  function;  and  the  memorizing  of  poetry  had 
also  been  improved. '  This,  to  be  sure,  establishes  only  the 
'  fact  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  general  memorial  training, 
and  that  our  whole  memory  is  improved  when  we  train  it 
^  Ebert  und  Meumann,  Uebungsph'dnomene  im  Bereiche  des  Geddcht- 
nisses,  Leipzig,  1904. 


Associative  Learning  355 

with  any  sort  of  material.  It  does  not,  however,  determine  to 
what  cause  this  fact  is  due,  whether  to  an  improvement  of 
certain  general  mental  factors  such  as  attention,  which  may 
be  of  indirect  advantage  in  all  learning;  or  to  the  existence 
of  a  general  internal  relationship  among  all  of  the  special 
memories,  in  virtue  of  which  every  training  of  one  memory 
brings  with  it  a  concomitant  training  of  all  other  memories; 
or  to  the  existence  of  a  general  memorial  function.  I  have 
been  engaged  for  some  time  upon  additional  experiments 
which  aim  to  settle  this  question  which  is  so  important  for 
psychology. 

Coover  and  Angell  ^  have  recently  investigated  this  problem 
anew.  In  experiments  which  dealt  with  related  mental 
functions,  they  found  that  the  effects  of  practice  may  be 
shown  to  be  transferred  from  a  trained  to  a  non-trained 
function.  For  instance,  one's  discrimination  of  brightnesses 
is  improved  by  a  training  in  the  discrimination  of  pitches; 
and  training  in  certain  complex  reactions  is  transferred  to 
other  reactions.  These  authors  refer  the  phenomenon  of 
transfer  to  an  improvement  in  certain  co-operating  factors, 
such  as  habituation,  a  more  economical  adaptation  of  atten- 
tion to  the  stimuli,  and  an  increased  concentration  or  a  capac- 
ity to  ignore  distracting  influences  and  accessory  circumstances 
during  the  act  of  observing.  This  seems  to  me  to  leave  the 
main  problem  still  unsettled;  but  so  far  as  pedagogical  prac- 
tice is  concerned,  Coover  and  Angell's  investigation  estab- 
lishes the  existence  of  a  transfer  of  training, — a  result  which 
has  a  purely  practical  significance.  Winch  ^  went  a  step 
farther  in  his  investigation  of  transfer  of  training  in  school- 

*  Coover  and  Angell,  General  Practice  Effect  of  Special  Exercise, 
Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychol.,  XVIII.,  1Q07,  32S-340. 

^  W.  H.  Winch,  The  Transfer  of  Improvement  in  Memory  in  School- 
children.   Brit.  Jour,  of  Psychol.,  II.,  190S,  284-293. 


356  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

children.  In  his  first  series  of  experiments, — with  girls  whose 
average  age  was  thirteen  years, — he  showed  not  only  that 
practice  in  the  learning  of  poetry  transfers  to  the  learning  of 
history,  but  that  the  transfer  is  present  in  high  degree  in  the 
majority  of  pupils.  In  a  second  series  of  experiments,  memory 
for  geography  was  considerably  improved  by  practice  in  the 
learning  of  poetry.  Winch's  chief  result  is  thus  expressed: 
"Training  which  is  acquired  through  the  memorizing  of  one 
sort  of  subject-matter  may  be  transferred  to  the  memorizing 
of  other  sorts  of  subject-matter  whose  nature  is  certainly 
diverse  from  the  first."  In  these  cases  the  investigation  dealt 
with  the  existence  of  transfer  in  verbal  memorization.  And 
-the  question  arises  as  to  whether  "rote  memory, "or  the 
mechanical  remembrance  of  verbal  material,  transfers  to  "sub- 
stance memory, "  or  the  remembrance  of  significant  material. 
Winch  answers  this  question  in  the  affirmative.  Boys  and 
girls,  ten  to  twelve  years  of  age,  improved  their  memory  of 
the  essential  content  of  a  significant  text  by  mechanically 
learning  verbal  materials;  not  only  did  practice  in  mechanical 
learning  improve  "substance  memory"  but  the  amount  of 
improvement  was  sometimes  greater  in  the  latter  (unprac- 
tised) case  than  in  the  former  (practised)  case.  This  investi- 
gation proves  that  the  transfer  of  memory  training  occurs  in 
children  as  well  as  in  adults. 

The  student  of  pedagogy,  however,  is  primarily  interested 
only  in  the  fact  that  such  a  general  training  of  memory  is 
possible.  And  in  consequence  of  this  fact  he  may  make,  on 
behalf  of  the  schools,  a  renewed  demand  for  memory  exer- 
cises which  shall  aim  to  improve  memory  itself,  and  which 
shall,  in  that  sense,  constitute  a  formal  training  of  memory. 
Let  us  point  out  once  more  that  this  does  not  mean  a  de- 
mand that  for  purposes  of  memorial  training  the  schools 
shall  resort  to  the  use  of  material  which  is  itself  valueless, 


Associative  Learning  357 

such  as  nonsense  syllables;  it  only  means  a  demand  that 
in  learning  the  materials  which  are  now  prescribed  by  the 
school  curriculum  memory  may,  and  indeed  must,  receive  a 
specific  training. 

We  may  now  finally  report  a  group  of  experiments  which 
deal  with  the  degree  to  which  memory  may  be  improved  by 
training.    There  are  two  points  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
here.    In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  asked  where,  after  all,  is 
the  limit  of  general  improvement  of  capacity.     In  how  far 
can  memory,  in  general,  be  improved?    Then,  in  the  interests 
of  pedagogy,  we  may  enquire  how  far  is  it  possible  to  level 
down  or  to  eliminate  individual  peculiarities  of  memory. 
Light  is  thrown  upon  both  of  these  problems  by  our  investi- 
gations of  practice.    As  to  improvement  of  memory,  we  can 
only  say  that  it  has  no  Hmit, — at  least,  a  given  memory  ^ 
function  may  be  developed  to  a  maximum  degree  by  practice. 
For  example,  the  maximum  efficiency  in  the  learning  of  a 
series  of  syllables  of  a  given  number  is  reached  when  the  series 
is  learned  in  a  single  reading.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  two  of 
my  observers  very  frequently  succeeded  in  learning  a  twelve- 
syllable  series  with  three  readings,  and  sometimes  even  with 
two  readings.     I  do  not  doubt  that  it  would  have  required 
but  a  slightly  longer  continuation  of  our  practice  experiments 
to  enable  these  observers  to  learn  a  twelve-syllable  series  with 
but  a  single  reading.     Now  one  of  these  observers,  Ba., 
required  forty-nine  repetitions  for  the  learning  of  a  series  of 
twelve  syllables  at  the  beginning  of  our  course  of  training;  and 
the  other,  F.,  required  fourteen  repetitions.     The  complete 
effect  of  training  upon  the  memory  of  the  adult  can  best  be 
understood  from  the  following  summary.    The  numbers  of 
repetitions  required  for  learning  ten  nonsense  syllables  were 
as  follows  (see  next  page) : 


358  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

Repetitions  required  at  Repetitions  required  at 

Observers        the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the 

the  experiments  experiments 
{For  the  learning  of  ten  nonsense  syllables) 

Ba.                     28  3 

F.                       23  2 

Br.                      25  4 

M.                     31  4 

{For  the  learning  of  sixteen  nonsense  syllables) 

Ba.  31  5 

F.  19  5 

Br.  23  8 

M.  34  3      ^ 

It  is  also  characteristic  that  the  progress  of  memorial  train- 
ing is  not  so  evident  in  the  learning  of  significant  material  as 
in  purely  mechanical  learning.  In  the  case  of  significant 
material  the  mechanization  of  learning  is  not  always  present 
in  equal  degree;  and  it  is  the  mechanization  of  learning  which 
seems  to  be  the  factor  which  profits  most  from  continued 
practice.  The  following  data  were  obtained  in  the  learning 
of  prose: 

Repetitions  required    Repetitions  required 
without  practice  with  practice 

Ba.  36  14 

Br.  26  II 

F.  17  5 

S.  38  10 

On  the  other  hand,  the  training  of  visual  memory  which 
certain  of  our  observers  acquired  from  the  learning  of  nonsense 
syllables  produced  an  extraordinary  degree  of  improvement 


Associative  Learning  359 

in  the  memorizing  of  visual  impressions.  The  visual  impres- 
sions, twelve  in  number,  were  all  geometrical  forms  which  were 
varied  in  regular  order  during  the  course  of  the  investigation. 
The  results  of  these  experiments  were  as  follows: 


Observers 

Repetitions  before 

Repetitions  after 

training 

training 

Ba. 

25 

7 

Br. 

26 

6 

F. 

24 

7 

S. 

43 

6 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  so  great  an  amount  of  trans- 
ferred training  cannot  be  explained  from  a  mere  acquisition 
of  mechanical  devices  which  aid  in  memorizing;  we  are  com- 
pelled to  assume  that  a  concomitant  training  of  related  func- 
tions of  memory  took  place. 

It  is  especially  to  be  noted  that  three  older  observers  took 
part  in  all  of  these  experiments,  one  of  whom  was  thirty-six, 
another  forty,  and  the  third  fifty-four  years  of  age.  And 
although  the  effect  of  practice  was  very  considerable  in  the 
case  of  these  three  observers,  still  it  did  not  even  approximate 
the  amount  which  appears  in  the  results  of  the  students.  At 
about  the  age  of  forty  years  then,  it  seems  probable  that  a 
retrogression  of  memory  occurs  even  under  conditions  of 
maximum  practice.  If  we  examine  our  w"hole  group  of  experi- 
ments, which  included  observers  ranging  from  seven  to  fifty- 
four  years  of  age,  in  order  to  determine  at  what  age  the 
greatest  memory  efficiency  can  be  attained  by  an  approxi- 
mately equal  amount  of  practice,  we  shall  find  that  the  period 
lying  between  twenty  and  twenty-five  years  is  the  optimal 
age  of  memorial  efficiency.  In  any  discussion  of  the  possi- 
bility of  eliminating  indi\ddual  differences  of  memory,  and  of 
making  all  memories  conform  to  a  common  type  we  must 


360  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

distinguish  between  real  defects  of  memory  and  such  cases  of 
one-sidedness  of  ideational  type  as  are  due  solely  to  a  predom- 
inance of  certain  sense-elements  in  an  individual's  stock  of 
imagery.  The  case  of  Dodge  may  be  cited  to  illustrate  a 
defect  in  auditory  imagery.  When  auditory  imagery  and  the 
memory  of  tones  are  lacking  to  such  a  degree  as  in  Dodge's 
case,  it  seems  probable  that  practice,  no  matter  how  long- 
continued,  would  not  produce  any  marked  result.  So  great 
a  degree  of  lack  of  development  of  a  particular  sort  of  imagery 
occurs  but  seldom  however.  In  all  of  the  individuals  whom 
I  have  investigated  the  sensory  quahties  of  all  modalities 
were  to  some  degree  represented  by  imagery,  although  a 
marked  predominance  of  some  particular  sense-modahty  could 
be  observed  in  certain  cases.  In  all  such  cases,  it  seems  to  be 
possible  to  make  the  equipment  symmetrical  and  well-rounded 
by  a  process  of  training. 

It  is  natural,  however,  to  institute  a  comparison  between 
the  brilUant  success  which  has  attended  the  systematic  train- 
ing of  memory  in  laboratory  experiments  and  the  dismal  fail- 
ure of  the  schools  in  the  training  of  this  function.  It  might 
be  supposed  that  the  slight  improvement  in  the  formal  func- 
tion of  memory  during  the  school-years  could  not  be  explained 
solely  from  the  fact  that  children  learn  by  means  of  unprac- 
tical and  imperfect  methods,  because  experience  teaches  us 
that  a  bodily  or  mental  function  improves  even  when  its 
training  has  not  been  done  in  accordance  with  the  most  appro- 
priate methods.  This  consideration  indicates  that  there  may 
be  a  deeper  reason  for  all  improvement  which  results  from 
training.  I  have  repeatedly  observed  in  my  laboratory 
experiments  that  every  improvement  in  mental  or  bodily 
skill  which  results  from  practice  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  a 
phenomenon  of  will.  We  profit  from  continued  practice  only 
in  proportion  as  we  incite  the  will  to  progress  and  arouse  an 


Associative  Learning  361 

intention  to  improve.  The  mere  repetition  of  an  act,  even 
though  it  be  repeated  daily,  is  by  no  means  sufficient  to  bring 
about  an  improvement  in  the  execution  of  the  act;  one  may 
even  fall  into  a  mechanical  routine  during  which  no  improve- 
ment appears  even  though  the  activity  be  repeated  hundreds 
of  times. 

So  long  as  the  observer  in  a  psychological  experiment  does 
not  suspect  that  he  is  able  to  improve  in  a  mental  capacity, 
improvement  is  sure  to  be  lacking;  but  so  soon  as  we  arouse 
his  intention  to  perfect  the  activity  which  is  being  practised 
the  improvement  itself  ensues.  This  statement  is  confirmed 
by  the  result  of  an  interesting  experimental  observation. 
Radossawljewitsch  ^  began  a  series  of  experiments  in  my 
laboratory  with  an  observer  who  had  not  yet  fully  mastered 
the  German  language.  He  had  failed  to  understand  the  object 
to  be  attained  in  the  learning  of  the  nonsense  syllables;  and 
the  repetitions  continued  to  be  non-effective  until  he  under- 
stood his  instructions.  The  will  to  memorize  was  now  aroused ; 
and  now,  for  the  first  time,  the  repetitions  became  effective. 

This  phenomenon,  which  was  thus  revealed  to  me  by  inci- 
dental observations  in  the  laboratory  has  been  made  the  sub- 

^  Radossawljewitsch  describes  the  incident  as  follows:  "G.  vol- 
unteered to  serve  as  an  observer  in  my  investigation.  Before  the 
experiments  began  I  showed  him  the  apparatus  and  demonstrated 
the  method.  At  that  time  he  knew  but  little  German,  and  did  not 
fully  understand  my  description;  but  he  sat  down  before  the  apparatus 
and  began  to  read  aloud  a  series  of  eight  syllables.  He  read  it  twenty, 
thirty,  forty,  even  forty-six  times  w^ithout  announcing  to  me  that  he 
had  committed  it  to  memory,  as  he  had  been  requested  to  do  in  my 
instructions.  I  had  begun  to  fear  that  the  experiment  would  not  be 
a  success,  and  after  the  forty-sixth  repetition  I  stopped  the  apparatus 
and  asked  him  whether  he  could  recite  the  series.  'What!  Am  I  to 
learn  the  series  by  heart? '  was  his  response.  He  still  required  six  more 
repetitions;  but  he  reached  his  goal  without  difliculty."  Cf.  Rados- 
sawljewitsch.  Op.  cil.,  127. 


362  The  Psychology  of  Learning 

Ject  of  a  special  investigation  by  Judd.^  Judd  arranged  an 
experiment  in  which  a  number  of  observers,  whose  hands 
were  obscured  from  view  behind  a  screen,  drew  obhque  lines 
from  a  copy  which  lay  before  them.  They  did  not  see  their 
hands,  nor  did  they  know  with  what  degree  of  accuracy  they 
accomplished  their  task;  and  in  consequence,  their  practice 
was  non-effective.  From  Judd's  statements  it  seems  to  me 
to  follow  that  the  will  to  form  a  habit  or  to  improve  by  prac- 
tice demands,  above  all  else,  the  controlling  influence  of  a 
consciousness  of  improvement,  and  indeed  for  a  two-fold 
reason, — i.  in  order  to  have  a  standard  by  reference  to  which 
the  individual  may  determine  the  amount  of  his  improve- 
ment; and  2.  in  order  to  guide  the  practice  qualitatively  in 
the  right  direction.  Judd  shows  that  if  this  control  is  lacking, 
a  falsely  directed  and  inappropriate  habit  may  be  formed 
which  is  difficult  subsequently  to  eradicate. 

Thus  an  intellectual  and  a  voHtional  factor  co-operate  when 
we  improve  by  practice.  Intellect  furnishes  the  standard, 
shows  the  quality  of  the  defect  which  is  to  be  overcome,  and 
prescribes  the  direction  in  which  improvement  must  take 
place.  These  constitute  the  content  of  the  idea  of  success  or 
improvement  which  directs  the  whole  process.  The  volitional 
factor  appears  to  consist  in  the  energy,  the  intensity  and  the 
persistence  with  which  this  idea  of  improvement  is  fixated  and 
with  which  practice  is  repeated  under  its  influence. 

All  of  this  information  is  of  prime  importance  for  pedagogy. 
It  shows  us  that  i.  the  arousal  of  the  will  to  improve  is  of 
fundamental  significance  in  all  mental  and  bodily  improve- 
ment, and    2.    that  this  will  cannot  be  a  mere  ''empty" 

^  C.  H.  Judd,  Practice  without  Knowledge  of  Results,  Psychol. 
Rev.  Mon.  Supp.,  VII.,  1905,  185-198;  see  "also  C.  H.  Judd,  Practice 
and  its  Effects  in  the  Perception  of  Illusions,  Psychol.  Rev.,  IX., 
1902,  27-39. 


Associative  Learning  363 

volition;  it  must  be  gauged  by  fixed  standards  and  it  must  be  f 
under  the  constant  control  of  the  end.*  In  our  every-day 
affairs  we  have  similar  experiences.  Whoever  has  learned  an 
athletic  game  is  familiar  with  the  phenomenon  that  he  soon 
reaches  a  certain  stage  of  skill  or  efficiency  where  his  progress 
seems  to  cease,  but  that  his  skill  and  efficiency  both  improve 
again  when  he  compares  himself  with  others  who  have  made 
greater  progress  in  the  same  game.  By  this  means  the  will  to 
improve  is  aroused;  and  now  the  efficiency  itself  improves. 
This  constitutes  the  basis  for  the  significance  of  standards  in 
all  human  efficiency  and  development;  the  pace-maker  im- 
proves the  efficiency  of  the  bicyclist  or  at  least  holds  it  up  to 
its  maximum.  A  similar  phenomenon  is  observed  throughout 
the  whole  mental  domain.  A  single  original  genius  who  sets 
up  new  standards  for  the  art  and  the  science  of  his  genera- 
tion and  establishes  a  higher  "record"  of  ability  and  scholar- 
ship can  raise  the  efficiency  of  hundreds  of  lesser  geniuses  of 
his  generation.  The  art  of  a  country  or  of  a  people  is  often- 
times found  to  be  raised  to  a  higher  level  by  coming  into 
contact  with  people  of  superior  culture  or  of  superior  artistic 
achievement.  The  higher  standard,  with  which  the  artist 
compares  himself,  itself  gives  rise  to  a  higher  art.  This  may 
perhaps  explain  why  the  art  of  the  miniature  painters,  the 
frescoes  of  the  Byzantine  and  Roman  periods,  the  grotesque 
smile  of  Gothic  sculpture,  as  well  as  the  jejune  poetry  of  an 
Opitz  should  have  met  with  admiration  in  their  generation; 
neither  the  artist  nor  the  layman  of  that  time  knew  the  possi- 
bilities of  art. 

Returning  from  this  digression  to  the  development  of  mem- 
ory in  school-children,  we  now  discover  the  real  reason  why 
the  development  is  so  slight  in  spite  of  their  daily  exercises  in' 
learning.     The  will  of  the  child  is  not  directed  toward  an  . 
increase  of  formal  memorial  efficiency  itself,  but  is  directed  in 


364  The  Psychology  of  Learnhig 

one-sided  fashion  toward  an  acquisition  of',qprtain  definite 
data.  This  explains  why,  notwithstanding  his  daily  training 
in  memory  and  in  immediate  reproduction,  the  child's  progress 
in  these  two  functions  appears  to  be  conditioned  solely  by  his 
increase  in  age,  and  is  entirely  disproportionate  to  the  actual 
use  which  is  meanwhile  being  made  of  his  memory.  In  our 
laboratory  experiments,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intention  to 
improve  one's  memory  is  awakened  from  the  first  moment 
onward,  the  real  experiments  having  been  prefaced  by  pre- 
liminary exercises  in  which  the  observer  practised  until  max- 
imum efficiency  was  attained.  Thus  it  comes  about  that 
even  school-children,  when  they  take  part  in  laboratory  experi- 
ments, soon  show  a  considerable  improvement  in  memorial 
ability.  And  this  again  indicates  the  necessity  of  school 
exercises  in  learning,  in  which  besides  the  material  end, — the 
acquisition  of  data, — the  formal  proficiency  of  memory  itself 
shall  be  sought. 


APPENDIX  I 

THE   CONSTRUCTION   OF   SERIES   OF   NONSENSE    SYLLABLES 

The  method  of  constructing  series  of  nonsense-syllables  was 
systematized  by  Miiller  and  Schumann,  They  had  found 
that  when  syllables  are  arranged  in  random  order,  as  in  the 
experiments  of  Ebbinghaus,  the  different  series  present  unequal 
degrees  of  difficulty.  And  they  stated  that  this  lack  of  uni- 
formity is  due  to  the  fact  that  a  series  of  syllables  is  more 
easily  memorized:  "  i.  When  it  contains  alliterations,  that  is, 
when  adjacent  syllables  begin  with  the  same  consonant; 
2.  when  consecutive  syllables  rhyme;  j.  when  consecutive 
syllables  or  the  initial  syllables  of  consecutive  rhythmic  groups 
contain  the  same  vowel  or  diphthong;  4.  when  the  initial 
consonant  of  the  first  syllable  and  the  final  consonant  of  the 
second  syllable  of  a  rhythmic  group  of  two  syllables  are 
identical,  or  when  the  final  consonant  of  a  syllable  and  the 
initial  consonant  of  the  succeeding  syllable  are  identical; 
5.  when  two  or  more  syllables  make  a  word  (Berlin)  or  a 
phrase  (send  us).  On  the  other  hand,  learning  is  hindered 
by  a  frequent  recurrence  of  diphthongs  or  of  consonants  which 
are  difficult  to  pronounce,  such  as  sch  and  z.  When  two 
syllables  belonging  to  the  same  series  are  similar, — for  instance, 
if  two  of  their  letters  are  identical, — the  learning  of  the  series 
may  be  rendered  more  easy,  although,  if  the  similarity  causes 
confusion,  the  series  is  rendered  more  difficult." 

"In  order  to  make  the  various  series  of  syllables  as  nearly 

uniform  and  as  comparable  with  one  another  as  possible" 

Miiller   and   Schumann   employed   only   'normal   series'   of 

twelve  syllables,  which  had  been  constructed  in  accordance 

25  365 


366  Appendix  I 

with  a  special  method.  "Each  of  the  seventeen  initial  con- 
sonants, b,  d,  f,  g,  h,  j,  k,  1,  m,  n,  p,  r,  s,  t,  w,  z,  sch,  was 
written  upon  a  small  card.  These  cards  were  shuffled  and  put 
into  a  box  where  they  could  not  be  seen  by  the  experimenter. 
Cards  containing  the  vowels  and  diphthongs,  a,  e,  i,  o,  u,  ae, 
oe,  ue,  au,  ei,  eu,  were  put  into  a  second  box;  and  cards  con- 
taining the  twelve  final  consonants,  f,  k,  1,  m,  n,  p,  r,  s,  t,  z, 
sch,  were  put  into  a  third  box.  In  the  constructing  of  a 
'normal  series,'  three  cards  bearing  an  initial  consonant,  a 
vowel,  and  a  final  consonant  were  taken  at  random  from  the 
three  boxes,  and  the  letters  upon  these  three  cards  were  com- 
bined to  form  the  first  syllable.  The  letters  upon  the  cards 
next  selected  made  up  the  second  syllable,  etc.  Letters  which 
had  been  used  for  the  making  of  a  syllable  were,  of  course, 
not  returned  to  their  respective  boxes  until  the  construction 
of  that  series  had  been  completed.  By  this  means  we  fulfilled 
the  condition  that  all  of  the  initial  and  final  consonants  of  a 
series  should  be  different.  One  of  the  vowels  or  diphthongs 
had  to  be  used  twice  in  each  series  since  we  had  only  eleven 
of  these  letters  at  our  disposal.  But  the  two  syllables  which 
contained  the  same  vowel  were  always  separated  from  each 
other  by  at  least  two  other  syllables.  Soon  after  the  beginning 
of  our  investigation  we  made  a  distinction  between  aa  and  a, 
long  a  and  short  a,  in  order  to  increase  the  number  of  our 
vowels  and  diphthongs  to  twelve. 

"This  procedure  in  the  constructing  of  our  syllables  en- 
abled us  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  alliteration,  rhyme,  and 
assonance  as  well  as  to  obviate  the  frequent  repetition,  within 
any  series,  of  diphthongs  and  of  consonants  which  were  diffi- 
cult to  pronounce.  But  we  had  still  to  arrange  for  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  conditions  which  we  mentioned  under  4  and  5. 
This  was  accomplished  in  the  following  way:  In  adding  any 
new  syllable  to  those  that  had  already  been  constructed,  the 


Appendix  I  367 

experimenter  always  took  the  precaution  to  observe  whether 
either  of  these  objectionable  features  was  being  introduced. 
If  it  was,  the  new  syllable  was  inserted  at  the  next  appropriate 
place  which  could  be  found  for  it, — usually  at  a  place  nearer 
the  end  of  the  series;  only  when  this  was  not  possible  was  it 
given  a  place  nearer  the  beginning. 

At  the  outset  Miiller  and  Schumann  entered  the  syllables 
in  a  '  syllable-book '  where  they  were  arranged  in  alphabetical 
order,  in  order  to  check  off  those  syllables  which  had  already 
been  employed.  It  is  essential  that  one  avoid  a  second  use 
of  the  same  syllable,  at  least  within  the  interval  of  time  during 
which  they  might  seem  familiar  to  the  learner.  They  subse- 
quently adopted  the  plan  of  recording  the  syllables  in  a  table 
instead  of  in  the  book,  a  procedure  which  made  it  more  easy 
to  check  them  off.  The  table  contained  sixteen  vertical  columns 
for  the  sixteen  initial  consonants  which  may  be  employed  and 
twelve  horizontal  rows  for  the  vowels  and  diphthongs. 

"When  a  syllable  had  been  constructed  in  the  manner 
described  by  withdrawing  an  initial  consonant,  a  vowel  or 
diphthong  and  a  final  consonant  from  the  boxes,  if  the  syllable 
was  such  as  could  be  used,  its  final  consonant  was  entered  in 
that  square  of  the  table  which  fell  in  the  horizontal  row  corre- 
sponding to  the  initial  consonants  of  the  syllables  and  in  the 
vertical  column  corresponding  to  the  vowels  or  diphthongs  of 
the  syllables.  And  at  the  same  time  we  added  to  the  tabular 
record  the  serial  number  of  the  day  on  which  the  syllable  was 
to  be  used.  In  deciding  whether  or  not  any  syllable  might 
be  presented  at  any  given  time,  the  experimenter  need  only 
glance  at  the  column  where  its  final  consonant  was  entered  to 
assure  himself  as  to  whether  and  on  what  day  it  had  already 
been  presented.  If  it  had  been  employed  within  the  last  ten 
days,  another  syllable  was  chosen."  Certain  syllables  were 
excluded  because  they  seemed  to  be  particularly  difficult  to 


368  Appendix  II 

pronounce,  for  instance,  zaesch,  zaech,  zoesch,  schaach, 
schaech,  schaesch,  schisch,  etc.  The  result  was  that  a  total 
of  22 lo  syllables  could  be  used.  Miiller  and  Schumann  also 
lay  especial  emphasis  upon  the  fact  that  the  composition  of 
the  series  of  syllables  is  wholly  withdrawn  from  the  control  of 
the  experimenter;  that  is,  it  becomes  a  wholly  impersonal  and 
automatic  matter. 

APPENDIX  II 

THE   MEANING   OF   ECONOMY   OF   TIME   AND   ENERGY  IN 

LEARNING 

The  meaning  of  economy  and  technique  of  learning  is  not 
so  simple  as  might  be  supposed;  and  one  finds  it  difficult  to 
clear  up  their  meanings  for  the  following  reasons:  These 
terms  are  usually  employed  to  mean  the  saving  of  time  and 
energy  which  results  from  the  use  of  a  particular  method  of 
learning  for  the  attainment  of  a  particular  goal  or  a  particular 
result  as  compared  with  the  use  of  another  method.  The  sav- 
ing which  is  effected  by  employing  any  one  method  is  always 
measured  in  relation  to  other  methods,  and  always  in  relation 
to  some  particular  memorial  effect  or  goal  of  learning. 

We  must  first  explain  what  is  meant  by  saving  time  and 
energy,  and  what  is  the  relation  between  the  two;  and  then 
we  shall  describe  the  different  memorial  effects  or  goals  of 
learning  which  one  may  attain  or  attempt  to  attain  in  relative 
independence  of  one  another.  For  instance,  if  it  should  be 
found  that  one  method  has  the  effect  of  leading  rapidly  to  a 
first  recitation  from  memory  but  does  not  have  the  effect  of 
securing  permanent  retention,  while  another  method  leads 
less  rapidly  to  a  first  errorless  recitation  but  secures  a  more 
permanent  retention,  the  former  method  appears- to  be  more 


Appendix  II  369 

economical  for  the  attainment  of  a  first  errorless  recitation  but 
uneconomical  in  so  far  as  pennanent  retention  is  concerned. 
It  is  evident  then  that  one  can  determine  whether  a  given 
method  is  economical  or  uneconomical  only  by  determining 
how  much  time  and  energy  are  expended  in  attaining  a  par- 
ticular memorial  effect,  and  then  comparing  this  measurement 
with  measurements  made  from  other  methods  which  seek  to 
attain  the  same  result  by  other  means. 

For  this  reason  no  determination  of  the  economy  of  a  method 
can  ever  possess  universal  vaHdity;  one  can  do  no  more  than 
reach  a  decision  which  holds  for  the  momentary  purpose  which 
the  learner  has  in  view.  Certain  measurements  of  economy 
of  time  and  energy  which  have  been  made  by  G.  E.  Miiller 
and  his  students  (StefTens,  Ephrussi)  are  to  be  evaluated  in 
the  light  of  this  fact. 

Since  economy  of  learning  depends  upon  the  purpose  or 
result  which  is  momentarily  desired,  it  is  especially  important 
to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  extraordinary  variety  of 
memorial  effects  which  may  be  attained  by  means  of  obser- 
vational noting,  or  learning  in  the  narrower  sense.  Certain 
chief  varieties  of  memorial  effect  which  come  in  for  considera- 
tion here  must  be  differentiated:  /.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  the  interval  which  elapses  between  acquisition  and  repro- 
duction we  must  distinguish  between  immediate  retention, 
transitory  retention  and  permanent  retention.  ^  2.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  material  effect  we  must  distinguish  between 
completeness  and  fidelity  of  remembering,  and  the  retention 
of  different  sorts  of  materials, — such  as  sensations,  spatial  and 
temporal  relations,  objects,  processes,  meaningless  and  mean- 
ingful materials,  poetry,  prose,  etc.  j.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  formal  memorial  effect  we  must  distinguish  between 
the  acquisition  of  elements  and  the  formation  of  associations 

'  See  pp.  34ff. 


370  Appendix  II 

between  elements, — for  instance,  associations  between  pairs 
or  between  groups  of  elements,  uniform  associations  of  all  the 
members  of  the  series,  analytical  and  synthetical  retention,— 
types  of  retention  which  are  illustrated  when  the  learner 
knows  in  advance  that  he  will  be  tested  by  means  of  the 
Trefermethode  or  by  the  Ersparnismethode, — together  with 
purely  anterogressive  and  purely  retrogressive  associations, 
and  uniformly  secure  associations  of  all  the  elements  of  a  group 
of  materials  with  one  another;  and  finally  the  amount  of 
material  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration.  4.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  reproduction  we  must  distinguish  between 
rapidity,  certainty,  fidehty,  and  completeness  of  reproduction. 
The  determination  of  the  economy  of  a  method  of  learning 
may  possibly  be  brought  into  relation  with  each  of  these 
partial  points  of  view.  Any  procedure  in  learning  may  be 
more  economical  than  any  other  from  each  partial  point  of 

view. 

When  we  consider  the  manifold  variety  of  memorial  effects, 
and  when  we  further  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that 
each  of  these  memorial  efTects  may  be  the  specific  purpose  for 
which  an  act  of  learning  is  undertaken,  we  see  how  recklessly 
decisions  regarding  economy  of  time  and  energy  have  often- 
times been  reached  in  the  school  of  G.  E.  Miiller.  Both  Miss 
StefTens  and  Miss  Ephrussi  fail  to  appreciate  that  such  deci- 
sions must  be  purely  relative  matters;  it  is  wholly  impossible 
to  reach  any  general  conclusion  regarding  the  economy  of  a 
method  by  an  exclusive  use  of  the  Trefermethode  which  has 
been  so  extensively  employed  by  Miiller's  students.  The 
determination  of  the  number  of  correct  associates  decides 
nothing  excepting  the  general  question  as  to  whether  or  not 
such  a  procedure  is  useful  for  the  attainment  of  the  wholly 
special  effect  of  estabhshing  pairs  of  associations,  and  the 
special  question  as  to  what  is  their  degree  of  stability. 


Appendix  II  ,  371 

In  addition  to  these  variations  which  are  due  to  variations 
in  the  purpose  of  our  act  of  learning,  differences  in  economy  of 
time  and  energy  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration;  and 
the  question  arises  as  to  how  economy  of  time  and  of  energy 
can  be  measured.     Several  difficulties  are  involved  here. 

One  might  be  tempted  to  suppose  that  economy  of  time  is 
distinct  from  economy  of  energy  because  one  speaks  of  an 
economy  of  time  when  one  refers  to  a  saving  in  the  amount 
of  time  which  is  expended  upon  an  act  of  learning,  and  one 
speaks  of  an  economy  of  energy  in  cases  where  a  saving  of 
energy  is  effected.  Nor  can  there  be  any  question  that  one 
can  always  measure  the  saving  of  time  readily  and  unequivo- 
cally from  a  comparison  of  learning-times.  It  is  more  difficult 
to  measure  one's  sa\ing  of  energy,  and  to  make  clear  its  rela- 
tion to  one's  sa\'ing  of  time.  The  gain  in  time  may  represent 
a  saving  in  energy  because  the  procedure  which  leads  to  the 
goal  in  the  shortest  time  is  also  most  economical  of  energy, 
pro\dded  that  equal  demands  were  made  upon  the  learner's 
energy,  per  unit  of  time,  by  each  of  the  procedures.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  the  saving  of  time  may  be  effected  at  the  cost 
of  an  increased  expenditure  of  energy;  the  intensity  of  the 
learner's  work  may  now  be  so  great  that  a  greater  amount  of 
energy  is  expended  than  would  be  demanded  by  another  pro- 
cedure where  the  learner  works  longer  but  less  intensively. 

The  fact  that  one  procedure  requires  a  greater  expenditure 
of  time  than  another  for  the  attainment  of  an  equal  memorial 
result  gives  rise  to  a  similar  duality  of  relationship;  the 
increased  expenditure  of  time  may  entail  a  saving  of  energy 
or  a  loss  of  energy.  When  one  procedure  demands  more  time 
than  another  for  the  attainment  of  the  same  goal,  the  increased 
expenditure  of  time  and  the  increased  duration  of  the  learner's 
work  may  give  rise  to  a  mode  of  working  which  is  of  such 
slight  intensity  and  which  entails  such  a  slight  expenditure 


2il'^  Appendix  II 

of  energy  that  the  total  expenditure  of  energy  is  less  during 
the  slower  procedure  than  during  the  faster  procedure.  But 
when  the  slower  procedure  involves  a  greater  intensity  of 
work  it  demands,  of  course,  a  greater  expenditure  of  energy. 

In  the  economy  of  energy,  however,  we  are  concerned  not 
only  with  the  intensity  of  work  as  such  but  also  with  the  advent 
of  fatigue,  because  we  always  endeavor  to  give  rise  to  as  little 
fatigue  as  possible.  If  now  the  amount  of  fatigue  may  be 
regarded  as  an  index  of  the  amount  of  time  and  of  the  intensity 
of  work  devoted  to  the  task,  then  the  amount  of  fatigue  may 
be  regarded  as  a  measure  of  the  amount  of  energy  expended. 
Unfortunately  this  is  not  the  case;  the  phenomenon  of  fatigue 
complicates  still  further  the  problem  of  determining  economy 
of  energy  because  the  degree  of  fatigue  present  in  an  individual 
varies  not  with  the  absolute  amount  of  his  work  but  with  the 
ratio  between  demand  and  supply  of  certain  materials  in  his 
organism.  This  relation  may  be  subject,  at  different  times  in 
the  same  individual,  to  the  influence  of  wholly  difTerent 
causes  than  time  and  intensity  of  work, — for  instance,  emo- 
tional condition,  especially  prevailing  unpleasantness,  previous 
fatigue,  and  the  like. 

The  amount  of  fatigue  which  is  present  after  an  act  of 
learning  need  not  therefore  be  a  simple  index  of  the  time  and 
the  intensity  of  the  work  expended,  but  it  may  be  a  product 
of  secondary  causes.  Hence  if  we  are  to  be  able  to  measure 
the  amount  of  energy  which  is  devoted  to  an  act  of  learning 
we  must  discover  a  direct  means  of  measuring  intensity  of 
work.  This  measure  may  perhaps  be  found  in  the  different 
number  of  repetitions  employed  by  the  learner  in  acts  of 
learning  which  are  of  equal  length.  If  he  devotes  now  more, 
now  fewer  repetitions  to  the  attainment  of  a  given  memorial 
effect,  learning-time  and  amount  of  material  being  constant, 
then  in  the  former  case  he  must  have  worked  more  intensively 


Appendix  II  373 

and  he  must  have  devoted  more  energy  to  the  task.  That  the 
increased  number  of  repetitions  is  nothing  more  than  a  merely- 
temporal  factor  is  more  apparent  than  real,  for  every  increase 
in  the  number  of  repetitions  in  a  given  unit  of  time  means 
that  an  increased  amount  of  energy  is  expended.  Repetition 
is,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  a  temporal  factor;  it  means  a 
reduplication  of  mental  work, — that  is,  an  increased  expendi- 
ture of  energy.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  repetitions  necessitates  a  corresponding  increase  in 
the  activity  of  speaking,  including  its  motor,  sensory  and 
intellectual  components.  Hence  one  may  say  that  so  long  as 
one  cannot  directly  measure  intensity  of  psycho-physical  work, 
the  measure  of  economy  of  energy  is  to  be  found  in  the  increased 
number  of  repetitions  and  in  the  degree  of  fatigue  which  they 
produce.  The  latter  is  the  less  reliable  of  these  two  criteria 
because  fatigue  not  only  depends  upon  the  amount  of  work 
which  is  necessitated  by  the  method  of  learning  itself  but  is 
also  influenced  by  numerous  contributing  causes  which  may 
exist  independently  and  vary  independently  of  the  particular 
method  of  learning. 

Our  discussion  may  be  summarized  in  the  statement  that 
that  method  of  learning  is  most  economical  which  secures  a 
particular  memorial  effect  or  attains  a  particular  memorial 
purpose  in  the  shortest  time,  with  the  least  number  of  repeti- 
tions and  with  the  minimum  degree  of  fatigue;  and  this 
method  may  be  regarded  as  the  most  economical  only  with 
reference  to  this  memorial  effect  and  this  memorial  purpose. 
Of  these  three  determinations,  the  learning-time  measures  the 
economy  of  time;  while  the  economy  of  energy  is  measured  by 
the  number  of  repetitions  and,  in  less  precise  form,  by  the 
amount  of  fatigue.  No  other  accurate  means  of  measurement 
is  at  our  disposal.  It  may  be  that  the  measurement  of  atten- 
tion,— especially  the  measurement  of  the  inhibiting  effect  of 


274  Appe7idix  III 

attention,— will  some  day  furnish  us  with  a  direct  means  of 
measuring  intensity  of  work.  In  his  psycho-dynamics,  Leh- 
mann  attempts  to  take  the  intensity  of  work  into  account  in 
measuring  the  economy  of  working.  But  his  discussion  is  not 
based  upon  empirical  findings,  and  we  can  not  here  discuss 
these  purely  hypothetical  considerations.  The  reader  is  re- 
ferred to  a  recent  criticism  of  Lehmann's  position. ' 


APPENDIX  III 

ADDENDA   FROM   THE   MOST   RECENT   LITERATURE 

In  an  investigation  of  the  memory  of  mental  defectives 
Gregor'  distinguishes  between  a  " normal"  and  a  "successive" 
type  of  learner.  In  the  act  of  memorizing  a  series  of  nonsense 
syllables,  the  former  learns  the  initial  and  the  final  syllables 
of  the  series  before  the  middle  region  of  the  series  is  acquired; 
the  latter  learns  the  initial  syllable  of  the  series  first,  and  then 
progresses  through  the  series  mastering  each  successive  syllable 
in  consecutive  order.  I  have  never  found  that  the  latter 
represents  a  constant  type  of  learner,  although  I  have  some- 
times observed  that  certain  learners  vary  between  the  two 
procedures.  Hellmut  Muller^  reports  that  his  mental  defec- 
tives almost  invariably  proceeded  in  the  "normal"  fashion  in 
the  learning  of  nonsense  syllables.  This  author  also  found 
that  the  part-procedure  was  the  more  advantageous  method 
of  learning  in  the  case  of  mental  defectives, — a  lesser  resistance 

» 

==  H.  Miiller,  Zur  Oekonomie  des  Lernens  bei  geistesschwachen  Per- 
sonen,  Sommer's  Klinikf.  psych,  u.  nerv.  Krankheiten,  VI.,  1911,  121- 
157;  see  135  and  elsewhere. 

^  M.  Gregor,  Beitrage  zur  Psychopathologie  des  Gedachtnisses. 
Monatsschr.  f.  Psychiat.  u.  Neurol.,  XXV.,  1909,  218-255;    339-386. 

^  H.  Miiller,  Loc.  cit. 


Appendix  III  375 

to  f-atigue  apparently  being  an  essential  characteristic  of  their 
learning. 

G.  E.  Miiller'  has  remarked  that  "there  is  a  tendency  to 
estimate  the  value  of  investigations  of  the  economy  of  learning 
in  terms  of  the  applicability  of  their  results  to  the  affairs  of 
practical  life,  and  especially  to  the  affairs  of  the  school-room." 
And  he  adds  that  "this  is  a  very  narrow  point  of  view"; 
investigations  of  this  sort  are,  in  the  opinion  of  Professor 
Miiller,  significant  for  psychologists  chiefly  on  account  of  their 
heuristic  value.  I  know  of  no  psychologist  or  educator  who 
has  evaluated  these  investigations  from  a  purely  practical 
point  of  view;  and  both  the  form  and  the  content  of  this 
random  polemic  seem  to  be  wholly  unwarranted.  Professor 
Miiller  appears  to  have  confused  two  radically  different  issues 
here.  That  the  pedagogical  and  practical  significance  of  in- 
vestigations of  the  economy  of  learning  should  be  emphasized 
in  a  treatise  which  is  written  for  a  pedagogical  purpose  is 
one  matter;  that  the  practical  point  of  view  should  be  made 
the  sole  criterion  in  estimating  the  general  psychological  value 
of  such  investigations  is  a  wholly  different  matter.  When  a 
critic  fails  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  standards  by  which 
a  book  is  to  be  judged  depend  upon  the  purpose  for  which  the 
book  was  written,  it  is  the  critic,  not  the  author,  who  lays 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  "lack  of  breadth."  I  have  re- 
frained from  discussing  certain  details  of  Professor  Miiller's 
monograph  for  the  reason  that  they  do  not  seem  to  me  to 
be  of  service  in  pedagogy;  and  many  of  his  polemical  criti- 
cisms have  not  been  considered  in  this  third  edition  because  I 
can  not  accept  the  views  regarding  "precision"  in  psycho- 
logical experimentation  upon  which  his  criticisms  are  based. 

'  G.  E.  Miiller,  Zur  Analyse  der  Ged'dchtnist^tigkcit  und  dcs  Vorstcll- 
ungsvcrlaufs,  (Zeitschr.  f.  Psychol.,  Erganzungsband  V.)  Leipzig,  191 1, 
I.,  402. 


376  Appendix  III 

I 

I  shall  illustrate  these  views  by  a  single  example  from  which 
the  reader  may  judge  how  this  polemic  is,  in  my  opinion,  to 
be  regarded. 

In  Dr.  M.  K.  Smith's  investigation  of  the  most  advanta- 
geous rhythm,  to  which  frequent  reference  has  been  made  in 
the  foregoing  pages,  the  act  of  learning  under  the  influence 
of  each  particular  rhythm  was  in  each  instance  continued  for 
four  days,  after  having  been  preceded  by  preliminary  experi- 
ments for  a  period  of  five  days.  Professor  Miiller  finds  that 
this  investigation  was  ''inexact,"  "not  only  because  the  number 
of  experiments  was  not  sufficiently  great  but  chiefly  because 
the  influence  of  practice  was  not  sufficiently  taken  into 
account."  This  is  a  characteristically  Miillerian  criticism. 
There  was  an  absence  of  "great  numbers  of  experiments" 
which  according  to  Professor  Miiller's  idea  of  precision  con- 
stitutes the  salvation  of  all  experimental  psychology.  Every 
psychologist,  however,  who  possesses  a  modicum  of  experience 
in  experimentation  must  grant  that  with  increasing  practice 
the  differences  in  the  effects  of  the  different  rhythms  upon  the 
act  of  learning  become  less  and  less,  and  with  maximum 
practice  they  wholly  disappear.  And  everyone  who  does  not 
cherish  Professor  Miiller's  idea  of  precision  knows  that  these 
differences  are  most  clearly  present  with  moderate  degrees  of 
practice.  During  the  progress  of  Dr.  Smith's  experiments  I 
investigated  the  influence  of  different  forms  of  rhyme  upon 
the  act  of  learning.  The  results  of  all  of  my  observers  showed 
that  the  different  effect  of  different  sorts  of  rhyme  upon  the 
act  of  learning  came  to  light  only  during  the  initial  stage  of 
practice;  after  a  certain  amount  of  practice  every  observer 
obtained  the  same  learning-effect  from  each  of  the  sorts  of 
rhyme  which  we  employed, — i.e.,  practice  had  ehminated  the 
differences.  Over  and  above  this.  Dr.  Smith  found  confirma- 
tion in  the  experimental  result  that  our  most  highly  practised 


Appendix  III  377 

learners  found  no  difference  between  the  effects  of  trochaic 
and  iambic  rhythms.  In  my  own  case,  no  difference  in  effect 
of  learning  with  trochaic  and  iambic  rhythms  is  found  because 
practice  has  eliminated  any  differences  which  may  have  been 
present  at  the  outset;  even  the  trisyllabic  rhythms  produce 
no  noticeable  difference  in  the  effect  of  learning.  Hence  the 
point  at  issue  is  not  so  much  a  "lack  of  precision"  on  the  part 
of  Dr.  Smith  as  it  is  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  Professor 
Mliller  to  judge  '*in  accordance  with  schema  F." 


V,'' 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


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OF   MEMORY 

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Instinkte,  Miinchen,  1906. 
Bergson,  H.,  Matter  and  Memory.      (Trans.)  New  York  and  London, 

1912. 
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Die  Lebenswimder.     Stuttgart,  1904. 
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(Trans.)  Chicago,  1896. 
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Lchcns.     Leipzig,  1908;  Die  mnemischen  Empfindungen.    Leip- 
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For  a  disctission  of  the  question  of  general  memorial  training  see: 

CoovER,  J.  E.,  and  Angell,  F.,  General  Practice  Effects  of  Special  Exer- 
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Ebert,  E.,  and  Meumann,  E.,  Ueber  einige  Grundfragen  der  Psychologie 
der  Uebungsphanomene  imBereiche  des  Gedachtnisses.  Archiv. 
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JuDD,  C.  H.,  Practice  without  Knowledge  of  Results.  Psychol.  Review, 
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Offner,  M.,  Das  Gcdachtnis.     BerHn,  191 1. 

Winch,  W.  H.,  The  Transfer  of  Improvement  in  Memory  in  School- 
Children.     Brit.  Jour.  Psychology,  II.,  1908,  284-293. 

CHAPTERS  II.,  III.  AND  IV.  FUNCTIONS  OF  MEMORY;  THE 
ANALYSIS  OF  OBSERVATIONAL  NOTING;  THE  EX- 
PERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  OF  OBSERVATIONAL 
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.-SiJi^J^ 


^  ■    I 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Albicn,  329. 

Angcll,  sec  Coover  and  Angcll. 

Aristotle,  13. 

Baade,  120,  12S,  130,  270. 

Bach,  200. 

Baldwin,  82,  226. 

Ballet,  180,  197,  207,  208,  209,  210, 

213,  230. 
Bernstein,  108,  iii,  116,  117. 
Bernstein  and  Bogdanoff,   108,   116, 

117, 319- 
van  Biervliet,  350,  351. 
Bigham,  340. 
Binet,  88,  89,  179,  197,  207,  213,  214, 

215,  217,  220,  222,  230,  307,  348. 
Binet  and  Henri,  82,  88,   136,   142, 

143,  144,  307.  318,  321,  329,  348. 
Bleuler,  18. 

Bogdanoff,  108,  116,  117. 
Boldt,  104,  108,  112,  119. 
Bolton,  245,  318,  320. 
Borst,  120,  128,  130. 
Bourdon,  318,  348. 
Breukink,  128, 129,  130. 
Broca,  215. 
Brodmann,  108. 
Burgerstein,  179. 

Charcot,  180,  207,  212,  213,  214,  215. 
Cohn,  225. 
Cooley,  319,  323. 
Coover  and  Angell,  355. 

Decroly  and  Degand,  319,  321. ' 

Diderot,    210. 

Diehl,  III. 

Dodge,  193,  200,  202,  206,  211,  212, 

213,  360. 
Diirr,  261. 
Diirr-Borst.    107. 
Dvorak,  209. 

Ebbinghaus,  33,  141    156,  159,  160, 
162,  163,  165,  217,  232,  234,  236, 


246,     260,     261,     265,     267,     27s, 
276,     277,     278,    306,    307,    330, 

331,    332,     333,     334,    335,    365- 
Ebert  and  Meumann,  143,  235,  290, 

291,  293,  296,  314,  319,  353,  354, 
Eckhardt,  224,  230. 
Egger,  207,  210. 
Ellison,  319. 
Ephrussi,    235,    240,    251,    260,    262, 

263,  370. 
Exner,  176. 

Feuerbach,   197. 

Finzi,   93,   94,   95,   96,   98,   99,    100, 

loi,  104,  182,  183,  184. 
Forel,  3. 
Freud,  18. 
Froebel,   186. 
Fuchs,  284. 

* 
Galton,  156,  207,  210,  213. 
Goldstein,  104,  108,    iii,    112,    113, 

114,  115. 
Gregor,  374. 
Gross,  99. 

Haeckel,  3. 
Hartley,  207. 
Hawkins,  154. 
Heidenhain,  82. 
Hensen,  3. 
Hering,  3. 
Hoffding,  31. 
Hume,  13. 

Jacobs,  262,  263,  272, 286, 319. 

Jastrow,  89. 

Jost,  265,  266,  285. 

Judd,  362. 

Jung,  18. 

Katzaroff,  273. 

Kerchensteiner,    200. 

Knors    268,  275. 

Kraemer,  260,  273,  290,  296,  304,  343. 


385 


386 


Index  of  Authors 


Kracpelin,   6,   87,   89,  93,   207,   227, 

281,     283. 
Kramer,   loi,   102. 
Kraus,  loi. 
Kronfeld,  18. 
Kussmaul,  207. 

von  Laar,  197. 

Lay,  154,  200,  224,  225. 

Lelimann,  374. 

Leibnitz,  207. 

Lewin,  82. 

Lipmann,  120,  128,  130,  138. 

Lobsien,    107,    108,    224,    226,    230, 

319,325- 
Locke,  13. 

Mach,  3. 

Macmillan,  319. 

Magneff,  331. 

Martins,   250. 

Mayer,  346,  348. 

Meumann,  83,  96,  97,  108,  120,  126, 
143,  147,  189,  203,  204,  229,  240, 
249.  257,  264,  277,  319,  347,  377- 
(5ee  also  Ebert  and  Meumann.) 

Meyer,  270. 

Moebius,  198. 

Mozart,  206. 

Miiller,  G.  E.,  23,  153,  156,  161,  163, 
170,  196,  214,  235,  251,  262, 
263,  264,  265,  314,  347,  369, 
375,376,377- 

Miiller  and  Pilzecker,  146,  166,  167, 
271,  273,  286. 

Miiller  and  Schumann,  161,  164, 
165,  263,  271,  365,  366,  367,  368, 

370- 
Miiller,  H.,  235,374- 
Muensterberg  and  Bigham,  97,  154, 

325- 

Nagel,  264,  314. 

Netschajeff,  48,   108,   119,   131,   208, 

224,352,353- 
Neumann,  235,  250,  254,  255. 
Nussbaumer,  200. 

Ogden,  260,  273. 
Oppenheimer,  107,  120,  128. 

Paulhan,  88. 

Pentschew,  235,  270,  314,  331,  347. 

Pestalozzi,  186,  351. 


Pfeiffer,    200,    207,    224,    225,    226, 

227,  230. 
Philippe,  93. 
Pohlmann,  141,  142,  144,   145,   151, 

152,  153,  154,  15s,  182,  224,  226, 

230,  269,  270,  273. 
Popp,  197. 

Queyrat,  226. 

Radossawljewitsch,  32,  185,  186, 
234,  24s,  314,  332,  333,  361. 

Ranschburg,  g,  102,  103,  104,  108, 
no.  III,  114,  115,  120,  131. 

Regnault,  197. 

Reinhold,    loi. 

Ribot,  207. 

Riklin,    18. 

Rodenwaldt,  8,  107,  108,  119,  123, 
124,  125,  136. 

Roller,  346. 

Rbmer,  131. 

Scherer,  210. 

Schmidt,  270,  346. 

Schneider,  loi. 

Schijrbler,  108,  120,   126. 

Schuyten,  319. 

Segal,  97,  150,  207,  228. 

Semon,  3. 

Sharp,   88. 

Shaw,  82. 

Smedley,  319,  323,  325. 

Smith,  M.  K.,  263,  314,  331,  376,  377. 

Steffens,    235,    237,    238,    239,    243, 

347,368,370. 
Stern,  99,   106,   107,   119,   120,   121, 

123,     124,     125,     126,     128,     133, 

136,  137,  138,  145- 
Storring,   207. 
Strieker,  211,  213. 
Stumpf,  206,  209. 

Taine,  207. 
Titchener,  87,  88,  92. 
van  der  Torren,  130. 
Tracy,  209. 
Twain,  211. 

Vogt,  89,  90,  91,  92. 

Warren,  82. 
Weber,  268,  275, 


Index  of  Authors 


387 


Wells,  227. 

Wernicke,  207. 

Wesseley,  256,  257. 

Wigan,  197. 

Winch,  319,  322,  323,  355,  356- 

Winteler,  179. 

Wilasek,  235,  273,  274. 


Wolfe,  80. 

Wolfskehl,  loi. 

Wreschner,  107,  119,  124,  225. 

Wundt,  98,  156. 

Ziehen,  156,  207,  224,  226. 
Zonefl  and  Meumann,  280. 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


Abnormalities  and  defects,  90,  loi, 
103,  112,  113,  180,  198,  204,  206, 
209,212,223,374.  _ 

accuracy  of  observation,  i32f. 

accumulated  vs.  distributed  repeti- 
tions, 258,  265f. 

additional  repetitions,  267f. 

adjustment    of    attention,    57f.,    71, 

8s,i74ff. 
adjustment    in    learning,    303,    305, 

306,  328. 
advantages  of  whole-procedure,  238f., 

24iff.,  248flt.,  307,  335,  375- 
age   and   memorial   capacity,    ii7ff., 

245ff-,    257f.,   320,   325,   347,   348. 

{See  also  Children  vs.  adults.) 
advantages  of  mediating  procedures, 

253^- 
age  and  memorial  training,  359. 
age  of  associations,  266. 
agraphia,  223. 

aids  in  rational  learning,  298f. 
aims   in    learning,    36-39,    231,    288, 

368-371- 
alexia,  223. 
amount    of    material,     147,     274ff., 

29of.,  334. 
anatomical    basis    of    memory,    2ti., 

iiff. 
aphasia,  223. 
artistic  endowment,    178,    190,    197, 

200. 
assimilation,  9ff.,   52ff.,  76,  132,  133, 

135,  2i9f.,  256. 
association  and  attention,   i6f.,   44, 

157,  278. 
association  and  emotion,  i6n. 
association  psychology,  i3f. 
association  types,  210. 
associative  learning,  35,  36£f.,  i39ff. 
attention,  i6f.,  44,  5°,  52,  62ff.,  66ff., 

7of.,    8iff.,    86ff.,    104,    no,    115, 

137,    153,    166,    i74ff.,    194,    201, 

203,  279. 
attitude  in  learning,  3031!.,  328. 


auditory  imagery,  96,  183,  191,  I93ff., 

204,  207,  209,  212,  218,  223,  226, 

230. 
auditory-motor    ideation,    183,    185, 

196,  208,  217,  221,  223,  229,  265, 

271. 
auditory  type,  8ofT.,   191,   193,   194, 

200,  203,  2o8f.,  269,313. 
Aufgabe,  287. 
automatization,  26. 

Behavior  of  attention,  no,  139, 
141,  159,  166,  170,  i74ff.,  i77f., 
240,  243,  2S2f.,  254,  261,  276, 
279,  327ff. 

Children  vs.  adults,  48,  66,  119,  122, 
125,  185,  224f.,  236£f.,  244ff., 
2S7f-,  265,  3_i8fr.,  347,  349f.,  359. 

capacity  of  immediate  retention, 
i4if!., 

causes    of    typical    variations,  i74f., 

I9if.,i07ff- 
classification     of     ideational     types, 

i8o£f.,  196,  204ff. 
classification  of  memories,  34!?.,  46fT. 
combination  types  of  ideation,  204, 

206,  210. 
compass  of  memory,  i4iff.,  146,  319. 
compass  of  immediate  retention,  44. 
concrete   ideation,    180,    i88ff.,    194, 

196,  204,  205,  210,  211,  224 
concrete     thinking.      See     concrete 

ideation, 
conditions  of  association,  i4ff. 
conditions  of  observation,  S9ff.,  6<)Q. 
connate  endowment,   171,   198,   200. 
curve  of  forgetting,  83,  85,  93,  95f., 

loif.,  107,  146,  173. 
cross-examination,   106,   i23fiF. 

Defects  of  ideation,  204. 
definition  of  memory,  i. 
development  of  memory,  Sec  Children 
vs.  adults. 


389 


390 


Index  of  Subjects 


Diamandi,  214,  2i8ff.,  221. 
differences   between   immediate   and 

permanent  retention,  40-45,  ii3f., 

IIS  131,  141,  174, 195- 
disadvantages  of  part-procedure,  233, 

238-244. 
disadvantages     of     whole-procedure, 

252. 
distributed   vs.   accumulated    repeti- 
tions, 258,  265f. 
dispositions,  2ff.,  iiff.,  27ff. 
dispositional  psychology,   32!. 
distractions,  44,  875.,  goff.,  98,  114, 

215,  216,  218. 
distraction  method,  2i7f.,  228. 
Dodge,  193,  200,  202,  206,  211,  212, 

213,  360. 
dramatic  type,  210. 

Economical  learning,  23iff.,  240,  324. 
effect  of  amount  of  material,  274ff., 

334. 
effect  of  additional  repetitions,  26 yf. 
effect  of  attempted  recitation,  2  73f. 
effect  of   attention,    278,    279,   308, 

341,343-     . 
effect  of  emotion,  28if. 
effect  of  habituation,  285. 
effect  of  ideational  type,  285. 
effect  of  mode  of  presentation,  269, 

323,325,  340. 
effect  of  practice,  284,  376. 
effect   of   will,    283,    287,    303,    315, 

361,  362ff. 
efficiency  of  the  various  types,  97, 98f., 

152,   i82ff.,   192,   211,    22if.,   230, 

28sf.,  329f. 
empathy,  204. 
emotion,  i6ff.,  173. 
emotion    and    learning,    in,    248f., 

28if.,  315. 
emotional  memory,  46. 
errors  in  observation,  i09f.,  118,  119, 

128, 135. 
errors  in  testimony,  8,  117-138. 
external   conditions    of    observation, 

59f- 
excessive  repetitions,   267ff. 

Factors  which  contribute  to  for- 
getting, 8iff.,  146. 

factors  which  contribute  to  observa- 
tion,  104. 

factors    which    determine    ideational 


types,  152,   igyff.,   201,   202,   208, 

210. 
falsifications  of  memory,  8. 
familiarity,   i. 
fatigue,  22,  i46f.,  165,  247,  277,  322, 

332,346,  372,  374,  375- 
fidelity   of   memory,   80,   g4f.,   96f., 

98,  99,  102,  105,  ii6f.,  ii8f.,  121, 

133,  182,  321,  347,  370. 
fluctuations  of  attention,  8if. 
forgetting,    3if.,    8iff.,    95f.,    i46f., 

3i5f.,  33off. 
formal  training  of  memory,  186,  313, 

337,  341,  343,  347,  35off. 
freistcigende  ideas,  22ff.,  26. 

Ganzmetliode,  See  Whole-procedure, 
general  memory,  6f.,  34,  352,  353. 
goal-idea,  5off.,  56f.,  6off.,  65,  69,  85, 

90,   104,   105,   I2lff.,   I32ff. 

Habituation,  177,  210,  269,  285. 
hindrances  in  rational  learning,  30of. 
histrionic  type,  210. 

Ideational  procedure,  193. 
ideational  types,   152,   i79ff.,   i87ff., 

i97ff.,  2oiff.,  210,  223. 
ideational  type  and  mental  efficiency, 

211,  221,  230. 
ideational  type  and  mode  of  presen- 
tation, I44f.,  i49f. 
imagination  and  memory,  8ff.,   136, 

i8Sf. 
immediate  after-effect  of  imprinting, 

41,  43,  loi,  104,  IIS,  172,  195- 
immediate   reproduction,   4off.,    105, 

ii2ff.,    IIS,   140,   145,   i7if-,   174, 

195,    2i6f.,    221,    222,   309,   3i7f., 

320,  321,  323,  348. 
Inaudi,  214,  2i5ff.,  219,  221. 
individual   differences   in   immediate 

reproduction,  326. 
individual  differences  in  learning,  105, 

i68ff.,  177. 
individual    differences    in    memory, 

48,   I79ff-,  3I3-' 
individual  differences  in  observation, 

loi, 102, 113. 
influence   of   mode   of   presentation, 

97f.,    I43f-,    I47f-,    151-155,    i92f-, 

226,  269. 
inheritance  of  ideational  endowment, 

I99f.,  2I2f. 


Index  of  Subjects 


391 


inquiring  observation,  5sff.,  672. 
intention,  37,  39,  51,   74,  141,   168, 

I76,303f.,306,36i. 
interest,  19,  106,  i2£ff.,  i34ff.,  i97f., 

201,  202. 
internal  speech,  180,  189,  190,  208, 

210,  211,  219,  223,  228.     {See  also 

Vocal-motor    type,  and    Histrionic 

type.) 
internal    conditions    of    observation, 

58,  6ofT.,  69f. 
involuntary  observation,   55!!.,   69!!. 
iteration  of  ideas,  25. 

Jost's  law,  266f. 

judgment  and  memory,  9.  (Sec  also 
Assimilation.) 

Law  of  totality,  31. 
laws  of  association,  I3ff.,  26,  27. 
laws  of  reproduction,  isff.,  igff.,  26S. 
localization,  181,  222,  229,  239,  243, 

27if.,    286,    306. 
logical  memory,  39,  216. 

Manual-motor  memory,  226,  230. 
materials  for  memorial  investigation, 

198,  2I4ff. 

mathematical  endowment,  198,  2i4ff. 
mathematical  prodigies,  2i4ff. 
meaning,    I24f.,    i39f.,    143,    i4sf., 
190,    207,    212,    243f.,    260,    296f., 

341,  343- 
meaning    of    economy    in    learning, 

23iff-,  368. 
mechanical  learning,   238,   241,   246, 
248, 2552.,  258,  290, 303, 307f.,  309f., 

341,  358. 
mechanical  memory,  244.     (See  also 

Mechanical  learning.) 
mediating  procedures,  253f.,  343. 
memorial    assimilation,    8f. 
memorial  dispositions,   27ff. 
memorial  terminology,  2ff.,  iiff.,  26f. 
memorial    training,    sf.,     loi,    s^^j 

335ff.,  340ff. 
memory  and  attention,  83f. 
memory  and  imagination,  Sff.,   136, 

i88f. 
memory  and   intelligence,    119,   320, 

322f. 

memory  and  understanding,  34,  35, 
38f!.,  137,  i3of-.  143, 146.  (See also 
Rational  learning.) 


memory  for  abstract  ideas,  46,  48; 
for  colors,  8,  82,  112,  124,  125,  134, 
137,  216,  340;  for  concrete  objects, 
46,  48,  H2,  124,  126;  for  emotions, 
340;  for  geometrical  figures,  82, 
116,  216,  322;  for  letters,  322;  for 
numbers,  46,  48,  109,  112,  153, 
216;  for  persons,  122,  133;  for 
pictures,  112,  119,  322;  for  quanti- 
tative relations,  37;  for  spatial 
extents,  82;  for  temporal  and  spatial 
relations,  46,  48,  49,  124,  125; 
for  tones,  46,  48,  8olt.;  for  voH- 
tional  processes,  46f.;  for  words, 
46,  153,  340- 

memory  span,  i4iff.,  146,  347. 

memory  types,  i79ff.,  313. 

method  of  aids,  229,  232. 

method  of  correct  associates,  i02f., 
i6sff.,  251,  37of. 

method  of  distractions,  218,  228. 

methods  of  investigating  memorial 
problems,  79f.,  95,  98,  i02f.,  106, 
108,   I4if.,   i49f.,   i55ff.,  232,  235, 

33<=>,  353,  365- 
methods  of  learning,  233. 
mixed  types,  180,  i93f.,  195,  205ff., 

2i3f.,  224,  227. 
mnemonic  devices,  i86f.,  215,  3iiff. 
modes  of  presentation,  142!!.,  147!?., 

151,   155,   i9if.,   226,   228f.,   269f., 

323ff.,   340. 
modern   concept   of   association,    15, 

27,  29.  _ 
modifiability  of  ideational  type,  227. 
motor  associations,  47. 
motor  imagery,   183,   189,   213,   265. 

(See  also  Internal  speech.  Verbal 

thinking,  and  Histrionic  type.) 
motor  memory,  47. 
motor   type,    i8iff.,    200,    203,    211, 

212,  218,  310. 
music,  206,  209,  212,  213. 
musical  endowment,   178,   190,    200, 

209. 

Natural    method    of    learning,    233, 

235,  237- 
nature    and    nurture    in    ideational 

endowment,  iqSff. 
nature  of  the  idea,  9!!. 

Objective  and  subjective  types,  i32f. 
observational  learning,  3,  49-138, 


392 


Index  of  Subjects 


organic    memory,    3. 
over-learning,  2()^i. 

Part-procedure,  233ff.,  335.  .343' 
passively  expectant  observation,  S5£f., 

SQff.,    72f. 

pathological  cases,  18,  48,  loi,  io3f., 
inf.,  131, 188,  209,  211,  223f.,  374. 

permanent  retention,  4off.,  105,  113!., 
115,195,317,330. 

perseveration,    235.,   251. 

persistence  of  ideas,  25. 

pertinacity  of  attention,  87,  90. 

practice,  s,  i7of.,  173,  227,  246,  247, 
250,    275,    284f.,    291,    347,    348, 

359.  376,  377- 

preparation  for  observation,  56,  672., 
71,  72f.,  132. 

presentation,  See  Modes  of  pre- 
sentation. 

procedure  in  ideation,  193. 

procedure  in  learning,  See  Part- 
procedure,  Whole-procedure,  Medi- 
ating procedures,  and  Stages  in 
learning. 

progress  of  forgetting.  See  Curve  of 
forgetting. 

prompting    method,  229,  232. 

psychical   dispositions,   5. 

psycho-dynamics,    374. 

psycho-pathology,  5,  180,  223,  {See 
also  Pathological   cases.) 

pure  types,  192,  1931.,  195,  205, 
207,  227. 

purpose,  See  Intention. 

Rapid    learners    and    slow    learners, 

i69£f.,  183,  250,  313,  345. 
rational  learning,   34,   35,  38!.,  137, 

I39ff.,    24if.,    249,    260,    290-313, 

334,358. 
recitation,  236,  273f. 
recognition,  317. 
recognition    method,     79,    82,     112, 

ii6f.,  322. 
reliability    of    memory,    94f.,    96f., 

98,  99,  102,  ii6f.,  121,   130,   133, 

326. 
repetitive  learning,  256. 
reproduction  method,  79. 
reproduction    tendencies,    i9£f.,    84. 
Ruckle,  214,  222. 
rhythm  in  learning,  165,  181,  263f., 

29^,  308.  376,  377- 


Saving  method,  166. 

scientific  endowment,  178,  190,  200. 

selective  function  of  attention,  5of., 

52,  64. 
sense-memory,  46,  79-86. 
sentence  structure,  299. 
sex  differences,  154,  200,  224f. 
similarity  and  dissimilarity,  95,  1092., 

114. 
simultaneous     and     successive     pre- 
sentation,  154,    i64f. 
slow    learners    and    rapid    learners, 

i69ff.,  183,  313,  345. 
specific  effect  of  attention,  44,  157, 

278. 
specific  effect  of  repetition,  44,  157, 

256,  278,  308,  310, 316. 
spontaneous    description,    106,    121, 

i23f.,  125. 
stability  of  association,  167. 
stability  of  ideational  type,  200,  225. 
stages  in  learning,  251,  296,  3i4f. 
stages  in  observation,  5iff.,  122. 
subjective  and  objective  types,  i32f. 
subjective  assurance,  99f. 
suggestive  questioning,  106,  136. 
superior  excellence  of  logical  memory, 

39f.,  143,  222,  29of. 
surrogate  imagery,  192,  193. 
symbolic  imagery,  i92f. 
synthetic    activity    of    memory,    9, 

3off.,  292. 

Teilmetkode,  See  Part-procedure, 
tempo   of    learning,    145,    172,    259, 

26lff.,     272f. 

temporal  factors  of  association,   16. 
temporary  retention,  4off.,  45. 
testimony,  35,  106-138,  202. 
training   in   observation,   68ff.,    73f., 

100,    102,    125,   I27ff.,   186. 

training  of  memory,  5f.,  loi,  i86,3Soff. 
training  of  type,  1833.,  i97f.,  225ff., 

336- 
transfer  of  memorial  training,  7, 3525. 
transformations  of  ideas,  10-12. 
Trejferfiiethode,  See  Method  of  paired 

associates, 
type,  and  mode  of  presentation,  226, 

228f. 

types  of  association,  201.     (See  also 

Mnemonic  t>T)e.) 
types  of  attention,  2793.,   295,  339, 

343- 


Index  of  Subjects 


393 


types  of  ideation,  169-186. 
types  of  learning,  144,  i65£f.,  1695., 
180,   236f.,   293ff.,   304,   306,   336, 

341- 
types  of  observation,  i32f. 
types  of  memory,  1692.,  i79ff.,  313. 

Unusual  cases  of  ideation,  188,  197, 
198,  210,  2Ilff.,  2I4ff. 

Variable  behavior  of  attention,  166. 
variability  of  type,  200,  226. 
varieties  of  attention,  4off . 
varieties  of  observation,  55ff.,  6of.,  102. 
verbal    ideation,     145,     180,     i88ff., 

196,  210,  213,  224. 
verbal  imagery,  189,  igof.,  205,  207, 

208,  212. 


verbal  thinking.  See  Verbal  ideation, 
view-points     of     observation,     52f., 

65f.,_ios,  i2if.,  123,  126,  134. 
visual  imagery,  96,  gS,  99,  183,  185, 

194,  195,  197,  203,  204,  207,  214, 

219,  224ff.,  230,  233. 
visual  type,  i8iff.,  191,   igsf.,   197, 

200,    203,    213,    2i9f.,    221,    229, 

269,  27if.,  310. 
vocalization,    i54f.,    161,    217,    218, 

226,    235,  _263ff.,    28s,    310,    373. 
vocal-motor  imagery,  191,  207,  210, 

223,   226. 
volitional  memory,  46f. 

Whole-procedure,  233£f.,  335,  3.13. 
will,    64f.,    66,    74f.,    115,    139,    283, 
287,  36iff. 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


ji^ 


